

HISTORY
OF THE
FRONTIER AREAS
BORDERING ON ASSAM

From 1883-1941

By

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Governor of Assam 1937-1942

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INTRODUCTION

These notes, which have been compiled in my spare time as Governor of Assam, from 1937 to 1942 are an attempt to bring that invaluable work of reference, Sir Alexander Mackenzie's "History of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the North-East Frontier of Bengal" up to date so far as it touches on the frontier districts of Assam, *i.e.*, taking them from south, by east, round to the north,

The Lushai Hills ;
Manipur State ;
The Naga Hills ;
Sadiya Frontier Tract ;
Balipara Frontier Tract.

Mackenzie's work was published by the Home Department Press, Calcutta in 1884 and his history of these areas stops short at that year or in some instances earlier.

The information contained in these notes has been almost entirely compiled from official sources except for occasional references to books such as Sir Henry Cotton's "Indian and Home Memories", Sir James Johnstone's "My Experiences in Manipur and the Naga Hills" or Mrs. Grimwood's "My three years in Manipur".

For the notes on Manipur, I am indebted for much good advice and information to Mr. J. C. Higgins, C.I.E., I.C.S., lately retired, who served for nearly 20 years in that State and to his successor Mr. C. Gimson, I.C.S., who has served for more than 10 years in the State.

For those on the Naga Hills, I have had the assistance as regards facts, policy and nomenclature first of Mr. J. P. Mills, C.I.E., I.C.S., Governor's Secretary throughout my term of office, who served for many years in that district and who, besides being an able administrator, has made himself an authority on Naga custom and folklore : and secondly, of Mr. C. R. Pawsey, M.C., I.C.S., the present Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills, of which area he has had 10 years' experience. So far as the history of the Lushai Hills is concerned, Major A. G. McCall, I.C.S., Superintendent of the Lushai Hills from 1932 to 1942, has checked the manuscript, supplied information from his own records and experience, and given most useful advice on the subject of the spelling of names.

For the Sadiya Frontier Tract, Mr. R. W. Godfrey, I.P., the present Political Officer, has checked my manuscript and given me useful criticism, while Captain G. S. Lightfoot, I.P., Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract, has performed a similar service so far as his district is concerned.

2. When Mackenzie's book was published the Naga Hills district (in a very embryo form) had only been formed a few years : the Lushai Hills district (at first organised in the form of two districts, North and South) was not to be constituted till 6 years later : while the two Frontier Tracts were not to come into existence until 1912, after the Abor Expedition. I have, however, for convenience, arranged these notes under the headings of their present-day districts.

3. As regards form, I have followed Mackenzie's example in introducing copious quotations from official documents. This has resulted in a certain amount of repetition, especially in the history of the Naga Hills, since so many important letters are of the "self-contained" variety and furnish a synopsis of past history as the background for present proposals. But perhaps this method gives a clearer picture of what was in the minds of those who were grappling with particular problems at the time than something more abbreviated. These notes too are meant mainly for reference and more for use of members of the Administration than the general public.

1. THE LUSHAI HILLS

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I. Introductory.—Mackenzie's references to the Lushai Hills stop at the year 1883, when disturbing reports had been received by the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, as to the intentions of the Lushais to raid under Khalgom (by modern appellation Kalkhama Sailo son of Suakpuilala)* and troops had been hurried up to strengthen the frontier.

At this time we did not attempt to administer the Lushai Hills, but the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, whose district bordered the Lushai Hills on the north and west, was charged with political relations with the Lushai Chiefs, and had a Political Assistant (at that time Rai Bahadur Hari Charan Sarma) to aid him in these duties. Not many years, however, were to elapse before the inevitable happened and these unsatisfactory political relations were done away with and the Lushais were brought fully under British administration. The history of the Lushai Hills for all except a comparatively small portion of the period with which these notes deal, therefore, ceases to be what Mackenzie's work was, a "History of the relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the North-East Frontier of Bengal" but the histories of an Assam and a Bengal District and then that of an Assam one only, albeit a non-regulation one.

II. The Expedition of 1888-1889.—The anticipation of serious trouble referred to in Mackenzie's concluding lines were not immediately fulfilled, but raids of varying degrees of seriousness continued in succeeding years, necessitating eventually the Expedition of 1888-89. On February 3rd, 1888 Lieutenant J. F. Stewart of the 1st Leinster Regiment, when in charge of a survey party, was attacked at a place only 18 miles from Rangamati, near the Saichul Range by men described at the time as "Shendus" (an Arracan appellation which does not really apply to any particular tribe), led by a chief named Housata [Haosata] and killed together with two British soldiers and one sepoy. Mr. Stewart apparently had not the smallest idea that any danger threatened and took no precautions whatsoever for the safety of himself or his party. A little later, on the 15th February, a raid was perpetrated on the village of Roazo Prekhyn Mro in the Chema Valley, in which 6 persons were killed, 2 wounded, and 23 prisoners taken. This also was attributed to Shendus.

The Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, Mr. D. R. Lyall, in a letter, dated the 4th March 1888†, urged in the strongest terms that an expedition should be sent in the ensuing cold weather to exact punishment from the "Shendus" or Pois in a thorough and unmistakable way, in retribution for the long series of outrages which they had committed over so many years. After recounting these outrages and pointing out our entire inaction ever since the expedition of 1872-73 he observed as follows:—

" 11. I think that a strong case for active reprisals has been made out.

*Spelling of names in Lushai is a matter of considerable difficulty. In Mackenzie's book, for instance, many of the names are quite beyond identification, even by well informed Lushais. I have therefore, wherever possible, added after a name when it first occurs, the modern spelling in square brackets.

1. Military Report—Chin-Lushai Country, 1893. Pages 36-37, 41-42.
2. Military Report—Assam 1908.

†Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, June 1891, Nos. 1-139. File L/20., 1889.

12. From the earliest days of our connection with these hills, the officers best able to give an opinion have said that until the Shendoos were dealt with there would be no cessation of raiding.

The operations of 1872-73 caused a lull, but when once they began again in 1882 with the attack on Lalseva [Lalchheuva] which was clearly a feeler in order to see whether any notice would be taken, they have followed up with a raid almost every year, culminating in the attack on Lieutenant Stewart and his guard at a place only 18 miles as the crow flies from Rangamati.

13. The feeling of insecurity caused by these raids is reacting most injuriously on our revenues. The Hill Tracts revenue consists chiefly of tolls on hill produce, and these have gone down from Rs.89,109 in Rs.1,882-83 to Rs.83,222 last year, and the amount collected will be even less this year. In fact Mr. Home does not expect it to exceed Rs.50,000.

Even in a financial point of view, an expedition ought, therefore, to go through the Shendoo country next year, but I urge the necessity on far higher grounds.

We are bound to protect the men living within our declared boundary, and not to avenge them would be a breach of faith. Lieutenant Stewart, too, was surveying ten miles from the boundary when attacked, and if these men be allowed to carry off from within our territory the heads of three white men with impunity, next year will doubtless be marked by even more savage raids. Mr. Murray says that every white man is held to be a Chief, and the recent raid is therefore the most successful they have ever made.

14. The report already submitted shows on what slight grounds a raid is committed. In the present case a quarrel between a savage and his wife on the banks of the Koladyne has caused the death of Lieutenant Stewart, two soldiers, and a sepoy within our territory, some 12 or 15 days' march distant, not to mention the affair in the Chaima Valley. Similarly, the death of a Chief may at any time cause a head-hunting expedition to come off; even the "chaff" of the village girls may send a body of young men off on the warpath for heads.

15. We are quite powerless in preventing such raids, and would be equally so if we had ten times our present force. In the kind of jungle which covers the hills a band of savages can always slip by unobserved, and the effect of our police guards is almost entirely moral. Their existence in fact serves to continue the remembrance of more severe lessons, such as the expedition of 1872-73, and they should also be able to cut off the retreat of raiders if we had a system of telegraphs, but the main safeguard against the recurrence of raids must always be the fear of punishment. A certain show of force is necessary to maintain this fear, but it would be most expensive and useless to maintain always on the frontier a force capable of punishing the most powerful tribes. The Shendoos think they are beyond our power to punish, and the more thoroughly we show them the baselessness of their belief, the more free shall we be from raids in the future.

It is for this reason that I advise three columns exploring their country from every side. I feel sure that if this be not done the hills on the side of Burmah will become a refuge for the dacoits and bad characters of Burmah, and will be a continual thorn in our side."

In their letter No.2576-P., dated the 3rd August 1888, the Government of Bengal fully endorsed Mr Lyall's proposals, remarking that "it is plain that, as a matter of general policy, it will be impossible to avoid the adoption of punitive measures sooner or later, and Mr. Edgar has shown conclusive reasons against postponing it".

The reference to Mr. (later Sir John) Edgar who was then Chief Secretary of Bengal, concerns a long * note which that officer had recorded on "Shendoo Raids on the Chittagong Hill Tracts" on 17th July 1888. This note gives a history and appreciation of the situation together with proposals for the future. The gist of it appears from the following extracts :

"The country is almost unexplored, and very little is known of it, except that it is a tract of most intricate hill ranges and impenetrable cane-brakes lying between Manipur and Cachar on the north, and the Arrakan Hill Tracts on the south, and between the Chindwin river on the east, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Hill Tipperah on the west. On the edges of this tract on all sides the hills are low, covered with dense forest and trackless jungle, the only paths being for the most part the beds of torrents. Further in the hills are much higher and more open, so that there would be less difficulty in exploring them. The villages of the inhabitants of the tract are, as a rule, situated on the higher hills. The people form a mingling of clans, speaking so far as I know, dialects of the same language, who are known to us by various names—Kookis, Lushais, Pois, Shendus, Chins, etc..... Almost every village has its own Chief, who generally, however, owes some sort of allegiance to the most powerful Chief of the group of villages to which he belongs, whom I may, for convenience sake, call the head of his clan. From time to time the Chief of some subordinate village gets power and throws off his allegiance to his former head, and founds a new clan for himself, which gets known sometimes by his name, sometimes by the name of the hill on which the Chief's village is situated, and sometimes by a variation of the original clan name. The people of these Chiefs change about from time to time, leaving a declining or feeble chief to settle under some one more able and energetic. Nothing does more to establish a Chief and bring him followers and influence than success in raids upon weaker Chiefs, upon the villages of Manipur, Hill Tipperah, and Upper Burma, or upon our villages and outposts and tea-gardens. The last are the most attractive of all, for there are more plunder and heads to be got there, with much less risk than elsewhere, especially now that our troops protect the villages of Upper Burma. In addition to the constant changes in the relative position of individual chiefs, a general movement would seem to take place from time to time amongst these people, apparently as if swarms were thrown off from the more crowded villages in the

* Assam Secretariat, Political and Judicial, A., Foreign Progs., August 1890, Nos. 1-46.

higher central hills, such swarms forming new communities all round the outer fringe of the tract, and in doing so driving before them the villages which had previously inhabited this fringe. The inhabitants of them are compelled, in consequence of the pressure, to take refuge in our territory or in Tipperah or Manipur, where they are often followed, themselves killed or taken captive and their villages plundered by the new-comers. This seems to have been the origin of what is called the great Kooki rising of 1849 and 1850, as it certainly was of the great series of raids in 1860-61.

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“But, apart from the danger to our tea-gardens, it is almost certain that, if no punishment is inflicted on account of the successful raids of the past year, the offending villages will be emboldened to make more extensive attacks on all parts of the frontier next year or the year after. It seems clear, therefore, that punitive measures are imperatively called for, and the only question is the form they should take.

Mr. Lyall has proposed that a column from Burma and a column from Demagiri should meet near what has until lately been supposed to be the most easterly branch of the Koladyne, but which is now known to be a confluent of the Myetta, and that a third column should effect a junction with these from the south.....but I gather the Chief Commissioner of Burma would not be likely to support such a project, and as it seems to me that the punishment of the perpetrators of the outrage on Lieutenant Stewart's party, and, if possible, of the Chima Valley raiders, is of paramount importance, I should therefore confine our present proposals to effecting these objects. In order to punish Housata and Jahoota [Zahuata] I should propose to despatch a small column from Demagiri, which should advance in the direction of the offending villages, possibly using the villages of Sayipuiya [Seipuia] and Vandula as a base, should these be found friendly and unmistakably to be trusted, and not attacking any of the other villages on the route unless active opposition from them were met with. On arriving at the hills occupied by Housata and Jahoota, the force should remain there until they had reduced the offending Chiefs and their people to submission, and inflicted on them such punishment as might be considered necessary. If possible, a portion of the force should be detached to march against the villages of the Tlang sai [this was the chief clan among the Lakhers] in order to punish the Chima Valley outrage, and to recover the prisoners then taken.

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.....Of one thing I am absolutely convinced. Any plan for dealing with these hillmen should be worked in concert by the Governments of Bengal, Assam and Burma. No mistake can be greater than for each of these Governments to deal separately with the villagers adjoining its own frontier without reference to those in the vicinity of the other two Governments, or in the centre of the tract, because the effect of this would be merely to divert attacks from one portion of the frontier to another, while doing nothing to remedy the real source of the evil which I take to be the belief of the inhabitants of the

higher central hills in the inaccessibility of their country and their safety from danger of punishment. It would be very easy to put an end to all this if the Governments of all surrounding country were to unite in a steady continuous attempt to open up this unknown tract, and to make its inhabitants feel that they were surrounded on all sides by a single government, with a single aim and a single method of working."

The Chief Commissioner of Assam in his letter No. 2574* dated the 7th September 1888 fully supported the Bengal proposal, but the Supreme Government in their letter No. 1889-E† of the 24th September 1888 intimated that they considered that their position in the Chindwin districts of Burma was not yet sufficiently consolidated to allow then of a "satisfactorily full and permanent development of the objects which a joint expedition from Chittagong and Burma might be expected to secure", and for this and other reasons they were not going to undertake an expedition. This decision evoked the strongest protest from Mr. Lyall who, writing on the 26th September 1888, said our inaction would be misunderstood by the trans-frontier tribes; we should have to expect fresh raids; the frontier police must be strengthened at once, a telegraph line between Demagiri and Rangamati being indispensable as well as from the latter place to Chittagong; while revenue would suffer owing to apprehension among the tribes within the frontier. The Lieutenant-Governor in his letter No. 140-PD., dated the 15th October† 1888, strongly supported all the Commissioner's proposals, adding that the local non-officials and planters and business men as well had represented the danger to which the frontier was exposed. As a result of these protests the frontier forces were strengthened and a detachment of the 9th Bengal Infantry left for Chittagong on the 8th November 1888, but the Government of India in their reply to Bengal on the 7th November said that they were unable to modify their previous orders about an expedition. The Government of Bengal again represented the matter in their letter No. 2726-P.†, dated the 10th December 1888, in which they reported a new development, *i.e.*, the possibility of the hitherto loyal Chief Sayipua being alienated owing to our inaction, a fact which "would not merely greatly increase the difficulties of any future expedition but would bring the dangers of attacks on our villages during the present season very much nearer". They were satisfied that a spirit of unrest prevailed on this border, and though they hesitated to reopen the question they felt it was their duty to state the facts, so that the Government of India could make up their minds before the season became too far advanced.

The question was, in fact, settled by the tribesmen themselves. On the 13th December 1888 occurred the raid on Pakuma Rani's village, within our territory and only 4 miles from Demagiri, when the Rani and 21 men were killed, 13 heads taken and 15 captives carried off. This raid introduced a new factor into the situation in that it was

* Assam Secretariat, Political and Judicial, A, Foreign Progs., Nos.1-16, August 1890.

† Bengal File No.L/20 of 1889.

committed by men from a direction hitherto not taken into consideration. (It was ascertained a year later that it had been carried out by the sons of the Lushai Chief Vuta, who inhabited country round about the places now known as Tachip and Phulpui. There was, therefore, every reason to view with some apprehension this new source of raiders, their country being 50 or 60 miles distant, as the crow flies, from the Rani's village.) In forwarding the information regarding this outrage in his letter No. 2734*, dated the 17th December 1888* and urging the necessity of punitive measures, the Lieutenant-Governor gave his views as to the general policy which should be adopted for the future in the following terms.

“4.....The policy which has been followed since 1872 owed its acceptance to the fact that the Lushai Hills formed a real frontier, having beyond them the territories of Upper Burma, and that the occupation of these hills would have brought us into immediate proximity to the tribes then imperfectly controlled by the Burmese Government. There were manifest objections to this, but since Upper Burma has been incorporated with our own territories, the political conditions affecting this tract of country have been changed. It is now surrounded on all sides by our settled districts, or by petty States under our immediate control. We cannot permit the continuance in our midst of groups of head-taking savages without responsible Chiefs, without organisation, and not amenable to political control, who yet from their geographical position are enable to commit outrages with practical impunity upon our territory on all sides of them; while we are put to great and constantly increasing expense to maintain lines of defence which prove ineffectual to protect our peaceful people.

5. The alternative policy which commends itself to the Lieutenant-Governor is to undertake the permanent pacification of the whole tract by means of roads run through it, and the substitution, for the present line of comparatively weak guards, of a central dominant post with an adequate military reserve, and such outposts as might be found necessary. The whole tract should be eventually brought under the control of a single officer stationed at the central post above mentioned. It is needless to point out that a similar policy has proved successful in many parts of India, as for instance, in the Garo, the Naga and the Cossyah Hills.....”

As regards immediate action, he did not, owing to the lateness of the season, advocate sending two expeditions into the Lushai country but advised that one only should be sent to the east to punish Houseata and his associates.

The Expedition of 1889.—The Government of India agreed that this fresh and atrocious outrage made it “necessary that active measures should be immediately undertaken” (their letter No.2424-E* dated the 19th December 1888), and stated their view of the purpose of the operations as follows. “4. The object of the expedition

* Bengal File No.1./20 of 1889.

is essentially to prevent raiding. The primary objective of the force will be Sayipua's village, and it will, as proposed by the Government of Bengal, proceed as far eastwards as may be possible with a view to operations against Howsata's and Jahuta's villages, if time and the season permit. Communications will be maintained by means of a road to be made from Demagiri as the force advances, and the Officer in Command will be instructed to select, if such can be found, a dominant central position suitable for the location of a sufficient force, and capable of being held throughout the coming rains and hot weather. A line of telegraph will also be immediately constructed between Chittagong and Rangamatti to Demagiri".

Demagiri was made the base and our troops commenced to penetrate into the country in January 1889. The operations were under the command of Colonel F. V. W. Tregear of the 9th Bengal Infantry with Mr. Lyall, the Commissioner, as Civil Political Officer and Messrs. C. A. S. Bedford and C. S. Murray as Assistant Political Officers. Captain J. Shakespear was employed as Intelligence Officer. About 1,150 men were engaged, including 200 men of the 2nd Madras Pioneers, 250 men of the 2nd Bengal Infantry, 400 men of the 2/2nd Gurkha Rifles, and the 250 men of the 9th Bengal Infantry, who were already in the country ; together with two mountain guns.

The course of the operations is described in Mr. Lyall's letter, No. 492-H.T., dated the 5th May 1889*. The 17th February 1889 saw matters sufficiently organised for a party consisting of 100 men with Mr. Murray and Captain Shakespear to visit Sayipua's village, who was now convinced that we meant business and gave his whole support to our demands. Murray then went on to Vandula's where he was well received, and heard news of Howsata's death. The advance on Howsata's village was commenced on the 14th March, starting from the fort which had been established at Lungleh. (Lungleh was described as "a hill 3,500 feet high in the neighbourhood of the village at present [1889] inhabited by Saipuya".) Jahuta's village was reached on the 19th March and Howsata's on the 20th. Howsata's grave was examined and underneath his body was found Lieutenant Stewart's gun, proving, as Mr. Lyall's report says, "that he had punished the right men." The village was destroyed, and so was Jahuta's.

On the 3rd April a durbar of Chiefs was held. It was attended by the 3 great Howlang [Haulawng] Chiefs, Saipuyia, Lal Thangbunga [Lalthangvunga], Lalunga, Vandula's son Sangliena [Sangliana] and Lalruma. These represented the whole of the southern Howlongs and they gave undertakings of loyalty. As Mr. Lyall observed in his report, this was excellent as far as it went, but the Shendoos, owing to the lateness of the season, could not, except for the burning of the deserted villages of Howsata and Jahuta, be fully dealt with. Be that as it may, by the 16th April substantial punishment had been exacted, Fort Lungleh had been established, a road constructed, and it was possible to withdraw, leaving a garrison of one British Officer and 212 men of the Frontier Police in occupation of Lungleh.

* Bengal File No.L/20 of 1889.

III. *The Chin-Lushai Expedition of 1889-90.*—The Lieutenant-Governor reviewed these results and considered what should be done in the ensuing season's operations in Chief Secretary Sir John Edgar's letter No. 19-PD*, dated the 3rd June 1889. His conclusion was "that the first object of the operations to be undertaken next year must be to reduce the Shendos to submission, to recover the remainder of the arms, and the heads taken when Lieutenant Stewart was killed, and also to release captives taken in 1883 from the village of the Lushai Chief Lalsiva..... This, however, should only be a subsidiary object. The main scheme of operation next season should be devoted to the release of the captives carried away in the raids on the village of Pakuma Rani and those in the Chengri Valley, and to the infliction of such punishment on the perpetrators of these atrocious outrages as may suffice to prevent the commission of similar raids in the future".

The reference to the Chengri Valley concerned the following incident. On the 8th January 1889 a party of about 600 men led by Lengpunga (or Lianphunga) and his brother Zarok [Zahrawka], sons of Sukpial [Suakpuilala] had descended on the valley which lay on the Chittagong Frontier and within 2 marches of Rangamati, burnt 24 villages, killed 101 persons and carried off 91 captives. Two contemporary letters give interesting details regarding the habits of the raiders. Writing on February 26th, 1890, Mr. L. R. Forbes, Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, says:—

"I beg to state that according to the lists furnished the number carried off amounts to 91, *viz.*, 76 in captivity and 15 ransomed or escaped. In addition to these there are those that were sacrificed on reaching the Chiefs' village and those said to have committed suicide. Besides these the Manager (Chakma and Mong Rajah's circles) states there may be more but owing to migration to Hill Tipperah he has not been able to get information. Lengphunga (Lianphunga) I see has given up 64 captives, if to these are added the 15. escaped and transferred there remains a very large number for sacrifice and suicide".

Writing on July 13th, 1889 to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, Mr. J. D. Anderson says:—

"2..... Lengpunga's own account of the Chengri Valley raid appears to be as follows:—While Zarok ruled a separate village, he laid claim to the land of the Chengri Valley people, and informed them that, inasmuch as they were not tributary either to the British Government, or to the Maharajah of Tipperah, he intended to assert his rights to their lands as an elephant-hunting ground. Shortly after this, some of the Chengri Valley Kukis hovered about Zarok's *jhum* cultivation and scared his women and children. Zarok took counsel with his brother, Lengpunga who (he candidly admits) advised him that it was his bounden duty to subjugate the Kukis, and for that purpose lent him some of his young men. Lengpunga admits that eight souls, seven women and a boy were released two months ago, being ransomed by a

* Bengal File No. L/20 of 1889.

“jemadar from Chittagong”. He says this person paid down Rs.185 in cash, and promised to pay Rs.515 subsequently ; the latter sum to be treated as a loan from Lengpunga to him at a rate of 10 per cent. per mensem. He (Lengpunga) has received no money subsequently and says that, if more money be not forthcoming in two months’ time, he will raid again. At least such is the report of my informant, who seems to have been much impressed by the Chief’s truculent demeanour. Our messengers were allowed free access to the captives who gave them a full account of how they were captured and carried off. They as well as their captors are suffering considerably from scarcity of food—they more than the Lushais, however, inasmuch as they are not accustomed to Lushai messes of jungle leaves, etc. In other respects they appear to be treated fairly well. They give a deplorable account of the journey to Lengpunga’s village after they were taken captives. The babies of nursing women (who could not carry other loads than their children) were taken from them, and butchered before their eyes. When they got to Lengpunga’s pungi, seven of them were sacrificed in the presence of the rest, and then (repeating the action) ‘we put our hands to our eyes lest we should see any more’. So their words are reported to me.

3. Lengpunga sturdily refused to let any captives go. The Deputy Commissioner of Cachar was ‘his father’, and so forth, but the Chengri Valley affair had cost him Rs.3,300, and if that sum were not paid, he was not going to let his victims go. These, according to his own account, are 55 in number, but the Kukis themselves say that they know of 70 still surviving, and think there may be more in confinement of whom they know nothing.”

Sir Steuart Bayley advised as follows regarding the conduct of the expedition.

“.....While, as before urged, steps should be taken at the outset to reduce the Shendoos to submission, our main advance should not be towards their villages but should be directed northward along the hills overhanging the Dallesari [known now-a-days as the Dhaleswari or Tlang], until some commanding point could be occupied from which the villages implicated in the Chengri Valley outrage could be effectually visited and punished. When the people inhabiting the villages on both sides of the Dallesari, and as far as the Sunai, have been reduced to complete submission, an advance should be made to the east, and the villages belonging to the sons of Bhuta [Vuta] should be dealt with in the same thorough-going manner as has proved so effectual this year in the case of the Kamhows and other tribes of the Burmese frontier.....No attempt should be made without more complete knowledge of the country than we have at present, to lay out the permanent road which will eventually have to be made between some point in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and some point on the frontier of Burma ; and the Lieutenant-Governor, as at present advised, is very doubtful whether the direction of such a road would coincide with the line of advance which must be adopted by us next season ; but it is probably that hereafter the first portion of the road from Lungleh towards the villages of Lengpunga and Zarock could be

extended to Cachar, and so form means of communication between that district and the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which would in any case be a necessary portion of the scheme for the permanent pacification of the Lushai tribes advocated in my letter above quoted."

The Government of India decided on the 11th September 1889* that operations should take place. The general plan was that a Chittagong Column should move *via* Lungleh to Haka, meeting a Burma Column coming from Gangaw *via* Yokwa, a column from the former force to go north to punish the raiders on the Chengri Valley and Pakuma Rani. This was the expedition known as the Chin-Lushai Expedition of 1889-90. It was on a bigger scale than that of 1888-89 and Bengal, Burma and Assam all took part. The "Scheme* of Operations" drawn up by the Quarter Master General which was approved by the Government of India stated the object of the expedition thus "The object of the expedition will be, firstly, to punitively visit certain tribes that have raided and committed depredations in British territory, and have declined to make amends or to come to terms; secondly to subjugate tribes as yet neutral, but now, by force of circumstances brought within the sphere of British dominion; thirdly, to explore and open out as much as can be done in the time, the, as yet only partly known, country between Burma and Chattagong; and, lastly, if the necessity arises, to establish semi-permanent posts in the regions visited so as to ensure complete pacification and recognition of British power".

The Chittagong Column, based on Demagiri was again under the command of Colonel Tregear and the 3,400 men engaged included the 3rd Bengal Infantry, 2/2nd Gurkha Rifles, the 28th Bombay Infantry (Pioneers), and detachments of the 2/4th Gurkha Rifles, the 9th Bengal Infantry, the Bengal Sappers and Miners and the Chittagong Frontier Police. Captain J. Shakespear was again attached as Field Intelligence Officer. From this force a column about 800 strong, referred to as the "Northern Column" in the correspondence of the period, under Colonel G. J. Skinner of the 3rd Bengal Infantry, accompanied by Mr. C. S. Murray as Political Officer, was detached to the north-west principally in order to punish the raiders on the Chengri Valley and on Pakuma Rani's village.

Simultaneously with these movements in the south, a force composed of 400 men of the Surma Valley Battalion of Military Police under their Commandant, Mr. W. W. Daly, a police officer, was organised from Cachar with orders to recover the captives taken in, and punish Liengpunga for, the raid on the Chengri Valley; to punish Vutais' [Vuttaia] sons for the raid on Pakuma Rani's villages; and to establish a permanent post in the vicinity of Liengpunga's village. The organisation of this force was undertaken in close consultation between Bengal and Assam, and Mr. Daly's instructions were agreed upon at a conference* held at the Lieutenant-Governor's residence at

* Bengal Sectt., Pol., A, June 1891, Nos.1-27.

File L/43 of 1889.

* Assam Secretariat, Political and Judicial, A, Military Proceedings, August 1890, Nos.68-152.

Belvedere in Calcutta on 15th January 1890 at which the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief Commissioner of Assam and Sir John Edgar, Chief Secretary of Bengal were present. They were as follows :—

“(1) Establish a stockaded godown, with sufficient guard, at Changsil or any other place Daly considers preferable in the direction of Lengpunga’s village.

(2) Collect all the information he can, and prospect for the road towards Lengpunga.

(3) As soon as he can, open up communications with the Northern Column, and, when communications are opened, place himself under the Officer Commanding the Column.

(4) Meanwhile, when everything is made perfectly secure, Daly is not precluded from advancing against Lengpunga, with the special object of punishing Lengpunga as completely and severely as his means permit, unless Lengpunga surrenders himself unconditionally, and gives up all captives.

(5) There is no objection to Daly’s receiving friendly overtures from other villages which did not take part in the recent raids”

Mr. Daly was accompanied by 3 British Officers, Messrs. J. R. Carnac, and L. St. J. Brodrick of the Assam Police, and Mr. S. N. Walker of the Bengal Police, with Dr. Partridge and subsequently Surgeon Coleman of the 43rd Gurkha Rifles, as Medical Officers. Mr. Daly left his base camp at Jhalnacheria in Cachar on the 18th January 1890, reached Changsil on the 24th January and joined hands with Colonel Skinner’s column on the 11th February at Aijal. On the 30th January, 58 of Lengpunga’s captives were brought in to Changsil, to be followed by 5 more on the next day, while the last remaining captive, a young girl of about 8 years old, was brought in a good deal later on 9th February. “Thus” (to quote the Chief Commissioner’s letter No.2876-J.,* dated the 19th July 1890, to the Government of India) “the recovery of the Chengri Valley captives, one of the most important objects of the expedition, was completely and expeditiously attained without bloodshed.” On February 4th, Mr. Daly reached the Aijal range and built a stockade on a site which he describes as “a good one for a permanent post”, and which eventually became the site of the headquarters of the Lushai Hills District. On the 8th he advanced on Lengpunga’s village some 16 miles south of Aijal, not far distant from the present-day village of Tachhip. Here he had an interview with the Chief but did not place him under arrest. Three days later Colonel Skinner’s Northern Column arrived, and Mr. Daly thenceforth came under his orders. Lengpunga then fled and it was some time before he came again in contact with our officers. The failure to apprehend Lengpunga led to a good deal of correspondence. Daly’s† explanation was that the man had come into his camp only after persuasion by the Political Jamadar, Shib Charan, and on a

*Assam Secretariat, Political and Judicial, A, Military Proceedings, October 1890, Nos.4-10.

†Assam Secretariat, Political and Judicial, A, Military Proceedings, August 1890 Nos.68-152.

solemn promise that he would not be detained. Daly, therefore, was unwilling to break faith with him by seizing him. He got him to promise, however, on condition his life was spared, to give himself up when Colonel Skinner's Column arrived. But the man, alarmed at learning of the approach of the Column, would not come in. Daly then made arrangements to try and capture him. But Colonel Skinner's Column arrived earlier than expected, and Lengpunga took to flight. The Chief Commissioner, however, and the Government of Bengal were both sufficiently satisfied that Daly acted rightly.

There was no opposition worthy of the name throughout these operations which were completed in March 1890, and, apart from the rescue of the Chengri Valley captives, the main work achieved was to establish posts and organise communications. The Assam Column established posts at Aijal (on the range on which Lengpunga's village lay) and Changsil, while in the south, Fort Tregear, east of Lungleh on the Darjow [Darzo] Range, was established and Fort Lungleh was improved.

In reviewing the results of the expedition, the Adjutant-General in his report No.4179-A.,* dated the 16th July 1890, said—

“3. [The objects of the expedition] have been attained by the expedition in a most complete manner, and his Excellency cannot too highly bring to the notice of the Government of India the excellent conduct of all concerned, in having so cheerfully borne the hardships and overcome the difficulties which had to be encountered—difficulties which were considerably enhanced by the physical conditions of the country and the severe sickness which attacked the force, and which crippled the Burma columns to almost a dangerous extent.

4. In such adverse circumstances, the results which have attended the operations of the expedition must be regarded as eminently satisfactory ; for not only has communication between Bengal and Burma been established, and the tribes which had previously given annoyance fittingly dealt with, but all the principal tribes inhabiting the country have been brought under subjugation, a large number of captives who had been in the hands of these tribes restored to their own homes,—and military posts at certain places for the preservation of order, and as evidence of British supremacy, established”.

The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal in his letter No.39-P.R.T.,† dated the 19th August 1890, agreed with this view so far as the punishment of Howsata, Paona and Jahuta was concerned, and said that there was not much “left to be done in the way of punishment in connexion with the tribes under Liengpunga and the sons of Vutai who were responsible for the raids on the Pakuma Rani's village and on the Chengri Valley”. He was still of opinion, however, that a further expedition in the ensuing cold weather was required against the tribes occupying the loop of the Koladyne, to whom had been traced responsibility for the raid on the Chima Valley (of the 15th February 1888). This, as it turned out, did not become necessary as the 5 village concerned themselves surrendered.

* Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, June 1891, Nos.1-34, File 1L/50 of 1890.

† Bengal File No. 1L-50 of 1890.

A reference to the future administration of these hills is made in paragraph 3 of the same letter in the following terms.

“3 The suggestion, however, for separating the Bengal portion of this territory entirely from the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and transferring to it the frontier police of the latter district (which would thereafter be manned only by civil police), and for placing the new district under a separate political agency controlled by the Commissioner of Chittagong, is one which commends itself to the Lieutenant-Governor. It has already been carried out to some extent, and when certain financial and legal details have been worked out, the Lieutenant-Governor will address the Government of India with a view to give full effect to the proposal”

On the administrative side these operations led to the creation of the 2 districts of the North Lushai Hills and South Lushai Hills, with headquarters at Aijal and Lungleh respectively. The North Lushai Hills became part of the Chief Commissionership of Assam, while the southern district was attached to Bengal.

IV The North Lushai Hills District.—The future of this area was the subject of discussion before the conclusion of the Chin-Lushai operations, and in February 1890* the Chief Commissioner of Assam, Mr. J. W. Quinton, caused inquiries to be made from Mr. Daly, who was then in Aijal, as to details of the garrison necessary and so on, as he had reason to believe that “a proposal will be made to him to take over in some form or other, the administration of the North Lushai country”. The final proposals for the control of the Northern portion of the Lushai Hills are contained in Mr. Quinton’s letter† No. 1230-P., dated the 15th May 1890. One important point, that of the method of exercising control, is dealt with as follows.

“.....Mr. Quinton was, satisfied that the mere occupation by a police force of certain points in the tract referred to would not in itself be sufficient to bring under our influence the chiefs with whom we have been so lately in collision, and that, if this object was to be adequately attained, it was essential that an officer, possessing both experience and judgment, should be at the same time appointed to feel his way among the people, and gradually accustom them to our control. It is quite impossible to employ the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar for this propose. It is true that our intercourse with the Lushais has hitherto been conducted under the control of that officer, but such intercourse has been only very slight, and our dealings with the Lushais have been few and infrequent. This state of things has, however, been completely altered by the late expedition, and the Deputy Commissioner could not, consistently with the due performance of his other duties, spare the time required for the closer control and more constant communication, from which alone the extension of our influence over the tribes concerned can be looked for. Accordingly, the Chief Commissioner has deputed a separate officer, and has

* Assam Secretariat, Military, B, Progs. August 1890, Nos. 106-114.

† Assam Secretariat, Political and Judicial, A, Foreign Progs. August 1890, Nos. 47-77.

selected for this purpose Captain H. R. Browne, Officiating Assistant Commissioner of the First Grade, and subject to the confirmation of the Government of India, has appointed him Political Officer in the Northern Lushai country.....”.

The Chief Commissioner's proposals were accepted by the Government of India in their letter No. 1391*, dated the 3rd July 1890 of which the following is an extract:—

“..... the measures you recommend contemplate—

- (1) The employment of 300 men of the Frontier Police to hold the tract of country, which will henceforth be under your control.
- (2) The appointment of a Political Officer to conduct our relations with the tribes. The officer selected for this duty is Captain H. R. Browne, and it is proposed to grant him a salary of Rs. 1,000 a month, leaving his vacancy in the Assam Commission unfilled for the present.
- (3) The appointment of an Assistant Commandant of the Surma Valley Police Battalion. A young military officer will be selected for this post, and receive a staff allowance of Rs. 200 a month in addition to the military pay of his rank.
- (4) The appointment of an European medical officer with the pay attached to a first-class civil station.
- (5) The organisation of a coolie corps of 100 men, who will receive Rs. 10 a month with free rations, and the maintenance of a small reserve of boat carriage between Jhalnacheria and Changsil.

* * * * *

4. It is observed from the second paragraph of your letter under reply, that you concur in the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal that it would be premature at present to fix any geographical boundary between Bengal and Assam. The control of the villages of the descendants of Lalul will, however, come under your jurisdiction. I am to say that the Government of India agree to this arrangement as a temporary measure, until fuller information of the country in question shall have been obtained. As regards the boundary between Assam and Burma, I am to forward a copy of a telegram* from the Chief Commissioner of Burma,

*No. 367, dated the 7th June 1890. and to state that the Government of India concurs in the views as therein set forth. The Tashons will accordingly remain under the control of the authorities in Burmah for the present”

Curiously enough, it was not until the 6th September 1895 that the *de facto* position as regards the administration of the North Lushai Hills districts, which had persisted since 1890 apparently without formal legal sanction, was regularised by a proclamation, No. 1698-E., made by the Governor-General in Council.

Captain Browne, who had lately been Personal Assistant to the Chief Commissioner, arrived at Aijal in May 1890 in the appointment of Political Officer. His instructions were contained in the Chief Commissioner's letter No. 1468-P.,* dated the 22nd April 1890, and ran as follows:—

“I am directed by the Chief Commissioner to communicate, for your information and guidance, the following instructions.....

1. Your headquarters will be at Fort Aijal but you should keep moving about among the chiefs with the object of establishing political influence and control over them, and inducing them to submit themselves gradually to our rule. As far as your means will allow, you should further endeavour to put down open raidings to protect our friends, and to punish those who injure them. You will otherwise not be strict to mark what is amiss or attempt to introduce a criminal administration, which, under existing circumstances, you are not in a position to enforce. You will leave the inhabitants, as far as possible, to settle their own affairs among themselves. For the present, you should consider as coming within the scope of your influence the tribes inhabiting the tract lying between the Cachar Frontier on the north, Hill Tipperah on the west, the Manipur river on the east, and on the south an imaginary line drawn east and west through the Darlung Peak. It is desirable that you should, if possible, open communications with the officers who will represent the Bengal and Burma Governments at Fort Lungleh, Fort Tregear, Haka and Fort White. You should also take every opportunity of procuring information regarding the numerical strength of the several tribes with whom you may come into contact from time to time, and regarding such matters as their tribal customs and organisation, particulars of which may be of considerable use hereafter.

2. After your arrival at Fort Aijal, you will take up and enquire fully into the question of the complicity of Lengpunga in the Chengri Valley raid, and submit a full report on the subject to the Chief Commissioner, containing any recommendations you consider fitting as to Lengpunga's punishment.

3. If, as the Chief Commissioner understands from Mr. Daly to be the case, some of the Chiefs are willing or anxious to pay revenue or tribute, you will receive it in money or kind as tendered, subject to the orders of the Chief Commissioner, and you will endeavour to induce others to follow their example; but no attempt should be made at present to exact revenue or tribute from tribes unwilling to pay it. You should report fully in due course what you find the position to be in regard to the willingness or otherwise of the tribes to pay revenue or tribute; and, pending the final orders of the Chief

*Assam Secretariat, Foreign A, Proceedings, June 1891, Nos. 5-9.

Commissioner, you should be careful not to accept, in return for the payment of revenue or tribute, any obligations of a nature which might render their future fulfilment a matter of difficulty.

4. You should re-open the bazar at Changsil if, as the Chief Commissioner understands to be the case, the Lushais are anxious for its re-establishment, and, so far as is practicable during the rainy season, you should examine the country between Changsil and our frontier, with a view to advise upon the alignment of the road which must ultimately be made to connect Cachar with Lushai-land.

5. You will exercise the powers of a Deputy Commissioner over the police quartered within the tract described in paragraph 1 as coming within the scope of your influence.

6. You will correspond directly with the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, to whom you will submit weekly diaries. Any important matters, or any matters which may appear to you to require orders, should be reported separately for the consideration of the Chief Commissioner".

A subsequent letter of the same date informed him that the Political establishment hitherto attached to the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, would be transferred to his office.

The Western Lushai Chiefs were restive and were determined neither to pay revenue nor to supply labour, and objected to the punishment of Lengpunga, which, as Captain Browne announced in a Durbar of Chiefs held on 14th June 1890, was to be deposition for 4 years. (This Durbar was held on the mound on which Aijal Jail now stands.) Their dissatisfaction culminated on 9th September 1890 in the ambushing of Captain Browne on his way down from Aijal to Changsil, at a point only 2 miles from Changsil. Apparently he had taken no special precautions against attack, being accompanied by a small party of only 4 police sepoy. Three of his men were killed and Captain Browne himself succumbed to loss of blood from three severe wounds in the arm fifteen minutes after reaching the Changsil stockade. An attack was made on the same day on another party consisting of sepoy and coolies between Aijal and Sairang and 11 of them killed. This outbreak was evidently quite unexpected by the local officers and it is possible that the immediate cause of its sudden occurrence may be found in the opinion expressed by Sir Frederick Roberts, then Commander-in-Chief in India, that the assaults on Changsil and Fort Aijal were the result of a "great drink on the part of the tribes and to the fact, stated in one of the late Captain Browne's diaries, that the neighbouring Lushais had been considerably excited at the prospect of some revenue being demanded from them". Aijal and Changsil were immediately besieged by the Lushais, the former being commanded by Surgeon H. B. Melville, I.M.S., and the latter by Lieutenant H.W.G. Cole [Later Sir Harry Cole]

(1) Assam Secretariat, Political and Judicial, A, Foreign Progs. October 1890, Nos. 1-135

(2) Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, August 1891, Nos. 30-38.

(3) Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, May 1892, Nos. 3-110.

Commandant of the Surma Valley Military Police Battalion, who had with him 170 Military Police. A Relief Force of 200 men of the Surma Valley Military Police was sent up from Silchar at once with Lieutenant A. C. Tytler, Assistant Commandant, in command and accompanied also by Lieutenant R. R. Swinton of the 44th Bengal Infantry, Mr. A. W. Shuttleworth, Assistant Superintendent of Police, and Dr. Whitchurch, I.M.S. Swinton was unfortunately killed on the 26th September in a fight which took place as the force was making their way up the Dhaleswari river towards Changsil. On the 28th Changsil was relieved. In referring to the defence of Changsil on this occasion, Mr. Quinton, Chief Commissioner of Assam, observed that—"Lieutenant Cole on this sudden emergency exhibited great coolness and sound judgment to which it is probably mainly owing that the garrison was not surprised and cut off". On the 2nd October Cole and Tytler started to the relief of Aijal accompanied by a force under the command of Lieutenant Watson of the 40th Bengal Infantry. They reached that place on the 4th October and brought Dr. Melville's arduous labours to an end. Dr. Melville was deservedly commended by the Chief Commissioner for the way in which he defended the place in the following terms—(Chief Commissioner's letter No.4346-P.,* dated 20th October 1890) "The Chief Commissioner would bring to the special notice of the Government of India the excellent services rendered by that young medical officer in circumstances so novel and foreign to the sphere of his proper duties." He had been invested since the 9th September and his small garrison of 110 native officers and men and 43 others had suffered great hardships from wet and cold, constant duty, shortage of food and want of warm clothing. It was stated in Melville's diary that 5 out of every 6 men had no warm clothing at all.

Meanwhile, Mr. R. B. McCabe, I.C.S., had been transferred from the post of Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, to be Political Officer in succession to Captain Browne. He lost no time in setting out and with Captain Williamson of the Commissariat, he arrived at Changsil on 5th October where he found Mr. A. W. Shuttleworth in command.

The operations undertaken to subdue the country were rapid and successful. By the end of the year all offending villages had been destroyed; the Lushais had suffered some 50 casualties; fines in guns had been realised and great losses in property had been inflicted. The opposition encountered was in fact not very serious and our casualties were nil. In the last days of November and first days of December, Lenkhunga [Liankung], Lalrhima [Lalhrima], Sailenpui [Sailianpuia], Thangula [Thanghula], Lienpunga, and Khalkam had all surrendered. It was Lenkhunga's men who were responsible for the death of both Captain Browne and Mr. Swinton, but Lalrhima was also implicated and it was he who eventually surrendered much of Captain Browne's personal property. The action which resulted in the taking of

*Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, May 1892, Nos.3-110.

Khalkam's village was well-planned and was carried out by a combined movement of forces from the direction of both Aijal and Changsil. Khalkam fled but 5 days later gave himself up to McCabe's "inexpressible delight", as he put it in his letter of the 23rd November 1890*

McCabe's appreciation of these events is contained in his letter No.13 dated the 19th January 1891*, of which the following is a quotation :—

"As far as I have been able to ascertain, the Western Lushais under the headship of Sukpilal, formed decidedly the most powerful combination of villages in these hills. After his death, about 1880-81, the chieftainship devolved on Khalkam, who has, from that date, virtually assumed control of this section of the Lushais, and has been more than able to hold his own against aggressive action on the part of the tribes east of the Sonai. I have noted with astonishment the blind submission rendered to these Lushai Rajas by their dependents, combining a feeling of almost filial affection with one of fear, and considered that this is a factor that cannot be ignored in any future arrangements that may be made for the administration of these hills. It may, therefore, be safely argued that in punishing the chiefs we punish the prime movers and instigators of the late raid, and at the same time impress on the Lushais generally that they will have to seek a different source from which to derive their initiative in any of their future undertakings.

As long as Sukpilal was alive, we had only one unit to deal with, now we have his many descendants, who may be classified as follows in order of merit as regards the extent of their influence :—

1. Khalkam [Kalkhama].
2. Lengpunga [Lianphunga].
3. Sailenpui [Sailianpuia].
4. Thanruma.
5. Lenkhunga.
6. Rankupa [Hrangkhupa].
7. Lalrhima.
8. Thangula [Thanghula].
9. Latsavuta.
10. Thalien.
11. Lalluia [Lalluaia].
12. Minthang [Hmingthanga].
13. Lenkhai [Liankhama].
14. Thompong [Thawmpawnga].
15. Tolera.

Of these, Lenkhunga, Rankupa, Lalrhima, Lalsavuta and Lalluia are mere boys, while Tolera, Minthang, Thompong, Thalien and Lenkhai are dependents of Sukpial's family, so that we have only to deal with Khalkam, Lenkhunga [*Sic*: this should be Lengpunga], Sailenpui, Thanruma, and Thangula as responsible agents. Thanruma is still at large, and his village is completely dispersed, and I do not anticipate that he will give us any trouble in the future.

As regards Sailenpui, I have no evidence against him sufficient to warrant his deportation, and from his previous history I am inclined to think that he is well disposed towards the British Government. The reports of the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar from 1880 up to date speak most favourably of him, and described him as influential, popular, and endowed with an aptitude for ruling. I had no occasion to attack his village, as he made a voluntary surrender, and he has given me great assistance with coolie labour, and proved that he could command, even under adverse circumstances, immediate and implicit obedience to his orders.

In the interest of the future effective administration of these hills, it is necessary to utilize existing powers, and, pending your sanction, I have, as a temporary measure, and without making any conditions or promises whatsoever, released Sailenpui, and told him that I will hold him responsible for the actions of the villages under his control.

This may appear at first sight a mild condoning of the late Lushai rising, but I think that, looking forward to the Government of the country with a minimised expense, the measure will meet with the approval of the Government of India. I have had an opportunity of seeing Sailenpui daily, of noting his personal influence, and have read carefully all his previous history. On these facts I have based my present plans, and consider that unless some responsible chief be released, I shall have to deal with scattered units, and for some years to come Government will find no one on whom responsibility can be thrown.

Khalkam was the leading spirit in the recent rising, and I consider that his deportation will have a good effect on the Lushai chiefs generally. Lengpunga has a bad record and the punishment inflicted on him last year does not seem to have proved an effective deterrent. He openly disregarded the orders of Government, rebuilt his villages, and threatened Lenkhai mantri, who had made himself popular with the Political Officer. During the present outbreak he has undoubtedly been one of our most subtle, though not prominent, opponents, and his presence in these hills would always prove a source of danger to us. Thangula Raja is Khalkam's step-brother and his right-hand man in the attacks on Aijal and Changsil. After careful deliberation, I have come to the conclusion that the deportation of Khalkam, Lengpunga, and Thangula will prove of salutary effect, and facilitate the administration of the Lushai Tribes."

The Chief Commissioner fully endorsed Mr. McCabe's advice in his letter No.753-P.,* dated the 7th March, 1891, to the Government of India in the following words.

"..... The Chief Commissioner..... accepts fully Mr. McCabe's finding as to the guilt of the three chiefs whom he proposes to punish, viz., Khalkam, Lengpunga, and Thangula, and concurs in the course which the Political Officer has adopted, of leaving Sailenpui and the other chief descendants of Sukpilal (except Thanruma) at large, and working through the former for the control and pacification of the country.

2. Khalkam, Lengpunga and Thangula have been deported, and are now awaiting the final orders of the Government of India, in the Tezpur Jail, in accordance with warrants of commitment under Regulation III of 1818 forwarded by you, and Thanruma, who lived close to Aijal and whose conduct was marked by special treachery towards Captain Browne, has fled. If arrested, he should be dealt with in the same way as the others. The Political Officer recommends that the three chiefs now in custody should be deported for a term limited to a defined number of years, and adds that he "thinks it advisable that the future good behaviour of the villages under the Rajas' control be made a condition on which the term of banishment should be based, as it is decidedly unwise to kill hope and let loose a number of outlaws in the district." Mr. Quinton considers that the security of the British dominions, whether from foreign hostility or internal commotion, calls for the confinement of these men as State prisoners. They have all three taken prominent parts in the late rising.

3. Lengpunga was only three years ago the leader in a raid upon British subjects, which necessitated the despatch of a military expedition to inflict punishment on the guilty parties and give security to British districts, and all three were present at the Darbar at Fort Aijal on the 14th of June, and swore friendship with Captain Browne, promising to obey his orders and three months afterwards secretly rose in rebellion, killed Captain Browne and peaceful traders and coolies, and endeavoured to cut off our garrisons at Fort Aijal and Changsil. They are men of turbulent character and of great influence amongst their countrymen, and their past career shows that such influence is not likely to be used for any good purpose. Khalkam, by their own admissions, was the head of the confederacy, and Thangula was his step-brother and right-hand man. The Chief Commissioner doubts whether Regulation III of 1818 authorises a sentence of imprisonment for a definite term on any person confined under its provisions, but he has no doubt that a long term must elapse before these three chiefs can safely be allowed to return to Lushai-land, and have the opportunity of exciting to violence against their peaceful neighbours the restless tribes whom we are now endeavouring to bring under control. Mr. Quinton would suggest that the place of their deportation be changed from this Province, where they are in dangerous proximity to

*Assam Secretariat Foreign, A, May 1892, Nos.3-110,

their own country, to the Andaman Islands, or some other place in British India where they may be under no temptation to escape from custody, and may gradually acquire habits of peacefulness and industry."

The Government of India concurred and Khalkam, Lengpunga and Thangula were accordingly ordered to be detained for ten years under Regulation III of 1818. The two former Chiefs hanged themselves in Hazaribagh Jail in the following September, an incident which caused little or no interest among their late subjects. The result of Mr. McCabe's expedition is described in the Report for the year 1891-92 as "The complete pacification of the North Lushai villages, west of the Sonai river."

These operations against the western Chiefs were followed by the erection of a stockade at Sonai Bazar and a "promenade" in the Eastern Lushai country, *i.e.*, on the east of the Sonai river. The purpose of this was not punitive, but rather exploratory so as to make the acquaintance of the Chiefs and to locate the sites of the different villages; and also to inform the tribes that they were now under the control of the British Government and that they would have to pay revenue. This "promenade" lasted from the 24th January up to the 5th March 1891 and McCabe took with him a force of 400 men of the 43rd Gurkha Light Infantry under Colonel Evans, (the same officer, no doubt, who presided over the Military Court of Inquiry set up in Manipur after the disastrous events of March 1891) and 20 Military Police. McCabe expressed himself, at any rate then, as entirely satisfied with the results, though he was careful to observe that it was "too early to prognosticate what absolute effect this promenade on the Eastern Lushais would have or whether house-tax would be paid without demur after next harvest." Be that as it may, he could show that he had increased our topographical knowledge of the hills; he had obtained local information about the country and the people; he had entered into relations with the Chiefs, who had agreed to pay house-tax and supply rice and labour; and he had shown that a force could march from village to village and rely upon obtaining Lushai coolies and supplies, the latter an important point.

In 1892 occurred the Eastern Lushai rising, the suppression which necessitated an expedition on a considerable scale. Mr. McCabe was Political Officer of the North Lushai Hills at the time and his Report written some 6 weeks after the expedition had completed its work, and dated the 23rd July 1892*, contains some valuable historical information. He points out that from 1872 to 1892 the Eastern Lushais gave no trouble. He says that the rising appears to have been mainly due to the determination of one of the Chiefs, Lalbura, not to submit to the payment of house-tax or the supply of coolies and rice. The tax was easily realised from nearly all the other villages which McCabe visited, but there were one or two important ones, notably, besides Lalbura's, those of Poiboi [Pawibawia], and Bungteva [Buangtheuva] which showed signs of recalcitrance. Matters came to a head

* Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, December 1892, Nos. 14-141.

in February 1892, when McCabe ordered Lalbura to supply 100 coolies. Lalbura refused and McCabe decided to visit the village. Towards the end of February he started for Lalbura and at his first stage on the journey he found Lalbura's men engaged in burning his camp at the Sonai. He reached Lalbura on the 29th February. Mr. McCabe had an unpleasant experience here. Some 300 Lushais were seen advancing towards the village. Mr. McCabe ordered Lieutenant Tytler to fire a volley which held up the enemy temporarily. But before satisfactory dispositions could be taken up to guard against attacks from every quarter the Lushais started to fire the houses. Mr. McCabe's party, however, managed to get much of their baggage out, and this was placed in a heap in the open centre of the village. The coolies were told to lie down and take shelter from the bullets behind this. So great was the heat that the brass plates of the sepoy, who lay near the west face of the stockade, became twisted into fantastic shapes. Severe fighting followed, but McCabe established himself in the village without real difficulty, though Poiboi, Bungteya and Langkham [Liankhama] joined in and aided Lalbura in the repeated attacks which were delivered on McCabe's position between 1st March and 10th April. During this period, on the 4th of April, a party of Lushais from Maite, Poiboi and Lalbura raided Boruncherra Tea Estate in the Hailakandi Subdivision of Cachar district, their object being to divert attention from the Eastern Lushai people, an object of course which was not fulfilled. In this raid 45 persons were killed and 13 carried off into captivity.

It was clear that operations on a big scale would have to be undertaken and a request was made for Military aid. Three hundred men of the 18th Bengal Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. F. Rennick, were sent up to Aijal, and they arrived there on the 19th March, releasing the Military Police for operations in the field. McCabe's plan was to keep Aijal strongly protected, to fortify Lalbura as a main base and to make a road from Aijal to the Sonai, so as to maintain his communications with Aijal. This road which was 14 miles in length over difficult country was completed by Mr. Sweet on the 3rd April and McCabe was ready to start on the 10th April. Captai Loch, Commandant of the Military Police, was in command of the column, which consisted of 225 men of the Surma Valley Military Police, under Lieutenant Tytler, Roddy and Johnson, and 75 men of the 18th Bengal Infantry under Lieutenant Edwards. The remainder of the 18th Regiment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Rennick garrisoned the fort at Aijal throughout the operations and gave great assistance in supplying food and reinforcements from the base. On the 14th April Poiboi was captured. The attack had been planned for the previous day, but as many coolies of the transport department were suffering from moon-blindness the advance was so delayed that camp had to be made on the banks of the Tuirini, and the attack postponed. The village was then stormed at dawn after a steep climb of over 2,000 feet. At this time Poiboi's village consisted of 722 houses. On the 7th May, Bungteya was captured. Before the end of May Lalbura was a fugitive and all resistance was at an end. The destruction of Maite at the end of May was the

last important event in these operations. On the 8th June the Expedition returned to Aijal. They had had a very strenuous time, fighting and marching under very harsh conditions in inclement weather, but they were completely successful in subduing the resistance of the eastern Lushais and casualties were small, 16 killed and 30 wounded. Fortunately the Western Lushais behaved well throughout this period, having evidently learned their lesson in 1890.

It is interesting to note that in forwarding McCabe's Report to the Government of India in his letter No. *4873-P., dated the 23rd October 1892, the Chief Commissioner already had in mind the possibility of the inclusion of the South Lushai Hills in the Assam administration. He was awaiting then McCabe's report on that proposal. Probably the incidents of the Expedition had emphasised the inconvenience of having the Southern Lushais under a different administration from the North. In sympathy with the Eastern Lushai rising, for instance, the Howlongs in South Lushai also took up arms, and were dealt with by Captain Shakespear from the South together with a column from Burma. But these forces failed owing to lack of provisions to join hands with McCabe at Bungteya as arranged and McCabe seems to consider that this detracted from the results of his campaign to some extent.

In 1894-95 it came to light that the Chief of Falam within Burma was demanding and receiving tribute from Chiefs within the Lushai Hills, and the Political Officer, North Lushai Hills, issued notices to the effect that Lushai Chiefs were not to meet such demands in the future. Among the Chiefs who had paid to Falam were Kairuma Sailo as well as others even nearer Aijal.

In 1895-96 the Western Lushais gave no trouble, and the conditions had improved so much that the Chief Thangula who had been deported in 1891 was allowed to return in July 1895, long before the ten years period, for which he was detained, had expired.

In the Eastern Lushai Country Lalbura submitted, and the Howlongs gave no trouble. But it became necessary to undertake an expedition against Kairuma, the determination of whom, and the other descendants of Vuta, in the east of the district to maintain their independence had been sufficiently evident when Shakespear, Political Officer, South Lushai Hills, and the Political Officer, North, had met at Kairuma's in January 1895. Loch with Lieutenants Wilson of the 44th Gurkha Rifles and Clay of the 43rd Gurkha Rifles, and 300 North Lushai Military Police, co-operated with the South Lushai administration under Shakespear and that of the Chin Hills under Mr. Tuck, and the operations were successfully carried out in December 1895. There was no resistance†.

*Assam Secretariat, For. A, December 1892, Nos. 14-141.

†1. Assam Secretariat, For. A, November 1896, Nos. 13-30.

In reporting the results of the expedition to the Government of India, the Chief Commissioner of Assam observed as follows in his letter No.321-For.-P.,† dated the 15th June 1896.

“2. The Chief Commissioner considers that the expedition has fully accomplished the object for which it was organised, *viz.*, the complete subjugation of what is known as the Kairuma group of villages. The fact that there was no active opposition to our forces is, in Sir William Ward’s opinion, due partly to the previous disarmament of the Tashons by the Falam Column, partly to the excellent arrangements by the Political Officer Mr. Porteous, for the conduct of the expedition, and partly to the cordial co-operation of the three columns from Fort Aijal, from Falam, and from Lungleh. Major Shakespear’s brilliant capture of Jakopa and Jaduna had also a marked effect in bringing the Kairuma group to terms.

* * *

4. In addition to the submission of Kairuma, which has been brought about by this expedition the Government of India will observe from paragraphs 20 and 21 of the report [*i. e.*, that the Mr. Porteous, Political Officer, North Lushai Hills] that the Eastern Lushai Chief (Lalbura), who gave so much trouble in Mr. McCabe’s expedition of 1892 against the Eastern Lushais, has also tendered his submission. This Chief had been a fugitive ever since the operations of 1892.

* * *

7. Sir William Ward considers that much credit is due to the Political Officer, North Lushai Hills, for the results which have been attained, and to Major Shakespear and the officers of the Burma Column for the cordial manner in which they co-operated with Mr. Porteous. The Political Officer, in paragraph 26 of his report, brings to the Chief Commissioner’s special notice the services of Captain Loch who commanded the whole police force. Captain Loch’s connection with the North Lushai Hills Military Police Battalion will shortly cease, and the Chief Commissioner has much pleasure in bringing to the notice of the Government of India the excellent work this officer has done not only in this expedition and in that against the Eastern Lushais in 1892, but also throughout the period of his tenure of the appointment of Commandant of the North Lushai Hills Military Police Battalion, during which he has organised that battalion on its present footing, and has also succeeded, in spite of many difficulties, in his efforts to improve the position of the men and to make them a thoroughly efficient and, at the same time, a thoroughly contented body”

* * *

†2. Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, November 1896, Nos. 16-17.

In the closing paragraphs of his report No. 85* on these operations dated the 6th May 1896, from Fort Aijal, Mr. Porteous reviewed the position as it then appeared. His conclusions were these.

“25. With the close of the operations against Kairuma it may, I think, be safely prophesied that the long series of Lushai expeditions has now ended, and that no further operations on the scale, which it was thought necessary to adopt against the descendants of Vuta, can ever again be necessary. There is not in the Lushai Hills any unexplored “Hinter-land” such as still exists in the Naga Hills to give possible future trouble, and although the system of Chiefs, all closely related, who are so implicitly obeyed and so complacently looked up to by their subjects, as is the case among the Lushais must for long demand a display of force unnecessary amongst a less intelligent and more disunited race, a substantial reduction in the force required to garrison these hills should certainly in a few years’ time be possible.

The immediate results of the expedition have been to break completely the power and prestige of Kairuma, and to dispel effectually the idea that any Lushai Chief, by reason of his supposed inaccessibility from Aijal, can safely ignore the orders of the Political Officer. The facility with which columns from Falam and Lungleh can co-operate with a force from the North Lushai Hills has also been demonstrated, and any lingering idea that the assistance of the Tashon Chiefs from Falam may be counted upon by a refractory Lushai Chief has been dissipated.

26. It remains for me to acknowledge the effective assistances received from Major Shakespear on the one hand, and from Mr Tuck and Captain Whiffin on the other, with their respective columns. To the previous disarmament of the Tashons in particular, I chiefly attribute the entire collapse of Kairuma’s threatened resistance.

With the Aijal Column, I am pleased to record that the officers, one and all, worked zealously and cheerfully. I wish however, to bring specially to the notice of the Chief Commissioner the services of Captain Loch as the officer in chief executive command of the whole force. To his untiring personal efforts and excellent organization of the transport and supply services, it is mainly due that in the incessant movements of detachments and convoys there was no hitch of any sort from beginning to end of the operations, while the discipline and marching of the sepoy was all that could be desired, and showed the high state of the efficiency to which Captain Loch has brought his battalion. Mr. Anley made an excellent transport officer, and did good service afterwards in dealing with three of the Chiefs to whose villages I sent him. I desire to draw special attention to his services.”

* Bengal Secretariat, Political, November 1896, Nos. 16-17.

In reporting on the history of the year 1896-97, Mr. Porteous was able to observe, "I leave the district with practically all the Chiefs reconciled to Government, and with, I believe, not the least likelihood of any future disturbance of the peace.....Lalbura received me in his village in March like any other Chief, while Kairuma met me outside his village, no sepoys, however, being present."

The same Report makes reference to the labours of Messrs. Savidge and Lorrain, the pioneer Missionaries who had been in these hills since the spring of 1893 and had been wonderfully successful in introducing education. In the Report for the following year, 1897-98, the last for the North Lushai Hills as a separate administrative unit, it is stated as proof of the peacefulness of the district, that while on tour no officer had had more than 4 rifles for an escort.

V. The South Lushai Hills District.—As early as 12th January 1890, the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, Mr. D. R. Lyall, I.C.S., sent up proposals* for the administration of these Hills to the Bengal Government on the assumption that it was "the intention of the Government of India to completely dominate the country between this and Burmah". A note which he prepared on the subject recommends that "for the present the system of Government through Chiefs should be fully recognised". He drew up (paragraph 5 of his note) a set of orders which he considered should be issued to the Chiefs. These were as follows :—

"1. All raids absolutely prohibited. Any chief raiding, to have his village destroyed by the paramount power, and the offending chief to be liable to death.

I put in this last clause advisedly. At present human life, except that of a chief, is of the very smallest value, and one of the most necessary lessons is to teach these men that it has a value. This can best be done by taking the only life that at present has any value. In the long run this will be found the kindest way, and, as the chiefs value their own lives, it will also be found the most effectual, but it must be no idle threat, and the first raiding Chief must be executed in the most public way possible.

II. Absolute security of person and property and free access into every village must be insisted on from the first. By this I mean security of persons and property as between village and village and between the people of the country and ourselves. The chiefs must be made to understand that a single frontier policeman, dak-runner, or a telegraph official must be as safe as the European Superintendent. Free access into every village must also be insisted on.

The present is the time to insist on these terms under severe penalties. If life is taken, it should be life for life, and if access is refused or a traveller robbed, severe fines should be imposed.

Assam Secretariat, For., A, July 1896, Nos. 7-41.

*Assam Secretariat, Political and Judicial, A, Foreign Progs., August 1890, Nos. 47-77.

III. Each village and chief should be made responsible for the maintaining, improving, and, if so ordered, the making of such roads round his village as the Superintendent may order him to maintain. The labour should be paid for at a low rate, thus enabling the men to pay their tax, as proposed hereafter. It is absolutely necessary, in order to control the people, that there should be a route fit for mules and coolies to every village.....

The Superintendent should have power of fining any chief not keeping up his roads, and of compelling him and his people to do the work by force.

IV. Each chief should be made responsible for the collection and payment of the tax of his village. This should be in the form of a poll-tax, both as being most easily imposed and as affording information regarding the number of his followers. It has been found best in the Naga Hills to insist on payment of taxation from the first. The payment should at first be not much more than the amount each village can earn by road-making, and the Superintendent should distribute the roads, so far as possible, in proportion to the size of the villages

V. There should be a meeting of the chiefs each year at the central post, and attendance at this should as far as possible be compulsory, as evidence of their acknowledgment of sovereignty, and absence should be punished by fine.

I lay stress on this so long as the Government is merely personal, and at this meeting the Superintendent should decide all disputes between chiefs and villages, the chiefs being instructed that the Superintendent is to be the final arbitrator of all disputes which they fail to settle amicably among themselves, and that they are not to be decided by force. Chiefs will, of course, have it open to them to bring forward grievances at any time, and so far as possible the Superintendent should decide them promptly; but there are some regarding which he would wish to consult the other chiefs, and all such disputes should be decided at this meeting. In the first days of the Hill Tracts as a district, Captain Lewin, who knew the people better than any British officer has done since, recommended a similar gathering for his district in the following words (paragraph 23 of his No. 532, dated 1st July 1872 :—

“I recommend that once a year there be held at Rangamati a mela or gathering at which every Chief, Roaja, Dewan, or other headman, be ordered to attend to meet the Commissioner of the Division and pay their respects. The chiefs should on this occasion publicly lay before the Commissioner such part of their revenue payment as may be due at that time to Government. On this occasion also all appointments of headmen might be publicly made or confirmed. By this meeting the headmen would be once a year at least brought into direct personal communication with the head of the district, whereas at present there exist hundreds of them whom I have never seen. This would also be a valuable opportunity for

ascertaining the popular feeling upon any subject, as well as for obtaining information as to what goes on in remote parts of the district”.

If such a mela was advisable in the Hill Tracts, it is absolutely necessary in the new country.....”

7. In all other matters he advised that the present administration by chiefs be absolutely left as it is, and that we should not interfere with the village administration of criminal, civil, and social matters, but confine the administration, at least for the present, to preserving the public peace, leaving internal matters to the Chiefs.

Mr. Lyall's proposal visualised the whole of the present Lushai Hills District being placed under Bengal, but this was subsequently modified to a horizontal division of the country between Bengal and Assam.

Discussions as to the future administration of the country went on during the year 1890-91, and a reference to the Northern boundary of the South Lushai Hills is found in paragraph 6 of the Bengal Government's letter No. 1619-P*, dated the 19th April 1890 where it is stated that it might be safely assumed that it would be to the south of the country “occupied by the descendants of Lullal”. This boundary was accepted by the Government of India in their letter No. 1396-E*, dated the 3rd July 1890.

Definite proposals were next submitted to the Government of India in Bengal letter No.449-P.D.,† dated the 6th November 1890 as follows.

“With reference to my predecessor's letter No. 1628-P., of the 19th April last, I am directed to submit, for the consideration and orders of the Government of India, the following proposals made by the Commissioner of Chittagong for the administration of the Lushai country under this Government.

2. Mr. Lyall proposes—

(1) That the Lushai country under the control of the Bengal Government should not be amalgamated with the Chittagong Hill Tracts, but that it should be constituted a separate charge under a special officer.

(2) That a post of Superintendent or Political Officer for the Lushai country, on a salary of Rs. 800 to Rs. 1,000 a month, should be created.

(3) That the appointment of Superintendent should be conferred on Mr. C. S. Murray, Assistant Political Officer, Lushai Expeditionary Force.

(4) That the Chittagong Hill Tracts Frontier Police should be transferred to the Lushai country, and that the Civil Police of the district, which would now man the Hill Tracts, should be increased.

*Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, April 1891, Nos. 1-38, File No. L-10.

†Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, April 1891, Nos. 1-38, File No. L/10.

(5) That Mr. R. F. H. Pughe, District Superintendent of Police, now in charge of the Frontier Force in Fort Lungleh, should be appointed commandant of the force in the new district.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that for the reasons mentioned in paragraph 5 of Mr. Lyall's letter of the 12th January last, the Lushai tracts should not be amalgamated with the Hill Tracts, but should be dealt with politically under a special officer. He would suggest, therefore, the appointment of a Superintendent of these tracts on a salary of Rs. 700 to Rs. 1,000 with a fixed travelling allowance of Rs. 150 a month, and if the Government of India sanctions the appointment, would appoint Mr. Murray to the post in consideration of the good work done by him during the last two expeditions.....

11, I am to add that the Lieutenant-Governor begs permission during the present cold season, and until the above arrangements come into force, to retain the services of Captain Shakespear as Assistant Political Officer as at present, as the work to be done during this period, according to Mr. Lyall's programme, will require two officers.....”.

The Government of India in their letter No. 2641-E.,* dated the 24th December 1890 agreed that the Lushai country should be formed into a separate charge and that the Chittagong Hill Tracts Frontier Police should be transferred to the Lushai country, leaving other points for further consideration.

Proposals for the future administration of the district in their final form were, after consultation with the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal Sir Charles Elliott, submitted by the Commissioner of Chittagong Mr. D. R. Lyall, in his letter No 133-H.T.,† dated the 28th February 1891. The main features of the proposals were as follows. The principal officers were to be a Superintendent in general control, a Commandant of Police with 4 Assistants, a European Medical Officer, and a native District Engineer. The Headquarters were for the present to be Fort Tregear, though Lungleh was regarded as the most convenient location, at any rate for police headquarters. Taxation was to be imposed, and the rates were based on rates proposed by Mr. McCabe in the light of his experience of the Naga Hills, *i. e.*, at Re. 1 house-tax, 10 seers of rice per house at the rate of Rs. 2 per maund, and 6 days free labour a year: labour above 6 days to be paid for.

The duties of the Superintendent are enumerated in a set of rules attached to Mr. Lyall's letter of which the three most important run as follows.

“1. The Superintendent will be over all departments, and will correspond with the Commissioner of Chittagong.

*Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, April 1891, Nos. 1-30, File No. L/10.

†Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, April 1891, Nos. 1-13, File No. L/27.

II. His duties are to settle all disputes between chief and chief village and village, and tribe and tribe, and to prevent all raiding and public breaches of the peace. He will not interfere in the administration of each village by its own chief unless in very exceptional cases when called on to interfere by either the chief or the villagers, and then only on strong grounds being shown, and he will report all such cases to the Commissioner.

III. The Superintendent will not interfere with the ordinary internal administration of the police, but he is the head of the police, as of all other departments, and all correspondence from the office of the Commandant will pass through him. He has power to issue orders on the Commandant in all matters, and his orders must be carried out."

Mr. Lyall also had something to say about the need for opening up communication with Burma from Chittagong, a subject that has become of increasing interest in more recent years. He wrote as follows:

"7. This subject has not been touched this year, though it is, in my opinion, the most important point in connection with the new country. Mandalay is only some 250 miles as the crow flies from Chittagong, and Chittagong will be within 20 to 22 hours journey from Calcutta when the railway is made. [It was completed in 1896.] If, then, a feasible line for a cart road or a railway can be discovered from Chittagong to Mandalay, the land route to Upper Burma will enable the surplus population of Bengal, who refuse to cross the sea, to spread into Upper Burma, benefiting both provinces. The trade of Upper Burma will also gain much by the possibility of easy communication between Calcutta and Mandalay.....

The difficulties are great but not, I think, insurmountable, while the gain would be enormous."

These proposals were forwarded to the Government of India with Bengal's letter No. 1049-P.,* dated the 16th March 1891. Discussing boundaries, it was stated that it had been agreed that, as between Bengal and Assam, "the boundary on the north should follow on the whole the tribal division between the descendants of Lalul and their southern neighbours." The Lieutenant-Governor agreed as to their being one head of the district in control of all departments and had already sanctioned the rules quoted above. As to location, His Honour had decided to post both the Superintendent and the Commandant of the Police at Lungleh, in order to shorten the route taken by supplies. The rate of tax proposed was approved: the Lieutenant-Governor's comment being that the payment of rice rather than cash should be encouraged.

The Government of India sanctioned these proposals in their letter No. 1104-E.,† dated the 27th May 1891 and subsequently intimated the sanction of the Secretary of State in their letter No. 2408-E.‡

*Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, April 1891, Nos. 1-13.

†Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, December 1891, Nos. 65-96, File No. L/27.

‡Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, January 1892, Nos. 63-64, File No. L/28.

dated the 12th December 1891. In forwarding their views to the Secretary of State, the Government of India in their Financial Despatch No. 191, dated the 14th July 1891 stated their view that "It is probable that ultimately it may be found possible and desirable to consolidate under one administration the whole or the greater part of the territory in the occupation of the various tribes now separately controlled from Bengal, Burma and Assam."

Meanwhile, in anticipation of the Government of India's and the Secretary of State's sanction, the new district had been constituted as from April 1st 1891 with Mr. Murray as the first Superintendent. Between the time when the operations of 1889-90 terminated and this date, there was evidently, judging from the Commissioner's letter *No. 231-H.T., dated the 22nd February 1891, which purports to be "a report on the work done in the Southern Lushai Hills since the departure of General Tregear and the bulk of his force in May 1890", no attempt at setting up a system of administration. Officers were engaged on separate operations in different directions, in improving communications and in difficult transport work; the latter especially being a major problem which bulks largely in all the correspondence. Apparently Mr. C. S. Murray of the Police was posted in these Hills as Assistant Political Officer, possibly under the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, while Captain J. Shakespear was also serving in the area, with a similar status. The Frontier Police were partly with Murray at Lungleh and partly in the Hills Tracts under Mr. Ryland and the Deputy Commissioner.

But Mr Murray was not to hold the position for long. Though in the previous November they had recommended that he should be the Superintendent of the new district, Government had, after the unfortunate incident at Jacapa's [Zakapa], to advise that he should be returned to the Police. The matter is dealt with in Bengal's letter No. X.† dated the 27th March 1891 to the Government of India, which ran as follows

"The Lieutenant-Governor desires me to apply to the Government of India for the services of Captain J. Shakespear, District Staff Officer of the 1st Leinster Regiment, to fill the appointment of Superintendent, South Lushai Hills District.

His Honour has had before him the full account of Mr. Murray's proceedings which ended on the 10th of February in the outbreak in Jacapa's village and in the death of two sepoy and a naik of the Frontier Police, two army signallers, and a private servant of one of the officers, and is constrained to say that they show such want of political sagacity, of judgment and of foresight as to lead to the conclusion that, however successful he has been in subordinate posts, Mr. Murray is not fit to hold the important and almost independent position of Superintendent of the South Lushai District. In spite of the distinguished service which Mr. Murray had previously rendered when under the guidance of such officers as Mr. Lyall and Colonel Tregear,

*Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, April 1891, File No. L/27, Nos. 1-13.

†Bengal Secretariat, A, April 1891, Nos. 1-38, File No. L/10.

Sir Charles Elliott is convinced that it is for the public interest that that officer should return to his ordinary duties in the Bengal Civil Police. Captain Shakespear has, in his capacity as Assistant Political Officer in these Hill Tracts, earned much distinction and evinced the possession of qualities which lead to a confident belief that he will do well in the position in which the Lieutenant-Governor proposes to place him".

The Government of India and the Secretary of State agreed to Captain Shakespear's being thus employed and he took over charge from Mr. Murray on the 16th April 1891. He was to remain in the Lushai Hills for some 14 years, first in the Southern area and then as Superintendent of the combined Lushai Hills district.

The first task that Shakespear had to carry out was the punishment of Jakopa who had defeated Murray a few months before. He was completely successful, Jakopa fled, and the Mollienpui tribe were finally subjugated.

His first report as Superintendent is for the year 1890-91 and is dated the 14th July 1891, but, since it refers to a period when, as he explains, he was not in charge of the district, but merely Assistant Political Officer, it is not a very informative document. He reported the country as having been quiet. It was garrisoned by 200 of the 2/2nd Gurkhas based on Tregear and 170 Frontier Police based on Lungleh.

His second* report for 1891-92 which contains much valuable material, is embodied in a report written by the Commissioner, Mr. W. B. Oldham, himself, who explains that this method had to be adopted "as Captain Shakespear was necessarily ignorant of much that was done for and in his charge". A durbar of chiefs was held on 1st to 4th January 1892 at a spot about 2 miles from Lungleh, and it was attended by representatives from every tribe. Shakespear addressed them on the subject of the permanency of our occupation and the punishment they would suffer if they carried on feuds with each other. They were made to swear friendship or at least peace with each other, and Mr. Oldham points out that, of those who thus swore amity, the only one concerned in the subsequent troubles was the petty chief Morpunga [Hmawngphunga] (of the Howlong clan). Five clans were represented, Howlong, Thangloa, Mollienpui, Lakher or Longshen, and Poi.

As regards revenue, Shakespear claimed that the principle of paying tribute in rice had been generally accepted. The question of enforced labour is discussed in paragraph 10 of the report. Shakespear considered that the labour should be paid, and suggested 4 annas a day. The Commissioner considered it should be 8 annas (paragraph 11).

Shakespear succeeded in effecting a meeting on 30th January 1892 with Mr. McCabe, the Superintendent of the North Lushai Hills at Kairuma's village: and they settled between them the details of the boundary line between the two districts. It appears that Captain Shakespear then went towards the south to the village of

Dokola [Dokulha], a Poi Chief, brother of Haosata, for on 20th of February 1892 he recorded a statement by Chief Dokola when the latter was being charged with murder, which reads as follows:—

“Thongliena’s men shot my brother Vantura. If I did not kill some men my brother’s spirit would have no slaves in the “Head men’s village” [sic. probably should be “Dead Men’s village (Mithi Khua)], therefore I went to shoot two men of Thongliena’s village. We met some men of Boite Thilkara’s village and mistook them for Thongliena’s men and so shot at them”. The capture of this Chief Dokola was effected on the 18th February 1892 by Mr. R. Sneyd Hutchinson in the following circumstances. On February 17th he and his party, consisting of a Subadar and 36 men, had camped late at night after an arduous march through thick bamboo jungle along the Kolodyne, fording and refording the river and often missing their path.

At 3 A.M. a start was made and Mr. Hutchinson’s account reads as follows:—

“We reached old *jhums* in about an hour and then struck down a path into some of this year’s *jhums*. Two houses were heavily laden with *dhan* but nobody was about. We then went through high tree jungle up to the top of a hill. While ascending I heard a cock crowing so knew we were near our goal and advanced with great caution. On topping the summit I saw the village with light of fires in the houses lying below me; we moved rapidly down the side but were observed just nearing the north village and a yell was given. I charged into the village with some 15 men who were near me; men with guns came tumbling out of the houses and I heard shots fired. I had ordered my men not to fire but to follow me in a rush on the Chief’s house, the situation of which I knew. Unfortunately a man with a gun took deliberate point blank aim at me and I fired at him with my pistol, he lurched forward dropping the gun but was seized and carried off by some other men near him, the gun remaining with me. The delay of a minute or so just stopped me from getting Dokola who made away as I entered the house in company with some other men.”

Mr. Hutchinson did not know that it was the Chief Dokola he saw disappearing, but learned this later. His force was too small to risk engaging the enemy in thick jungle so he remained in the village. It was here that on searching, Mr. Hutchinson found a knife and a prismatic compass belonging to Lieutenant Stewart, also a brown leather shoe and some empty revolver cartridge cases. Mr. Hutchinson used the captives he had made as a bargaining counter for the production, unconditionally of Dokola and after much procrastination Dokola came in on the evening of the 18th of February.

Lalbura’s rising of February 1892 in the Northern district had its effect in the Southern district. News of the attack on McCabe on 2nd March reached Shakespear on the 5th and he at once prepared to start for the North, with 3 British Officers and 150 rifles of the Frontier Police. Shakespear undertook this operation without being asked and though the Commissioner decided later his action had been precipitate, yet both the Assam Administration and Mr. McCabe welcomed his advance to the North as a diversion which might prevent the Southern Howlongs from joining the tribes who were fighting

McCabe. Though Shakespear was able to get no further than Vansanga's village, he succeeded in keeping a number of chiefs fully employed. The opposition he encountered was considerable and he had eventually to decide that his force was too small to quell the rebellion completely and to return to Lungleh towards the end of March, leaving a force under Mr. Daly to garrison Vansanga's village. Reinforcements were sent both troops and police from Dacca, but the situation continued dangerous for some time, Vansanga was constantly attacked, Lungleh itself and Demagiri were threatened, telegraph wires were cut, communications interfered with, while Shakespear had great difficulty in preventing the friendly chiefs from joining the rebels, but all opposition came to an end with the arrival of a column from Burma. This Burma, or Nwengal column, as it was called, was originally destined to assist McCabe by demonstrating in the neighbourhood of the disturbed area. They had, however, for some reason been recalled to Fort White so as to be there on 10th April. But on receipt of the Lieutenant-Governor's request for help it at once started out again and, after a most arduous march in unknown country at a very trying season, effected a junction with Shakespear at Daokoma's village on 3rd May. They were about 350 strong. The combined forces effected as much punishment as they could between 4th and 9th May, which, owing to want of provisions occasioned by difficulties of transport, was all the time they could spare, about 1,500 houses being burnt. The column then continued to Lungleh and Chittagong and so back to Rangoon.

Climatic conditions in the country were bad and sickness among the men employed was very great. In paragraph 18* of the Commissioner's letter, he says that out of 409 ranks of the 3rd Bengal Infantry, 267 including 1 British Officer, were sent away invalided, and of them many died: of 74 men of the Dacca Special Police Reserve all but 6 were invalided and some died: of 480 Military Police over 100 were invalided including 2 British Officers.

Fort Tregear was destroyed by fire on 5th January 1892 and Mr. Apothecary Antonio was burned to death.

In commenting on the results of these operations, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, in his letter No.601-P.D.† dated the 3rd October 1892, described them as far from decisive and gave his opinion that it would be necessary to organise a combined military expedition from North to South and from Burma as well "in order to thoroughly subdue these warlike and enterprising savages".

It was thus that at the urgent request of the Bengal Government the Government of India sanctioned reluctantly, in the Viceroy's telegram No. 38-C.,‡ dated the 7th November 1892, further operations in the cold weather of 1892-93, and agreed to furnish a force of 400 Gurkhas and 2 guns. These operations were undertaken

* Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, November 1892, Nos. 30-34.

† Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, April 1893, Nos.27-197. File L/28 of 1892.

‡ Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, April 1893, Nos. 27-197.

between December 1892 and February 1893, and resulted in the submission of all the villages concerned. They were carried out in consultation with Mr. A. W. Davis, Political Officer of the North Lushai Hills, who co-operated in occupying the village of Lalrhima. Five hundred and fifty troops were employed and about 400 Military Police. There was no organised opposition, the fines imposed were easily collected and about 500 guns were surrendered. The expedition and its results were summarised as follows in the Bengal Government's report No. 1-P.T.,* dated the 31st July 1893.

".....in order to protect friendly villages, our convoys and communications, and to impress on the native tribes once for all a sense of British supremacy, a punitive expedition, consisting of 400 Gurkhas, two Mounted [sic] Battery guns and 150 rifles of the XVth Bengal Infantry under command of Major Pulley, was despatched to Chittagong in December last. This force, acting in concert with a force from Fort Aijal, completely effected its object, and without meeting any resistance established the authority of Government throughout the whole tract of country where it had been resisted and returned to India in February. Captain Shakespear summarises the result of the expedition in the following words:—"The general condition of the country now, and the success we have attained in the payment of revenue and fines, seem to point to the fact that the Lushais have abandoned all idea of combined resistance, although it is quite possible that isolated outbreaks, such as that at Jacopa's, may, under similar circumstances occur for several years to come, but the force of the police on the spot, if maintained at its present strength, should be sufficient for the suppression of such disturbances". An outpost has been established at Lalrhima in the heart of the Lushai country on the boundary line between the North and South Lushai territory, and the small force stationed there, together with the disarmament of hostile Chiefs will, it is believed render it almost impossible for any serious trouble to again arise."

In the following year, i.e., 1893-94, Shakespear reported the capture of an important person and a bitter enemy of the British in the shape of Ropuilieni, mother of Lalthuama, widow of Vandula, an old enemy of the British, and daughter of Vonolel, the chief against whom the Gachar Column was directed in 1871-72. She was evidently a focus of discontent and her capture led to the surrender of her son and another man, Loncheyva, who was wanted for murder. The woman and her son were dealt with under Regulation III and confined in Chittagong Jail, where Ropuilieni died of old age in January 1895. Another capture which had a good effect in pacifying the country was that of Vanchanga or Vansanga, made personally by Mr. C. W. C. Plowden of the Military Police. Vansanga had been troublesome in 1892 and as long as he was at large he kept up the spirit of hostility among the Lushais. In his report for this year, 1893-94, Captain Shakespear reviews the three years in which he had been in charge of the District since April 1891. At that time only 20 villages in the whole District had ever been visited by our Officers; the subject of

*Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, August 1893, Nos. 4-6, File L/49 of 1893.

tribute had not been broached ; the buildings at Lungleh were mere hovels ; between Demagiri and Lungleh there were no Rest Houses ; the Military Police were disorganised and badly equipped ; the whole clerical staff of the District only numbered two men ; and the utmost confusion prevailed everywhere. He was able to claim that in three years this confusion had been cleared up and that the machinery of the District was in working order.

In August 1893, the Government of India sanctioned the permanent transfer to the civil authorities of 2 150-lb mountain guns (7 pounder) which were retained at Lungleh.

On September 6th 1895 by their Proclamation No. 1697-E., the Government of India declared the South Lushai Hills to be included in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, a position which they had in fact if not in law, occupied since 1891.

In December 1895 operations were commenced against the villages of Kairuma and Jaduna, in consultation with Porteous, the Political Officer and Loch, the Commandant of the Military Police, of the North Lushai Hills. Shakespear started on the 17th December 1895, reached Jaduna's village on the 24th December and he and the forces from Aijal and Burma, the latter under Mr. Tuck, met at Kairuma's on the 25th. There was no resistance, the necessary punishment was imposed without any trouble and Jaduna himself was captured on the 4th January 1896. Jacopa who had for long evaded capture was also run to earth on the 1st January 1896 in this expedition, Shakespear's last in the south.

The report for 1895-96* being Shakespear's last, as he was under orders to leave the District for the North Lushai Hills, he took the opportunity to set down his view as to future policy. He expressed the firm conviction that throughout the District all ideas of resistance had been definitely abandoned and it had been generally accepted that tribute must be paid and coolies must be supplied whether for transport or for building. The "rough coercive measures" of the past could now safely be changed for more gentle ones, though he still held that any chief who disobeyed orders would have to be severely dealt with. He mentions as a certainty that with peaceful conditions the villages would gradually break up into small hamlets, a tendency which would render it more difficult to recover tribute and to collect labour as it would make it harder for the Chiefs to enforce their orders. As a remedy for this, his view was that certain Chiefs should be appointed as Heads of Circles, being paid at certain moderate rates per month. They would be responsible for tribute and labour for all hamlets in their Circle and for the disposal of all complaints. In this system Shakespear saw a way out of many difficulties which lay ahead.

In forwarding this report to the Government of Bengal with his letter No. 239-L.,† dated the 20th March 1896, Mr. W. B. Oldham, the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division who had worked with Shakespear for several years, wrote as follows.

*Report on the Administration of the South Lushai Hills for 1895-96, in Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, May 1896, Nos. 17-21.

†Bengal, Political, A, May 1896, Nos. 17-21.

“ The full accomplishment of all he has striven for is a fitting crown to Major Shakespear's work and efforts in the South Lushai Hills during the five years for which he has administered them. This last report of his will have to be carefully studied by his successor, as it either lays down, or refers to, the lines in all matters of chief importance on which the administration should proceed and progress, and desirable developments should be sought for. Major Shakespear is making over his charge not only wholly pacified, but thoroughly examined and accurately known and ready for the gradual application of the internal territorial system, which alone can be a permanent basis for its future administration.”

The Lieutenant-Governor* added his encomium when forwarding the report to the Government of India in these terms.

“ 7. Sir Alexander Mackenzie entirely concurs in the high praise which is bestowed by Mr. Oldham on Major Shakespear's administration of these hills, and is glad also to recognise the value of his final report, which deals thoroughly and clearly with all matters of importance. It must be added that to Mr. Oldham's advice and counsel much of Major Shakespear's success is due. It is a serious loss to Government that both these officers should be simultaneously transferred from a division where they have laboured in co-operation for several years, during which time the country has not only been pacified, but British rule has been firmly established and the lines of future administration finally laid down. In effecting these results, the work of Major Shakespear's Assistants, Messrs. Sneyd Hutchinson, William-son and Drake-Brockman, deserves also to be acknowledged.”

In writing to him on the 16th† January 1896, on his going on leave, the Chief Secretary of Bengal, Mr. (afterwards Sir Henry and Chief Commissioner of Assam) H. J. S. Cotton, said, “ You will have the satisfaction of leaving a thoroughly quiet country to your successor, and will know that however trying your work has been during the past five years, it has not been in vain.”

Mr R. H. Sneyd Hutchinson of the Indian Police succeeded Major Shakespear, and was the last Superintendent of the South Lushai Hills. Very little of importance occurred in 1896-97 except that two important wanted men submitted voluntarily, Kaplehya [Kaphleia] son of Jaduna [Zaduna], and Kairuma, who gave himself up to Porteous of the North Lushai Hills.

VI. The amalgamation of the North and South Lushai Hills into the Lushai Hills District.—This had long been the subject of discussion. On 29th January 1892, a conference was held at Calcutta, subsequently known as the “ Chin Lushai Conference,” at the instance of the Governor General, “ to discuss civil and military affairs connected

*Bengal, Political, A, May 1896, Nos. 17-21.

†Bengal, Political, A, January 1896, Nos. 120-121.

with the control of the Lushai and Chin Hills" (letter No. 248-B.,* dated the 21st January 1892 from Government of India, Military Department) at which the following officers were present—

Sir Charles Elliott, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal ;

Lieutenant-General Sir J. C. Dormer, Commander-in-Chief, Madras ;

Sir Alexander Mackensie, Chief Commissioner of Burma ;

Mr. W. E. Ward Chief Commissioner of Assam ;

Sir Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary, Government of India ;

Major-General E. H. H. Collen, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department ;

Major-General Sir James Browne, Quartermaster-General ;

The following is an extract from a Resolution which the Government of India recorded on the proceedings of this Conference on the 25th July 1892 (No.1383-E.)†.

"Resolution—In January last a Conference met at Calcutta to examine certain questions relating to the country of the Lushai and Chin tribes. The Governor-General in Council has now considered the report of the Conference, and is in a position to pass orders upon the main points involved.

2. The territory referred to is at present under three distinct civil administrations and three distinct military commands. The northern Lushais are under the Chief Commissioner of Assam and the General Officer Commanding the Assam district, the southern Lushais are under the Bengal Government and the General Officer Commanding the Presidency district, and the Chins are under the Chief Commissioner of Burma and the General Officer Commanding in that province. It has been recognised for some time past, both by the Government of India and by Her Majesty's Secretary of State, that this tripartite division of authority is open to objections, and the main question laid before the Conference was what remedies would be practicable.

3. The final recommendations of the Conference are stated in these words :—

"The majority of the Conference are of opinion that it is very desirable that the whole tract of country known as the Chin-Lushai Hills should be brought under one administrative head as soon as this can be done. They also consider it advisable that the new administration should be subordinate to the Chief Commissioner of Assam.....

The Conference is agreed that North and South Lushai, with such portions of the Aracan Hill Tracts as may hereafter be determined, should be placed under Assam at once on condition that—

- (1) complete transport and commissariat equipment for supplies from Chittagong to South Lushai, and from Cachar to North Lushai are provided ;

*Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, April 1892, Nos. 55-60 ie L/36.

†Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, October 1892, Nos.87-95.

(2) Funds are granted for roads and telegraphs from Aijal to Lungleh”.

4. The conclusions at which the Governor-General in Council has arrived in respect of the proposals of the Conference are as follows:—

(1) The whole of the Lushai country should be under the Chief Commissioner of Assam, and the transfer of the Southern Lushais from Bengal to Assam should be made as early as possible.....

* * * * *

(4) The Northern Arakan Hill Tracts should be transferred from Burma to Assam.”.....

Some four years, however, were to pass before the Government of India again reviewed the situation—greatly improved in both North and South Lushai as well as in the Chin Hills—in their letter No.1564-E.B., dated the 8th September 1896*. They stated that everything seemed to point to the arrival of a period when very substantial reductions in expenditure and establishment might safely be undertaken, and suggested the holding of a conference of Superintendents of the 3 tracts. This took place between 14th and 18th December 1896 at Lungleh and was attended by—

Mr. A. Porteous, I.C.S., Political Officer,
Northern Lushai Hills ;

Mr. R. Sneyd Hutchinson, Bengal Police, Superintendent,
South Lushai Hills ;

Mr. H. N. Tuck, Burma Commission, Political Officer,
Chin Hills ;

Captain G. H. Loch, I.S.C., Commandant,
North Lushai Military Police.

They discussed and made recommendations on a large number of important subjects. As regards the amalgamation of the North and South Hills Districts, they were all agreed that on both political and financial grounds the transfer of the South Lushai Hills to Assam was eminently desirable, and that it might effect an annual saving of 2 lakhs of rupees.

Incidentally, it should be observed that the Government of Bengal decided in February 1897 to abandon Fort Tregar, a course which the Chin Lushai Conference also advised.

The project took final form when, in his letter No.149-P., † dated the 17th July 1897, the Chief Commissioner submitted to the Government of India his proposals for the future administration of the Lushai Hills. (The transfer of the South Lushai Hills to Assam was then

*Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, February 1897, Nos.10-73.

†Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, August 1897, Nos.26-42.

intended to take place on the 1st October 1897, but this date was to be put back by 6 months). The salient points of this letter are given in the extracts below.

"...2. The first step to be taken must be the formal transfer of the South Lushai Hills from the Government of Bengal to the Administration of Assam with effect from 1st October next. The whole of the Lushai Hills will then constitute one area, which will be placed under the immediate control of the Political Officer of the North Lushai Hills, to whom, as subsequently explained in this letter, it is proposed to give the designation of Superintendent of the Lushai Hills. I am to enclose herewith a draft notification of transfer for the approval of the Government of India

* * * * *

5. The station of Demagiri is not situated within the present area of the South Lushai Hills. It is topographically within the area of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. But, under Sir Charles Elliott's orders, passed in 1892, it was declared that, for administrative purposes, Demagiri should be considered to be part and parcel of the South Lushai Hills, and the Chief Commissioner considers it absolutely essential for the future administration of this tract under Assam, that Sir Charles Elliott's arrangement should be continued after the transfer of the South Lushai Hills has been carried out.....

6. Mr. Cotton accepts Sir William Ward's views as to the present legal position of the Lushai Hills.....but he does not concur in the opinion therein expressed, that only the adjective law should be barred in the Lushai Hills, and that the substantive law in force in other parts of British India should be allowed to remain in operation there.....Sir Alexander Mackenzie observed that in his opinion it was desirable to have as small a number of enactments as possible in force in the Lushai Hills, that very few of the Acts enumerated in list (i) annexed to my letter of the 26th June 1896, were really necessary, and that the rules framed for the administration of the Hills, supplemented by the Executive action of the Officer in-charge, should generally suffice. The Lieutenant-Governor commended this question for the reconsideration of the Chief Commissioner, and Mr. Cotton, who had already given the matter his careful attention, has had no hesitation in entirely accepting Sir Alexander Mackenzie's views.....It has always been maintained in Bengal that the less substantive law there is in force among the Frontier tribes the better. This principle has been steadily maintained in the Chittagong Hill Tracts to the great advantage of the Hill people, and Major Shakespear who has had long experience of the Bengal system and was consulted by the Chief Commissioner on the question now under discussion, has expressed his approval of it. In these circumstances, I am to recommend for the sanction of the Government of India, that the whole of the substantive as well as the adjective law which is held to be in force in the Lushai Hills *proprio vigore* with the exception of the Indian Penal Code, may be barred under the provisions of section 2 of Regulation II of 1880, in that tract.....

9. With reference to the rules for the administration of the country which it is proposed to issue under section 6 of Act XIV of 1874, I am directed to say that Mr. Cotton has carefully considered the rules

drafted by Mr. Porteous which were accepted by Sir William Ward. These draft rules were based on those in force in the Naga Hills, but Mr. Cotton ascertained from the late Mr. McCabe that they are practically unworkable in those hills ; and, although he is not prepared without further consideration to recommend their modification where they are already in force, he could not agree to their application to the Lushai Hills. They are far too elaborate for the purpose aimed at and involved an amount of interference with the Chiefs which the Chief Commissioner is convinced it would be most inexpedient to exercise. On this subject, Mr. Cotton's attention has been drawn by Major Shakespear to the following remarks recorded by Mr. Davis on the occasion of his making over charge of the North Lushai Hills to Mr. Porteous in 1894 :

“I always held the Chiefs of villages responsible for the behaviour of their people, and upheld their authority to the best of my ability. I have repeatedly told them that this policy will be consistently followed, and that, as long as they behave themselves as they should, their orders will not be interfered with, even though the orders may appear to us at times a little high-handed, and not quite in accord with abstract ideas of justice. In this connection, it is well to remember that no Chief can very greatly misuse his power or oppress his people. Were he to do so, his village, and with it his own importance, would quickly diminish, as the people would migrate to other villages. In upholding the authority of chiefs, I have, as a rule, declined to take up appeals against their orders in petty cases, as it only diminishes a man's authority to be brought into Aijal to answer some petty charge preferred against him by a discontented villager. Besides, any course of action which tends to discourage litigation amongst a people like the Lushais is worth persisting in or they would soon become like the Kukis, in the Naga Hills, who, having been, by neglect on our part, practically emancipated from the control of their hereditary chiefs, are the most litigious tribe in that district.”

The Chief Commissioner entirely agrees with these observations, and he is aware that they were fully endorsed by the late Mr. McCabe, and are approved by Major Shakespear. Holding these views, Mr Cotton placed himself in communication with Mr. McCabe, and he is indebted to the invaluable experience of that lamented officer for the sketch of the draft rules which forms the last Appendix to the letter. It will be seen that they have not been drafted with any attempt at technical precision, and that they aim at simplicity and elasticity, while at the same time giving effect, as far as possible, to the procedure, which, either with or without formal sanction, has already established itself in the Lushai Hills. The rules have been sent to Major Shakespear, who reports that they are well suited to the tract for which they are designed and the Chief Commissioner trusts that they may receive the sanction of the Government of India.

10. I am to add that the Chief Commissioner has purposely used the term Superintendent throughout these rules as the designation of the officer in charge of the Lushai Hills. The expression Political Officer is not very appropriate, as his duties are widely different from those of Political Officers employed under the Foreign Department. The term Deputy Commissioner is also not suitable, as it fails to mark the distinction, which should be clear and decisive, between his status and that, for instance, of the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar. The only suitable name appears to be Superintendent, which Mr. Cotton believes is the designation applied to the officer in charge of the similarly situated Shan States. It is proposed, therefore, unless the Government of India should see any objection, to give to the officer in charge of the amalgamated area from the 1st October next the style and designation of Superintendent of the Lushai Hills, but to make no change in his status or allowances as a member of the Assam Commission."

The Government of Bengal on being consulted, agreed to the inclusion of Demagiri in the Lushai Hills (their letter No. 278-P.D.,* dated the 4th September 1897) and in their letter No. 667-P.D., dated the 9th October 1897 submitted to the Government of India a notification defining the boundary between Chittagong Hill Tracts and the Lushai Hills.

A Conference to discuss the numerous matters relative to the transfer took place on 12th August 1897 at Chittagong, among those present being Mr. H. J. S. Cotton, Chief Commissioner of Assam and Mr. Collier, Commissioner of Chittagong.

The proposals put forward by the Chief Commissioner in his letter of July 1897 were accepted by the Government of India in their letter No. 155-E.B.† dated the 27th January 1898, from which the following are extracts.

".....2. The first step must, as you say, be the formal transfer of the South Lushai Hills from the Government of Bengal to the Administration of Assam. This will be effected by the issue of a Proclamation under section 3 of the Government of India Act, 1854 (17 and 18 Vict., 77). Neither the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal nor the Governor-General in Council sees any objection to your proposal to include Demagiri and the adjoining villages in the Lushai Hills. A copy of the Proclamation which it is intended to issue is enclosed, together with a draft Regulation to amend the Assam Frontier Tracts Regulation, 1880 (II of 1880), and revised drafts of six of the notifications received with your letter under reply.

* * *

6. The rules embodied in the draft notification which formed Appendix VIII to your letter are accepted in substance.

* * *

8. The proposal that the officer in charge of the amalgamated area should be styled "Superintendent of the Lushai Hills" is approved and accepted."

* Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, November 1897, Nos. 5-8.

† Assam Secretariat, For., A, May 1898, Nos. 13-46.

On 1st April 1898 a proclamation by the Government of India No. 591-E.B. * placed the South Lushai Hills under the administration of Assam. It ran as follows—"591-E.B. Whereas the territories known as the South Lushai Hills, were by a Proclamation No.1697-E., dated the 6th September 1895, issued under the Government of India Act, 1865 (28 and 29 Vict., Cap. 17) section 4, included within the lower Provinces of Bengal, and whereas the Tract known as Rutton Puiya's villages, including Demagiri, in the Hill Tracts of Chittagong is also included within the said Lower Provinces, and whereas it is expedient that the said territories and tract should now be placed under the administration of the Chief Commissioner of Assam ; know all men, and it is hereby proclaimed, that the Governor-General in Council has been pleased, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Government of India Act, 1854 (17 and 18 Vict., Cap. 77) and with the sanction and approbation of the Secretary of State for India, to take the said territories and tract under his immediate authority and management, and to place them under the administration of the Chief Commissioner of Assam, and further to direct that henceforth they shall be included within the Province of Assam."

Another Proclamation of the same date by the Assam Government, No. 977-P. ran as follows :—"977-P. With the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council the Chief Commissioner hereby declares that the Lushai Hills shall be placed in charge of an officer who will be styled "Superintendent of the Lushai Hills" and appoints Major John Shakespear, C. I. E., D. S. O., to be the First Superintendent".

A third proclamation, No. 978-P., by the Chief Commissioner of Assam, published the rules for the administration of the Lushai Hills, rules which with periodical modifications have remained in force till to-day. One of the main principles of these rules is the internal control of villages by their own leaders, the Chiefs. This was one of the most important aspects of Major Shakespear's policy and, as he states in the report for 1897-98, the last year in which the North Lushai Hills remained separate from the South, his aim was to interfere as little as possible between the Chiefs and their people and to do all he could to impress upon the Chiefs their responsibility for the maintenance of order in their villages. In a note which Shakespear recorded on 22nd March 1905, on leaving the district, he said, "I am sure that the sound policy is to do all we can to make the best of the form of Government we found existing. The people are quite ready to run to an officer whenever the chief's decision does not suit them, and as the decision in every case must be displeasing to the loser, there is a great tendency to appeal to the nearest Sahib, but this does not mean that the chief's rule is unpopular or that their decisions are always corrupt, and while admitting that in many cases the order passed may not be as just as we should like it to be, I am convinced that it is better to uphold the government of the chiefs and to govern through them, rather than to try to govern without them. With this view, I have submitted proposals for educating the sons of the chiefs. I am strongly opposed to

* Assam Secretariat, For., A, May 1898, Nos. 13-46.

the formation of many petty hamlets. Every chief has his boundaries now and I should not subdivide the land further. Where a chief has sons, he may if he likes give them hamlets within his boundaries, but his responsibility for the collection of house-tax and the carrying out of orders should not thereby be diminished."

VII. The Lushai Hills District from 1898 onwards.—An important event of the year 1898-99 was the beginning of Shakespear's system of 'Land Settlement', the basis of which was to give to each Chief a certain area of country within which he and his people could move about as they liked. This scheme was successfully carried out and holds the field until the present day. It has been of the greatest benefit to the people themselves as well as to subsequent administrators.

A detail which should be recorded at this point is that in 1897-8, the last years of separate administration for the North and South, Shakespear discontinued in the North Lushai Hills the refund of ten per cent. for commission on account of revenue on the ground that it was never given in the Southern Hills and was quite an unnecessary concession. He says that the discontinuance had caused no grumbling.

In 1901-2 an important event was the introduction of the new system of "Circle administration", a system which was adumbrated in the report for 1895-6, the last one which Shakespear recorded before he left the South Lushai District on transfer to the North. The whole District was divided into Circle, 12 in the Aijal Sub-division and 6 in the Lungleh Sub-division. An Interpreter was appointed in each as a channel between the Subdivisional Officers and the Chiefs and their people. This system, of which Shakespear laid the foundation, has stood the test of 40 years experience and is still working well. Experience has shown, however, that it is necessary to maintain vigilance so that the Interpreters do not usurp the positions of the Chiefs.

In this year 23 Chiefs had the privilege of being taken down to Silchar by Colonel Shakespear to meet the Viceroy, Curzon, who was then on his way up to Manipur

The Military Police were reduced in this year by 150 to a strength of 840 and were armed with Martini rifles.

There is nothing worth noting in the following three years, except that 1905 saw the departure of Colonel Shakespear from these hills for Manipur. He had served for 5 years as Superintendent of the South Lushai Hills, for a year as Political Officer of the North Lushai Hills, and for 8 years as Superintendent of the Lushai Hills: and had left his mark on the administration of those areas.

In 1906-07 it is mentioned that there was a tendency for the Circle System, which had been reported to be working well in the intervening years, to be abused by the Interpreters for their own advantage. There was some trouble in the far south of the District where outrages were committed by the people of Zongling in what was then unadministered territory about 7 miles south of our southern border, but owing to the lateness of the season punitive operations had to be postponed until the next cold weather.

These operations took place in December 1907, Major Cole taking with him a force of 100 Military Police under Lieutenant-Colonel Loch. The fine of Rs. 500 which it had been decided to impose was realised without difficulty in the shape of 20 guns at Rs. 25 each. Our officers then met the Burma Officers at Lakhi, one day's march south of Zongling, and discussed with them proposals for the delimitation of the southern boundary of the Lushai Hills and for bringing under administration the tract between Northern Arakan and the Lushai Hills. The Burma Officers were Mr. W. L. Thom, Deputy Commissioner of the Arakan Hill Tracts District, and Mr. W. Street, Superintendent of the Chin Hills.

An interesting change was made in the Circle System by which Interpreters were made to reside at Aijal and only go to their Circles once in three months.

In 1910 the Aijal-Sairang Cart Road was completed.

The partial failure of crops in 1910-11 as an indirect result of the flowering of the bamboos, was followed by serious scarcity all over the district. The effect of this flowering was to cause a tremendous increase in the number of the rats, who destroyed all crops. Government had to distribute relief, and the total amount finally given out was Rs.5,85,000. Since it was useless to hand out money to the people when there was no rice within the district to buy, this relief was given in the form of orders for rice at a fixed price on shopkeepers at Sairang for Aijal and Demagiri for Lungleh, to which places rice was imported from outside the district.

The Eastern Bengal and Assam Government decided to fix the boundary* of the district on the south of the Sherkor region and proposals to this end, as made by Colonel Loch and modified by Major Cole, the Superintendent of the Lushai Hills, were approved by Government in their letter No.432-P., *dated the 21st June 1911. Keokratong on the Chittagong Hill Tracts border was taken as the western starting point and the line ran fairly straight east across the Koladyne past Kaisi to the Sulla and then north-east past Laiki and keeping north of Zongling.

In 1914-15, the first of the war years, the Lushai Hills Military Police Battalion supplied 103 officers and men for the Army in October 1914. They also sent 101 officers and men to Manipur for eight months to relieve the regular unit there. Throughout the war the Battalion supplied to the Gurkha Brigade a total of 7 Indian Officers, 36 Non-Commissioned Officers and 1,024 men. Besides fighting troops a Labour Corps of 2,000 men was raised without any difficulty in 1917-18 and went to France under Lieutenant-Colonel Playfair. This Labour Corps earned a good name for itself when on service and returned in June 1918 when it was disbanded.

In September 1915, the then Superintendent, Mr. Hezlett, and his two Agricultural Inspectors together with a party of Chiefs, paid a visit to Kohima to acquire information on the methods of cultivating terraced rice, and as a consequence two Angamis were employed

*Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, January 1912, Nos. 7-13.

at Aijal and one at Lungleh to teach the Lushais their methods. This process has gone on with varying success ever since but it has had to face many difficulties not least of which is the apathy of the Lushais themselves.

In 1917-18 there was serious unrest in the unadministered area lying to the south between the district border and Arakan Hill Tracts, which manifested itself in the shape of raids within our border and elsewhere. The Superintendent Mr. H. A. C. Colquhoun, i. c. s., went there in January 1918 with an escort of 50 rifles and visited the villages of Zonglong, Chapi and Laikei. There was no opposition and he exacted punishment in the shape of fines. Conditions in the district were also affected by the disturbances which took place in that year in the Chin Hills and in Manipur. The Military Police Battalion was called upon to send parties of troops to the Manipur Border as well as to Falam to help the Chin Hills administration and also to guard the Lungleh-Haka Road. In addition to this, 150 men from the 3rd Assam Rifles were sent to Haka itself in December 1917.

These disturbances in the south continued during 1918-19 and the unadministered villages showed considerable hostility during this period. The Battalion had to supply 287 officers and men for service in Manipur in connection with the Kuki operations. Altogether it was a bad year with disturbed conditions in the south, bad agricultural conditions and a serious outbreak of the post-war influenza in Aijal Subdivision.

By 1921-22 the disturbances in the direction of the Chin Hills had subsided and the inhabitants of the Lushai Hills ceased to be nervous. In that year orders were received about the future of the unadministered territory in which the Lushai Hills, the Chin Hills, the Arakan Hill Tracts and the Chittagong Hill Tracts were interested and the boundaries were settled.

In 1923-24 the Governor, Sir John Kerr, visited Aijal, and passed orders which led to the eventual extinction of the long outstanding agricultural loans which were given out in the scarcity between 1910 and 1912. In a note which he recorded on the 19th December 1923, Sir John observed that he had gone into the matter at some length with Mr. S. N. Mackenzie the Superintendent and Mr. Tilbury, the Subdivisional Officer at Lungleh, and stated his conclusion thus "I am convinced that our best course is to cut our losses and to bring the business to an end as soon as possible." The bulk of the outstanding being irrecoverable, the result was that in the following year they were practically wholly written off.

In the cold weather of 1924-25, Mr. N. E. Parry, i. c. s., the Superintendent, made a long tour in the hitherto unadministered area in the South of the district, where he met the Deputy Commissioner, Chin Hills. Mr. Parry's recommendations were mainly in the direction of bringing these areas under the same system of administration as the rest of the district, proposals with which the Assam Government had no difficulty in agreeing.

In 1925-26 the bamboos were again reported to be flowering and the Superintendent, Mr. Parry instituted a rat-killing campaign, which resulted in over half a million of these animals being killed. This threat of renewed scarcity arising out of the flowering of bamboos persisted in the following year, but fortunately did not materialise to the extent which it did in 1910-12. In fact, as the Commissioner noted at the time, the usual period is 30 years and, therefore, it ought not to have been expected so early as this.

In 1931-32 the Zongling area, previously under loose political control, was with the sanction of the Secretary of State, conveyed in Foreign and Political Department Government of India letter No. *F-185/X/28, dated the 17th January 1930, included in the district, certain adjoining areas being at the same time included in the Chin Hills District of Burma.

In 1935-36 was inaugurated the South Lushai Chiefs' Conference. The idea had originated with Pu Makthanga, the Lushai Chief of Aijal. Three such Conferences were held in the cold weather of that year and promised success.

In 1936-37 there was recorded the first beginnings of the Lushai Cottage Industries, which were started by the enterprise of Major A. G. McCall, I. C. S., and his wife. The first class of work which they developed was that of making Lushai rugs, an indigenous industry which they greatly improved. The work has greatly enlarged since and there is a definite hope that it may become a permanent institution in this district.

In 1937-38 a certain amount of anxiety was caused to the authorities by a "revivalist" outbreak which contained dangerous possibilities. The matter became so serious that the Superintendent had to go himself with an armed escort to one village, Kalkang, and compel the people to give up their hysterical doings. Such hysteria is a thing to which Lushais are always prone and it has to be carefully watched.

In this year Major McCall initiated an elaborate system of Welfare Committees in the villages with a view to serving two purposes—(1) the dissemination of public health information by authoritative means and (2) the formation of a local Village consultative machinery capable of being adapted to any electoral needs which the future might bring, and with the intention also that such a system might strengthen the relationship between the Chiefs and their subjects.

VIII. *The Constitution Act of 1935.*—Neither the Assam Government nor any other authorities who dealt with the matter had any difficulty in agreeing that the Lushai Hills should be excluded from the purview of the New Constitution, and they were accordingly classed as an "Excluded Area" in terms of the Government of India (Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas) Order 1936.

*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, December 1931, Nos. 27-59.

POLITICAL OFFICERS, NORTH LUSHAI HILLS

- 1890 Captain H. R. Browne, killed 6th September 1890.
 1890-1892 Mr. R. B. McCabe, I.C.S.
 1892-1894 Mr. A. W. Davis, I.C.S.
 1894-1897 Mr. A. Porteous, I.C.S.
 1897-1898 Major J. Shakespear, C.I.E., D.S.O.

SUPERINTENDENTS, SOUTH LUSHAI HILLS

- 1891-1896 Captain (later Colonel) J. Shakespear.
 (Leinster Regiment).
 1896-1898 Mr. R. H. Sneyd Hutchinson, I.P.

SUPERINTENDENTS, THE LUSHAI HILLS DISTRICT

- 1898-1899 Major J. Shakespear.
 1899-1900 Captain H. W. G. Cole, I.A.
 1900-1903 Major J. Shakespear.
 1903-1904 Mr. L. O. Clarke, I.C.S.
 and Major J. Shakespear.
 1904-1905 Major J. Shakespear.
 1905-1906 Mr. J. C. Arbuthnott, I.C.S. } For short periods.
 Major Loch.
 Major H. W. G. Cole.
 1906-1911 Major H. W. G. Cole.
 1911-1912 Major W. Kennedy.
 1912-1913 Major Loch } For short periods.
 Mr. F. C. Henniker, I.C.S.
 and
 Mr. J. Hezlett, I.C.S.
 1913-1917 Mr. J. Hezlett, I.C.S.
 1917-1919 Mr. H. A. C. Colquhoun, I.C.S.
 1919-1921 Mr. W. L. Scott, I.C.S.
 1921-1922 Mr. S. N. Mackenzie, I.C.S.
 1922-1923 Mr. W. L. Scott, I.C.S.
 1923-1924 Mr. S. N. Mackenzie, I.C.S.
 1924-1928 Mr. N. E. Parry, I.C.S.
 1928-1932 Mr. C. G. G. Helme, I.C.S.
 1932-1942 Major A. G. McCall, I.C.S.

SUBDIVISIONAL OFFICERS, LUNGLEH

1898-1899	Mr F. C. T. Halliday, Bengal Police.
1899-1902	Mr. C. B. Drake-Brockman, Bengal Police.
1902-1904	Mr. G. P. Whalley, I.P.
1904-1906	Mr. A. R. Giles.
1906-1907	Mr. C. W. T. Feilman.
1907-1909	Mr. C. N. Shadwell.
1909-1910	Lieutenant J. H. G. Buller.
1910-1912	Mr. R. W. Von Morde, Eastern Bengal and Assam Provincial Service.
1912-1914	Mr. M. Bradshaw, I.P.
1915-1918	Mr. J. Needham, I.P.
1918-1919	Mr. H. G. Bartley, I.P.
1919-1924	Mr. J. Needham, I.P.
1924-1926	Mr. H. Fischer, Assistant Superintendent of Police.
1927-1932	Mr. W. H. Tilbury, M.C., Extra Assistant Commis- sioner. Died on 15th December 1932.
1933-1937	Mr. L. L. Peters, Extra Assistant Commissioner.
1937-1938	Mr. G. P. Jarman, Extra Assistant Commissioner.
1938-1942	Mr. L. L. Peters, Extra Assistant Commissioner.

COMMANDANTS, SURMA VALLEY MILITARY POLICE
BATTALION

1889-1890	Mr. W. W. Daly, Bengal Police.
1890-1891	Lieutenant Cole.
1891-1892	Captain G. H. Loch.
1892-1893	Captain G. H. Loch.

COMMANDANTS, NORTH LUSHAI MILITARY POLICE
BATTALION

1894-95	Captain H. Loch.
(In 1894-95 the North Lushai Battalion was separated from Silchar Battalion)				
1895-98	Captain H. Loch.

COMMANDANTS, SOUTH LUSHAI HILLS MILITARY POLICE
(IF SUCH WAS ITS TITLE)

1892-95	Mr. C. W. C. Plowden, I. P.
1895-96	Captain J. Shakespear (as well as Superinten- dent).
1896-98	Mr. R. H. S. Hut- chinson, I.P.

COMMANDANTS OF THE LUSHAI HILLS MILITARY
POLICE

1898-1914	Major G. H. Loch.
1914	Captain H. C. Nicolay 2nd Gurkhas.
1914-15	Major Nicolay Captain F. K. Hensley the Guides.
1915-16	Captain F. K. Hensley Captain J. S. Ring
1916-17	Captain J. S. Ring Captain F. K. Hensley
1917-18	Captain F. K. Hensley Captain H. Falkland
1918-19	Captain H. Falkland
1919-20	Captain H. Falkland Captain Davies.
1920-21	Captain H. Falkland Captain W. A. Gardiner
1921-22	Major W. L. Corry.
1922-23	Major W. L. Corry, and Captain C. D. Balding.
1923-24	Captain Balding.
1924-25	Major J. D. Scale.
1925-26	Major J. D. Scale.
1926-27	Captain H. T. Craig.
1927-33	Major W. B. Shakespear.
1933-38	Captain A. L. Fell.

2. MANIPUR

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MANIPUR STATE

I. 1883—1890.—Mackenzie's chapter on Manipur (Chapter XVI of his book) brings us down to February 1883. At that time the Ruler was Maharaja Sir Chandra Kirti Singh, K.C.S.I., who had been formally recognised in 1851 by the Government of India. Chandra Kirti had outstanding qualities as a Manipur Ruler, and his name still commands the greatest respect in Manipur. Although his methods of administration might not commend themselves at the present day, he was certainly more enlightened than most of his predecessors and he took a genuine interest in the welfare of his subjects. Always loyal to the British Government, he greatly improved communications in the State and encouraged trade with British India: and it was in his reign and with his approval that English education was started in the State. He died in 1886 after a reign of 35 years, and was succeeded by his son Sur Chandra Singh, whose inability to control his more turbulent brothers led to his abdication and was a contributing cause of the disaster of 1891.

Between 1883 and 1890, there are one or two events which require notice. The first is the part played by Manipur in the 3rd Burmese war which broke out in November 1885. Colonel (later Major-General Sir) James Johnstone was then Political Agent. A few days before the commencement of hostilities he received orders to do what he could for the European employees of the Bombay Burma Corporation who were in the Chindwin Valley. Seven of these, while making their way down the Chindwin to the Irrawaddy, were met by the Thundawsin or Secretary of the Queen of Burma, who had three, Messrs. Allen, Roberts and Moncure, murdered in cold blood, and four, Messrs. Hill, Rose, Bates and Ruckstuhl junior, handed over as prisoners to the Woon of Mingin. Meanwhile, three more of the Company's men, Messrs. Morgan, Bretto and Ruckstuhl senior, were made prisoners by the Woon of Kendat. They were protected by the two Woons and not badly treated. Johnstone then went himself on December 19th with force of 50 men of his own escort of the 4th Bengal Native Infantry, and some 300 or 400 Manipuris to try and rescue the prisoners, and bring them to a place of safety. He reached Kendat by tremendous exertions on X'mas Day, 1885, and was fortunate in finding the Bombay Burma Corporation men still alive. Besides rescuing them he took the opportunity of formally annexing the country. But he found himself in a precarious position; his force was small and most unreliable, the country hostile, and he himself the only British Officer, apart from the Bombay Burma employees. On January the 3rd, the country was up, the Woon, Mr. Ruckstuhl (Morgan and Bretto had escaped) and all native British subjects were imprisoned by the people of Kendat, while Johnstone in camp on the right bank of the Chindwin was in a dangerous position. He, however, decided to attack, and on the 4th he opened fire on the Burmese stockade on the opposite bank of the river. By evening all outworks had been captured except the great stockade. Next morning, 5th January, the latter had been evacuated and Johnstone immediately took possession of it, together with 16 guns, and rescued Ruckstuhl and the Woon and his family. That day a relief party from Mandalay consisting of British and Indian troops under Major Campbell of the 23rd Madras Infantry arrived by steamer. But the troops and the steamers all went

back again 3 days later and Johnstone and his Manipuris were left to make their way back to Manipur. He took with him the Woon of Kendat, and arrived at Tamu on the 14th January. Here he established the Woon and returned to Imphal. He soon however, had to return to the assistance of the Woon and was wounded seriously himself by a gunshot in the left temple in a fight with the Burmese at a place, called variously Pantha, Pawsa, or Pot-tha, on 1st February 1886.

Colonel Johnstone's wounds necessitated his taking leave. The services he and the Manipur State forces had rendered in restoring order in the Kubo and Chindwin Valleys while the occupation of Upper Burma was proceeding were considerable, and were appreciated by the British authorities. He was succeeded by Major Trotter, who, a short six weeks later, was ambushed near Tamu and died of the wounds he received. It was not till the autumn that order was restored.

Among internal affairs, there were rebellions against Sur Chandra in 1886 and 1887, which had to be put down with British aid. That of 1886 occurred within a few months of Sur Chandra's accession and was led by Bora Chaoba Singh, a son of the Nar Singh who had been Regent in Chandri Kirti Singh's infancy and then Raja from 1844 to 1851 before Chandra Kirti succeeded. Bora Chaoba was defeated by Manipuri forces under Tangal General and fled to Cachar, whence he started again in October for a fresh attempt. He was pursued by a party of the Cachar Frontier Police under Lieutenant Harris of the 4th Bengal Infantry, was defeated near the capital, and then surrendered.

In 1887 two attempts were made. The first was led by the Wangkhairakpa, who ranked next to the Senapati and was the principal judicial officer of the State. This was quelled without difficulty and the Woon was shot. The second was led by Jogendra Singh, a Manipuri exile but not related to the ruling family. He also started from Cachar but was attacked by forces made up of Frontier Police and of the 44th Gurkha Light Infantry and killed with 14 of his followers on the 4th of October 1887.

II. *The Disaster of 1891.*—In 1890 the events occurred which led up to the disaster of March 24th 1891, when five British Officers, *i.e.*,

Mr. J. W. Quinton, C.S.I., I.C.S., Chief Commissioner of Assam,

Lt.-Col. C. McD. Skene, D.S.O., 42nd Gurkha Rifles,

Mr. F. St. C. Grimwood, I.C.S., the Political Agent, Manipur,

Mr. W. H. Cossins, I.C.S., Assistant Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, and

Lt. W. H. Simpson, 43rd Gurkha Rifles, were put to death by the Manipuris, and Lieutenant L. W. Brackenbury of the 44th Gurkha Rifles, died of wounds received in action.

Pages 240-270 of "My experiences in Manipur and the Naga Hills" by Johnstone.

Assam Administrative Report for 1885-8, pages 2-3, Part II-B.

According to a note written on 16th July 1891 by Mr. W. E. Ward, I.C.S., (later Sir William Ward, K.C.S. I.) who succeeded Mr. Quinton as Chief Commissioner on the latter's death, the Raja Sur Chandra Singh, was never anything more than a puppet Raja and the real Ruler of Manipur since 1886 had been the Senapati Tikendrajit Singh, a man who had always been hostile to the British influence. Tikendrajit was one of Sur Chandra's seven brothers, and the third son of the late Maharaja Chandra Kirti Singh. On the 2nd September 1890 the Raja Sur Chandra appeared at the Residency at 2-30 a.m., accompanied by Pakka Sana and two other brothers, and announced that the Palace had been attacked ; that he had fled ; and that the Senapati Tikendrajit and two of the other brothers were in possession of the Palace. The next day the Political Agent, Mr. Grimwood informed the Chief Commissioner that the Raja had abdicated in favour of the Jubraj, by which title his next brother Kula Chandra Singh was known, and was going to retire to Brindaban. The Political Agent took the view that this was a good thing and that the Senapati (*i.e.*, Tikendrajit), who was popular with all classes, would help to make the rule of the Jubraj (*i.e.*, Kula Chandra) strong and popular. The Chief Commissioner agreed that Kula Chandra, the Jubraj, should be acknowledged as Regent until the sanction of the Government of India was received. He had been recognised already as the heir to the throne, in conformity with the wishes of the late Maharaja (Chandra Kirti Singh) who, contrary to the ordinary Manipuri custom of primogeniture, had desired that his sons should succeed to the throne by turn. The Government of India, however, on receiving the report of the Chief Commissioner, dated 31st December 1890, expressed considerable doubt as to whether the course recommended was advisable, and observed that if they acquiesced in the proposed recognition of the Jubraj (Kula Chandra) the Senapati (Tikendrajit), a man who had more than once incurred the displeasure of the Government of India, would wield the real power in the State.) The views of the Government of India and the Chief Commissioner were strongly divergent as to what policy it was most expedient to pursue, but after considerable correspondence followed by personal discussion the Government of India issued their final orders in their letter No.360-E., dated 21st February 1891 which were to the following effect :—

- (a) that the Senapati (Tikendrajit) should be removed from Manipur ;
- (b) that the Jubraj, *i.e.*, Kula Chandra, should be recognised and that the *ex*-Raja should not be restored ;
- (c) that the Chief Commissioner should visit Manipur and make known on the spot the decision of the Governor-General.

The Chief Commissioner set out for Manipur from Golaghat with an escort of 400 men of the 42nd and 44th Gurkha Rifles, (now the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles and 1/8th Gurkha Rifles respectively), under the command of Col. Skene of the 42nd on March 7th 1891. There were already in Manipur 100 rifles of the 43rd Gurkhas (now the 2/8th Gurkha Rifles) Lieut. P. R. Gurdon, as Assistant Political Officer

to the Chief Commissioner's staff had previously been sent on ahead to Manipur to make arrangements and acquaint Mr. Grimwood with what was intended. Mr. Quinton's intention was to require the Regent (Kula Chandra), and the Darbar to meet him on arrival; to announce the decision of the Governor-General; to arrest the Senapati Tikendrajit and take him away into exile in India. These proposals were approved by the Government of India.

The Chief Commissioner arrived at Manipur on the 22nd March 1891. He had announced that a Darbar would be held at noon of that same day at the Residency. The Regent (Kula Chandra) arrived at the Darbar, with the Senapati (Tikendrajit) but there was considerable delay, they were kept waiting outside the Residency gate, and eventually the Senapati went away. The Chief Commissioner said that he would not hold the Darbar unless the Senapati was present, nor would he see the Regent until the Senapati came and in the end the Regent also went away and no Darbar was held. Another Darbar was fixed for 9 A.M. on the 23rd but nobody came. Every effort was made to persuade the Regent to produce the Senapati but all proved useless. The Chief Commissioner then decided that he must use force and had a letter delivered to the Regent (Kula Chandra) stating that the Senapati (Tikendrajit) would be arrested if he were not surrendered. It was estimated at the time by the Political Agent that there were 5,000 to 6,000 Manipuri troops in the Palace enclosure.

Two small columns of troops consisting of 30 and 70 men under Lieutenant Brackenbury of the 44th and Captain Butcher of the 42nd respectively, with Lieutenant Lugard of the 42nd in support with 50 men, were ordered to enter the Fort and arrest the Senapati on the early morning of the 24th. These operations resulted in complete failure. The Senapati was not found in his house and the troops suffered severe losses, 3 Gurkha other ranks being killed, Lieutenants Brackenbury, who subsequently died and Lugard and 14 other ranks being wounded. During the course of the day these detachments were withdrawn to the Residency and the Residency was subjected to severe fire both from muskets and two 7-pounder guns. It should be added that when our troops entered the palace subsequently they found therein four 7-pounder guns, 1 mortar and six 3-pounders. [General Officer Commanding Assam's report, dated 30th April 1891 at page 5 of E. I. (M) 1891, No.4.] The existence of these considerable armaments is to some extent accounted for by the fact that after the 3rd Burma War, in recognition of the services rendered to our troops by the State, the Government of India presented the Maharaja with two 7-pounder guns and 180 rounds of ammunition, 200 Enfield rifles and 60,000 rounds of ammunition, and 6 Martinis and 1,000 rounds Martini ammunition for the Maharaja's brothers.

The fire was so severe that the Chief Commissioner and Colonel Skene discussed the advisability of withdrawing from the Residency and taking up a position in the open. Before doing this, however, an

attempt was made at negotiation, and eventually a messenger came and said that the Senapati wished to meet the Chief Commissioner. The Chief Commissioner with the four officers referred to at the beginning of this chapter proceeded to the main gate in the Fort. They had no escort and were unarmed. After a long conversation they all went inside the gate and were seen no more. They were all murdered. Mr. Grimwood was speared by a Manipuri sepoy when the party was surrounded by an excited crowd and the other four were kept for 2 hours and then beheaded by the public executioner.

Little authentic information is, naturally, available about these occurrences. It is improbable, however, that this act of treachery was premeditated, but when Grimwood had been killed it appears that the Ministers came to the conclusion that there was nothing to be gained by sparing the lives of the others.

That night a party consisting of the remaining British military Officers, Mrs. Grimwood and Lieutenant Gurdon, together with 160 men, evacuated the Residency, taking the wounded to the number of 17 with them. They left some 270 men behind still holding the Residency enclosure. The Residency, a wooden structure with a thatched roof, was set on fire soon after they evacuated it. They went across country westwards towards the hills and eventually made contact with a detachment of the 43rd Gurkha Light Infantry under Captain Cowley, who were marching up to Manipur from Cachar in the ordinary course of relief. Their action in retreating from Manipur without attempting to rescue their superior officers or even to ascertain what had happened to them, and at the same time leaving so many of their men behind to their fate, was the subject for a considerable time of great controversy and severe comment. It was investigated by a Court of Enquiry held under the orders of the Government of India, and the two senior officers, Major Boileau of the 44th and Captain Butcher of the 42nd Gurkhas, were court-martialled and cashiered for gross neglect of duty in the face of the enemy. In contrast to the feeble conduct of these officers was that of Lieutenant C. J. W. Grant of the 12th Madras Infantry who was commanding at Tamu on the Burma-Manipur border, and of the Gurkha Officer, Jemadar Birbal Nagarkati of the 43rd, who was in command of the detachment at Langthobal, 4 miles from Imphal. Displaying great gallantry and powers of leadership, the Jemadar cut his way through to Tamu with his little force of 33 men, covering 60 miles in 48 hours, and brought to Grant the news of the disaster. Grant at once asked for and obtained orders to march on Imphal and did so with 50 men of the 12th Madras Infantry and 30 of Jemadar Birbal Nagarkati's gallant detachment. They were held up at Athokpam Lawai close to the village of Thobal, 15 miles from Imphal and surrounded by superior Manipuri forces. They fought, however, a most gallant action for 10 days until ordered to withdraw and join the Burma Column, which they did with a loss of 1 I. O. R. killed and 3 wounded. For this action Lieutenant Grant received the Victoria Cross and Jemadar Birbal Nagarkati, who was wounded subsequently at the attack on the stockade on 25th April, was decorated also.

Two members of the telegraph Department, Mr. Melville, Superintendent of Telegraph and Mr. O'Brien, a signaller, also lost their lives in connection with this outbreak. They were on their way to Kohima on the 25th March when they were attacked at Mayangkhang by some Manipuri sepoys assisted by some neighbouring Nagas, and both killed.

Columns of troops were at once sent into Manipur from Kohima, Silchar and Tamu under the command of Colonel R. H. F. Rennick, Major-General H. Collett, C. B., and Brigadier General T. Graham, C. B., respectively, and the rebellion was soon quelled. The chief incident was the attack on the Manipuris' stockaded position by the Burma Column on April 25th, when about 130 Manipuris were killed and the British lost 2 killed and 13 wounded, among the latter being Lieutenant Grant and Jemadar Birbal Nagarkatti. The three columns met at Manipur on the 27th April.

Retribution fell on the perpetrators of the outrage of March 24th. Kajao Singh, who speared Grimwood, was hanged on May 24th, and Niranjana Subadar, a renegade from the Indian Army, on June 8th. Tikendrajit, the Senapati and Thangal General were hanged on the 13th of August 1891 in public. The Regent or Jubraj Kula Chandra Singh together with his brother Angou Singh and a number of others were sentenced to transportation for life. Of the men who murdered Messrs. Melville and O'Brien, one was hanged and 8 sentenced to transportation for life. The area covered by the Manipuri citadel and Palaces, together with a large amount of surrounding land, covering in all 1.83 square miles, was taken as a British Reserve and cleared of most of the buildings on it. The site of the old citadel and Palaces is now occupied by the Assam Rifles Lines, Officers' Bungalows, etc. The only things left standing were the brick wall round the Palace and Coronation enclosures, Gobindji's temple buildings, the Senapati's temple, the Durbar Hall where the prisoners were taken before execution, and the timber entrance to the Coronation enclosure. It was at the foot of the steps leading up to this last building that the British Officers were beheaded. The masonry dragons which formerly stood in front of these steps were blown up.

It may conveniently be mentioned here that in 1928 His Highness made a representation asking for the return of the site of the old Palace and neighbouring buildings. This was rejected* by Sir Laurie Hammond. He renewed his request in 1932† as part of his statement before the States Enquiry Committee which was set up in connection with Federation. The Local Government gave its opinion in 1934 (Sir Michael Keane) that it was not desirable. The Government of India agreed in their letter No.F.198-I/34, dated the 13th August 1934, that the proposal could not be discussed as long as the Assam Rifles remained there. This view was again endorsed in paragraph 6 of Assam letter No.93-G.S., dated the 22nd April 1937, to the Crown Representative in connection with the details of Federation. There the matter rests. New cantonments were built on the site for the

*Political, A, June 1929, Nos. 136-139.

†Political, A, June 1932, Nos. 75-118.

troops of the garrison and from 1901 were occupied by regular troops until, in March 1915 the 123rd Outram's Rifles handed over to the Darrang Battalion of the Assam Military Police, subsequently to become the 4th Battalion, Assam Rifles.

The new Residency which replaced that burnt down by the rebels in 1891 was completed in 1897 and first occupied in January 1898.

The way in which Mr. Quinton handled the situation on the 24th March was the subject of considerable controversy, both in England and in India, especially in respect of his action in inviting the Senapati (Tikendrajit) to the Darbar with the intention of arresting him. The views of the then Viceroy (Lord Lansdowne) were given in a telegram No.954-E., dated May 11th, 1891, to the Secretary of State in the following terms: "...You may repudiate in strongest language idea that Government of India intended to sanction treachery towards Senapati, and we believe that Quinton was incapable of carrying out instructions in a treacherous manner. Imputation of treachery arises from misconception of Senapati's position and that of Manipur State. State is subordinate to Government of India, and Senapati must have known that his conduct in conspiring against Maharaja, who had been recognised by us, rendered him liable to punishment. There was no question of alluring him to Darbar under false sense of security. It is very doubtful whether he ever meant to attend Darbar. According to Gurdon, Grimwood did not believe that he ever left Palace to do so on morning of 22nd. If he did not, he apparently expected arrest.

Until Gurdon's telegram of 7th May reached us, we had not received specific information that, if Senapati refused to submit quietly, Quinton intended to have him arrested at Darbar after announcement of our orders; but we have no doubt Quinton considered open arrest in Darbar, in case of such refusal, would be most straightforward and safest procedure. Knowing Senapati's character, Quinton probably felt that only chance of depriving him of opportunity of fomenting disturbance was to effect his deportation as promptly as possible.

As a matter of fact when Senapati failed to comply with Quinton's orders and letter of warning was sent to Regent, Senapati evaded arrest and prepared resistance which led to massacre. This result shows correctness of Quinton's provision. Had arrest taken place at Darbar as intended, Quinton would not have lost his life.

Antecedents of Senapati should not be overlooked. Grimwood described him as a desperate man who would not be taken alive. In 1881 he was banished and made an outcaste for brutally ill-treating some Manipuris, and in 1888 we advised Maharaja to remove him from State for similar offence. His cruelties were notorious."

This point of view is reiterated in the Viceroy's telegram of 5th June, 1891 to the Secretary of State in which he completely exonerates Mr. Quinton of any discreditable intention or conduct. The telegram ran as follows :—

“Manipur—We wish to draw special attention to the following points :—

First.—It is the right and duty of the British Government to settle successions in Subordinate Native States. Every succession must be recognised by the British Government, and no succession is valid until recognition has been given. This principle is fully understood and invariably observed.

Second.—Manipur is a Subordinate Native State. We rendered it independent of Burma. We have recognised successions in Manipur, and have asserted suzerainty in many ways ; and Manipur ruling family have repeatedly acknowledged their position of dependence. For example, in 1874, Maharaja presented Nazar to Viceroy and received Khilat. Again *ex*-Maharaja now in Calcutta was recognised as future successor by us during his father's lifetime at his father's request ; and, similarly, at *ex*-Maharaja's request, we recognised as his successor present Jubraj. *Ex*-Maharaja, and even Regent and Senapati since revolt, have all admitted dependent position of State. See *ex*-Maharaja's letter, 14th November, paragraph 7. Regent's letter 25th March, last paragraph but one. Rassick Lull Kundu's letter, 4th April, end of paragraph 6. He now states that portion of letter referring to Senapati was dictated by Senapati himself.

Third.—It is our right and duty to uphold Native Chiefs recognised by us except in case of gross misrule, and to punish unlawful revolt against their authority. We have accordingly more than once upheld Manipur Chiefs by force, and punished rebels against their authority—See Aitchison's Treaties, Volume I, page 248, and recent case of Bara Chauba and Jogendra Singh, referred to in Maharaja's letter of 14th November.

Fourth.—The rising against Maharaja in September 1890 was unlawful revolt, and we should have been justified in putting it down by force and punishing rebels. But for Maharaja's abdication, which was somewhat hastily accepted by Grimwood, without reference to us, we should probably have done so. Chief Commissioner offered Grimwood armed assistance from Kohima. See Quinton's telegrams to Cunningham, 22nd and 24th September 1890, and Grimwood's letter 25th September, paragraphs 10 to 14, and Cunningham's letter to Quinton of 24th January, paragraph 6.

Fifth.—When Maharaja wished to recall abdication we were disposed to restore him and re-assert his authority. We gave away on this point to objections earnestly pressed by Quinton, both in letters

and in personal communication, with the Viceroy and Council. Grimwood also was opposed to Maharaja's restoration. See Quinton's letters to Cunningham, 9th and 19th February 1891, and Grimwood's letter 4th December, paragraph 26.

Sixth.—Nevertheless we could not permit a revolt against a Chief recognised by us to remain wholly successful and unpunished, and virtual authority in Manipur to pass into hands of Senapati, who, as lately described by Johnstone in letter, is "a man of infamous character", and who was notoriously turbulent, and the real leader of the revolution of September 1890. See paragraphs 4, 11 and 19 of Grimwood's letter of 25th September, and paragraphs 5, 14, 17, 19 and 27 of his letter of 4th December. Also, correspondence of 1881 and 1888, as to Senapati's antecedents and occasions on which he incurred the displeasure of Government.

Under these circumstances we decided that Senapati should be removed from the State, and Quinton while at Calcutta did not question propriety of this decision.

Seventh.—We did not indicate to Quinton method in which deportation was to be effected. We asked him what steps he considered necessary for carrying out removal without affording Senapati the chance of making forcible resistance. No instructions other than those contained in Letter No. 360 of 21st February were given to Quinton on this point, either by letter or by word of mouth.

Eighth.—Quinton did not immediately consult Grimwood on subject, doubtless for reasons given in demi-official letter to Cunningham of 22nd February. Following is extract from this letter:—Begins. It is of importance that the decision of the Government of India, which I am going to Manipur to announce and enforce, should not be divulged prematurely, and it is scarcely possible to guard against its leaking out if I use the telegraph at Manipur or even write: so many persons are interested in knowing what is about to happen. The Political Agent has no cypher code.—Ends. No doubt Darbar would have tried hard to get message or letter from telegraph or Post Office, and might have succeeded. Some of the Agency establishment are suspected of having been in the habit of supplying information to Darbar, and Quinton must have known this. These facts explain alleged studious concealment from Grimwood of Quinton's attentions, (*sic*).

Ninth.—Quinton's desire to consult Grimwood as far as circumstances permitted is shown by Gurdon's special mission to Manipur a week in advance of Quinton. On that occasion Gurdon gave Grimwood clear information of intended removal of Senapati, and consulted him as to the method of arrest: Grimwood could suggest no way for effecting arrest without affording Senapati opportunity of making forcible resistance. Gurdon's Italian telegram to Quinton reporting on situation was seen and approved by Grimwood. See Gurdon's telegram, 7th May, and his report forwarded with our Despatch of 26th May.

Tenth.—On Gurdon's return from Manipur, Quinton sent his Telegram of 18th March to Cunningham. This telegram was the only reply received to inquiry mentioned in section 7 above, except

demi-official letter of 22nd February mentioned in section 8. In that letter Quinton expressed intention of consulting with General Collett before submitting his recommendations officially.

Eleventh.—We did not know, and we had no reason to infer from Quinton's telegram of 18th March, that Quinton contemplated summoning a formal Darbar or public assembly for the purpose of arresting Senapati. The words "Regent and the Darbar" in that telegram mean Regent and Court or entourage. The word Darbar is habitually used in this sense

Twelfth.—The decision to arrest in Darbar or public assembly was apparently arrived at on 21st March in conference at Sengmai between Quinton, Skene, Cossins and Grimwood. Gurdon, who was in Quinton's confidence, informs us, in report cited in section 9 above, that after this conference Quinton told him that Senapati would be arrested at Darbar next day. Gurdon adds:—Begins. This was the first mention I had heard of the plan.—Ends. Until Gurdon's telegram of 7th May reached us, we did not know precisely what Quinton had intended.

Thirteenth.—Grimwood was opposed to removal of Senapati, and doubtless also to his arrest

Fourteenth.—As to merits of Quinton's proposed action, there was certainly nothing unusual in announcing our orders in formal Darbar, including the order for removal of Senapati. Under ordinary circumstances, this would have been the natural and proper course. No question as to exact time and method of arrest would have arisen, because ordinarily there would have been no thought of resistance, and any person to be deported would have considered himself at Quinton's disposal from the time that orders of Government were announced.

Fifteenth.—The anticipation of possible resistance to such orders is so rare that comparatively few instances of formal arrest in Darbar are on record; but the following cases may be cited. Sandeman lately arrested in open Darbar the Naib of Kej who had attended at his summons. In 1879 General Roberts made formal entry into Bala Hissar, and read out proclamation to assembled notables. After doing so, he informed principal Ministers, whom he suspected of using their influence against us, that it was necessary to detain them. In these cases idea of treachery never occurred to anyone concerned

Sixteenth.—It cannot be too clearly understood that the proposed Darbar at Manipur was not a conference between equals, or anything of the nature of a hospitable reception. It was an assemblage summoned by the Representative of the Paramount Power to declare the orders of the British Government in a case of disputed succession, upon which both *ex*-Maharaja and Regent had addressed us, and upon which in accordance with custom we were entitled to decide, and they were bound to accept our decision. Quinton, in telegram of 18th March says:—"I propose requiring Regent and the Darbar to meet me," and Regent's letter, 25th March, first paragraph, shows Regent understood that he was required to attend with his brothers to hear what our decision was. There was nothing of the nature of allure-ment. The Senapati like the Regent was bound to attend and accept

our order. The Regent was to be recognised as Maharaja, and the Senapati was to be banished. In the meantime Quinton was right in treating both with ordinary politeness. Though Senapati was to be banished, the immediate cause of his banishment was political rather than criminal misconduct.

Seventeenth.—To say that Quinton was bound to give Senapats previous warning of the orders of Government, and of the fact that he would be forcibly arrested unless he submitted to them, is in effect to say that because Senapati was known to be a man of violent character and likely to give trouble, it was therefore Quinton's duty to show him special consideration and give him special opportunity of preparing for mischief. The necessity for forcible arrest could not arise unless Senapati refused to accept our orders. It could only therefore be the result of his own misconduct and revolt against our paramount authority, which authority he himself subsequently acknowledged in letter referred to above, Section 2.

Eighteenth.—We do not know Quinton's motive for arrest in Darbar. He probably desired to announce and carry out our orders in most formal and open manner. Statement that Darbar was delayed in order to give time for translation of Quinton's speech supports this view. Arrest of Senapati could apparently have been effected with less difficulty by summoning him to private interview ; but Quinton probably thought this would not have been as a suitable to the occasion. In any case there was nothing of the nature of treachery involved.

Nineteenth.—If Quinton had been willing to stoop to treachery there would have been no difficulty in the matter. He could certainly and easily have allayed Senapati's suspicions by friendly assurances and have seized him on occasion of friendly visit.

Twentieth.—Suspicion of treachery, which arises primarily from misapprehension of nature of proposed Darbar, may perhaps be secondarily due to special circumstances for which Quinton was not responsible ; for example, Grimwood and Simpson's shooting expedition with Senapati after orders of Government had been communicated to Grimwood.

Twenty-first.—As to military questions involved we would rather not offer any opinion until the receipt of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry held at Manipur, which were posted there on the 31st May and are due here on the 14th instant. We can only say that both in letters and in personal communication with Quinton, we instructed him to take care that he had a sufficient force. From the papers that have come before us, it is evident that Quinton and the responsible military authorities in Assam considered the escort ample to overcome any resistance that could reasonably be expected.

Twenty-second.—To sum up. It was our duty to settle disputed succession in Manipur. We accepted opinion of local authorities and decided in favour of acknowledging Jubraj instead of restoring Maharaja : but we stipulated that Senapati, who had led revolt against Maharaja, and was a man of turbulent and infamous character, must

leave the State. We did not prescribe method of his deportation ; and we did not know Quinton intended to arrest him in Darbar ; but we considered that Darbar was suitable place for announcement of our orders, including order for banishment of Senapati, and we see no treachery whatever in Quinton's intention to arrest Senapati there and then if he declined to submit to those orders, which, as subject of a subordinate Native State he was bound to obey. As to question of escort we desired Quinton to take sufficient force, and he took the full force which was considered necessary by him and the local military authorities."

Paragraphs 12 to 17 of the Secretary of State's despatch No.9, dated the 24th July, 1891 are important on the question of policy and run as follows :—

"12. Your Government would undoubtedly have been justified in restoring the Maharaja by force in September, when the revolution took place, and had he not fled precipitately this course would probably have been adopted ; nor, in my opinion, would either the delay that occurred or the fact that the local officers were content to accept the results of the revolution without comment have justified you in abstaining from considering the *ex*-Maharaja's application when it came before you, and vindicating the right of the Paramount Power to decide the question of succession on its merits. Your interference was necessary, not only in the interests of the Manipur State, where the character of the Senapati and the traditions of the succession indicated the probability of this attempt, if allowed to go unpunished, being frequently repeated ; it was necessary also in the interests of the British Government, which has of late years been brought into much closer relations with the State and its subject tribes than was formerly the case, and cannot safely tolerate disorders therein ; but above all it was necessary in the interests of the other protected States of India, for every Chief would have felt the stability of his power was compromised had you passed over without notice an unprovoked and successful rebellion proceeding only from family quarrels.

13. I am satisfied, therefore, that your Government were right in deciding to interfere. I am equally satisfied that no interference which left the successful head of the rebellion, a man notorious for his turbulent and violent character, in possession of the real power of the State would have been adequate, and that your decision to remove the Senapati from Manipur and intern him in India was sound and politic.

14. The question whether the *ex*-Maharaja should be restored, or whether the Jubraj should be acknowledged as Maharaja, was by no means so clear as that of the Senapati's removal. Your Government were at first inclined to restore him, and only yielded to the strong remonstrances which the Chief Commissioner urged against that course. I have very carefully considered the subject in the light of the objections urged by Mr. Quinton to the restoration of the expelled Maharaja, and am of opinion that your Government was justified in yielding to those objections. The obligations imposed on you by the

declaration of the Government of India in 1851, though not limited to Maharaja Kirti Chundur, were necessarily dependent on the Maharaja's capacity to govern, and on his willingness to abide by our advice. In this case, the Maharaja's abandonment of his throne and territory (for I am satisfied that his abdication was deliberate and complete), and his unreadiness to follow the advice of your Government, absolved you from looking to any other considerations than those demanded by the interests of peace and good government, while the representations of the local authorities, as well as the Maharaja's previous history, indicated that these interests would in all probability be better served by the acknowledgment as Maharaja of the heir apparent, than by the forcible restoration of one who had shown himself incapable of properly exercising the authority conferred upon him.

15. The decision to accept the Jubraj as Maharaja, if Sur Chandra Singh was not to be restored, followed as a matter of course. He had not taken part in the insurrection, he was the heir apparent, he was supposed to be capable, he had shown himself amenable to advice, and there was practically no other competitor.

16. So far then as the policy of your Government is concerned, I am glad that Her Majesty's Government have been able to afford it their full support. It was honourable, it asserted the rights of the Government of India, and it was calculated to give assurance to feudatory Chiefs. Nor do I doubt that you were right in leaving to the discretion of the Chief Commissioner the details of the method of enforcing your decision.

17. One question remains, which I think may be better dealt with in considering the orders of your Government than in considering the action of your subordinates. I refer to Mr. Quinton's intention for causing the Senapati, should he not surrender, to be arrested in Darbar. I have considered this subject very carefully in the light of your telegram of 11th May last, in which you explained that you had no specific information on this point until the receipt of Mr. Gurdon's telegram of 7th May, and I am satisfied that in giving your sanction to the proposals formulated in Mr. Quinton's telegram of 18th March, you had no reason to contemplate, and in fact did not contemplate, this action. I fully concur with you that nothing like treachery can be imputed to Mr. Quinton in this matter, but care should be taken that persons summoned to attend Darbars, which are almost universally understood to be held for ceremonial purposes, should not be subjected therein to measures of personal restraint."

It will be observed that Lord Cross, while he concurs with the Government of India in holding that "nothing like treachery can be imputed to Mr. Quinton in this matter", indicates by the injunction in his last sentence as to future procedure some feeling of misgiving regarding the line of action that was adopted at Manipur.

In paragraph 2 of the same despatch, reference is made to a Committee of Enquiry which the Government of India had constituted at Manipur and the Secretary of State observes that until he had received those proceedings and the Government of India's orders

thereon, he would not be in a position to comment on the later phases of the question (*i.e.*, the action taken by the local authorities in giving effect to the Governor-General's instructions which culminated in the disaster of March 1891). A Military Court of Enquiry presided over by Colonel Evans, 43rd Gurkhas, sat during May 1891 to investigate the action of Military Officers between 21st and 25th March, and also of civil officers so far as was known to the witnesses: while Major Maxwell, the Chief Political Officer, undertook simultaneous investigations into "the causes and circumstances of the outbreak.....including the action of our civil and military officers between the 21st and 25th March."* It is a serious misfortune that in spite of search at Manipur, in the Shillong and the Government of India Secretariat, and at the India Office, no record of either the Assam Government's nor the Supreme Government's views nor the Secretary of State's final decisions on those inquiries have been traced.

These events were the subject of discussion both in the House of Commons and the House of Lords.

On June 16th, 1891, Sir William Harcourt, the Member for Derby, moved for papers in a moderate speech. One of the points he made was that it was improper to arrest the Senapati in Darbar. The Secretary of State for India, Lord Cross, being in the Upper House, Sir John Gorst, the Under-Secretary, replied. He made an unfortunate speech, which was severely criticised by other members and in one particular repudiated by his official superior. His main effort was directed towards defending the procedure which was adopted, and in particular repudiating any suggestion of treachery on Mr. Quinton's part. But he made a great blunder in advancing the theory that Government did not like to have able men in native States, and that that in fact was the real reason for getting rid of the Senapati, a policy of cutting off the tall poppy heads.

Mr. George Nathaniel Curzon, then the Member for Southport, and latter to become the great Viceroy, expressed his complete disagreement with the Under-Secretary and warmly defended the arrest in Darbar of the Senapati, whom he described as a man of infamous character. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman defended Quinton and Grimwood as against the Government of India, who, he made out, made him act against his better judgment. Sir Richard Temple, the Member for Evesham and *ex*-Governor of Bombay, said it was not justifiable to summon the Senapati to the Darbar without giving notice of the intention to arrest him, but he defended generally the action of the Government of India.

The general trend of the debate was in the direction of exonerating Quinton but condemning the Government of India. Gorst, the Under-Secretary, undoubtedly made a bad impression.

In the House of Lords on the 22nd of June 1891 the debate was on a rather higher plane. The *ex*-Viceroy, Lord Ripon, criticised the Government of India's action as an unsatisfactory compromise

* East India (Manipur) 1891, No.5 C.6548.
Harvard—Vol. CCCLIV, 1890-91, Pages 541-641 and 985-1053,

between two courses. Either they could have restored the *ex-Raja* or they could have acknowledged *de facto* the new one. But they chose the third course of acknowledging the revolution but punishing its authors. He condemned the arrest in the Darbar but acquitted Quinton of any underhand intention. He severely condemned Sir John Gorst's "rash and cynical declaration" as to the policy of the Government of India and he ended by begging the Government not to annex Manipur.

He was followed by Lord Cross, the Secretary of State. He declared himself, subject, of course, to the advice of the Government of India, which had not yet been received, as against annexation. He described his Under-Secretary's suggestion that a man was to be removed from a State simply because he was an able man or an independent man as "utterly repugnant to all common sense and to all our practice in India or elsewhere" As regards the arrest in Darbar, he explained this particular one as being in the nature of a Court where Government's decision was to be pronounced but could find no precedent for the summoning of a man to a Darbar in order to be arrested and he expressed his disapproval of such a procedure. He defended, however, the action of the Indian Government and paid a high tribute to the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne. Lord Kimberley and Lord Northbrook, the second another *ex-Viceroy*, both condemned what was done in connection with the Darbar as being wrong, Lord Kimberley describing it as savouring "a little too much of oriental finesse". Both of them were opposed to annexation. Lord Derby also advised against annexation and said that the Princes would mistrust us if we did so.

It is interesting to observe that throughout the discussions in both Houses there was no mention, much less criticism, of the ignominious flight of our officers on the night of March 24th. Probably details had not yet reached England.

The future position of Manipur had to be decided. The Chief Commissioner, Mr. Ward, was decidedly in favour, as were a great many other officers, of annexing the State. Reviewing the facts in detail in a note recorded on the 16th July 1891, he stated his view, and in the strongest terms, that there were no mitigating circumstances which might lead to hesitation in declaring the annexation of Manipur. Paragraph 35 of his note sums up his views as follows:—

"35. To sum up, then, the views expressed in this note :

(1) In view of the recent events at Manipur, I think that we are not only justified in annexing that State, but that it is imperative for the maintenance of our *prestige*, and as a lesson and a warning to other Native States in India, and without any regard whatever to financial considerations, that we should do so.

(2) I have little doubt that the whole of the hill population, being one-third of the total population of the State, and that nine-tenths of the whole population of the State, would welcome annexation. In the case of the hill tribes I think there are obvious reasons why they should do so. Under the circumstances, unless we wish to cast off the obligation, which we took upon ourselves thirty years

ago, of protecting the people of the State against oppression, and against the necessary consequences of misrule and periodical revolution, I consider it to be a moral duty imposed upon us to annex.

(3) Lastly, I have no doubt, looking at the matter solely from a financial point of view, that there are no grounds whatever for thinking that annexation will result in financial loss to Government.

The view taken by the Supreme Government was otherwise, as the following quotation from pages 286 to 288 of Tupper's Indian Political Practice, Volume II, shows :—

286. Another illustration of the policy of maintaining Native rule is afforded by the Manipur case, of which the main facts have been stated in the first chapter. In discussing the question whether the Manipur State should be annexed, the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, wrote as follows :—

“The questions which have to answer are, I think, two—

- (a) Have we a moral right to annex the State ?
- (b) If we have such a right, is it desirable, upon grounds of broad policy, to exercise it ?

The answer to the first of these questions must, I think, be in the affirmative. At the same time it might, I think be contended with some show of reason that the Manipur rebellion was the work of one man, and not a deliberate attempt on the part of the State to shake off our yoke. Be this, however, as it may, we cannot allow ourselves to forget that the lawful Ruler of Manipur—a Ruler whom we had recognised—was forcibly deposed ; that the nominal Ruler by whom he was replaced, has been properly convicted of waging war against the Queen ; and that the virtual Ruler of the State from the time of the conspiracy of September 1890, up to the date of occupation of the State by a British force, was the turbulent and disloyal ruffian who, supported by the whole of the Manipur army, and as far as we know, by the people of Manipur generally, has been, implicated in an open rebellion, the ultimate consequence of which was the murder, under circumstances of exceptional horror and treachery, of a high official of the Government of India and the officers with him. The savage hounding down of the telegraph officials, who were in no way connected with the political or military proceedings, and the barbarous murder of Mr. Melville, the entire destruction of the telegraph line, and the desecration of graves in remote localities, have incidentally shown that orders must have been issued for the extirpation of all traces of British supremacy.

We are, therefore, justified in holding that the State, as a whole, has been guilty of rebellion, and that it has consequently, forfeited its right to exist as a State.

It remains then to consider whether we are to insist upon such forfeiture or not. In arriving at a decision, we have, I think to determine one point only. Are we, or are we not, satisfied that it is possible to inflict upon Manipur and the Manipuris a punishment sufficiently significant and exemplary without annexation ? If such

a punishment has been, or can be, inflicted without annexation, I think we should certainly not annex. I am on principle strongly opposed to needless annexations, and I would have a scrupulous regard for the independence of the Native States in subordinate alliance with us so long as they remain loyal, and do nothing to forfeit their right to our protection. The *onus* should, I think, always be upon those who advocate annexation, and it lies with them to show that no other course will satisfy the claims of justice and public policy. We have then to consider what punishment has already been inflicted upon the Manipur State, and what punishment, supposing us to stop short of annexation, can, or ought, yet to be inflicted upon it, and we have to decide whether, when all has been done that can be done without actually annexing, it will be possible for any one to contend that the offence of the State has not been sufficiently purged.

As regards, then, the punishment which has been already inflicted, we have to remember—

- (1) that the rebellion was promptly suppressed by the display of overwhelming force ; that in the only engagements which took place, considerable loss of life was sustained by the Manipuris ; and that their capital has been occupied during the last few months by British troops ;
- (2) In the next place, we have to consider the fact that, of the persons most conspicuously concerned in the rebellion, the Senapati and the Tongal General will be put to death, the Regent and one of his brothers transported and their possessions forfeited, and that suitable punishment has been inflicted upon the other offenders. Upon the assumption that the Senapati was the person most responsible for the rebellion, and for the murder of the prisoners, his execution, and that of the Tongal, must be regarded as of the first-rate importance in respect of the exemplary character of the punishment.

As to the future, assuming that we are to stop short of annexation, I hold strongly that we should deal with the State in such a manner as to make it clear that, just as some of the persons tried before the Manipur Court were properly held to have forfeited their lives, although we did not exact the death penalty, so the State, as a whole, has forfeited its right to exist as a State, although, as a matter of clemency, we may determine not to insist upon such forfeiture. I would, therefore, in the contingency which we are supposing, pass sentence of extinction upon the Manipur State in the most solemn manner. I would revoke all existing *Sanads*, and I would re-grant to a new Ruler whom we shall select a carefully limited amount of authority under conditions which would for all time render it impossible for any Manipuri to contend, as Mr. Ghose has contended, that the State is one enjoying sovereign rights, and therefore not owing any allegiance to Her Majesty. The new *Sanad* should, on the contrary, place Manipur in a position of distinct subordination, and any privileges conceded should be made to continue only during the good behaviour of the Ruler, and the pleasure of the Government of India”

287. With regard to the selection of a Ruler, Lord Landsowne did not think it would be desirable to restore the deposed Maharaja ; and eventually the choice fell upon a minor collateral relative of the Maharaja a boy aged five, named Chura Chand, the great grandson of a former Manipur Chief. The Viceroy was of opinion that the new *sanad* should put an end to the succession of brother by brother—a system which had been fraught with trouble to the State, and His Excellency was inclined to adopt a suggestion made by Sir Mortimer Durand that to the new Ruler should be given the title of Raja instead of Maharaja.

The views thus expressed by His Excellency were carried into effect by a Proclamation, dated August 21, 1891, and a notification dated September 1891, both of which are here transcribed :—

Proclamation.—“Whereas the State of Manipur has recently been in armed rebellion against the authority of Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India ; and whereas, during such rebellion, Her Majesty’s Representative and other officers were murdered at Imphal on the 24th of March last ; and whereas, by a Proclamation bearing the date the 19th April 1891 the authority of the Regent, Kula Chandra Singh, was declared to be at an end, and the administration of the State was assumed by the General Officer Commanding Her Majesty’s forces in Manipur territory ;

It is hereby notified that the Manipur State has become liable to the penalty of annexation, and is now at the disposal of the Crown :

It is further notified that Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, has been pleased to forego Her right to annex to Her Indian Dominions the territories of the Manipur State ; and has graciously assented to the re-establishment of Native rule under such conditions as the Governor-General in Council may consider desirable, and in the person of such ruler as the Governor-General in Council may select.

Her Majesty has been moved to this act of clemency by the belief that the punishment inflicted upon the leaders of the revolt, together with the imposition upon the State of suitable conditions of re-grant, will afford an adequate vindication of Her authority.

The Governor-General in Council will make known hereafter the name of the person selected to rule the State and the conditions under which he will be invested with power.”

Notification (No.1862-E., dated the 18th September 1891).—“With reference to the notification in the *Gazette of India*, No.1700-E., dated the 21st August 1891, regarding the re-grant of the Manipur State it is hereby notified that the Governor-General in Council has selected Chura Chand, son of Chowbi Yaima, and great grandson of Raja Nar Singh of Manipur, to be the Raja of Manipur.

The *Sanad* given to Chura Chand is published for general information.

SANAD

The Governor-General in Council has been pleased to select you, Chura Chand, son of Chowbi Yaima, to be Chief of the Manipur State ; and you are hereby granted the title of Raja of Manipur, and a salute of eleven guns.

The Chiefship of the Manipur State, and the title and salute will be hereditary in your family, and will descend in the direct line by primogeniture, provided that in each case the succession is approved by the Government of India.

An annual tribute, the amount of which will be determined hereafter, will be paid by you and your successors to the British Government.

Further you are informed that the permanence of the grant conveyed by this *Sanad* will depend upon the ready fulfilment by you and your successors of all orders given by the British Government with regard to the administration of your territories, the control of the hill tribes dependent upon Manipur, the composition of the armed forces of the State, and any other matters in which the British Government may be pleased to intervene. Be assured that so long as your House is loyal to the Crown and faithful to the conditions of this *Sanad* you and your successors will enjoy favour and protection of the British Government”.

288. The cases of Mysore, Baroda, Manipur and, we may add, Kalat are all leading cases of great importance and therefore the subject of frequent reference and comment in these volumes in connection with the several topics of political policy and law. The Baroda and Kalat cases are alike in this that in both the Chief was actually or virtually deposed (for the Khan of Kalat merited deposition, and it seems certain that he must have been deposed if he had not abdicated), while in both the relations of the State with the British Government were allowed to remain unchanged. In both of these cases intervention was necessitated solely by the personal misconduct of the Chief himself ; the Sardars and other people of the States were sinned against, not sinning against us ; they had suffered from the oppression or cruelty of the Chief ; and the Sardars of Baluchistan were urgent in their appeals to the British Government to set them free from the tyranny of their ruler. The case of Manipur differed essentially in this, that, as Lord Lansdowne said, we were justified in holding that the State as a whole had been guilty of rebellion and had forfeited its right to exist as a State. Advantage was then very naturally taken of the opportunity to get rid of a bad law of succession which had led again and again to disorders in the past ; and, in re-granting the State, to remove all ambiguity as to the nature of its dependence on the Paramount Power. If by force of arms we conquer a State in open rebellion, it is obvious that the conquest must sweep away the former system of relations existing between the suzerain and the feudatory ; and the facts in the Manipur case were clearly those of the conquest of a rebel State. The future system of relations must in such a case depend entirely on the will and pleasure of the conqueror. But if what we have to do is not to put down a rebellion

against our authority but to remove a tyrannical Chief or sanction his abdication, then, though his breach of engagement may set us free to make new conditions with his successor, it is probable enough that the expediency of making new conditions may, if any such are desirable, be outweighed by the expediency of exhibiting political self-control.

* * * * *

The Chief Commissioner received the final order of the Government of India* in their letter No.1878-E., dated the 21st September 1891, which ran as follows :—

“In continuation of the correspondence ending with my telegram No. 48-N. E., dated the 12th September 1891, regarding the regrant of the Manipur State, I am directed to forward the enclosed copy of a notification by the Governor-General in Council, No.1862-E., published in the *Gazette of India* on the 18th instant.

2. The *sanad* conferring the Chiefship on Chura Chand, son of Choubi Yaima, is herein enclosed, and should be made over to the new ruler on the occasion of his investiture. A copy of the *sanad* is enclosed for information and for record in your office. You will observe that it provides for the complete subordination of the Manipur State. As the new Raja will be a ruling Chief with a salute of 11 guns he will be entitled to the style of Highness.

3. The investiture of the new Raja should be carried out under your orders without delay. The ceremony should be as public as circumstances will allow. The *sanad* should be carefully translated into Manipuri and read aloud in Darbar at the investiture, and in the meantime all publicity may be given to the contents of the notification. On the occasion of the investiture you should if possible arrange that the chief persons in the State shall in some suitable manner publicly express their allegiance to the new Chief; and you should make it quite clear that his right depends solely upon his selection by the Government of India, and that the Government of India will not allow that right to be called in question on any ground whatever.

4. Your proposals regarding the levy of tribute will be awaited. At present the information before the Governor-General in Council regarding the resources of Manipur is not sufficiently definite to enable His Excellency to pass orders on this point.

5. The Governor-General in Council has further determined that a fine of which the payment may be spread over a term of years shall be exacted from the Manipur State as a penalty for its misconduct. Your opinion is invited regarding the amount of such fine. I am to suggest that a sum of 2½ lakhs of rupees (British) may be taken as the aggregate contribution on this account. According to your note of

* 1892. Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Confidential, A, Nos. 9-17, Re-grant of the Manipur State.

July 16th, 1891, this would represent the pecuniary loss to Government caused by the outbreak. The contribution might perhaps be taken in labour employed upon the construction of good military roads.

6. With regard to the administration of the State during the minority, Major Maxwell is hereby appointed Political Agent in Manipur and Superintendent of the State, with full powers. He should exercise those powers with due regard for the customs and traditions of the Manipuris, and should endeavour to interfere as little as possible with existing institutions, in so far as they may be compatible with peace and good order.

7. The education of the newly selected Chief is one of the objects to which the attention of the Political Agent should be directed. I am to say that he should remain as much as possible in Manipur, and that the aim should be to make him a practical ruler, contented with his position and surroundings, and willing to spend his life in the management of his State. A complete English education is a matter of secondary importance.

8. I am to inform you in conclusion that, although the Government of India have not thought it desirable to annex the Manipur State, they have given careful attention to the arguments advanced in your note of the 16th July 1891."

Thus was Chura Chand Singh, at that time aged 6 years, placed on the throne. This boy was the great grandson of Nar Sing, who was Regent during the infancy of Chandra Kirti Singh, then seized the throne for himself and reigned until 1850 when he died. Chura Chand was born, according to a statement made in Major Shakespear's annual report for 1904-05 on the 14th April 1885.

From 1891 Manipur entered on a new phase of its history characterised, as the terms of the *sanad* indicate, by close control by the British Government and, indeed, until power was made over to the young Raja and his Darbar in 1907, by direct administration by British Officers. The events of this period down to the present day may most conveniently perhaps be dealt with under different heads rather than in chronological order.

III.—*The Ruler and the System of Administration.*—The investiture of the Minor Raja took place on 29th April 1892, the proceedings being conducted with due ceremony by Major H. St. P. Maxwell, the Political Agent and Superintendent of the State. A guard of honour was supplied by the 43rd Gurkha Rifles. In the course of his speech, Major Maxwell announced* the abolition of the "*Lalup*" system of forced labour, for which was substituted a house-tax in the valley of Rs. 2 per annum, and of slavery; and the imposition of a land revenue assessment at Rs. 5 a *pari* or $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres, and of a house-tax of Rs. 3 per year in the hills.

* Assam Secretariat—Foreign, A, February 1893, Nos. 56-62.

As regards *lalup*, the Chief Commissioner in his letter No.415-M.,* dated the 7th October 1891 with which were forwarded the instructions of the Government of India contained in their letter No. 1878-E., dated the 21st September 1891 referred to at page 78 above, had intimated his wish to see the system abolished as soon as might be. The Political Agent was then (*vide* his reply dated the 31st October 1891) not in favour of its abolition until roads had been further improved, but the Government of India in a letter No. 568-E., dated the 26th March 1892, expressed a desire "that *lalup* should be abolished as soon as circumstances permit of this reform", and it was in compliance with these instructions that Major Maxwell made the announcement of April 29th, 1892. In his report on the investiture, he stated as follows :

"4. As regards the *lalup*, it may be thought that the present is an inopportune time to abolish a system which so greatly assists in improving the backward communications in the State ; but, in addition to the desire of the Government of India to abolish the *lalup*, I have been guided in my action by the numerous cases of distress caused by the system which have come to my knowledge. The late Durbar worked the *lalup* in the same slow and easy fashion of its other undertakings, the majority of the *lalup* coolies on duty idled away their time, and more often than not were fed by the State during the term of service. Under our Engineers a real hard day's work was exacted from each man, and he had to feed himself. When sickness entered a house, the *lalup* member had either to carry out his *lalup* or purchase a substitute; in former days the payment for a substitute was a few annas, but under the more businesslike way in which the *lalup* was worked by us it rose to 6 and 7 rupees. In Manipur the internal trade of the valley is carried on by the women who are remarkably industrious, and the *lalup* fell heavily upon their earnings ; when a husband was unable to perform his *lalup* through sickness, the substitute was purchased by the wife's industry, and again the idle husband was relieved, when practicable, by the same means. Over and over again have the groans of the *lalup* coolies reached my ears, and in consequence of the *lalup* much disappointment has been expressed by the subjects of the State at our rule. It further possessed the drawback of affecting only the poorer classes of the community ; all Brahmans and other well-to-do persons escaped the duty. Daily labourers on small wages are obtainable in the valley, and I do not anticipate any difficulty in obtaining labour for our public works in Manipur.

5. In the place of *lalup* I assessed the valley with a house tax of Rs. 2 per annum. This tax, I estimate, will produce a sum as Rs. 50,000 yearly, which will enable me to carry out the public works of the district in an efficient manner. The poorer classes will be able to work out the tax, and the rich and others will have the opportunity to share the expenditure incurred on communications. The homesteads of the people are not taxed, and in the majority of instances the compounds are large. Should afterwards it be found that the house tax is too small, it can be increased by bringing them under assessment."

* Assam Secretariat—Foreign, A, February 1893, Nos. 50-55.

He made the announcement of its abolition in the following words.

“...The first measure which is most open to abuse is the *lalup* system. This is a system which calls upon a certain part of the population to labour free for the State for ten days in every forty. The burden of this duty falls upon the poor, and the rich and well-to-do escape it altogether. When sickness enters a house, the *lalup* member has either to carry out his *lalup* or purchase a substitute, and very often the family is impoverished owing to his cause. It is, of course, necessary for the welfare of the State that its communications should be kept in good order, and that its public works should be progressive, but it also is the essence of just Government that these works should not be kept up at the expense of the poor only, or of only a small portion of the community. It is fair that every one should bear his quota of this expenditure, and, in consultation with the leading Manipuri gentlemen in Manipur, I have come to the conclusion that the system of *lalup* must be abolished, and it will cease from this date. To provide for the necessary expenditure on public works, as a substitute for *lalup*, a uniform tax of Rs. 2 an hour per annum throughout the valley will be levied. I hope this change will be willingly accepted by you all.”

As regards slavery he wrote as follows.

“...6. The question of slavery has attracted my attention ever since the arrival of the British troops in Manipur. Early in May 1891 I was given a list† showing the number of the Raja’s slaves, and ever since the birth increase to this number has been reported to me. My sanction to marriages of these slaves has always been solicited, and the poor people seem to think they are as much my property as the fowls in my poultry yard.

The chief duty of the Raja’s slaves is to cultivate the royal lands, retaining for themselves just sufficient of the produce to sustain life, to work for the Raja at all times, and it has been the custom of the master, on marriage, to settle on his wife’s family several of his slaves. Favourite Ministers and others are also on occasions rewarded by a gift of a certain number of slaves. Only under very special circumstances are the Raja’s slaves released, and the great majority have been born into slavery.

Ordinary individuals possess slaves by purchase ; when a person is fined in a court of justice, and is unable to pay, he is sold to any other person willing to pay the fine, and the slave is retained until he is able to refund the purchase money. Parents, when pressed for funds, sell their children, and any children born of these slaves become the property of the master of the slave. A husband for the same reason will often sell his wife and children, and marrying another woman will commence life afresh. On repayment of the purchase money, this class of slaves can redeem their liberty, but, as a matter of fact, having to work for their master, no means are open, except a nugget fall from the skies, to accumulate money, and death only frees these poor people from serfdom. The Chief Commissioner will see I have

† Married couples	394
Single men	434
Male children	288
Female children	128
Widows	77
Old and infirm per- sons.	10

ordered that all persons at present in slavery to private individuals shall cease to be slaves in five years from the 29th ultimo or at any previous date on repayment of the purchase money, deducting one-fifth for each year's service commencing from that date.

This in a measure may be considered to acquiesce in the system of slavery, but I did not see any other practicable way out of the difficulty. • A leading Manipuri gentleman whose advice I sought in the matter, gravely proposed that a forward service of 25 years should be fixed as the term when redemption from slavery might be claimed. I myself have no means of judging the number of people at present in bondage, nor the total sum invested in this kind of property, but I have great hopes, however, by offering advances for working on the roads, etc., of enabling many persons to repurchase their liberty."

At the conclusion of his address Major Maxwell made an allusion to the succession in the following terms,—

"...the Government of India has decided that the succession to the Chiefship of Manipur will be hereditary in the family of Raja Chura Chand, and will descent in the direct line by primogeniture, and that each succession must be approved by the Governor General in Council."

The young Rajah was sent to the Mayo College, Ajmere, in 1895, with his half-brother Raj Kumar Digendra Singh, where he had the advantage of the particular care and tutelage of Colonel Loch, the Principal of the College. Later on he spent a certain period with the Imperial Cadet Corps at Dehra Dun.

In 1901 the Chief Commissioner (Mr. H. J. S., afterwards Sir Henry, Cotton) decided that the Raja, who had attained the age of 16 in April 1901, should leave the Mayo College in order to obtain training in Manipur under the Political Agent. He returned accordingly in September 1901 in time to receive the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, who paid a visit to Manipur in November and held a Durbar at which the young Rajah was present. A tutor, Captain J. R. Nuttall, 44th Gurkhas, was appointed in September 1902.

A Maharaja of Manipur must have at least 5 wives. The first one is known as the Maharani, the rest being called Ranis. On the 17th March 1905 the Rajah celebrated his first wedding to Ngangbam Dhanamanjuri Ibemacha of Imphal. He married a second wife, Chingakham Syama Sakhi, in March 1908: and a third, Ngangbam Priya Sakhi, subsequently. The first Rani had a daughter Tampha Sana, in 1909 and 4 more later on: the second, 3 sons, the eldest being born on 24th July 1908; the third 1 son and 2 daughters. By 1913-14 His Highness had acquired 2 more wives, *viz.*, Chongtham Chetanamanjuri and Haobom Lilabati, the second of whom bore him one son. In 1925 he married a sixth Rani, Maisnam Subadani, who gave birth to a daughter in 1929 and a son later on. In 1925 Her Highness the Maharani adopted as her own the son of the third Rani under the name of Jai Singh.

On the 15th May 1907, the administration of the State was made over to His Highness, assisted by a Durbar consisting of one member of the Indian Civil Service lent from Eastern Bengal and Assam and 6

Manipuris. It then had a balance of Rs. 2½ lakhs to its credit, while its normal revenue was about Rs. 4,20,000 with an expenditure of Rs. 4 lakhs. The young Raja was formally installed on the *gadi* by Sir Lancelot Hare, the Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam in February 1908. (It is interesting to note that the Lieutenant-Governor's party travelled from the railway at Dimapur to Imphal by motor car.)

In 1908 the Raja's new palace, built at considerable cost, was completed and occupied.

On the 4th December 1917 His Highness was made a C.B.E., in recognition of his services in connection with the war, and was promoted to the hereditary title of Maharaja. He was made a K.C.S.I. on January 1st, 1934.

On 12th September 1941, after a 50 years' reign he announced his desire to abdicate, but before the formalities towards this end had been completed, he died on 6th November 1941 at Navadwip in Bengal.

He was succeeded by Maharajkumar Bodh Chandra Singh, born to the second Rani on July 24th, 1908. He was educated from the age of 12 to 20 at the Rajkumar College, Raipur, where he was joined later by his brother Pryabrata. They went to England for 6 months in 1922 with Mr. V. A. S. Stow, the Principal of the College, and were there for 6 months under the guardianship of Colonel Sweet. The third son, Lokendra Singh, also went to Raipur in 1925-26 and then to the Mayo College, Ajmere, when he obtained the Chief's College Higher Diploma in 1935-36. Pryabrata subsequently pursued his education at the Ewing Christian College, Allahabad, and Allahabad University, where he took his B. A. degree in 1934. The third Rani's son, Jai Singh, adopted by the Maharani, also went to Ajmere in 1935-36. The Jubraj, as the eldest son and heir is entitled, was married in 1929 to Rajkumari Tharendra Kishori or Ram Priya Devi, third daughter of the Raja of Bodo Khemidi, in Ganjam District, Madras Presidency. This marriage was an unhappy one, and he divorced her in 1941. He was married, secondly, on 18th June 1941 to Iswari Debi, eldest daughter of Prince Ramaraja of Ramnagar cousin of His Majesty the King of Nepal, and granddaughter of His Highness the Maharaja of Nepal.

The system of administration in Manipur underwent changes from time to time, and the rules at present (1941) force were framed in 1919 after the Kuki rebellion. They were approved by the Government of India, in their letter No.4326-I. A., dated the 1st October 1919, a letter in which they laid special stress on the needs of the Hills portion of the State.

The main features of the rules are as follows:—

- (a) The Maharaja will be responsible for the administration of the State. He is assisted by a Darbar, the President of which is selected by the Governor of Assam and is usually a member of the Assam cadre of the Indian Civil Service. There are at least 3 Manipuri members of the Darbar.

His Highness can veto any resolution of the Darbar, but copies of his orders have to be submitted to the Political Agent. The latter can refer any matter to the Governor.

- (b) As regards justice, the Darbar is the highest Original and Appellate Court both Civil and Criminal, and may, in its latter capacity, pass sentences up to and including death, subject to confirmation by His Highness in the case of imprisonment of 5 years and upwards, and by the Governor in the case of death.

The Ruler has powers of pardon in criminal cases and revisionary powers in both civil and criminal cases, subject to the approval of the Political Agent.

Cases where hillmen are concerned and cases arising in the British reserve are excluded from the Darbar's civil and criminal jurisdiction.

Below the Darbar are a series of Courts going downwards thus:—

- (i) *Cherap Court*.—This has criminal powers up to 2 years and Rs.1,000 fine (like a 1st Class Magistrate in British India) and civil powers up to any amount.
- (ii) *Sadar Panchayat sitting in Imphal*.—Criminal powers to 3 months and Rs.100 fine. Civil powers to Rs.300.
- (iii) *Rural Panchayats*.—Criminal powers to Rs.50 fine and civil to Rs.50. Appeals lie in each case to the superior court.

In 1940, the then Political Agent Mr. C. Gimson, i. c. s., said that the Rural Panchayats did their work reasonably well: that the Sadar Panchayat was the subject of frequent complaint: that the Cherap Court had a very bad reputation: and that the Darbar as a Court was generally respected. References to His Highness were often kept pending for years.

The Police consist of a small body of Civil Police, 56 in number, and a force of 233 State Military Police. The latter are an expensive force costing Rs.30,000 a year. Many of them were recruited from the Manipur Double Company which served in the Great War of 1914-18 and were then smart and well-disciplined, but the force is of little or no value now.

(c) Separate rules govern the administration of the Hills, and they are detailed in the chapter dealing with the subject.

(d) As regards finance, the State Budget has to be passed annually by the Governor of Assam as Agent of the Crown Representative.

IV. *Relations with the Hill Tribes*.—After the events of 1891, steps were at once taken to improve road communications with British India and by February 1896 the bridle path to Kohima had been opened as a cart road, though as yet unmetalled

In 1892 a band of Kukis led by one Toki raided Swemi, as the Angamis call it or, to give it its correct Manipuri name, Chingjaroi, a village in the north east corner of the State, and massacred some 286 persons. This was duly punished by the Political Agent.

In February 1910 a punitive expedition was sent by the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam against two villages of Kukis lying in unadministered territory on the eastern boundary of the State, who had been guilty of raiding both in the Naga Hills District and in Manipur.

In the following year a similar expedition under the direction of Colonel J. Shakespear, the Political Agent, and commanded by Major B. J. Fagan, was sent to deal with some of the more southern tribes in the unadministered Somra Tract. This also was successful.

Kuki Punitive Measures.—The most serious incident in the history of Manipur and its relations with its Hill subjects was the Kuki rebellion commencing in the closing days of 1917, it cost 28 lakhs of rupees to quell, and in the course of it many lives were lost.

In Assam letter No.6310-P., dated the 27th June 1919, which submitted for the orders of the Governor-General the cases of the principal rebel Chiefs arrested in connection with the Kuki punitive measures, is to be found a self-contained account of the origin and the circumstances of the rebellion. In this letter it is observed that one general defect in the administration of Manipur was that the rules did not make adequate provision for the administration of the hills. It was impossible for a single officer to tour satisfactorily in the huge area under his control. Secondly, between the hillmen and the British Officers there intervened a most unsatisfactory intermediary in the shape of the petty Manipur officers termed Lambus. These men were responsible in no small measure for the rebellion. Thirdly, changes in the rules made in 1916 resulted in the President of the Durbar being very much tied to Imphal and so prevented from making long tours in the hills. Lastly, the war and other local troubles made it more difficult than ever for the President to devote the proper amount of time to the hill tribes.

There is no doubt that the administration had been seriously out of touch with their hill subjects, that the latter were not always well treated, and that there were genuine grievances and genuine abuses behind the immediate cause, *i. e.*, the question of recruitment for the Labour Corps, which turned discontent into open rebellion. Such was the position in the beginning of 1917 when recruiting commenced for labourers for employment in France. Difficulties manifested themselves from the start. The Chiefs were against this recruitment, while the Lambus used it unscrupulously as an opportunity to make money for themselves. In spite of these difficulties, however, by May 1917 the first Manipur Labour Corps (No.22) consisting of 2,000 Nagas and Kukis from the Hills was completed and went away. A second Corps was asked for in June 1917 but the idea was soon dropped and the War Office only asked for drafts for the existing Corps. The Chiefs continued to be as obstructive as before and when the Political Agent met them in September 1917 they flatly refused to have anything to do with it. In November 1917, recruiting was suspended owing to the opposition. In December 1917, the Thado Kukis who had responded

poorly to the calls for the Labour Corps sent to France early in the year, broke into open rebellion and raided into the Manipur Valley. They had been alarmed by rumours of further recruitment and coercion, and by pictures painted by the Manipuris on the hill staff of the difficulties and dangers of the journey to Europe and of service in France, in the hope that, by preventing recruitment, they would themselves avoid being compelled to accompany the Corps. The unrest was brought to a head by a low class Manipuri adventurer who toured the hills with stories of the wane of the power of the British and promises of immunity in battle and favours to come, if the royal house were overthrown and he himself installed as the ruler of the State.

Columns of the 3rd Assam Rifles, stationed at Kohima in the Naga Hills, and of the 4th Assam Rifles, stationed at Imphal since 1915 were immediately despatched against the rebels. The area affected was the greater part of the hills south of parallel $25^{\circ} 15'$ in the west and parallel $25^{\circ} 0'$ in the east, the Kukis of the Somra Tract, which was still unadministered, joining the rebels. In the south west, the villages south of parallel $24^{\circ} 30'$, and west of parallel $93^{\circ} 30'$, which had sent men to France, remained loyal. The villages, however, mostly belonged to non-Thado tribes.

Between December 1917 and May 1918 three columns, aided by operations directed from Burma, acted vigorously and continuously against the rebels with varying measures of success.

Towards the end of May, further operations in the hills became impossible, owing to the climate and the state of the rivers, and the rebels were left in peace until the following cold weather. They were still far from being subdued. A large number of villages had been destroyed, but, owing to the nomadic habits of the tribe and the flimsy nature of their houses, the loss sustained was small. More serious was the destruction of considerable quantities of grain and livestock and the interference with cultivation. But owing to their methods of fighting, in ambushes and stockades, which they quickly abandoned, as soon as outflanked, the Kukis had sustained very few casualties, fewer, in fact, than they had inflicted. They were able to supplement their supplies from their Naga neighbours who, though friendly to the forces of law and order, were afraid to refuse the demands of the more ruthless Kukis, better armed than themselves and living in their midst. The majority of the rebels, therefore, were not averse from continuing to fight, while those who were inclined to yield feared reprisals from the rebels, on the one hand and on the other punishment from the authorities for having taken up arms.

The early part of the rains was marked by a succession of raids by the rebels. In the hills, especially, the Kukis seized the opportunity to pay off old scores against Naga villages, the Kabuis and Tangkhuls being the chief sufferers. Upwards of 200 heads were taken by the raiders, and several villages destroyed. With the object of protecting the Tangkhuls and inducing waverers among the rebel chiefs to surrender, a column was sent out from Imphal in July, into the north-eastern hills. One of the most prominent chiefs in these parts eventually made his surrender, and in September two leading Chiefs in the

north-western hills came in, but without their guns. Negotiations were opened with all the leading chiefs, promising them their lives and a fair trial, if they surrendered, with their guns, and assuring them that no further recruitment of labourers for France would take place. But the greater number of the chiefs decided to continue in rebellion.

Long before this, however, the local officers had realised the seriousness of the situation and by May 1918 they had begun to envisage military operations. In July a conference was held at Government House, Shillong, at which Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Keary, Commanding in Burma, and Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Macquoid, then A. A. and Q. M. G., Meerut Division, were present, and it was decided that military operations would be necessary in the cold weather of 1918/19. The Government of India showed considerable anxiety to avoid having to undertake operations, a natural attitude at this stage of the Great War and in view of the widespread commitments of the Indian Army. Accordingly, in September, 1918, at their instance, lenient terms were offered to the rebel chiefs, but the negotiations only resulted in the surrender of a few minor chiefs, who would probably have surrendered in any case. The majority of the Somra chiefs surrendered before the resumption of operations. In the western hills, all thought of surrender was rendered impossible by the outbreak of hostilities between the rebel Kukis and a friendly Kabui tribe. A Kabui village, to pay off an ancient grudge, raided a small Kuki hamlet and massacred the inhabitants. The overlord of the hamlet, one of the rebel leaders, collected his forces and destroyed 20 Kabui villages, taking 76 heads. The Kukis now dared not surrender and give up their guns, for fear of the Kabuis taking advantage of their defenceless condition, and the Assam Government made it fully plain in a letter dated 8th November 1918 that it was now impossible to avoid military operations. The Government of India agreed and the operations were entrusted to Brigadier-General Macquoid, in immediate command with headquarters at Imphal, under the direction of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Keary.

It had been intended that the period of grace fixed for the surrender of the rebel chiefs should expire at the end of October, and the operations should commence on the 1st November. But a serious outbreak of the post war influenza, in a very fatal form, caused serious delay in the Naga Hills and Burma, and to a less extent in Manipur, with the result that active operations were not under weigh until the middle of the month. The scheme of operations consisted in dividing the hostile territory into areas, each with one or more well-equipped bases and chains of outposts, from which small and mobile detachments could operate against the rebels and keep them on the run. In the south-eastern hills, friendly Chins, and in the south-west Lushai and friendly Kukis, were armed and employed as scouts and irregulars. The rebels, who by this time were beginning to feel the pinch of hunger were impressed by the ubiquity of the forces opposed to them, and the first of the leading rebel chiefs surrendered in December. By the end of January, two more had surrendered, while another had been captured, and yet another killed by the Chin irregulars. By the first

week in March all the leading chiefs had given themselves up, and they were quickly followed by the lesser chiefs. The operations resulted in the complete suppression of the rebellion, and the surrender of about 1,000 guns, of which approximately two-thirds came from the Manipur State and the remainder from Thaugdut and Somra. The troops engaged in the operations consisted almost entirely of the Assam Rifles and Burma Military Police, with only a few details of regular troops, such as Sappers and Miners. The Manipur State Military Police also co-operated. Political control was completely resumed by the civil authorities on April 21st, 1919, and in that month Messrs. W. J. Reid, I.C.S., and W. C. M. Dundas, I.P., were appointed as an Advisory Tribunal in connection with the cases of the principal Kukis in the rebellion. In forwarding their recommendations to the Government of India, Sir Nicholas Beatson-Bell expresses the opinion that there was "much to be said for the point of view of the Kuki Chiefs", and that it was "possible to hold that they were more sinned against than sinning". In replying in October 1919 to these recommendations the Government of India decided that a policy of clemency was both called for and justified, and in accordance with that view none of the Chiefs concerned were confined in jail except three persons, not really Chiefs, who were very seriously to blame. These were Chingakhamba, the Manipuri referred to above who exerted great influence over the Kukis; Enjakhup, a Kuki ex-sepoy of the Naga Hills Battalion, who was described as the brains of the movement; and Ngulkhukhai, who was guilty of certain outrageous crimes. It was proposed accordingly that the 9 Chiefs should be confined to an area in the neighbourhood of Sadiya, the headquarters of the Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract.

Though, with few exceptions, it was the Thado Kukis alone in Manipur who were concerned in the rebellion, the trouble spread both into Burma and into unadministered areas, while the Naga Hills District where it borders on Manipur was seriously disturbed. The Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, had to take precautionary measures for a long period. These are described in the chapter dealing with that district.

Colonel H. W. G. Cole was the Political Agent up to May 1917. It is pretty clear that he did not realise how serious the matter was, or if he did, he gave no serious hint of trouble either to Government or to his successor. Mr. J. C. Higgins was President of the Durbar during Colonel Cole's time and succeeded him as Political Agent until Mr. W. A. Cosgrave took over on the 27th of December 1917, when Mr. Higgins went on special duty. Mr. Higgins was engaged almost continuously between 1917 and 1919 in connection with operations against the Kukis. Sir Robert Henderson, a retired tea planter, was appointed President of the Durbar in 1918.

It is worth while observing that at the end of 1917 there were similar serious disturbances in the Chin Hills in Burma, but it was agreed on all sides that they had no connection with the Kuki troubles, and that if there had been no recruiting for the Labour Corps there would have been no rebellion.

When the rebellion was at an end, the future administration of the Hills was the subject of anxious consideration. In their letter No.4326-I. A., dated the 1st October 1919, in which the Government of India conveyed their approval to the new rules they laid special stress on the needs of the Hills and their own desire to see the Hills properly ruled. Their order ran as follows:—

“.....3. In order to give effect to your proposals for the future administration of the hill tribes you recommend the appointment of three Subdivisional Officers, with the necessary establishment, who will reside in different parts of the hills and administer their charges subject to the control of the President of the Darbar and of the Political Agent, and you consider it desirable that in the initial years these officers should be British or Anglo-Indian officers, who should be Government servants and whose services should be lent to the Manipur State, just as the President of the Darbar is lent. As there are few suitable officers in the Assam Provincial Civil Service who could be appointed to these posts, you propose to recruit two or three more officers with a special view to their employment in Manipur. In regard to the emoluments to be given to the officers appointed to the subdivisions you consider that, as they will be members of the Provincial Civil Service, they should receive their pay on the new time-scale of pay of that service, together with a local allowance of Rs. 150 a month to compensate them for the solitude of their surroundings and the responsibility of their work. You, however, suggest that it should be open to you to lend to the Darbar, as an alternative, the services of junior officers of the Indian Civil Service or of the Police Service, who, when so appointed, would receive similar allowances, provided that the total pay and allowances should in no case exceed Rs. 800 a month.

4. The good government of the Hill tracts is an object in which the Government of India are directly interested, and in conveying sanction to these proposals I am to say that the Government of India also approve the other measures which you consider desirable for the proper administration of the Hills, *i. e.*, the opening up of roads and bridle-paths; the extension of education among the tribes; and the bringing of medical relief within the reach of the people of the Hills.

5. With reference to the cost in introducing these reforms you estimate that when the subdivisions have been established and are in working order, the recurring expenditure on the Hill tribes will be approximately Rs. 1,25,000 a year. The revenues derived by the Manipur State from these tribes is not sufficient to cover this charge and as the State finances are at present not in a position to make any contribution on this account, you are of opinion that special measures are necessary for financing the reforms. You accordingly recommend—

- (a) That the annual tribute of Rs. 50,000, payable by the Darbar, may, with effect from the current financial year, be reduced to Rs. 5,000, in recognition of the loyalty of

His Highness the Maharaja and of the aid furnished by the State in raising a double company of Manipuri soldiers and a corps of labourers to take part in the war, and

- (b) That Government should undertake to pay the whole cost of the up-keep of the Mao-Imphal road.

As regards (a), I am to say that it is inadvisable that war services should be made a ground for the reduction of the tribute paid by a State. The Government of India desire to make it clear that the reduction of tribute is not sanctioned in recognition of the services rendered by the State during the war but because they wish to see the hill tribes properly ruled and are willing to help the State in this aim. Moreover it was expressly provided at the time that the Manipur tribute was fixed that the amount would be liable to reconsideration later and the Government of India are of opinion that the administration of the hill tribes is an appropriate object to which the tribute payable by the Manipur State might be diverted. The Government of India accordingly agree to the reduction of this tribute to Rs. 5,000 a year for a period of ten years, in the first instance, with effect from the 1st April 1920, on condition that a sum of Rs. 45,000 is assigned annually from the general revenues of the Manipur State for expenditure on the Hill tribes.

As regards (b), the Government of India accept your view that Government should in future pay the whole cost of the up-keep of the Mao-Imphal road on the condition that the Manipur State will devote the sum of Rs. 30,000 a year which it at present contributes towards the maintenance of this road to the improvement of communications in the hills.

You request that allowance may be made for this liability in the new provincial settlement to be made under the Reforms Scheme. I am to say that due consideration will be given to this point when your proposals regarding the new settlement are received.

6. You state that even with these concessions the Manipur State will find it very difficult to pay its way and repay the loans taken from Government by the sanctioned instalments of Rs. 60,000 a year. You accordingly propose to limit the annual payments on this account to Rs. 30,000 a year which will have the effect of deferring to the year 1937-38 the complete liquidation of the loan of Rs. 2,75,000 granted to the State in 1937 to remedy the results of the floods of 1916-17. The Government of India are pleased to agree to the action you propose."

The wording used in Rule I of the rules which werethus approved is important:—"The hill tribes are administered on His Highness' behalf by the President of the Darbar, assisted by one or more Subdivisional Officers". It is laid down that the President or the Subdivisional Officer shall try all cases (both civil and criminal) in which members of the hill tribes are concerned, Sentences of death or transportation or imprisonment exceeding 7 years have to obtain the confirmation of the Governor. His Highness has a right to be consulted in all matters of importance concerning the

Hill Tribes (Rule 14 of the Rules for the General Administration of the State). The Durbar exercises no direct control ; but from time to time it has tried to claim some indirect control through its power over the Budget.

This policy as regards the hill tribes was anticipated ten years before when Colonel J. Shakespear in sending up a revised set of rules for the administration of the State in his letter No. 1 of the 4th April 1909, was emphatic about the dangers of letting the Ruler have control of the Hills (thereby differing from Mr. A. W. Davis, who had been acting for him). The outcome of the discussions was that the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government in their letter No. 4780, dated the 9th September 1909, proposed that the rule on this point (Rule 18) should run as follows:—

“The Hill Tribes are administered by the Vice-President in accordance with rules approved by the Local Government. His Highness shall be consulted in all matters of importance and the Political Agent, in consultation with the Vice-President, shall try to give effect to His Highness’ wishes, so far as may be. If the Political Agent is unable to agree to His Highness’ proposals, the matter shall, if His Highness so wishes, be referred to the Local Government.” This in fact differs little from the rule accepted in 1919. At an open Durbar held at the Palace on 16th October, 1919, by the Chief Commissioner, Sir Nicholas Beatson-Bell, the new proposals were proclaimed. For the better administration of the Hills the area was divided into 4 Sub-divisions, one with headquarters at Imphal and three outside, *viz.*, for the south west area, inhabited by Kukis, with headquarters at Churachandpur ; for the north-west area, inhabited by Kukis, Kabui Nagas and Kachha Nagas with headquarters at Tamenglong ; and for the north-east area inhabited by Tangkhul Nagas and Kukis, with headquarters at Ukhrul. To assist the State to meet the expenses of the new arrangements, the Government of India remitted for a period of 10 years, later extended to 15, Rs.45,000 out of the annual tribute of Rs.50,000 on condition that the amount was spent on the Hills, while the Assam Government excused the State permanently from the annual contribution of Rs.30,000 towards the upkeep of the Manipur-Mao road on condition that the amount was spent on improving communications in the Hills.

In a resolution dated the 16th September 1920, Sir Nicholas Beatson-Bell reviewed the history of events from the outbreak of the rebellion, which he described as “the most formidable with which Assam has been faced for at least a generation” down to his own tour throughout areas which has been in rebellion, which he accomplished unaccompanied by any escort in May 1920. In it he expressed in cordial terms his appreciation of the attitude of His Highness throughout the rebellion and of the statesmanlike view which he took of the problems that had arisen.

In April 1922 conditions were considered to be sufficiently favourable to allow of the return to their homes of the Kuki Chiefs who, since the rebellion, had been interned in Sadiya, and this was effected without any ill results. The policy of clemency which was adopted after the rebellion was justified, as the Kukis have been conspicuously loyal since. They are now enlisted in the Assam Rifles and two have risen to be Subadars, one in the 3rd and one in the 4th Assam Rifles.

From 1st January 1930, a rearrangement of the administration of the Hill areas was tried. The Subdivisions constituted in 1919 were abolished, the outlying Subdivisional headquarters being done away with, and the whole hill areas was placed immediately under the President with two Subdivisional Officers to assist him, one being in charge of the South and one of the North

In the year 1930-31 occurred the unrest connected with the rise of Jadonang, a Kabui Naga, who started a new religion and induced the superstitious Kabuis to believe that he would overthrow the existing administration and enable them to take revenge on the hated Kukis. The Political Agent decided to make an armed demonstration in February 1931 and proceeded with a column of Assam Rifles to Kambiron where Jadonang had established a temple, and other villages. Jadonang's temple and idols were destroyed. Jadonang himself had meanwhile been arrested in Cachar. He was handed over to the Manipur authorities in March, put on his trial for the murder of four unarmed Manipuris, probably as sacrifice to his new gods, in 1929 and hanged on the 29th August 1931.

But in spite of these stern measures, the Jadonang cult continued under the leadership of a girl called Gaidiliu. She was arrested but escaped, and the period subsequent to her escape saw the movement assume serious proportions. It was a semi religious, semi-martial movement, affecting both Kabui and Kacha Nagas, the belief being prevalent that the new cult would eventuate in a 'Naga Raj' over all the tribes in the hills, and to the special disadvantage of the Kukis. Besides Gaidiliu, a number of other "Maibas" or "medicine-men" arose in one village or another, usurping the authority of the village elders and inducing the simple villagers to believe that to accept the new cult would bring them all sorts of benefits. The movement spread in 1931-32 beyond the borders of Manipur into the North Cachar Hills, the plains of Cachar and the Naga Hills District and gave great anxiety to the Government of Assam. There was continued unrest among the Kabuis and Kacha Nagas in the hills to the west of the valley in 1932-33 but the administration had the satisfaction of capturing Gaidiliu in October 1932 at Kenoma in the Naga Hills. She was given a life sentence in the Political Agent's Court for abetment of murder.

Assam Secretariat, Political, A, October 1920. }
 Nos.1-20 }
 Assam Secretariat Political, A, February }
 1920, Nos.1-57. }

See Annual Report for 1931-32, pages 2-5, Hills for Jadonang.

The uprising under Jadunang would almost certainly have been brought under control earlier, if the Subdivisional Officers had been left in their subdivision instead of being brought into Imphal, and there is good reason to hold that the removal of the Subdivisional Officers from the Hills was the main cause of these troubles, the Administration being once more out of touch with the Hill Tribes. Accordingly, the north-west or Tamenglong Subdivision was reopened in October 1932, and from 1st May 1933 a new arrangement was made whereby the hills were divided into 3 subdivisions, Sadar, Ukhrul and Tamenglong, an arrangement which remains in force now. The President, Manipur State Darbar, is himself in charge of the Sadar Subdivision while at the same time being responsible for the administration of the whole Hill area. Since 1933 a Manipuri Assistant has been appointed with the powers of a First Class Magistrate, and is supposed to relieve the President of all the ordinary work of the Sadr Subdivision.

Unrest was again reported in the year 1933 and in July of that year the Kacha Naga village of Leng had to be burnt. One Jinongpuri had set up himself as a leader there and built a shrine where they offered the head of a Manipuri, whom they murdered. He and his associates were convicted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

The most modern pronouncement on the question of the administration of the Hill Tribes is to be found in letter No.93 written by the Governor's Secretary on the 22nd April 1937, a few weeks after the New Constitution was inaugurated, in response to a request from His Excellency the Crown Representative for an appreciation of the position of Manipur in the future, in special relation to Federation. The references to the Hill Tribes are as follows:—

“2. The most important sphere in which the Political Agent and President of the Manipur State Darbar exercise control is that over the hill tribes. For that control there are historical reasons. In this connection, a reference is invited to letter No.6484-P. of the 4th July 1919 from the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, in which it was emphasised that from the installation of the present Maharaja the hill tribes were treated as on a footing distinct from that of His Highness' Manipuri subjects, being only “dependent on” the Manipur State. The phrase “dependent on” exactly describes the position which has existed from time immemorial and still exists to-day. The State of Manipur consists of a central valley some 700 square miles in area, surrounded by 8,000 square miles of hills. In the valley there live 300,000 Manipuris and a few hill-men, while the hills are inhabited by 160,000 hill-men and no Manipuris. The contrast between the almost fanatically strict Hindus of the valley and the beef-eating, dog-eating tribesmen of the hills cannot be too strongly emphasised. The boundaries of the State do not enclose a cultural unit, but are rather a mixture of the limit up to which the Manipuris of the valley were in the past able effectively to extract tribute from the hill-men whom they despise, for in the eyes of a Manipuri a hillman is on altogether a lower plane of human life.

He could however be made a source of profit, and till 1891 as much tribute as possible was extracted from the hills while not a rupee was spent for their benefit. The method of dealing with recalcitrant subjects in the hills was a simple, if barbarous, one based on the fact that all hill tribes were head hunters. If any village failed to pay the taxes demanded, other villages were armed with guns by the State and allowed to go in and decapitate as many of the inhabitants as they could.

3. Even after 1891 there was no proper administration of the hill tribes and no proper provision for them in the budget. The expenditure on them was only one quarter of the amount they paid in taxes. Neglect of their interests and lack of touch between them and the administration came to a head in the Kuki Rebellion of 1918, which cost the Government of India nearly twenty lakhs of rupees, and the hill tribes and the forces engaged a large number of lives. After the rebellion had been quelled proposals for the future administration of the Manipur State, including the dependent hill tribes, were submitted to the Government of India with Mr. Webster's letter referred to above. Under the Rules approved in the Government of India's letter No.4326-I.A., dated the 1st October 1919, the Political Agent and the President of the Manipur State Darbar were given the control over the hill tribes which they now exercise. The President administers the hill tribes on behalf of His Highness, who is consulted in all matters of importance. The Political Agent, in consultation with the President, gives effect to His Highness wishes so far as is consistent with the orders of the Governor. The duties of the Political Agent are not clearly defined, but in practice his powers are wide.

4. His Excellency, after careful consideration, has reached the conclusion that the present control should in no way be lessened. It is a fact, if a regrettable one, that neither His Highness nor his Darbar is interested in the good government of the hill tribes, while they grudge the expenditure of money on them. Nor would the hill tribes, all warlike peoples, tolerate a reimposition of the old Manipuri method of control by periodical massacre. There is little doubt that any considerable relaxation of our control would inevitably lead to head-hunting and tribal warfare. Thus when one of the hill subdivisions in the State was abolished in 1930, war between Kukis and Nagas was preached within a few months and the hills were soon in a turmoil. Murders were committed both in the State and in the adjoining British District of the Naga Hills, and even now some of the murderers are still at large and in fact it is only on the surface that there is peace. In this connection a reference is invited to the correspondence resting with letter No.D.-3754-P/32 of the 8th December 1932 from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India on the subject of unrest among the Kabui Nagas and the case of the woman Gaidiliu, as illustrative of the ease with which unrest can arise and the difficulty with which it can be allayed among these primitive peoples. His Excellency feels that only by maintaining a decent standard of administration can peace be preserved. Nor would a rising in the hills of Manipur be confined to that locality. It would undoubtedly have most serious repercussions in the State, in Assam, and probably, in

Burma. History shows that the Manipuri cannot and will not give the hills an administration of the standard to which they are both entitled and now accustomed and that it can only be maintained by the control now exercised. We are under an obligation to the hill tribes to maintain to them a decent administration. The consequences of unrest and rebellion among them might be disastrous for Manipur and would be most dangerous for those portions of British India and Burma which lie along Manipur's boundaries."

V. *Internal Affairs*.—In May-July 1898 the Manipur Valley was visited by a terrible epidemic of cholera which caused some 6,053 deaths, including that of the wife of the Political Agent, Captain Cole.

Ten years later an even worse epidemic carried off 12,491 persons in the valley or 6.5 per cent. of the population and double the number that died at the last visitation. In a similar epidemic in May-August 1924, 7,327 persons perished. An outbreak in 1935 promised to be as bad as that of 1908, but the efforts of the medical staff and the more enlightened attitude of the people enabled effective preventive measures to be taken, and the number of deaths was only 1,162.

In 1904* there were disturbances in Imphal known as "nupi lan" or the women's war, arising out of an order issued by the then Political Agent, Lieutenant-Colonel H. St. P. Maxwell, temporarily resuscitating "lalup" or forced labour for the purpose of making the Manipuri inhabitants of Imphal rebuild as a punishment the Assistant Political Agent's bungalow, which had been burnt down. Colonel Maxwell attributed the burning of this bungalow, which was only one of several such incidents, to incendiarism on the part of the Manipur inhabitants of the town, instigated by the "Rajkumars" or descendants of the late ruling house, as a means of showing their dislike for the Ruler who had been imposed upon them in 1891. There was violent agitation, and demonstrations by the market women had to be dispersed by force, but the whole thing was over within a week. In making his recommendations on the matter to the Government of India in his letter No.2-C., dated the 19th October 1904, the Chief Commissioner, Mr. J. B. Fuller, expressed a doubt as to whether it had been wise to allow the families of the former Regent and Senapati (Tikendrajit) to return, as they did with the sanction of the Government of India in 1900, to Manipur after the incidents of 1891. Be that as it might, the Chief Commissioner now advised the banishment of such of the six Rajkumars who had been arrested as ringleaders of the disturbances and who could not show good cause against banishment. The Government of India agreed to this measure, and all six were banished, together with Arsem Gulab Singh, President of the Town Panchayat Court, who had been found guilty of serious intrigue entailing a false charge against the Raja himself.

States, A, June 1940, Nos.454-507, Pages 60-62.

* Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, March 1905, Nos.1-93.

In the letter referred to, Mr. Fuller had something to say on the subject of "lalup" which Colonel Maxwell said he had resuscitated for the purpose of punishing the disaffected element in Manipur. The Chief Commissioner explained that though, as reported to the Government of India in telegram No.23-S., dated the 1st May 1892, "The system of forced services known in Manipur as *Lalup*" had been abolished on the occasion of the investiture of the minor Raja, this abolition did not extend to labour for annual repair of roads and embankments. He was not satisfied that it was desirable to continue the system and proposed to make further inquiries.

On the 22nd November 1904, Lord Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief, visited Manipur on his way to Burma. Unlike Lord Curzon, who travelled *via* Cachar, he chose the Kohima-Mao route, and is said to have had the satisfaction of completing the further journey from Manipur to Burma in one day less than the great Viceroy took in 1901.

1911 saw one of those periodical visitations of scarcity consequent on the seeding of the wild bamboo which attracted hordes of rats which then turned their attention to the rice crop and destroyed it in the villages of the South Western tract of the hills. Elsewhere, though there was scarcity it was by no means serious and relief measures were not necessary.

In 1912 there was worse scarcity as the rats destroyed the millet on which the hillmen were relying to replace their lost rice crop.

Early in 1913 the public peace was seriously disturbed by a widespread agitation against the system of "pothang" or compulsory labour provided by villagers for the repairs of roads and schools and the transport of officials' baggage, every village in the valley combining in passive resistance. The administration almost came to a standstill, attempts at conciliation were in vain, and finally a detailed scheme for the abolition of *pothang* and the substitution of grants for road and school repairs and for officials' travelling allowance were drawn up and sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner. The abolition of *pothang* was proclaimed on June 9th, 1913 together with orders regarding the imposition of new taxes to defray the extra cost consequent on the abolition of *pothang*. These new taxes gave rise to fresh agitation which it took some time to allay. The Darbar then went into the various other ancient obligations and services of the people to the ruler and the State and put them on a regular, in many cases a cash, footing. The Vice-President's annual report for the year 1913-14 describes it as "a memorable one in that.....it saw the last of all the old systems binding the people to personal service to the State."

In October 1916 occurred disastrous floods. Practically the whole of Imphal was submerged and great damage and distress was caused both in the Manipur Valley and in the settlements in the valleys of the Barak and Jiri rivers on the Cachar border. Some 35,000 acres of rice was severely damaged. The cost of repairing public works was estimated at a lakh of rupees and Rs.11,000 was spent in the relief of distress.

In May 1921 and February 1922 detachments of the Manipuri Military Police were sent to assist the Assam Government in maintaining order on the Assam-Bengal Railway and in Sylhet and Silchar during the troubles consequent on the Civil Disobedience movement, a tribute to the efficiency and discipline which they then possessed.

In 1921 there was great distress owing to the high price of rice resulting on the poor harvest of the previous winter. Relief works were opened and gratuitous relief distributed and the State had to spend Rs.20,000 on famine relief.

In November 1926 the Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Birdwood, passed through the State on his way to Burma.

In June 1929 the Valley was visited by severe floods similar to those of 1916, and great damage was done to the State works, including the new Hydro-Electric plant, necessitating the taking of a loan of Rs.99,000 from Government for repairs. Owing, however, to the time of year at which they occurred, the damage to crops was not so serious.

The Viceroy, Lord Irwin, visited the State in January 1931, the first visit made by a Viceroy since that of Lord Curzon, 30 years before.

In 1939 and 1940 there was a substantial amount of agitation arising partly out of economic conditions, partly out of grievances of other sorts. There was an unfortunate incident on December 12th, 1939, when the President, Manipur State Darbar, and other British officers were besieged in the Telegraph Office in the British Reserve by hundreds of bazar women who had in the end to be forcibly moved aside by men of the Assam Rifles. The occasion for this was the economic grievance arising out of a rise in the price of rice due to excessive exports coupled with a genuine fear of a shortage of rice in Manipur, where a shortage means starvation, because it is impossible to import rice at a price which Manipuris can pay. The heavy exports in turn were the result of the numerous rice mills which have sprung up in Manipur. Though the export of rice was stopped and the mills ceased working, the agitation, which was fomented by Congress elements in Assam, persisted for many months in 1940 and gave rise to some anxiety.

VI. *External relations.*—Boundaries, to which Mackenzie's book devotes considerable space, were the subject of discussion many times after 1883.

Controversy centred chiefly round the Kabaw Valley in its bearing on the Burma-Manipur frontier, the dispute regarding which was kept up till modern times, though it may now be regarded as closed.

Mackenzie deals with this matter at pages 175 and following of his book. The important dates are as follows. In 1834 an agreement was reached with the then Government of Burma by which the boundary between Burma and Manipur was placed at the eastern foot of the

mountains on the west of the plain of the Kabaw Valley, in other words the valley was ceded to Burma. Manipur was granted compensation at the rate of Rs.500 a month on account of the loss of territory. This agreement received the sanction of the Government of India.

In 1882 a Boundary Commission was appointed to examine the boundary or rather only a part of it, *i.e.*, that part north of Kongal thana. Colonel Johnstone who incidentally was a staunch supporter of Manipur's claims to the Kubo Valley was appointed on the Manipur side, but Burma did not co-operate in the matter and the Commission did its work without their assistance. The Government of India accepted the findings of the Commission and the Secretary of State approved of them in his Despatch No. 8 of 31st January 1883.

In 1896 a Joint Boundary Commission on which Colonel Maxwell represented Manipur and Captain MacNabb represented Burma explored the boundary between the two countries south of Kongol thana up to the Tinzin river. They defined as far as possible the boundaries laid down by the agreement of 1834, their conclusions were accepted by the Government of India in their letter No. 1262-E.B., dated the 16th July 1896, and the Chief Commissioner of Assam accepted the boundary in his letter No. 478-For.-3299-P. of the 5th August 1896.

In 1924 the Maharaja raised the question again regardless of the long period which had elapsed since the boundary was last defined. His main point was that the existing boundary did not follow that which had been agreed on in 1834. There followed a long correspondence between Manipur, Assam and Burma. In a letter dated the 5th June 1928 the Governor in Council expressed the opinion that the matter ought to be dropped. The Maharaja, however, persisted and, on its being again represented to them, the Government of India in a letter dated the 3rd October 1929 said they would be prepared to reconsider the matter. They referred it to Burma and said they would be prepared to appoint a Board of Arbitration. Burma expressed the strongest opposition to the re-opening of the case and incidentally pointed out that if it was re-opened then they could not avoid in fairness to refuse to re-open also the claims of the Thaugdat Sawbwa in the territory lying to the north of Kangal thana. Assam agreed entirely with the view taken by Burma and informed India accordingly. His Highness, however, expressed a wish to visit the area in person and there the matter rested. The Maharaja never in fact found it convenient to make the proposed visit.

In March 1932 this question, among others, formed the subject of a memorandum signed by His Highness for submission to the States Enquiry Committee which was set up in connection with Federation. The Committee, however, held that the matter was outside their terms of reference.

1. Political, A, December 1931, Nos. 80-116
2. Political, A, June 1932, Nos. 75-116.
3. Political, A, 15premies 1935, Nos. 1-17

The last time on which it was raised was in August 1932 when the Maharaja again addressed the Local Government. In forwarding the representation to the Government of India in a letter dated the 6th April 1934 the Government of Assam strongly advised against action to re-open the matter being taken or even contemplated and His Excellency in Council expressed his hope that the Government of India would decline to consider the proposed retrocession of the Kabaw Valley. The matter was finally disposed of in the Government of India's letter No. F.453-P/34, dated the 11th April 1935, in which they said that "The agreement of 1834 could not be revised at this late stage and the Government of India are unable to agree to an enhancement of the rate of compensation which had been fixed and enjoyed for a period of 100 years".

The question of the Somra Tract was of interest to Manipur. The Tract lay on her North-East frontier in the direction of Burma, in the hills north of the Kabaw Valley, between the Tizu and the Nampanga rivers, and covered some 800 square miles inhabited by Thado Kukis and Tangkhul Nagas. The latter were concentrated in the north west corner of the Tract. The Kukis, who were immigrants of the Manipur State lived in the eastern and southern part of the Tract.

Both the Tangkhuls and the Kukis were in the habit of making occasional raids into the Naga Hills, the Manipur State, and Burma, and from time to time expeditions were sent to exact reparation. In 1897, a force of 150 of the 44th Gurkha Rifles, with 50 Manipur State Military Police, destroyed Somra Khulen, the principal Tangkhul village arresting some raiders and recovering two heads taken from a Manipur hill village. In 1910, a joint force of the 17th Infantry, the Naga Hills Military Police and the Manipur State Military Police visited the Kuki villages in the north of the tract, imposing fines for raids and arresting the Chiefs of the villages concerned. In 1911, a force of the 17th Infantry and the Manipur State Military Police visited and destroyed the Tangkhul village of Somra Phuntret, and fined and disarmed a Kuki village in the south of the Tract.

In a letter dated the 11th September 1915, Burma made the proposal that the Somra Tract should be brought under administration and included in Burma. In 1908 and again in 1911 and 1912 they had considered the matter but decided against such action, as the Tract was giving no trouble and the Chief Komyang kept a good control over his Kukis. Komyang, however, was now dead and there was no hope of peace. This proposal seems to have had some relation to a letter from Assam, No. 1544-P. dated the 3rd April 1914, which made certain proposals regarding this Tract.

There were two parties of Kukis, one under the son of Komyang, which numbered 22 villages and 496 houses and the other under Pase, or Pachei which numbered 6 villages and 107 houses. The latter portion were Chassads. The Nagas were in 11 villages and numbered 1,002 houses. There was agreement between Assam and Burma that the Somra Tract naturally belonged to Burma and not to Manipur. The only doubtful point was a small area, hatched on the map, and in

subsequent proceedings known as the "cross hatched area", as regards which there was doubt as to whether it should properly go to Assam or to Manipur State. Be that as it may, the Tangkhul Nagas in the Somra Tract were anxious to be administered and to be saved from what was described as "wholesale slaughter" by the Kukis. In letter No. 3270-P., dated the 27th May 1916, the Assam Government recommended to the Government of India that the Somra Tract should be placed under Burma leaving the fate of the cross-hatched area for later consideration. More than a year later, the Government of India agreed to the proposal regarding the Somra Tract in their letter No. 359-E.B., dated the 23rd November 1917.

3. *The Cross-hatched Area.*—As indicated above there was difference of opinion as to the correct affinities of this area. On the one side Mr. Higgins, the Political Agent in Manipur, expressed the view that the villages in the cross-hatched area had paid taxes to Manipur State for many years and considered themselves subjects of that State, while on the other side the view was equally firmly held, though they were unable to adduce any very strong reasons for it, by the Commissioner, Surma Valley Division, Mr. W. J. Reid, and the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. H. C. Barnes, that the cross-hatched area ought to go to the Naga Hills.

In December 1917, the then Commissioner, Mr. W. J. Reid, rather modified his views and suggested that the Tungkhul villages in the cross-hatched area might be given to Manipur in exchange for Jessemi, a Naga village, in Manipur territory. In the meanwhile Government were preoccupied with the widespread Kuki Rebellion of 1917-1919 and when the matter was raised in 1919 and again in 1920 the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Beatson-Bell, declined to take it up. Finally however in April 1922 the then Chief Secretary, Mr. A. W. Botham, suggested that the cross-hatched area should be recognised as belonging to Manipur. Sir William Marris agreed and Mr. Reid gave way. A request was made to the Government of India accordingly in our letter of the 26th April 1922 and they agreed. The northern boundary of the area was finally defined in 1923. So ended a trifling matter, affecting three small villages, which was noted on and re-noted on for a matter of seven years.

VII. *The Great War of 1914-18.*—The first 2 years of the Great War, viz., 1914-15, 1915-16 made little difference to the life of the State, except at the beginning of the War when the wildest rumours were current, soon however to be satisfactorily allayed. In 1916 His Highness offered to raise a Double Company of men for service. This was accepted and they were sent under the command of Mr. F. B. Blackie, the Raja's Private Secretary, to be trained with the 3/39th Garhwalis at Lansdowne. Some 215 men of the Manipur Contingent were ordered to go on active service in Mesopotamia during 1917-18. This led to considerable uneasiness and opposition which was however overcome by the Raja's personal exertions. He visited the unit at Lansdowne in February 1917.

Political, A, May 1916, Nos. 15-37.

Political, B, June 1919, Nos. 562-578.

Political, A, June 1922, Nos. 3-6.

Political, A, December 1923, Nos. 1-17, which includes a useful map.

His Highness presented an aeroplane and two motor ambulances to the Imperial Government at a cost of Rs.22,500.

One unfortunate outcome of the War, so far as Manipur was concerned, was the Kuki Rebellion of 1917-19. This is dealt with above under the heading "Relations with Hill Tribes".

VIII. *The Constitution Act of 1935*.—The Government of India Act, 1935, brought fresh problems with it. The Central Government were anxious to bring all States still in relations with Local Governments into direct relation with the Government of India. But in the case of Manipur so many difficulties were found to stand in the way that it was decided that when the new Act came into force relations with the State should be conducted by the Governor of Assam in his personal capacity as Agent of the Crown Representative, and by letter No.F.544-P/36, dated the 1st April 1937, he was authorised under section 287 of the Act "to discharge such functions of the Crown in its relations with Manipur State as had hitherto been performed by the Governor in Council of Assam". This in fact has led to no practical change in procedure.

Federation in terms of Part II of the Government of India Act, 1935 and all the complicated questions connected with it, was the subject of prolonged correspondence and discussions between 1936 and 1939, and one of the principal subjects of controversy was, of course, the administration of the Hills. Though they cover some 7,000 square miles out of the State's total area of 8,000 square miles and contain a population of about 150,000 persons, it has never, and with reason, been adjudged safe to leave their administration in the hands of the Ruler. To quote the words of Mr. A. C. Lothian of the Political Department who in 1936-37, was on special duty in connection with Federation "the Ruler's sole concern with Federation would appear to be whether by so doing he would lighten the political control exercised over him by the Assam Government and regain direct administrative control over the Hill Tribes". The Assam Governor's Secretary's letter No.93-G.S., dated the 22nd April 1937 gives an appreciation of the then position and an outline of what was considered necessary for the future. The views of the Governor as regards the administration of the Hills were that they could not possibly be handed over to the Ruler, and he cited a number of cogent reasons to that effect. This view was accepted by the Government of India in their letter No.F.359-Fed./36, dated the 30th July 1937. Two years later the Ruler again raised the question of the Hills during the course of discussion on the details of Federation (Enclosure to D. O No.F.69-Fed./36, dated the 13th July 1939, from Political Department), but he agreed in a letter dated July 21st, 1939, to federate on terms which covered the exclusion of the Hills from his direct control.

But the hopes that Federation would be established by 1938, *i. e.*, a year after the inauguration of Provincial Autonomy were never fulfilled. Further discussion were brought to an abrupt end by the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, during which, as a letter from the Government of India expressed it, "it was not expected that in view of War pre-occupation, His Majesty's Government will be able to give active attention to Federal problems".

The new status assumed by Burma under the Act of 1935 raised the question of the relations of Manipur with that country, no longer part of India but a separate Dominion.

In November 1936 orders were issued by the Government of India as to the channel of communication on matters affecting Indian States and Burma and it was laid down that all correspondence on matters affecting Indian States and Burma should be conducted through the headquarters of the Crown Representative, except that as long as the Governor acted as Agent of the Crown Representative, correspondence which was not of importance and did not affect policy should be conducted direct between him and Burma regarding Manipur, the Khasi Hills and Tribal Areas.

IX. The Tribute.—The circumstances under which the Tribute of Rs.50,000 per annum was imposed and was later, with effect from 1st April 1920, reduced to Rs.5,000, at first for 10 years, a period later extended to 15, have been recounted above. The condition of the concession was that the difference between Rs.50,000, and Rs.5,000 *i.e.*, Rs.45,000 should be spent on improving conditions in the Hills. To this concession was added at the time a further concession of Rs.30,000 on account of contribution for the upkeep of the Manipur-Mao road. This concession was an absolute one and not for a term of years but the same condition that the money thus made available should be expended on the Hills was attached to it. The period of the concession expired on the 21st March 1935 and the Government of India put forward the proposal that the concession should be withdrawn. Though the Political Agent protested vigorously against the withdrawal of the concession, the Assam Government agreed that the payment might be gradually restored, the instalments being increased until they reached the full amount of Rs.50,000 in 1939-40. There was some discussion as to the distribution of the instalments but the matter was finally adjusted and the full amount is being paid since 1939-40. Arrangements have been made to ensure the expenditure of a reasonable amount on the Hills.

3. NAGA HILLS

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NAGA HILLS

I. 1881—1890.—The history of the Naga Hills since 1882, where Mackenzie leaves off, is the same in kind as that of the years preceding. The process of penetrating into the Hills, the early stages of which are described in Mackenzie's book, has been a gradual one, dictated originally, and mainly, by the necessity of protecting our settled districts, Nowgong and Sibsagar, from raiding Nagas, and generally agreed to at each step with great reluctance by the Supreme Government. Visits to troublesome villages led inevitably to the establishment of posts to control their doings. For our first permanent footing, Samoogudting *[Chimakudi] was chosen in 1866-67. This village commands the Diphu gorge, the natural path to the plains from the Angami country, and was a more suitable place from which Nowgong could be protected against Western Angami raids especially from the powerful villages of Mozema, Khonoma and Jotsoma, than the old outpost of Asalu to the south-west. Thence we proceeded in 1878 to move to Kohima in the centre of the Western Angami country in order to command both the Eastern Angami country and the Manipur frontier, and simultaneously to Wokha in order to dominate the Lhota country to the east of the Dikhu and to protect it from raids from the north and east. The final decision to make the Naga Hills a British district was taken in 1881. The steps thus taken had permitted the hope that, as Mackenzie (page 143) puts it, "on the whole the Angami Naga problem was at last in a fair way to final solution." The Angami in fact have not since given any serious trouble, but besides them and the other tribes enumerated in Chapters XII and XIII of Mackenzie's work there were numerous others who were to offer problems to be solved.

*Nomenclature in the Naga Hills history presents great difficulties just as it does in that of the Lushai Hills. Both place-names and names of tribes are exceedingly confusing throughout the older writings. To start with, of course, the general name of "Naga" is merely an Assamese appellation, meaning "naked", and, like the stereotyped tribal names now in common use, is not what the people call themselves. This was fully recognised by the early British administrators. Thus Lieutenant G. F. F. Vincent, "Acting Junior Assistant Commissioner on Special Duty, Angamee Naga Hills", writing to his Principal Assistant Commissioner at Nowgong, Captain John Butler, on the 10th September 1850, describes how he was surprised to find "the people called by us 'Angamee Nagas' were totally ignorant of the signification of the term and how he learnt that this was a term given by the Cacharees to all independent Nagas signifying in their language, "unconquered". This is repeated in 1873 by that great authority Captain Butler, in the long extract regarding the Naga tribes quoted at page 84 of Mackenzie. Similarly the phrase "Hatiguria" was for long used as a synonym for "Ao" though it was certainly known as early as 1886 that the latter was more correct. Very frequently a tribe applies to itself merely the word meaning "man" in its own language—with the implication that members of that tribe are the only real men in the world. Thus the Lhotas call themselves "Kyou", the name "Lhota" being apparently that applied to them by the Assamese.

By the exertions, however, of such ethnologists as Hutton and Mills who have been Deputy Commissioners of the district, the whole nomenclature has been put on a scientific footing. Monographs have been written by these and other authorities on the Naga Tribes in general and on the Angamis, Semas, Aos, Rengmas and Lhotas

The necessity of protecting the borders of Nowgong and Sibsagar against raiding Nagas which in the early days compelled us to penetrate in to the hills little by little, ceased with the formation of the Naga Hills district. But the process of penetration went on, inexorably if irregularly. It was impossible to draw a line as the boundary of our area of control and to say that we should be blind and deaf to all that went on across that line. Transfrontier Nagas raid our administered villages, the latter are involved in dispute with the former, head hunting and massacres go on just across the border and under the very noses of our officers. In such conditions local officers inevitably, and with reason, clamour for a forward policy. The Chief Commissioner sometimes supports them, sometimes he does not. The Government of India is nearly always reluctant. But the

in particular, thus carrying out the wish expressed by Mr. Chief Commissioner Elliott in his memorandum of March 1881 (see page 4 below), and can be studied by anyone who wishes to acquaint himself with the ethnographical history of these interesting peoples.

Mr. J. P. Mills, C.I.E., I.C.S., who was Governor's Secretary throughout my time in Assam, and who had, previous to that, sixteen years experience of the Nagas, as Subdivisional Officer, Mokokchung, and as Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills District, writes as follows on this subject in a note by him, dated the 5th September 1941.

“On modern maps the names of villages shown are those used by the inhabitants themselves, a commonly used synonym being sometimes added in brackets. Sometimes the name in the old record is obviously merely a corruption of the correct name. Frequently however, there is no apparent connection between the two at all. The reason for this is that at each advance into the Naga country officers tended to adopt the names of villages used by the interpreters hailing from the area on which the advance was based. For instance, when we first entered the Ao country from the plains, Merangkong was known as Naogaon and Mubongchokut as Molodubia, and so on, Naogaon and Molodubia being the Assamese names for these villages. Once established in the Ao country, officers began to ask the names of villages yet further in the interior and were naturally told the Ao names. Thus the big Chang village of Tuesang was for years known by its Ao name of Mozungjami—“the village of wicked men”, for the Changs were the hereditary enemies of the Aos. Further complication was caused by the system of transliteration used by the American Baptist Missionaries, who were often the first people to attempt to record Ao names in writing. They do not use the British system but write “j” where we should use “ch” and often omit “y”. Thus “Chami” becomes “Jami”, and “Yongyimsen” becomes “Yongimsen”.

The same process went on at the southern end of the district. Western Angami names were soon brought into use, though often misspelt, and for long Western Angami names were used for Eastern Angami and Kacha Naga villages. For example, the Eastern Angami village of Chizami was wrongly called Khezabama, and even now Henima would hardly be recognised by its correct name of Tenning. When we began to acquire more detailed knowledge of the Eastern Angami country we began to learn their own names for their own villages. But here again, the same muddle was repeated and Eastern Angami names were used for the less known Sangtam and Rengma villages beyond them. Even today “Meliomi” and “Primi” are probably in more general use than the correct names of “Meluri” and “Akhegwo”

The method I have adopted, as in the case of Lushai names, is, when a name first occurs, to put the correct spelling in square brackets after that used in the current records.

frontier moves forward. Whatever difficulties were felt by Governments the truth of the dictum of the Secretary of State of 1878, Lord Cranbrook, that "the continuance in the immediate proximity of settled districts of a system of internecine warfare conducted principally against women and children cannot be tolerated" was vindicated time after time.

While, therefore, in 1882 our writ ran only in an area covering Kohima and Wokha and their immediate neighbourhood, we have in the intervening 60 years become responsible for an administered area covering country far to the east and south of the boundaries of that date, and beyond that again of an area of "control".

After the occupation of Kohima and Wokha in 1878 the general policy appears to have been one of consolidating our rule around those two centres. Mr. C. A. Elliott, Chief Commissioner of Assam between 1881 and 1885, recorded on the 31st March 1881, a memorandum *on the administration of the district after he had made a tour of the Naga Hills in the cold weather of 1880-81. A brief reference is made to it at page 142 of Mackenzie. As regards forced labour, which had been levied in a very unequal way, causing extreme dissatisfaction, he said things must be put right at once and laid down certain rules to that end. It is clear that transport arrangements at that time were very badly organised, if organised at all, the position being made difficult because the station of Kohima was in course of construction. His views as to disarmament of the district are, in the light of present conditions, interesting. He states that all guns had been taken away from the Nagas and that no Angami was even allowed to carry a spear. He regarded it as "essential that the habit of carrying of arms should be discouraged which has a martial tendency or lead the people to believe that they can successfully resist our arms". He was also very strong on the point that all village defences should be removed, and expressed the desire that the practice of fortifying villages sites should altogether be put a stop to, his idea being that as soon as the village ceased to be defensible it would be safe to relax the rules against bearing arms. His wishes, however, were never fully carried out. Though village defences have in fact gradually fallen into disrepair, large numbers of guns did remain in Angami hands, and it is still normal for a Naga to carry a spear, for use both as a "khud-stick" and to kill any game which may cross his path. He foresaw the great need of extending the practice of terracing as an alternative to *jhuming*, and he was very insistent that his officers should try and spread this practice. (Over 30 years were to elapse before these orders were carried out. Dr. Hutton began to introduce terraces into the Sema country about 1915). He also advocated the extension of the cultivation of potatoes. Finally, he declared that all officers should do their utmost to enquire into and record the habits and customs of the people and said that he would be glad to publish works on these subjects free of cost.

* Assam Secretariat Files No. 137-J. of 1881 and No. 104-J. of 1882.

A further reference to policy is to be found in a letter dated the 25th January 1883 *No. 122 to the Deputy Commissioner, in which Mr. Elliott referred to "his scheme for the allocation of out-posts in the district by which to bring home to the people the assurance that they are permanently under the domain of the British Power". This letter was written with reference to a report from Mr. R. B. McCabe, I. C. S., the then Deputy Commissioner, who had earlier in the month established a post without any opposition at the Sema village of Lozema [Lazani]. The villagers had failed to pay their revenue in full for two years and Mr. McCabe decided it was necessary to punish them. He took an ample force, met with no opposition and constructed a stockade where he left a garrison of 55 police under a British Officer. Incidentally, in his report he makes mention of the bitter mutual hatred between the pushing, intruding Semas and the Angamis, an antagonism which persists to this day.

A similar expedition on a smaller scale, but attended unfortunately with considerable loss of life, was undertaken by Mr. McCabe in June 1883 against the Sema Village of Ratami across the Diyung in reprisal for that village's raid on the Lhota village of Tsingaki, or Chingaki, as McCabe spells it. He took a force of 72 officers and men of the 44th Sylhet Light Infantry under Lieutenant Boileau and 42 officers and men of the Frontier Police under Mr. Livesay, Assistant Superintendent. The Deputy Commissioner reporting † on the 28th June 1883, was fully satisfied with the results, but the operations certainly entailed severe loss both of life and property. The Nagas were estimated to have lost between 50 and 60 men, their houses and *dhan* were destroyed, and their cattle carried off. This incident seems to be closely connected with the steady pressure of the Semas towards the west, the pursuit of which received a check when we occupied Wokha.

Mr. McCabe raised the question of policy in a letter No. 205 ‡ which he addressed to the Chief Commissioner on the 10th June 1884. He took the view that there were two possible policies,—(1) non-interference with the trans-Frontier people; (2) annexation. Of the two he preferred annexation carried out in a gradual way. He also explained that his own policy had been based on four general principles, (a) to insist on strict obedience within his own jurisdiction (b) to punish villages within his jurisdiction for all raids committed against trans-Frontier villages; (c) to punish trans-Frontier villages for raids against cis-Frontier villages; (d) as far as possible to mediate in disputes between villages adjacent to the Frontier.

It is interesting to observe that in paragraph 4 of his letter he uses the "somewhat singular name", as an Assam letter of November 1888 was later to describe it, of "military promenade" to describe expeditions made by the Deputy Commissioners with an armed escort among

*Assam Secretariat, Foreign, B, February 1883, Nos.12-13.

† Assam Secretariat, Foreign, B, December 1883, Nos.4-11.

‡ Assam Secretariat, Judicial Department, File No.149-J of 1884.

the Frontier tribes. This was later to become a commonplace term of the Naga Hills frontier, but was used possibly for the first time on this occasion in official correspondence.

The Chief Commissioner, Sir Charles Elliott;—and it looks as if the problems raised in this letter from the Deputy Commissioner had long been in his mind—addressed the Government of India on the 22nd August 1884 in his letter No.1263. He referred to the increase of outrages of recent years; to the decrease of influence of British Officers and to what he considered had been the failure of the policy that had been carried on for the last 20 or 30 years. These circumstances had led him to review again the policy which had been associated during the years 1840-44 with the name of Captain Brodie, who was then in charge of the Sibsagar district, and which was described briefly in pages 93 to 95 of Mackenzie's work. The main feature of this policy were comprehensive excursions throughout the Naga villages accompanied by an armed force, during the course of which Captain Brodie took engagements from the Chiefs to abandon their feuds and refer all differences to the British Power. Sir Charles Elliott proposed to revert to some extent to that policy and he outlined a scheme by which a force of 150 Naga Hills Frontier Police should start from Wokha in the Naga Hills under Mr. McCabe; 50 Frontier Police should join in from Sibsagar at Molong [Molungyimchen] or Deka Haimong under the Deputy Commissioner of that district; and, thirdly 50 Lakhimpur Frontier Police should join in turn with their Deputy Commissioner at Jaipur. It appears that Colonel W. S. Clarke, the Deputy Commissioner of Sibsagar was opposed to the proposal and preferred complete annexation straightaway. Mr. Godfrey of Lakhimpur, however, thought a promenade would have an excellent effect.

The Government of India replied in Mr. Grant's letter No.2789-E., dated the 20th October 1884, a letter which was quoted as a "locus classicus" of policy for many a year thereafter, and which in the words of Sir William Marris, written 37 years later, "Sanctioned if it did not actually initiate the policy of political control areas beyond the Naga Hills Frontier". They did not approve of the proposal for a comprehensive promenade. They preferred to adhere to the existing policy, *i. e.*, (a) that infraction of our border and ill-treatment of British subjects beyond it should be punished, but (b) inter-tribal feuds and murders committed outside the Frontier should be disregarded. They expressed in definite terms their dislike of taking engagements and gave at length their reasons for this attitude. They were clearly opposed to doing anything which might entail commitments, a term which covered of course such undesirable eventualities as extension of responsibility, a series of expeditions and a widely increased area of administration. Their instructions are summed up in the final paragraph of the letter which runs as follows:

"5. For these reasons, chiefly, the Governor-General is disinclined to sanction any very marked alteration of the policy at present pursued towards the tribes in question. But at the same time he considers that the existing methods of checking and punishing border offences

should be followed when necessary with increased energy and promptitude. He therefore approves of the arrangement under which the political control of the Nagas to the east of the Lhota country as far as the Jhanzi river, or any other point which you may select will be made over to the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills. All other details he leaves to your discretion with the reservation that interference with inter-tribal quarrels should, as a rule, be limited to those cases where they involve (1) outrages on British subjects ; (2) violation of the Inner Line ; (3) danger to the interests of people dwelling inside the British borders by reason of the proximity of disturbances outside, such disturbances, for instances, as would be likely to intimidate coolies employed upon tea estates or cultivators”.

This decision was passed on to the Deputy Commissioners of the Naga Hills and of Sibsagar, but, as will be seen later, it was not long before it had to be modified.

In order to implement the Government of India's instructions, the Chief Commissioner then ordered the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, to make two expeditions (*a*) to a number of Eastern Angami villages along the Manipur border to the east of Kohima and outside the existing boundary of the Naga Hills district, and (*b*) to a number of Ao villages east of Wokha. The Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, was instructed to make a similar visit to the Konyak villages to the east of his boundary, ending by a return to his district along the Dikhu.

Mr. McCabe of the Naga Hills, accompanied by an escort of 30 Frontier Police, accomplished the first expedition between December 23rd 1884 and January 3rd, 1885 and reported a highly successful trip in connection with which Mr. Elliott expressed his “extreme gratification” that the fame of British administration in the Naga Hills was “attracting the wistful admiration of the residents beyond the Inner Line.” Mr. McCabe started on his second expedition from Wokha on the 11th January 1885 with Mr. L. St. J. Brodrick, Subdivisional Officer, Wokha, Dr. S. Borah, Civil Surgeon, and Captain Plowden, Commandant and 100 non-commissioned Officers and men of the Frontier Police. The objects of the expedition were—“1st.—To punish the Sema village of Nungtang [Litami] for the murder of a British subject. 2nd.—To bring home to the Ao tribe the fact that it is politically subordinate to the British Government. 3rd.—To determine a point on the Borodubia [Changki] Waromong range, which should be the limit of the political control of the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills District in the direction of the Frontier of Sibsagar.” They punished Nungtang, and then turned aside from their original route to visit the Sema village of Lophemi [Lumami]. The Ao village of Nankam [Lungkam] had complained against them, and this village was connected with the other offending village of Nungtang

Secondly, they visited the Ao village of Longsa to the south on a complaint from Borodubia and Moldubia. To Longsa McCabe went *via* Ungma, the biggest village of the Ao tribe. In both cases submission was obtained without difficulty. Thence proceeding *via* Mokokchung he met the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar (Colonel Clarke), on 30th January, the date fixed. The villages visited, except the Sema villages of Nongtang and Lopphehi were all Ao.

Mr. McCabe's conclusions as a result of this tour were clear and definite. In his letter No.853, dated the 16th March 1885, he wrote as follows—

“21. In attempting to form any idea of the probable results of this promenade, it would be advisable to consider the object attained by Captain Brodie's tour in 1844. Captain Brodie marched from Bor Haimong to Lakhuti, and took engagements from the headmen of the different villages to refrain from inter-village war. He had not returned to the plains before many of these engagements were broken, and the chiefs in fault refused to obey his summons and appear at Sibsagar. From 1844 up to the present time, these villages have carried on incessant blood-feuds; the Deputy Commissioner of Sibsagar has repeatedly sent orders prohibiting murderous raids, but, as no steps were taken to enforce these orders, they have been systematically disregarded. The Government of India has now sanctioned the extension of the political control of the Deputy Commissioner of Naga Hills district to these tribes, and my chief object in this promenade was to acquire a knowledge of the country and of the inhabitants, and to impress on the people my determination to put a stop to the cruel murders which have unhappily been of so frequent occurrence during the past years.

22. The reception I experienced was of a friendly though somewhat apathetic character, and coolies and supplies were obtained without difficulty. The smaller villages would welcome subordination to the British Government, and the whole of the Ao tribe would view with pleasure security in trading with the plains.

The larger villages make constant demands on the smaller ones for cattle and *daos*, and in case of refusal a feud is established resulting in the loss of several lives. If murder is to be checked, the causes which stimulate it must be attacked, or the political control over these tribes will be of a merely nominal character. Mr. Clark, the missionary, who resides at Molong, believes that this promenade will check for some time the aggression of the larger villages. I am not so sanguine. The men of the Ao tribe have been so accustomed to receiving orders and being allowed to disregard them, that nothing less than the most severe punishment will impress on their minds the necessity of obedience.

I presume that the Government of India intends that this political control shall be of a real character, and it therefore remains to be decided in what manner it should be carried into effect.

There are two courses open :—

- (1) To make an annual promenade during the cold-weather, when punishment might be inflicted on all villages that had disobeyed orders during the rains.

- (2) To establish an outpost in the heart of the Ao country, and exercise the same political control over these tribes as that now brought to bear on the Angamis and Lhotas.

The objection to the first proposal is that the punishment inflicted would follow at such a lapse of time after the commission of the offence that the motives of our actions might be misconstrued, and the inhabitants would simply regard us as a superior class of looters and murderers to themselves.

The second proposal is the one which appears to me to afford the only solution of the difficulty. Experience has clearly proved that as long as Government contented itself with establishing outposts on the frontiers of these hill tribes, no efficient control was ever exercised. From 1837 to 1879, no outpost existed in the heart of the Angami country, and the history of those years was one succession of raids on Assam and inter-village feuds. From the date of the occupation of Kohima, the development of the control over this the most warlike of the Naga tribes has been clearly marked.

On the Sibsagar frontier outposts have been established for many years past, and nothing has been effected towards checking feuds which have caused the loss of thousands of lives. Under these circumstances, I think the Sibsagar Frontier Police might be more usefully employed if they were incorporated with the Naga Hills Police, and posted in the heart of the Ao tribe. A guard of 100 men at Ungma would, in my opinion, effectually control the whole of the country between the Doyang, Dikhu and the plains, and communication with Wokha could be maintained by a road, *via* Nankam, and the crossing the Doyang by a suspension bridge below Ao.

Captain Plowden, the Commandant of the Naga Hills Frontier Police, has given full details of this scheme in his letter No. 75, dated 7th instant, to the Inspector General of Police, and it is not necessary for me to enter more fully into the matter, pending the decision of the Government of India on the policy to be adopted. There is one point, however, on which I consider definite instructions should be issued and that is the alignment of a fixed boundary, beyond which no control of any description should be exercised."

Colonel Clarke who similarly had had no difficulties during his tour of 14 days, considered that all the villages he visited should be added to the Naga Hills charge, and he agreed in general with Mr. McCabe's views.

McCabe's proposals did not entirely commend themselves to the then Chief Commissioner, Mr. W. E. Ward, I. C. S., who was officiating for Mr. Elliott. They are discussed at length in his letters Nos. 923* of 11th June 1885 and 1898 of the 8th October 1885 to the

*Assam Secretariat, 1885, File No. 40-J

Government of India. "They seem", he said in the first letter "to go considerably beyond the policy sanctioned by the Government of India in your letter No. 2789-E., dated the 20th October last: [see page 103 above] in the second place, they amount practically to a proposal to annex and administer the whole of the new area by adding it on to the present Naga Hills district, a measure which Mr. Ward thinks is certainly not called for at present; thirdly, the cost of carrying out these proposals is more than the circumstances of the case warrant.....; and lastly, the proposal to withdraw the Frontier Police entirely from the Sibsagar district and to abolish its frontier outposts is one which would be sure to meet with much opposition from the tea-planting interests in that district." He then pointed out that the analogy which McCabe had drawn from the cases of the occupation of Samaguting in 1866 and Kohima in 1878 was scarcely correct. "The occupation" [he wrote], "of Samaguting and the subsequent advance of the Political Agent's headquarters to Kohima arose entirely from the necessity which existed for checking the numerous raids of the Angamis on British and Manipur territory, and also the state of lawlessness in the Naga Hills district which encouraged the Angamis to make these raids.

10. The Officiating Chief Commissioner does not find that any such excuse exists to justify similar action being taken with respect to the hill tribes now living *outside* the boundary of the Naga Hills district. In the first place, we have no longer the warlike race of Angamis to deal with. Then, again, raids by Naga tribes on British subjects are now almost unknown; such as have occurred of late years have been entirely on villages lying just within the boundary of the Naga Hills district, the raiders having, perhaps, scarcely yet realised the fact that all Nagas residing within this boundary are now our subjects. On the Sibsagar frontier the hill tribes are peaceable enough, except amongst themselves, being too anxious to trade with us to be otherwise. Nor was the existence of any such raids advanced as a ground for the policy advocated by Mr. Elliott in my letter No. 1263, of the 22nd August last. [See page 103 above] Mr. Elliott's recommendations were based on the view that the inter-tribal feuds and consequent massacres among the tribes on the Sibsagar frontier were on the increase, that they bore evidence of the growing turbulence of the Nagas and the decreasing influence of British officers, and that if we wished to prevent this turbulence spreading over into the plains, some more stringent measures than exist at present ought to be adopted to check it.

11. In your letter of the 20th October last, you stated, with reference to Mr. Elliott's proposals, that the Government of India was disinclined to sanction any very marked alteration of the policy at present pursued towards the tribes in question, but at the same time considered that the existing methods of checking and punishing border offences should be followed, when necessary, with increased energy and promptitude, provided only that interference with inter-tribal quarrels should be confined, as a rule, to the three cases mentioned in the last paragraph of your letter. It is, however, only in the last of the three cases mentioned by you that any real difficulty has arisen

in determining the policy to be pursued ; in the other two cases, *viz.*, where outrages occur on British subjects or British territory is violated, our policy is clear, and is being vigorously acted up to. It is only in cases of inter-tribal feuds not affecting British subjects or involving any violation of British territory that doubts have occurred, giving rise to the present correspondence. In these cases the existing policy has ever since the days of Captain Brodie been one of absolute non-interference ; neither the former Political Agent nor the present Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills district has ever since the time mentioned exercised any political control whatever in such cases outside the district, and the question now to be considered is whether we should continue this policy, or, if we interfere, in what way should this interference be exercised, what orders should the Deputy Commissioner be authorised to pass, and what power should be given to him to enforce his orders.

12. The Officiating Chief Commissioner observes that the Government of India desires that all interference in the particular cases here referred to should be confined to those instances in which danger arises to the interests of people dwelling inside the British borders by reason of the proximity of disturbances outside, such disturbances, for instance, as would be likely to intimidate coolies employed upon tea estates or cultivators. These instructions, however, only affect the question as to what area should now be brought under control. It still remains to determine the mode of control and the Deputy Commissioner's power to enforce any orders he may be authorised to issue within that area.

13. Upon this point, Mr. Ward would ask the sanction of the Government of India to his issuing the following instructions to the Deputy Commissioner to whom may hereafter be given the political control of the new tract or of any portion thereof. He will march once annually with a Frontier Police force through the particular tract assigned to him, and in the course of his march, will enquire, whether invited to do so or not, into all cases of murder committed within the past year, and punish the village to which the murderers belong. All punishments should, in the first instance, be by fine, the amount of fine in each case being left to the discretion of the Deputy Commissioner, subject to the approval of the Chief Commissioner. If the fine is not immediately paid, its equivalent in grain or cattle may be seized. If no grain or cattle are found, the village should be debarred from all trade and intercourse with the plains until the fine is paid. In no case should the destruction of the offending village be resorted to as a punishment. In no case other than murder should the Deputy Commissioner interfere to settle inter-tribal disputes by making, or attempting to enforce, any award. This does not, however, debar him from using his personal influence in inducing the tribes to settle their disputes amicably. Lastly, in no case should the Deputy Commissioner interfere in disputes between tribes residing within and the tribes residing outside the area of control, even though such disputes may have resulted in murder either without or within such area.

14. The Officiating Chief Commissioner thinks that if the Government of India will sanction the issue of the instructions above proposed nothing more is required. Mr. Ward is not so sanguine as to expect that the limited power of control which he now proposes to give to the Deputy Commissioner will suffice to altogether put down the inter-tribal feuds and massacres among the Nagas whom it is proposed to bring under control, but he sees no reason to think that his proposals will not amply suffice to check to a very great extent that growing turbulence among the Nagas to which Mr. Elliott referred in my letter of the 22nd August last and so effectually prevent such turbulence from spreading over into our settled districts."

The area of political control which the Chief Commissioner proposed should be assigned to the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, was defined in paragraph 6 of the letter of the 11th June subject to some slight subsequent modifications and, briefly, it covered the whole Ao country starting from west of the Dikhu where it cuts the present Mokokchung Subdivision from north to south, together with the Sema villages to the east of Wokha.

The Government of India replied in their letter No.246-E., dated the 3rd February 1886,* which was forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner with Assam letter No.494, dated the 9th March 1886. While observing that Mr. Ward's proposals were "practically a step towards the amalgamation of a considerable tract of trans-frontier country with the British districts", they were unable to see how it could be avoided. They approved the proposals in general, only observing that the instructions to be given were a little too stringent and inelastic and desiring that more discretion should be given to local officers. Burning a village, for instance, was to be allowed as a last resort. The geographical area was agreed to, as also that it should be placed under the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills.

In February 1886† occurred the Shipvomi raid, in reprisal for which two villages had to be punished. Three men of the big Angami village of Khonoma were killed while trading in Manipur. Their friends believed this to have been done by men of Shipvomi [Tephunge], a Manipur village just across the border, and on the 13th February 1886 Khonoma, together with a number of men, said to be as many as 1,500 from 15 or 20 Naga villages, took revenge. They burned and looted Shipvomi and killed at least three persons. Mr. R. T. Greer, i.c.s., was on his way to join as Deputy Commissioner when this happened. Arriving at Kohima on the 17th February, he at once went to the spot accompanied by Captain Plowden and was aided in his inquiries by the "Tangal Major", the Prime Minister of Manipur, a gentleman who was to figure prominently later on in the events at Manipur in 1891. He was satisfied that not Shipvomi, but Thetchulomi [Thetsemi] a village within our boundary, was the original culprit and that therefore Shipvomi was raided and looted by mistake. Be that as it may, a number of Khonoma and

* Assam Secretariat, File 21-J of 1886.

† Assam Secretariat, 1886. File No.784-J.

other Angami men were brought to trial and severe punishment was meted out to them. Thetchulomi also was punished by being burned for their part in the transaction. Mr. Greer had some severe remarks to make on the slackness of the Manipur administration. Colonel (later General Sir James) Johnstone was the Political Agent in Manipur at that time, and one can well imagine the measured periods in which, if he had not been busily engaged in connection with the Third Burma War, a campaign in which he was wounded, he would have trounced the young officer who had dared to criticise the administration for which he as Political Agent was responsible. Greer's remarks, as a matter of fact, only repeated what McCabe had said in 1885* on Manipur methods as the result of his own observations criticisms which evoked from the Political Agent, who must then too have been Johnstone, a spirited protest dated 20th March 1885.

There is reference in the Report of 1885-86 to great trouble over forced labour for transport purposes. Unusual and heavy demands were made on the labour on account of the sudden removal of the 43rd Regiment for service in Burma, their relief by the 42nd from Shillong and by the breakdown of the Transport Department.

A brief reference to the growing of potatoes by some Gurkhas near the station of Kohima, in fulfilment of the wishes expressed by the former Chief Commissioner, Mr. Elliott, is worthy of record.

The Report for the year 1886-87 is signed by Mr. Porteous, but he actually only held charge of the district for the last two months of that year, the preceding period being divided into three short incumbencies, namely, those of Messrs. Greer, Davis and Grimwood. This last officer was Mr. F. St. C. Grimwood who was to lose his life as Political Agent in Manipur in 1891.

A severe though localised outbreak of cholera occurred in this year. It was brought into the Hills by Naga coolies who had been taken to Manipur on transport work by the 44th Gurkha Light Infantry. There were 350 deaths in the group of villages to which the coolies belonged and 367 in Kohima. In the Civil station of Kohima there was only one death, that of the European Subedar, Mr. Lyons.

The cultivation of potatoes spread further, but, as before, the Angamis refused to have anything to do with it and it was only Gurkhas and Kukis who cultivated it. As regards transport, though the position might have been expected to be somewhat eased in this year with five to six hundred pack ponies working on the road to Nichuguard and Kohima, Mr. Porteous again makes strong references to the hardships arising out of forced labour, as many as 16,500 men being impressed during the year.

File 794-J of 1886.

* Assam Secretariat July 1885. Proceedings of the Chief Commissioner in the Departments under the control of the Foreign Department of the Government of India No.13.

Large sums of money were spent on public works: the total amount being as much as Rs.92,730. These works included, besides roads, the Kohima Fort and Magazine, both of which remained under construction at the end of the year. Rupees 9,000 was spent on the construction of 33 miles of the new bridle path from Henima to Khonoma. The Kohima water supply arrangements were completed in 1887 and actually taken into use on the 4th April 1887.

An interesting side-light on administrative conditions in those days is afforded by the fact that during the cold weather of 1886-87 Wokha subdivision remained in charge of the Head Clerk. It must be remembered, however, that the Subdivisional Officer of Wokha had at that time neither Civil nor Criminal powers. The gap occurred between the death from dysentery of Mr. C. H. Parish on the 4th November 1886 and the arrival of Mr. E. Muspratt on the 20th February 1887.

The usual promenades were carried out and Mr. Porteous remarked on the very hostile attitude of the Semas throughout. All efforts at friendship failed with only one exception, a village which was wise enough to see that it was worth while to be on friendly terms with the British. It was to the Semas to whom Mr. Porteous referred when, in his letter No.841* dated the 21st February 1887, he asked for permission to take an expedition against the "Mezami Nagas" to punish them for their raids since December 1885 on Eastern Angami villages, especially Chipokitami which lay just outside the boundary, but was an off-shoot of a village inside the boundary. As Porteous pointed out in the subsequent year's report, "Mezami" was merely an Angami word for "barbarian" and meant nothing to the Semas themselves. The Chief Sema village was that of Sakhai, being the headquarters of the powerful Zumoni clan and the village which, thirty years later, was to send a higher proportion of its population as volunteers to France than any other village in the hills. Besides Chipokitami they had raided in December 1885 the village of Phiuma [Phuyemi] and in November 1886 the village of Zulhami, both of which lay within the political control area. The expedition was authorised, and took place between the 26th March and the 24th April 1887. Mr. Davis, Assistant Commissioner, and Mr. Muspratt, the Subdivisional Officer of Wokha, accompanied the Deputy Commissioner, and he took with him as escort 80 Naga Hills Frontier Police under their Commandant, Lieutenant Macintyre and 40 of the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry (presumably from the garrison of Kohima) under Lieutenant Robin. There was no opposition and suitable fines were imposed on offending villages, while the Chief of Sakhai was carried off to Kohima, to suffer two months detention as a lesson to his pride.

Mr. Porteous followed this up with a long tour through the Sema Political Control country, first between the Tizu and the Doyang, and then northwards, still east of the Doyang, into the Sema country which lies east of Wokha. The only display of truculence came from the

*Assam Secretariat, File No.181-J of 1887 and page 15 of Military Report.

large and powerful village of Seromi, who were the prime movers in an attack on Porteous' rearguard when leaving Lukobomi on the 15th April and had to be fired on. He ended his tour at Nunkum in the Ao country, a big village of 400 houses, at which village he signified his disapproval of the practice of head-taking by burning all their trophies. Thence he turned south-west to the Lhota village of Pangti where Captain Butler was killed in 1875 and went back *via* Wokha to Kohima. As he says in his report the results were that the "Mezamis" were subdued, our knowledge of the Semas was increased and the ground was prepared for the extension of our rule. The Chief Commissioner's comments contained in paragraph 2 of Assam Government letter No.1487* dated the the 29th July 1887 were.

"2. The results of the march, as stated in your 38th paragraph, are the protection, which it is hoped will be lasting, of the Eastern Angami villages from further aggression by the Mezamis, the establishment, for the first time, of our influence among the Semas, most of whose villages had never been visited by a British Officer since the survey, and the commencement of a policy which in the course of time will, the Chief Commissioner trusts, put a stop to inter-tribal murders and feuds among these savages and prove as successful in winning them to peaceful pursuits as it has already been among the Angamis and Lhotas".

A month latter, in his letter No.516† dated the 17th August 1887, Mr. Porteous recommended, as a result of his expedition to Are and Nunkum in June of that year, that the four Lhota villages of Are, Are Yanthamo, Pangti, and Okotso; the Ao villages of Nankum and Mungatung; and the Sema villages of Hangrung, Nangtang and Phinsing should be taken into the area of ordinary administration, and that an outpost should be established at Nankum. His views were stated as follows.

"22. While at Nunkum, I was frequently begged to have an outpost stationed at the village, and was told that revenue would gladly be paid for the privilege of being included in British territory. The same request as to payment of revenue was preferred to me by the gaonburas of Pangti, the principal of the four Lhota trans-frontier villages. At present they said they belonged to nobody, and were taunted with their position by their fellow Lhotas in Lakhuti and other British villages. A proposal to include these four villages in British territory was made by Mr. McCabe in his No.853, dated the 16th March 1885, giving an account of his tour through the Ao' country, *vide* paragraph 6, I am unaware whether the separate proposal, there referred to, was ever made, and, if so, with what result.

23. It is my decided opinion that not only should these four villages be included in the Wokha subdivision, but that the whole tract lying within the streams Teshi and Chebi might now with advantage be so included, an outpost, as desired by its inhabitants, being stationed at Nunkum. The tract I refer to forms roughly the triangular or

*Assam Secretariat, 1887. File No.181-J.

†Assam Secretariat, File No. 625-J. of 1887.

wedge-shaped area of independent territory which will be seen on the map running into the eastern boundary of the Wokha subdivision north-east of Wokha.

24. The addition of this small area to the charge of the subdivisional officer of Wokha would not be felt. There is no village within it more distant from the subdivisional headquarters than at least one-third of the villages in the present subdivision.

The placing of an extra guard of 25 or 30 men at Nuakum would moreover, put no undue strain on the resources of the Frontier Police. The Force at headquarters has within the past two years, been increased by the strength of the out posts formerly kept up at Barpathar and Dimapur, while no corresponding decrease for the establishment of new or the increase of former outposts has taken place. The proposal, therefore, involves no administrative inconvenience.

25. From a political point of view, the establishment of an outpost at Nunkum would be advantageous in no ordinary degree. The present report has illustrated the serious disadvantages under which political control is at present exercised over the Ao and northern Sema country. Had Nunkum had ready access to Wokha, the feud between Are and that village could not have occurred. The complaint of Nunkum that it can get no hearing for its grievances against Lhotas is an old one. The gaonburas represented their case to Mr. McCabe in August 1884, *vide* paragraph 27 of his No. 377, dated the 18th August 1884, and he could only suggest to them that if unable to reach Wokha through the Lhota country, they should represent their grievances to the subdivisional officer at Jorhat, whence news could be sent to Kohima. The Ao country was at that time outside the sphere of any recognised political control. Now that it is within that sphere, it is, I would submit, our duty to see that the Ao villages have, at all events, the opportunity of making their wants known to the authority to which they are being taught to look for guidance in their relations with one another and with the Semas. At present this opportunity is virtually denied to them, as their messengers are, and not it appears without cause, afraid to pass through the intervening Lhota villages. So far as the Semas are concerned, their isolation from Kohima and Wokha is still greater. They are on the worst of terms with the Lhotas, and but few of their villages lying between Loppheimi and Wokha have in recent years escaped being burnt for quarrels ending in murder between them and one and other of our border Lhota villages, generally Chingaki. In the tract I would have annexed to British territory are included three Sema villages, through which sooner or later communication with the outer Semas would certainly be established.....

27. To sum up the arguments for the establishment of the outpost I propose, with annexation of the country on its hither side:—We are invited by the population to take it over; the political result of the step in increasing our influence over the Ao and Sema tribes would be most favourable; financially there would be a small increase of revenue, the administration of the new territory would give rise to no inconvenience, and, lastly, the move would be a safe one and unlikely to give rise to complications of any kind."

It fell to Mr. Denis Fitzpatrick, who had succeeded Mr. Ward as Chief Commissioner on 31st October 1887, to decide this question of policy. In a note * which he recorded on the 15th November 1887, he set out succinctly the general position as regards control. He said—

“ 2. Mr. Porteous' proposal is really an instalment of the important scheme advocated by Mr. McCabe in paragraph 22 [page 110 above] of his letter above mentioned, which would have virtually added to the Naga Hills district an extensive tract of country that it was ultimately decided by Government of India (No.246-E of the 3rd February 1886) on the recommendation of the Chief Commissioner, should be excluded from that district and be treated as an area of political control to be dealt with on the “ promenade ” system’.

3. Now it seems to be admitted by all who have from time to time considered this question, that it is our destiny, if not our duty, to bring these wild tribes more and more under control, and there can be no doubt that in time the tract in question, and a great deal more besides, will come to be included in our ordinary fully administered districts.

The only question is as to the rate at which we should proceed, and the answer to that must depend on a variety of matters, the most important being those inexorable limitations of finance that hamper us at every turn in this country, and the absolute necessity of completely establishing our authority within the existing boundaries of our districts before we advance those boundaries further”.

Further consideration and consultation on the spot with Mr. McCabe, who had once more come to the Naga Hills as Deputy Commissioner followed, and McCabe's views were summed up as follows at the end of a note † which he recorded on the 31st January 1888. “ I would not advise the establishment of an outpost at Nankam, unless, Government is prepared to take over the administrative control of the whole of the country between the Doyong and the Dikhu now included in the area of political control.” The Chief Commissioner, came to the conclusion that the time was not ripe to recommend the depositions proposed, and decided to hold his hand for the time being.

Mr. McCabe made an important promenade between the 13th March and the 7th May, 1888, in the Ao country. In his report ‡ dated the 24th May 1888, No.190, on this promenade and on “ the expeditions conducted against several transfrontier Naga villages in punishment of raids upon villages within the area of political control ” he observes that he was guided by the rules laid down in the Assam Government letters Nos.494 dated the 9th March 1886 (*see* page 114 above), and 91—T dated the 4th February 1888. He took with him Lieutenant Macintyre Commandant, and 100 Non-Commissioned

*Assam Secretariat File No. 39-J. of 1888.

†Assam Secretariat File No. 39-J. of 1888.

‡Assam Secretariat File No. 520-J. of 1888.

See also pages 16-18 of “ Military Report on Naga Hills ” 1913 (written by Hutton).

Officers and men of the Naga Hills Frontier Police, and also Mr. Muspratt, the Subdivisional Officer of Wokha, and encountered serious opposition on the 18th April at the trans-Dikhu Ao villages of Yajim [Yacham] and Chihu [Yong] the latter being a separate 'khel' of Yajim, some 300 yards from the main village. McCabe had determined to visit them, as they had been guilty of raiding on the cis-Dikhu villages within the area of political control of Ungurr and Akoaia. Both villages were burned on the 19th and a number of casualties inflicted. On the 25th April he burned Noksen and Letum [Litim] also transfrontier villages, for similar offences.

Mr. McCabe sums* up the results of this eight weeks tour in the following words—

“26. I either visited or received deputations from every village within the country lying between Pangti and Nankam on the south, the Dikhu on the east, the plains of Assam on the north, and the boundary of the Wokha subdivision on the west, and disposed of every complaint that was brought to my notice.

With reference to the results achieved by these visits, I would point out that from 1885, my first promenade in this part of the hills, up to the present time, only three murders have been committed by villages within this area, and inter-village warfare has practically ceased, and I trust that the punishment inflicted on villages beyond the area of control will effectually put an end to the murderous raids that have been noted in this report. I enclose copy of a petition presented to me, from which you will see that a considerable number of villages are willing to pay revenue. No difficulty whatsoever would be experienced in administering the Ao country, and a European officer, with a force of 100 police sepoy, could in a few years bring this tribe into as civilized and amenable a state as that of the Lhotas and Angamis in the Naga Hills district.” The Chief Commissioner (Mr. Fitzpatrick) who had himself toured in the Naga Hills in February and March 1888, forwarded this report to the Government of India with his letter No.1441, dated the 13th June 1888, and in commenting on “the question of bringing some portion of the area of political control under our more direct administration referred to in the last paragraph of Mr. McCabe’s report,” said that “it would of course stand on a new footing if it appeared that the people were really willing to pay revenue”, and that he would address the Government of India again. He concluded his letter with a warm tribute to the work which Mr. McCabe had done in his long service in the Naga Hills, in the following terms.

“9. The Chief Commissioner, I am to say, cannot close this letter without adverting to the fact that the submission of the report herewith enclosed is the last official act of importance done by Mr. McCabe as Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills district. The Chief Commissioner views Mr. McCabe’s departure from the Naga Hills with much regret ; but Mr. McCabe had served his time there, and it was impossible to refuse him a transfer which domestic and other reasons led him

to solicit. Mr. McCabe's services have been so highly spoken of by previous Chief Commissioners that Mr. Fitzpatrick can hardly hope that anything he may say would add to the reputation that officer had already acquired ; but, having travelled with Mr. McCabe through the Naga Hills this year, and seen the good work he has done among this wild people and the feelings of mingled attachment and awe with which they regard him, Mr. Fitzpatrick cannot abstain from adding his testimony to that of his predecessors. He has rarely seen an officer who so happily combines the power of command with kindness of feeling and consideration towards the people "

Mr. Fitzpatrick's commendation only repeated similar praise which Mr. McCabe's work as Deputy Commissioner of the district during the 3 years 1882-85 had already earned for him from Mr. Elliott, whose Resolution* on the Administration Report for the year 1884-85 concludes with a panegyric on Mr. McCabe's work written by Mr. Elliott himself. It compares Mr. McCabe's work with "the influence exerted by the greatest men in Anglo-Indian history over the Santhals, the Bhils and the tribes of the Derajat", and refers with satisfaction to the friendly way in which he, as Chief Commissioner, had been received throughout a tour which he made in the previous cold weather, a happy result which he attributed to Mr. McCabe's unusual qualities. Mr. McCabe subsequently became Inspector General of Police and it was when holding that office that he was killed in Shillong in the earthquake of 1897.

Mr. Alexander Porteous succeeded Mr. McCabe as Deputy Commissioner and in July 1888 he had to report the burning of the Ao villages of Mongsembi [Mongsemyinti] and Lungkung, both situated within the area of our political control, by a combination of trans-Dikhu villages, news of which was sent to him by the Rev. E. W. Clark, an American Baptist Missionary, who had been established for some time at Waromang and Molongyimsen (Molungting ?) on the outer range of the Ao country. Mr. Clark referred to the raiders as "Mozunger", but this is merely the Ao word for "bad men" and they were in fact, what are now known as Changs. They had already absorbed a number of Ao villages and were tending to press across the river to the richer Ao country. In this instance they were reported to have killed and captured no less than 173 persons in Mongsembi and 44 in Lungkung. In his letter No.426, dated the 26th July 1888†, Porteous said.

"3.....The raids are evidently intended as a revenge for the punishment inflicted on Noksen and Letum in the late promenade. I had previously so far back as May received news from Mr. Clark that these villages were boasting of the vengeance they intended taking, but, as no messengers reached me direct, and no demand for assistance came through Mr. Clark from Susu, which had reported the matter to

*Chief Commissioner's Proceedings in the Departments under the control of the Foreign Department of the Government of India for July 1885. No.1067, dated 2nd July 1885.

†Assam Secretariat, 1888, File No.676-J.

him, I considered these threats as mere empty bravado, not seriously taken by the Aos themselves, and I merely wrote informing Mr. Clark that villages threatened were free to take any defensive measures they desired so long as they abstained from carrying war across the Dikhu. The threats made have been only too amply fulfilled, but it remains to be seen whether provocation of some sort may not have been given.

4. We have of late so far interfered in the affairs of the Aos, and the recent massacres are (so far as can be seen) so clearly the result of our late unfortunately futile attempts to protect their outlying villages from the attacks of their savage neighbours by a policy of punishment followed by withdrawal, that it would now, I respectfully submit, be inconsistent both with the honour and duty of the British Government to abandon them further to the attacks of their relentless enemies.

5. As regards my proposal to establish a guard at Susu or Mongsemdi, it would be useless to attempt to disguise the fact that such a guard must almost necessarily, to be effective at all, be permanent, and that to render its position perfectly secure the annexation of the whole Ao country must perforce follow.

* * * * *

7. An expedition sufficiently strong to visit all the villages which combined against us, and imposing enough to leave no doubt in the minds of the inhabitants of the hopelessness of attempting to contend with us, will be indispensable for the future security of the Aos, with or without annexation of the country of the latter."

In his letter No.578* of the 21st September 1888 he reports the steps he had taken to establish a guard in the Ao country for the protection of the villages recently raided. (Incidentally, in this letter he refers to the hostile tribes as "Miris"). He chose Mongsemdi as the site for the stockade in which the guard would be established. He gave further details about the raid on Mongsemdi as follows.

"11.The attacks were unquestionably intended as a retaliation for the expedition against Noksen and Litam in April last, undertaken to punish those villages for raids on Susu, Mongsemdi, and Lungkung. As I have now learnt, these villages suffered far more severely than could ever have been intended by my predecessor. Not only were several men killed by the small guard left by Mr. McCabe at Litam while he proceeded to Noksen, but a number, approaching 40, was killed in the jungles round the two villages during Mr. McCabe's halt, by a rabble of some hundreds of friendlies who had followed from Susu, Mongsemdi, Lungkung, Salachu, and other villages in the wake of our force. There is reason to believe the one man of Mongsemdi who was killed met with his death while so engaged.

The narrative of this massacre, and the looting which accompanied it, was told me with a manifest feeling of pride by, among others, one of the gaonburas of Salachu and he clearly exulted in the

*Assam Secretariat, 1888, File No.676-J.

prospect of being again afforded an opportunity of indulging those blood-thirsty instincts, which have now for some years had no outlet on this side of the Dikhu. He showed the naivest ignorance that the recital of these atrocities could be other than pleasing to me, although he had cunning enough to deny, when I put him this question, that any women or children had been slaughtered.

12. It is small wonder that, after losing so many men in addition to the destruction of their villages and the loss of most of their cattle, either killed or carried off as loot, the men of Noksen and Litam should have sent round the fiery cross, and, with the help of their allies, taken a savage revenge on the villages at whose hands (with our aid) they had suffered so heavy a punishment.

13. The attack on Mongsem-di was made in broad daylight, about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when almost all the men and many of the women and children were at work in their fields. A few men were on guard duty, but they were apparently taken by surprise, and although, with a devotion for which I could hardly have given Nagas credit, and which cost them all their lives, they stayed long enough at their post to sound the alarm on the village drum, which stands near the gate by which the enemy entered, it was too late to save the lives of the majority of the women and children then in their houses. The Miris swarmed over the village like ants, as one of the survivors described the scene, and cut down every man, woman, or child who was unable to escape, a few young children who were taken alive excepted. After taking all the heads, they set fire to the village and made good their retreat before the Mongsem-di men could come up from their *jhum*s. In all, 148 persons were killed, of whom 15 are said to have been men, 30 women, and the rest children. Lungkung was attacked at dawn on the 23rd of June, no watch having apparently been kept. Here the number of persons slaughtered was 40—5 men, 20 women, and the rest children. Two children were also carried off alive."

For the future, his views were as follows.

"18. Now that a guard has been stationed at Mongsem-di, the question arises of how long it is to remain, and, if not permanent, how in the future is the protection of the Ao frontier to be provided for. I take it for granted that an expedition will be sent through the Miri country in the cold weather, but unless we take hostages, which it may, perhaps, be impossible to do, I do not see how any effective security against a repetition of the Mongsem-di and Lungkung massacres can be taken, without either annexation of the Ao country, or a continued occupation of Mongsem-di, or some other post in it, which would be really equivalent to that step, and would entail many of the responsibilities of annexation with none of its advantages.

In considering the expediency of taking over the country west of the Dikhu, I may here point out that, adding to the list of Ao villages given at the close of Mr. McCabe's recent report, the large trans-Dikhu Ao village of Longsa, containing 1,000 houses, the Lhota group, Pangti, Okotso, and the two Ares, containing 500 houses, the few Sema villages north-west of the Teshi river containing 350 houses, and Assiringia, Tamlu, and Namsang, which are not Ao although this

side of the Dikhu, a total of 11,000 houses is attained. Now, even on an assessment of one rupee per house, which, it is my own opinion, would be all we could at first demand, this represents a large increase of revenue, while the services of a European officer being certainly no longer required at Wokha, in the event supposed, a large saving in the administration of that subdivision would ensue. The duties of the Subdivisional Officer at Wokha have for some years, especially since the Semas ceased raiding across the Dayang, been such as could perfectly well be performed by a tahsildar on Rs.150 a month. They were, in fact, performed with success for nine months in 1886-87 by the Wokha Head Clerk on Rs.80."

Before the Government of India was approached Mr. McCabe who was now Deputy Commissioner, Tezpur, was consulted. He gave his views as follows.

"The permanent occupation of the Ao country.—I have always argued that no final settlement of our relations with the Ao tribe could be obtained without a permanent occupation of the country. The interests of the tea-planters demand that the hill tribes immediately bordering on the north-east frontier should be under direct British control ; and once this is achieved, raids on the plains of Assam become an impossibility and the necessity of maintaining police outposts in the plains districts no longer exists.

No difficulty will arise in permanently occupying the Ao country. The tribe is well disposed towards us, is readily amenable to discipline, and has experienced the advantages of the protection we can give it.

The present movement seems to afford a favourable opportunity for instituting direct government, and it would be advisable to commence at once by levying a house-tax.

This tax should be at Rs.2 per house, and I think little difficulty would be experienced in realising it. The enhanced security to life and consequent development of trade, the sale of rice to the police, whose requirements would aggregate 1,500 maunds annually, the wages paid for work on roads and carriage of stores, would all cause an influx of money into this country, many of the Aos are opium-eaters, and it would take but a small sacrifice of this luxury to enable them to pay the house-tax. If this tract of country become an integral portion of the Naga Hills district, it will be necessary to fix a definite boundary beyond which under no pretence whatsoever should any control be assumed. The trans-frontier tribes should be given clearly to understand that, provided they respect the sanctity of our frontier, we have no wish to interfere in any way with them. A natural boundary is preferable to any other, and as the whole of the Aos, with the exception of Longsa, reside on the left bank of the Dikhu no better selection for a boundary than this river could be made.

2nd.—Location of headquarters and outposts.—Ungma is a very good site for the headquarter station. It is a large village, finely situated on the main ridge running parallel to the Dikhu river. The inhabitants are well-to-do, and inclined to be exacting in their demands from the neighbouring small villages.

An outpost at Mongsemdi would be necessary to afford protection against the raids of the trans-Dikhu tribes, and this post could easily be connected with Ungma by a road along the ridge above referred to. In case of necessity the journey from Ungma to Mongsemdi could be made in one day."

Letter No.3293,* dated the 14th November 1888, was then submitted to the Government of India with two proposals,—(a) a punitive expedition across the Dikhu, and (b) the annexation of the Ao country.

On the latter point, the letter contains a valuable résumé of the past history of our relations with trans-frontier tribes together with a careful review of the then situation, and the obligations resting on Government. Sir Denis Fitzpatrick expressed himself as follows.

"10.....the Chief Commissioner has no hesitation whatever in saying that if the present political control system is to be maintained, it must be with the obligation of defending the area of political control against aggression from without, and as regards the limitation laid down by the Government of India, *viz.*, that 'the measure of protection must depend upon proximity and convenience' it is unnecessary to discuss it, because, so far as the Chief Commissioner is aware, raids of the sort here in question are always made by villages at no great distance, which it is easy to reach and punish some way or other. It is no doubt very inconvenient to have to go even across the Dikhu to punish the raiders ; but it is a thing which we could not with any decency refuse to do as long as we assert the authority we do within the area of political control.

11. The question accordingly is, shall we stop (there is no possibility of going back) at the present system of political control, saddled with the obligation of defending the territory against raids from without, or shall we go a step further and by degrees occupy the territory, taking revenue from it ?

This question presented itself on a small scale to Mr. Fitzpatrick on his taking charge here this time last year, on a proposal made by Mr. Porteous to take Nunkum and a few other villages across the Doyung into the district (*see* correspondance ending with your office letter No. 568, dated the 16th March last). On that occasion Mr. Fitzpatrick was averse to the step, partly because, though he regarded it, now that Upper Burma has been annexed, as ultimately inevitable, and indeed a thing to be desired, that we should gradually absorb all the country between our present district boundary and the confines of Burma and Manipur into our regularly administered territories, he was anxious to proceed slowly and cautiously, partly because he thought the political control system promised to be fairly successful, and had moreover not yet been sufficiently tried, but chiefly because there were financial difficulties, the particular proposals then made by Mr. Porteous applying to so small a number of villages that the revenue which they offered to pay would have gone but a small way towards defraying the necessary additional expense.

* Assam Secretariat, 1888, File No.676-J.

12. Subsequently..... the Chief Commissioner came to the conclusion that if so large a proportion of the people of any portion of the political control area extensive enough to pay the additional expense involved are found willing to pay revenue that there would be no great difficulty about collecting it from all, it would be unwise on our part to abstain from occupying the tract and collecting revenue. The consideration which chiefly led the Chief Commissioner to this conclusion was that if we go on for a long series of years settling the affairs of these people and protecting them against attacks from beyond the political area, doing for them, in fact, almost all they want, they will come in time to imagine that they have a sort of prescriptive right to have all this done for them for nothing, and when the time comes when we must realise revenue from them, it may be a difficult and unpleasant business.....

13. As to the necessity of the step, it is manifest that the chastisement inflicted by Mr. McCabe on these trans-Dikhu villages in the spring has had no effect whatever, and the Chief Commissioner scarcely ventures to hope that the further action which he now proposes against them, though a sense of duty and a regard for our good name compel us to take it, will have very much effect as a deterrent.....

.....altogether the Chief Commissioner, while insisting on the necessity of the punitive visit he now proposes, cannot venture to think that, so far as the future is concerned, we shall after it has been made, be in a very much better position than we were before the recent raid. It would be utterly impossible to withdraw altogether within the limits of the present district. The force at present at Mongsemdi would have to be kept where it is, and it is more than possible that a year or two hence one or more similar posts would be found necessary.

The question is how is all this to be paid for, and the only answer seems to be by taking revenue from the Aos' who on every conceivable principle may be fairly required to pay at least in part for the special measures we take for their protection.

14. Further, as above observed, the recent occurrences make it easier to take revenue from them, and the opportunity is one which the Chief Commissioner would not allow to go by."

As regards the headquarters of the new area he proposed that it should be Ungma to which place the headquarters of the Subdivisional Officer of Wokha would be transferred. Finally he said.

"17. It only remains to be said that if His Excellency in Council should be pleased to approve of what is now proposed, the Chief Commissioner would not advocate the establishment of a fresh area of political control in the territory adjoining the portion of the present area of political control now to be occupied, as in his opinion the result of doing that would inevitably be that what has now occurred would repeat itself, and we might be compelled to enter into permanent occupation of that fresh area much sooner than would be convenient. It may be that when the time approaches for a further advance, those who come after us will think it well to begin by establishing an area of political control along the frontier. That will be for them to consider ; but for the present the Chief Commissioner would make the Dikhu our

boundary in the strictest sense and have nothing whatever to do with the people beyond, except in cases, which he believes under the new position of things would hardly ever occur, in which they might venture to commit aggressions on the people on our side. It would further, he thinks, be a question whether we should not place some restrictions on people crossing the river from our side, such as is established on other parts of our frontier under the Inner Line Rules”

The assent of the Central Government was obtained,* an expedition with Mr. Porteous in general charge assisted by Mr. A. W. Davis, I. C. S., and with Lieutenants R. M. Maxwell of the Lakhimpur Military Police Battalion and D. F. Macintyre of the Naga Hills Frontier Police Battalion in charge of the troops, which consisted of 68 of the former's men and 32 of the latter's, crossed the Dikhu on their way to visit the offending tribe on 5th January 1889. This tribe is what is known at the present day as the Changs, but in 1888, they are referred to as “Miris” or Mazungs, with their principal village as “Mazung—Jami” The Expedition was entirely successful and the casualties on either side extremely small. Porteous reported that 1 sepoy was killed and 1 wounded and 20 coolies spiked by panjis, while he put the loss of the “Mazungs” at “5 men killed, wounded unknown” Mozung—Jami [Tuensang] was occupied on 12th January 1889. The tribesmen had then no acquaintance with fire-arms and Mr. Maxwell remarks that they were so unaccustomed to these weapons that they thought, as fire come from the muzzle of the gun, all that was required was a *chunga* of water to put it out. In fact, in general he describes them as a “contemptible”, enemy. The ringleaders whom it was desired to capture escaped but the tribes were reduced to submission without any difficulty. Towards the end of his tour, Mr. Porteous visited the Trans-Dikhu Sema village of Seromi, whose attitude to him in his tour of April 1887 is referred to at page 116 above. Their defiant attitude was no less marked than before and “it was very evident that it was interpreted as a sign of weakness that we had taken no steps to bring Seromi to its bearings, and, on the eve of our assuming the administration of the Ao country, it would have been impolitic to allow such a feeling to get abroad unchecked.” Seromi offered no resistance and, as they made complete submission and were not in the control area, Porteous contented himself with warning them that headtaking must in future cease and exacting a small fine of 10 cattle.

In the course of his tour Porteous halted at Ungma in order to examine a site near Mokokchung [Mokoktsü] which seemed to him to offer the most suitable place for the new subdivisional headquarters. He was able to recommend the site, provided the water supply stood the test of the hot weather. (Subsequently, on 29th May 1889, he was able to report that the site he had selected “on the eastern slope of a hill, about half a mile west of Mokokchung” had stood the test.)

*Assam Secretariat, 1889—File No. 281-J.

Government then proceeded to take over the Ao country. This had been sanctioned in the Government of India's letter No. 2463-E,* dated the 24th December 1888 in the following terms: "3 The Government of India, while not desirous to hasten the extension of the frontier in this direction, has previously recognized the probability of such an advance being forced upon it by circumstances; and the Governor-General in Council agrees with you, for the reasons stated in your letter under reply, that the time has now come when the direct administration of the country of the Ao Nagas may with advantage be undertaken. It is not intended that the system of political control should be generally and definitely abandoned, but in this particular part of the country, where the people are themselves willing to pay revenue in return for protection, there is no sufficient reason why their wishes should not be acceded to. The Government of India accepts your recommendation not to establish, at present, any fresh area of political control, and will consider any further proposal you may make in regard to restrictions upon people crossing the Dikhu from our side.

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5. As regards the taxation to be levied from the inhabitants of the incorporated tract, I am to say that the Governor-General in Council would prefer, if the Aos have no obligations corresponding with those imposed upon the Lhota Nagas, that the house-tax should be fixed at Rs. 2 per dwelling to begin with; but His Excellency in Council will not object, if you consider it advisable to its being temporarily assessed at one rupee only. It will in any case be desirable that the country should as soon as possible, without exceeding the two rupee limit, pay its own expenses."

Discussion followed as to various details, of which four may be mentioned, *i.e.*, (a) were any Sema villages to be annexed; (b) was the Ao village of Longsa, which was across the Dikhu, to be included too; (c) the rate of revenue to be fixed and (d) where was to be the site for the new headquarters of the Subdivision.

As regards the first point, Porteous' advice was that the small group of villages west of the Teshi river, *viz.*, Mangrung, Nangtang and Phinsing should be taken over: while, subject to the necessity of increasing the police force so as to provide for a guard at Loppsemi, he would have liked to take over also the powerful group of 6 villages lying along the ridge from Lumokomi to Loppsemi. As regards the second point, he was in favour of including Langsa which would have otherwise been the sole Ao village outside British territory. Thirdly, he advised that Rs. 2 should be the rate of revenue. Lastly, he repeated the views referred to above about the suitability of a site near Mokochung, summarising his reasons as follows:—

"12. Summary of reasons for choosing the site near Mokochung—

- (1) Reasonable proximity to headquarters at Kohima.

- (2) Command of the frontier ridge of the Ao country with direct communication by the Khenza ridge with the rest of the Ao villages, without necessity of dropping into any valley.
- (3) Convenience of position with view to probable future extensions of the subdivision in to the Sema country.
- (4) Situation midway between three large villages Ungma 600, Khenza 300, Mokokchung 300 houses, none more distant than $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and consequent facilities for procuring supplies and coolie labour.
- (5) Suitability of site in height and lie of ground for establishing a station."

At the conclusion of the letter, No. 1033 of the 8th March 1889, in which he gave his views on these questions, Mr. Porteous added the following remarks about slavery :—

"20. Not the least important question in connection with our assumption of direct administration over the Aos is that of slavery, an institution which in the domestic form prevails widely throughout the tribe. Some rich men are said to possess as many as ten or twenty slaves. Slaves are not allowed to marry, nor to possess property, and children borne by female slaves are usually put to death. It is obvious such a state of things cannot be allowed to continue in British territory, but the question arises—is Government to declare at once all slaves emancipated with or without compensation, or should we leave the institution to disappear by the slow, but equally certain, method of refusing to enforce the supposed rights of slave-owners? The latter system was that adopted, I presume unconsciously, by Government in the Kuki country, where slavery was, however, not so widespread as among the Aos, and the result has been that slavery has entirely disappeared. I believe this to be the wisest policy, unless the Government be prepared to allow compensation, but I have to request that definite instructions on the subject may be issued as soon as possible."

The Chief Commissioner agreed to including the group of Sema villages west of the Teshi, but not the others ; he did not accept the inclusion of Langsa ; he approved of revenue being collected at the rate of Rs.2 and the location of the subdivisional headquarters at Mokokchung, (Incidentally, the missionary Mr. Clark, had pressed strongly for Waromang but this was rejected on a number of good grounds).

As regards slavery, the Chief Commissioner's reply was as follows :—

"9. Lastly, as regards your request that definite instructions may be issued as soon as possible regarding domestic slavery, which you state prevails widely among the Aos, I am to say that it would be altogether out of the question to come to any final conclusion as to the manner in which a matter of such importance and difficulty should be dealt with until we have had possession of the country for some little time, and learned something about it. It is most probable that here, as elsewhere, the status in question involves, besides the incidents

of mere social inferiority, such as, in accordance with our practice of giving effect to native usage, are recognised all over the country,—exclusion, *e. g.*, from marriage with superior classes, exclusion from certain special tenures of land, and so forth,—and if from the depths of our present ignorance we were to attempt to formulate any definite declarations on the subject, we should in all probability either go, or be understood to go, too far or not far enough, in the one case destroying other things besides slavery, and in the other appearing to extend our countenance to things which called for our reprobation.

The only instructions the Chief Commissioner can give you for some time to come are that you should absolutely refuse to lend your countenance in any way to slavery; in the proper sense of the word, and in particular that you should refuse to admit it as a justification for illtreating or restraining the liberty of any person whatsoever. I am to add that if the practice of putting to death the children born of so-called female slaves actually prevails, you should at once publicly notify throughout the new tracts that it will be punished as murder.”

The Government of India agreed to the setting up of the new Mokokchung Subdivision in its letter No. 223-E., of the 28th January 1890 and this was formally announced by Assam Government Notification No. 749-J, of the 28th February 1890, Mr. A. W. Davis, *i.c.s.*, being placed in charge as the first Subdivisional Officer by Notification No. 1491-G., of the same date. Mokokchung has remained the outlying subdivision of the district ever since, and Wokha has lost its administrative importance.

II. 1890–1900.—The year 1890-1891 was a year of quiet, a quiet the more remarkable towards its close in view of the events in Manipur in March 1891, when the Chief Commissioner and 4 other British Officers were murdered. The Nagas behaved extremely well and showed generally a disposition to help the British. There was, however, a certain amount of unrest on the Sibsagar border and so much apprehension was felt among tea gardens and other residents that a body of troops was maintained for 2 months at Sibsagar.

There was one exception, however, to the general record of tranquility, not that it was of great moment in itself, but because it led to the raising once more, and in a new direction, of the question of policy.

In December 1890 Davis had to punish two Sema villages outside the area of political control which lay to the east of Wokha, Seromi and Ghovishe's village. [Tsukohomi], the former for the murder of an Emilomi man, and the latter for a more serious raid in which one woman and, 10 children were killed. Seromi which he reached on the 1st December, put up no opposition, and was fined 30 head of cattle. Ghovishe also put up no fight, but his village burned as a punishment. (Seromi was included within the area of Political Control ten years later, with the sanction of the Government of India given in their letter No. 1988-E.B.* of the 9th October 1900).

* Assam Secretariat, For., A, October 1900, Nos. 46-50.

With his letter No. 915 *, dated the 29th December 1890, Mr. Davis sent in certain recommendations for the extension to the east of the area of political control, so as to include the Tizu and Tita Valleys, or, in other words, the whole of the Sema and Angami tribes, as well as the Ao village of Longsa, the only pure Ao village hitherto left outside our jurisdiction. †

The proposal commended itself to Mr. Quinton, but his death in 1891 and the hostility of his successors resulted in its being shelved for many years. The attitude of Sir William Ward and Sir Henry Cotton is well summed up in Mr. Ward's note of 25th November 1896, which runs as follows—"I have always been opposed to extending our area of political control, which is always followed by annexation, as in the case of Mokokchung subdivision. To annexation succeeds a further area of political control, and further annexation, etc. All this annexation means further expenditure. North Lushai is bad enough, with its expenditure of 5½ lakhs a year and a revenue of Rs. 7,000 only, we don't want to annex more hill tribes than we probably can help. The annexation of the Mokokchung subdivision was due to the theory started, I think, by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick and adopted by India in which I have never agreed, *viz.*, that political control area implies protection by us of that area from attacks of the area beyond. That practically means that to protect properly, we must annex and establish additional police outposts and establish political control of an area next beyond the area annexed, and so on, *ad infinitum*. The object of political control areas is, I have always held, to keep people immediately outside our annexed territories from taking heads, etc., on our borders. We say—"If you want to take heads, keep away from our borders. I would also say—'We can't undertake to protect you from the attacks of tribes beyond the political control area, and therefore won't interfere with your marching into their country and retaliating upon them if they attack you'." Mr. Cotton endorsed this view on 8th January 1897* saying, "I entirely agree with Sir William Ward's views, and would strongly object to any extension of political control, if it can possibly be avoided. But there is always the risk of our hands being forced at any time."

1891-92 was described by Mr. Davis the Deputy Commissioner, in his annual report as a most disastrous year both for the Angamis and for the foreign residents. The former suffered greatly on account of the excessive impressment of coolies for military requirements, and the outbreaks of cholera and small pox. No less than 20,500 coolies had to be provided during the year and that total did not cover those taken at Nichuguard and in that neighbourhood. The foreign residents of Kohima suffered "on account of the scarcity of provisions and famine prices..... consequent on the impressment of all available transport in Sibsaigar and this district for military purposes and the high prices paid by the Transport Department for paddy for pack animals."

*Assam Secretariat, For., A, January 1897, Nos. 1-8.

† The still independent villages of Yacham and Yong are generally regarded as Ao, but differ greatly from the rest of the tribe in language and custom.

In 1892-93* Longsa (a hitherto independent Ao village whose inclusion in administered territory had been the subject of discussion in 1889) paid revenue for the first time. (Mr. Davis had informed them that they would be so liable when he visited the village in April 1892, but, as was discovered 11 years later somewhat to the consternation of the Secretariat, no written sanction of Government to this order was ever issued at the time, an omission which the Assam Government requested the Government of India to rectify in their letter No. 428-For., † dated the 9th July 1904). In 1893-94 our hold over the eastern Angamis immediately east of the Sidzu was tightened and Chajubama [Chozumi] was taken in as a revenue paying village.

Correspondence took place in 1895 between the Governments of India, Burma and Assam, arising out of a raid by trans-frontier "Chins" from the west on a village called Shawpu, just beyond the Burma border and about 10 miles south-east of Melomi in our Eastern Angami country, in which the Chief Commissioner of Burma, Sir Frederic Fryer, in his letter No. 742 ‡ dated the 25th September 1895, raised the question of defining the boundary on either side of the tract lying between the North Chindwin District and Manipur. This matter was left by the Government of India, in their letter No. 1942-E., † dated the 23rd October 1895, to the Chief Commissioner of Burma, to the two administrations to arrange. They took, at the same time, the opportunity to reiterate their policy that "no interference in the tract beyond our administrative borders should be encouraged or permitted, provided the tribes occupying that tract refrain from raids within the administered area. This principle of general policy should be impressed on the local officers concerned." In so doing they repeated what they had said previously to the Chief Commissioner of Assam in their letter No. 679-E., dated the 29th March 1895, *i.e.*,

3. "The Chief Commissioner of Burma has laid down, and the Government of India have approved, the principle that no interference with the tribes in this region should be permitted so long as they abstain from raiding on the country under our settled administration. From this principle the Governor-General in Council would be unwilling to depart; and should any operations be undertaken, it would be desirable to explain clearly to the tribes that the Government of India have no desire to enter into any relations with them, or to maintain over them any permanent control. The scope of possible operations should be regarded from the standpoint of this policy."

In December * 1897 Captain Cole, now Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills, visited the Sema villages of Kiyéku [Kiyekhu], a trans-border village, to punish it for raiding Sakhai and taking 17 heads. He imposed the heavy fine of Rs.1,000, but this was not

* Assam Secretariat, For., A, August 1892, Nos. 36-37.

† Assam Secretariat, For., A, August 1904, Nos. 41-56.

‡ Assam Secretariat, For., A, December 1895, Nos. 5-13.

Assam Secretariat, For., A, September 1895, Nos. 9-20.

* Assam Secretariat, For., A, May 1898, Nos. 4-5.

realised and the village was burnt, and cattle to the value of Rs.400 were seized. A sum of Rs.150 was later brought in in cash, and the rest worked off in labour on the Sema road.

The report for 1899-1900 records a period of tranquillity, with one exception. The one exception*, however, was an important one, the incident of Yachumi. In his annual report Captain Woods, who had succeeded Captain Cole, merely says he "met with opposition" from this village and had to punish it. The punishment, however, was one of unusual severity. Captain Woods, together with Mr. Noel Williamson, Sub-divisional Officer of Mokokchung, and 100 rifles of the Naga Hills Military Police under Captain Shakespear left Kohima on the 28th January 1900 on a Trans-Dikhu tour. The route he took was north-east from Kohima by way of Khyeku, which had been burnt by Captain Cole in December 1897, to the Tizuriver. At Kukiyemi [Huchirr] in the Tizu Valley, some 6 miles from Yachumi [Yimtsung-Aenrr], Woods got information of Yachumi's hostile attitude. He went there next day, the 8th February, and the incident is best described in the following extract from Wood's diary.

"8th February—Kukiyemi to Yachumi and back, about 12 miles.— Shortly after leaving Kukiyemi this morning, we found the path *panjied*; this, I think, must have been devilment on the part of Ghovishe or Kukiyemi with the intention of getting Yachumi into a row, because the path was quite clear of *panjies* until quite close up to the village of Yachumi. The path runs pretty level for about four miles, and then descends to a stream, from which there is a pretty steady pull up to the spur on which the village is situated, then the path runs slightly downhill to the village; when we got within half a mile or so of the village, apparently the alarm was given, and many men were seen running up from the fields into the village. The village was hidden inside a ring of magnificent bamboo clumps. A number of men came out from the village in their full war paint with spears, *daos*, and shields, and executed the usual war dance. My *dobhashas* spoke to the people, and told them that our visit was only a friendly one, and that if they put away their arms, no harm would come to them, but it was all of no avail, as they were collecting in numbers, and there would have been a heavy loss had they got in amongst my coolies; I was reluctantly compelled to give the order to fire. It was only after they had some losses that they retired. We then entered the village, but not without a good deal of opposition. The village had a very strong fence and ditch all round, and the latter was heavily *panjied*. It was a very fine village with some 400 or 500 houses in it; the houses were all of the Trans-Dikhu pattern, with a long main street and houses closely packed on each side of it. I had intended to stay the night here, but on account of the difficulty in keeping the coolies, who had been looting pretty freely all round, and the impossibility, had they bolted, of getting coolies from anywhere else, I decided on returning to Kukiyemo. As the village had offered so much opposition all through, I decided on burning it, and Captain Shakespear with the rearguard burnt the village. It is probable that this lesson to

* Assam Secretariat, For., A, April 1900, Nos.1-9.

Yachumi will have a salutary effect in this valley and elsewhere, more especially as Yachumi had been boasting so much, and had such a terrorising name on all sides. Did not get back to Kukiyemi until after dark. It was a long, trying day. One sepoy and my head *dobasha* wounded by *panjies* and one coolie with a spear were our only casualties. There are a number of very big villages in this valley. This village cannot be very far from Mozungjami. Elevation of Yachumi 5,400 feet."

The truth at which Captain Woods evidently guessed, was that the Semas through whose villages he had passed, had sent word to Yachumi urging them to resist. The Semas knew that heavy casualties would be inflicted and, following the column, decapitated the dead and wounded. The rest of his tour was uneventful and he visited a large number of villages outside the administrative border.

The Chief Commissioner addressed the Deputy Commissioner on the subject in his letter No ^{199-For.} _{1338-P} dated the 11th April 1900 in the following terms.

"..... It is observed that on the 8th February you were encamped at the village of Yachumi which is far outside the area of your political control, and were there involved in serious collision with the men of that village, which resulted in your firing on them at close quarters and killing several, and afterwards burning the village which is said to contain 400 or 500 houses.

2. I am to say that the Chief Commissioner does not wish to take any exception to your conduct at this village. He has no reason to doubt that the circumstances in which you found yourself rendered it necessary for the safety of yourself and of your party to fire upon the men of the village, and that some loss of life was unavoidable. But it is none the less deplorable that this collision should have occurred. Mr. Cotton cannot understand that there was any necessity on your part to visit this unfriendly village, and he does not look with favour on any part of your protracted tour over a tract of country where the British Government possess and claim no political control, and where there is obvious risk of your coming into conflict with the savage tribes who inhabit it. He believes that on former occasions expeditions similar to your own have been undertaken without sanction, and this may be held to justify your procedure in the present case; but he wishes you now to understand distinctly that he cannot approve of such expeditions unless some special reason exists for them, and that you must not in future organise or make an expedition or promenade through independent territory outside the area of your political control without obtaining the previous sanction of the Local Administration.

3. The general policy has been frequently laid down of discouraging interference beyond the Dikhu, except when aggressions are committed on the people on our side; and while the Chief Commissioner has no intention of laying down any hard-and-fast rules to which it would probably be found impossible to adhere in practice, he is convinced that it is desirable to conform to the established policy, and that

tours such as you have recently undertaken beyond the political control area involve the risk of collision, such as actually occurred at Yachumi, and are likely to lead to the gradual extension of the area under direct administration in the Naga Hills and to political and financial responsibilities of a serious nature. The tendency no doubt is in this direction, but the Chief Commissioner has no wish to precipitate matters. The area of the Sema country under political control is sufficiently well defined with a natural boundary, though it is not marked on the maps, as it ought to be. This area is within your jurisdiction, but the Tizu and Tita and Yangnu valleys which you have recently traversed lie beyond it, and it is to prevent excursions being undertaken by the Naga Hills authorities into these independent tracts without previous sanction that the present orders are issued”

III. 1900-1913.—The Government of India to whom the Yachum incident was reported agreed in their letter No.1046-E.B.*, dated the 18th May 1900 with Mr. Cotton’s view of the matter and with his orders. These orders had far-reaching effects as subsequent events were to show, and eventually circumstances proved too strong and they had to be modified.

It is worth while recording that Yachumi itself does not seem to have taken the matter very much to heart, as Mr. W. M. Kennedy in his report for the year 1900-1901 says—“They are now on the most friendly terms with us and are anxious that we should visit their village again, which of course is impossible, in view of the present orders regarding crossing the frontier. The Yachumi people say that Ghovishe instigated them to attack us.....”

Mr. Kennedy raised the question of control in the area to the east in the Tizu Valley in a letter No.486-G.,† dated the 1st June 1901, which he addressed to Government. He asked that he should be allowed to settle disputes across the frontier, and secondly, he strongly urged that the boundary should be extended so as to include the whole Sema country or at least that the Tizu should be made the boundary. At the conclusion of his letter he described the position which had come about as a result of the orders which were issued after the Yachumi collision as follows.

“The Chief Commissioner may with justice complain that he is always being urged to extend the area of our political control notwithstanding his repeated refusals to undertake any further responsibilities in that direction, but there are special reasons why this matter should be raised now. In times passed my predecessors have from time to time toured in the Tizu Valley, settled the more serious land disputes, and punished recalcitrant villages, the result being that there is peace in the Tizu Valley at present, and more particularly on the western slope thereof, which is contiguous to our boundary. These tours, which were reported in diaries have at least the tacit approval of the Local Government. The position of affairs is however, now entirely

*Assam Secretariat, For., A, August 1900, Nos.9-11.

†Assam Secretariat, For., A, August 1901, Nos.27-32.

different, as, since the collision at Yachumi last year, stringent orders have been issued prohibiting officers crossing the boundary or having any dealings with independent tribes. I am therefore now precluded from settling a land dispute even a few yards across the ridge, which is our boundary and once the independent villages close to us realise this, they will resume the former habits of rioting and head-taking, which cannot fail to re-act unfavourably on our own villages close by. I feel, therefore, that I should be failing in my duty if I did not represent the state of affairs to the Chief Commissioner. If I remained silent I should be bound to carry out the present policy of non-interference beyond our border, and the responsibility for plunging back the Tizu valley into a state of anarchy would be mine”

The reply which he got in the Government letter No.327-For.-P-3466, dated the 8th August 1901 turned down his proposals in singularly definite and unsympathetic terms. It ran as follows—

“2. In reply, I am to say that the Chief Commissioner observes that most of the arguments put forward by you and Captain Woods have been used before and will doubtless be used again in favour of an extension of the area of political control. Where there is an ethnological boundary it will be said that a further extension is necessary in order to secure a good natural and geographical boundary. When the boundary is a natural one an ethnological frontier is declared to be the best. When the boundary is a stream it is proposed to push it on to the top of the mountain ridge beyond. When the watershed has been reached it will be found that political considerations require an extension to the bed of the next river below and so on *ad infinitum*. It is usually reported that the proposed extension will involve no increase of expenditure, but in point of fact such extensions always do involve directly or indirectly additional outlay and further acquisitions of territory at no distant date. It may be that in the present case it will not be necessary to establish any outpost in the tract, which it is proposed to take over, and that no addition to the Military Police force will be required. But it is quite certain that the prolonged tours of the Deputy Commissioner in the area of Political control and beyond it do impose responsibilities and additional expenditure on the Administration, which increase as that area extends.

3. The Chief Commissioner does not forget that since the present boundary of the political control was laid down the Deputy Commissioners of the Naga Hills have repeatedly interfered to settle disputes among the independent Nagas beyond it. There is always a strong temptation to do this. Under the important orders of the Government of India, No. 246-E., dated the 3rd February 1886 you are authorised to punish villages outside the area of political control for raids committed on villages within that area when this can be conveniently be done. In practice it has always been found convenient not only to punish such villages but to make enquiry into and settle the disputes and quarrels out of which the raids originated. Your predecessors have thus come to adjudicate in disputes between independent villages and to punish disobedience of their orders. In making an expedition

to an independent village it is necessary to pass through other independent villages and sometimes to halt at them with an armed force and to require them to furnish transport. In this way the Deputy Commissioners of the Naga Hills have gradually extended their control over a number of independent villages beyond the political control area.

4. It may be admitted that the result of this has been beneficial in the establishment of order in localities such as Tizu and Tita Valleys. But Mr. Cotton cannot doubt that your predecessors would have been better advised if they had adhered more strictly to the spirit of the orders of Government and had avoided as far as possible any interference with independent tribes. Sometimes, as for instance, in the case of the visit of Yachumi, which led to a serious collision and loss of life last year, expeditions or promenades beyond the area of political control appear to have been taken with no other object than exploration, and the Chief Commissioner regrets that the orders, which were the consequence of that case, did not issue earlier and that it was not laid down long ago that expeditions outside the area of political control should not be undertaken without previous sanction.

5. Holding these views the Chief Commissioner is unable to accept your proposals for extending the area of political control in the direction of the Tizu river or to approve of your interference in the specific cases which you have brought to notice, which all relate to inter-tribal disputes in villages outside of that area”

The Chief Commissioner evidently drafted the latter part of the letter himself though he incorporated in the beginning of it almost the whole of a note written by his Secretary, Mr. F. J. Monahan, who, incidentally, while realizing the nuisance arising out of constant incursions into tribal territory accepted the situation and considered that there was no help for it out to accede to Mr. Kennedy's request

The advent of a new Chief Commissioner, Mr. J. B. Fuller, promised a more sympathetic attitude to these ideas. In February 1903, apparently in response to enquiries from the Chief Commissioner, Captain A. A. Howell, the Deputy Commissioner, wrote strongly on the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Tizu and Tita Valleys gave many instances of outrages which had occurred and reported how at least one village, Yatsimi, had asked to be taken under our protection, a request which he had had “with grief and regret” been obliged to refuse. In a later letter No. 2426-G., *dated the 24th February 1903 he made the following suggestions by way of remedy.

“I have the honour to inform you that during my tour along the border of the political control in the Sema country, many of the leading men of that tribe have come in to see me. They all complain of our present boundary, which follows the crest of a range of hills, and certainly it is by no means all that a boundary should be. For instance, within a radius of some six miles of Sevikhe's village are some dozen villages all on the same hill, some on one side of the crest, and some on the other, while some are on the crest itself, which is our

border. These villages are all closely connected by descent, marriage, and trade (such as it is), and their lands, which lie on both sides of the crest of the hill, are inextricably intermingled with each other. Whatever a red line on the map may mean to a civilised man, it has no meaning to these people, who entirely fail to see, where all are alike, by what principle Government should make such important distinctions. In their opinion, the best thing that Government can do is to take over the whole of the Sema tribe, or, failing that, to take some natural boundary, such as the Tizu or Tita River, forbidding the people on either bank to cross the boundary on any pretence whatsoever. There is a good deal in what they say, but the first alternative would necessitate the establishment of a Military Police outpost in the Sema country. Until the tribe will bear the costs of this outpost, the expense to Government is not justifiable. The second alternative is certainly an improvement on the present arrangement. A river is a natural feature, which the meanest savage understands, and is, to a great extent, a dividing line between villages and village interests, which the crest of a hill most certainly is not. I however, am not prepared to recommend either a natural or a tribal boundary. In a country such as that on the eastern border of the Naga Hills, inhabited, as it is, by numerous tribes often much scattered, whose lands are limited by no well-defined natural features, I venture to suggest with all due deference that neither a tribal nor a natural boundary is the most desirable, but a mixture of the two, the principle to be followed being that the benign influence of Government should be exercised as far as can be extended without in any way increasing the cost of the ordinary administration of the British portion of the Naga Hills district. That this influence can be thus exerted beyond the boundary of our present political control, there is no doubt whatever. I am no advocate of exploring excursions unless specially ordered by the Chief Commissioner. It is from these that the present unsatisfactory state of affairs has arisen. I would, however, most earnestly request that these villages, which have lived for many years in peace and order, considering themselves under our protection, should not be given over to every description, of violence and outrage. Under existing orders the maintenance of peace and order is impossible, and I, therefore, trust that these orders may speedily be modified”

Mr. Fuller recorded a long note on the subject on 18th April 1903 in which he reviewed the past policy and showed himself to be inclined to favour Captain Howell's ideas. Further inquiries led to letter No.1064-G. from Captain Howell dated the 25th July 1903 in which he advocated the immediate declaration of control over all Angami villages: its gradual extension over the whole Sema tribe: and the application of taxation to the whole existing area of political control, to the 5 Angami villages east of the Tizu and to the Sema villages lying between our border and the Tizu. He also made certain important recommendations about running roads through the country in question, proposals with which Mr. A. W. Davis, late of the Naga Hills and by then Inspector-General of Police, agreed. These proposals, as Mr. Davis explains in his Memo. of 30th July 1903, were a revival of those which

were put forward by himself in 1891, accepted by Mr Quinton, thrown aside owing to the latter's death in 1891, renewed in 1891 and 1892 by Mr. Davis, again shelved, revived in 1896 and this time definitely turned down by both Sir W. Ward and Sir H. Cotton: and then again revived in 1901 and again disapproved by Sir H. Cotton. Mr. Davis considered that the political control area should be extended so as to include every Sema and Angami village.

He observed incidentally that the prohibition rule (consequent on Yachumi) had led to a "deplorable amount of bloodshed and numerous murderous outrages just across our frontier", and in a note recorded a little later he stated his opinion that the frontier line was "no longer safe as it was 10 to 12 years ago", a "direct result", he considered "of the non-interference policy". He condemned the present condition of affairs as being "discreditable to our administration and unintelligible to the people who are affected by it"

The proposals which the Chief Commissioner forwarded to the Government of India in his letter No. 517-For-P./5295, dated the 23rd November 1903 embodied this advice in general. He reviewed the policy of the previous 20 years starting from 1884 and made the following recommendations: (a) that the present area of "control" should be formally incorporated in the district and house tax levied which would regularise the existing *de facto* position; and

(b) that the area lying west of the Tizu as far north as and including the village of Yehim as well as 6 villages, among them Sohe-mi, inhabited either by Angamis or by Semas who had adopted Angami habits, lying to the east of the said river, should be included in the district. He decided not to include Melomi or Lapvomi, though they had applied for annexation.

The letter ended with the following reference to the Government of India's order of the 18th May 1900 arising out of the Yachumi case:--

"12.....the Chief Commissioner ventures to represent that the decision of the Government of India in the Yachumi case, referred to in paragraph 2 of this letter, has led to a recrudescence of barbarism across the frontier. Previous to the issue of those orders the Deputy Commissioners were in the habit of making occasional tours beyond the boundary of the "political control" area, in the course of which they settled disputes which were referred to them, and punished recalcitrant villages, with the result that raiding and head-taking were kept under control. It was early brought to notice that the stringent prohibition against crossing the frontier was likely to lead to resumption of murderous feuds by the adjacent Naga villages, and the numerous cases of violent outrage which have been reported lately show that the apprehension was well founded. An annexure to this letter gives a summary of the cases which have occurred since the 1st January 1902.

With regard to the Tizu Valley, the eastern side of which will lie immediately beyond the proposed boundary, Major Howell writes:—

"It should be remembered that until the issue of the orders in the Yachumi case, the people in the political control were as well behaved as

those in any other part of the district. So were those in the Tizu Valley. This Valley is now fast relapsing into barbarism, and the process has a disturbing effect on the villages within the control proper”

Mr. Davis writes :—

If the control area be not extended to include the whole Sema tribe, then the rule prohibiting the Deputy Commissioner from crossing the border without formal permission should be relaxed, as it is very necessary that he should be able to settle cases brought by people within the control area against people living outside it. * * * The prohibition rule has, I am afraid, led to a deplorable amount of bloodshed and numerous murderous outrages just across our frontier, which would not have occurred if the policy of the pre-Yachumi days had been followed of recent years.

While we have, of course, no definite responsibilities for keeping the peace across our frontier, our Political Officers cannot but feel regret at the constant occurrence of barbarous outrages close beyond our border, which are preventible without risk or expenditure, and the Chief Commissioner sympathises with their feelings. Both Major Howell and Mr. Davis earnestly plead for the relaxation of the rule that now prohibits the Deputy Commissioner from promptly visiting villages across the border and using his mediating authority to compose feuds which not only lead to misery and loss of life, but have a disturbing effect on our own people. Mr. Fuller quite realises the danger of allowing British Officers a free hand across the frontier. They are subject to great temptations to extend their authority further than it is possible to enforce it without risk of collision or of expenditure. But at the same time he is of opinion that cases arise in which short tours may be undertaken without any such risk and with great benefit to the people. Mr. Fuller would on no account allow the Deputy Commissioner to cross the border without his express sanction ; but he would be glad if the Government of India would permit him to give such sanction occasionally on the understanding that a definite programme of the tour will be submitted by the Deputy Commissioner for his approval, and that it will be strictly followed.”

In their letter No.291-E.B., * dated the 26th January 1904, the Government of India agreed to the extension of the eastern boundary of the district. This affected a long strip of country from Yehim in the north along the line of the Tizu which became, to its junction with the Hipu, the boundary of the administered area (as it is to this day) down to Sohemi [Sahunyu] on the south. Mr. Noel Williamson who was then Subdivisional Officer of Mokokchung (subsequently, as Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya, to be murdered by Abors in 1911) went through the part of the newly annexed country which lay in his subdivision in March 1904 and was well received ; Major Howell went a week later to the villages lying to the southern part of the area concerned. He also had no difficulties, but he lays emphasis in

* Assam Secretariat, For., A, August 1904, Nos. 41-56.

his report on the menace of the Aishan Kuki villages to the east who were "a terror to the country side" especially as they were estimated to be armed in the proportion of a gun a piece for 200 houses.

In 1905* occurred the second expedition against Mozungjami—the first was conducted by Mr. Porteous in 1889—situated about 20 miles east of Mokokchung and known by its own Chang inhabitants as Tuensang or Yemkhung. This expedition was sanctioned by the Government of India in 1904 and it started from Mokokchung on the 12th January 1905 with Mr. W. J. Reid, the Deputy Commissioner, in charge, accompanied by Mr. Williamson, and an escort of 100 men of the Naga Hills Military Police, under Captain H. A. H. Thompson, the Commandant. They arrived at their destination on the 15th January and found both the offending khels, Pelasi [Bilashi] and Chongpo deserted. These they burnt in reprisal for the killing of two Sema coolies and they then devastated the country and destroyed the possessions of the villagers. The punishment meted out is described as severe. The expedition, however, instead of staying up to 26th January as was intended had to depart prematurely on the 22nd on account of choleraic diarrhoea breaking out among the coolies. This prevented the operations being as thorough as the Deputy Commissioner desired and he would have liked to exact further punishment subsequently. The Chief Commissioner, Mr. Fuller, was however, sufficiently satisfied with the results, though it was realised that it was only Chongpu which made reparation while Pelasi made none. Little more than 2 years after the receipt of the Government of India's sanction to the shifting forward of the eastern boundary of our area of control, the Local Government again addressed them with a similar request. Their letter No. 6119-J.,† dated the 7th June 1906, arose out of certain strongly worded complaints which were submitted by the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills on the 11th July 1905 regarding the state of affairs just across his eastern border, of which the following are extracts:—

"4..... in the early nineties raiding on our immediate frontier had been put a stop to to a great extent. Since then, as we have taken no notice of savage acts of bloodshed, the country is lapsing into its former state, and if we maintain the non-interference policy it will be only a matter of time before it returns to the condition in which we found it. From a purely official point of view the present policy of allowing this barbarous warfare to be carried on is an excellent one, provided there is no fear of the sanctity of our border being violated. There should be no grounds for this fear, however, if we were to show ourselves more across the frontier. I have said that the orders in the Yachumi case as regards touring across our border have not been the cause of the present condition of affairs. But these orders have had a distinct effect in lessening our influence across the border.

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* Assam Secretariat, For. A, April 1905, Nos. 1-50.

† Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, July 1906, Nos. 25-32.

The total number of murders, therefore, about which I have received reports amounts to 545 during the last 3½ years. For the reasons given in my last Annual Report it might not have been possible to prevent the murders across the Tizu which during 1904 and 1905 amount to 130. But all the other 324 murders, or an average of over 90 a year, which have all occurred in a portion of the frontier not much more than 30 miles in length, could have been prevented without any increase to the Military Police Battalion and without the expenditure of a single extra rupee. These figures, it must be remembered, represent only the numbers of murders about which I have received information. As pointed out in my Annual Report others must take place about which nothing is ever heard.

6. If the present awful condition of affairs is to cease, the only solution as far as I can see is annexation. Let the country annexed be called a political control area if necessary, but let the inhabitants clearly understand that they are British subjects, and as such they may look to Government for protection and redress in return for the obligations we impose on them as regards raiding. I have written at length on this subject in my Annual Report. If we cannot annex, I think our policy should be one of strict non-interference. If a savage comes to us for protection or redress which we cannot give him on the grounds that our policy is one of non-intervention, we can hardly in turn, I take it, place restrictions on him as regards raiding and expect him to consider the feelings of Government on this subject.

7. I would mention here that Mr. Davis sent a note to the Secretariat in about April 1903 on the state of affairs of this frontier. This note was written by him after seeing the village of Alisibo burning before his eyes on the 25th March 1903 while on tour at Mokok-chung."

In referring the matter to the Government of India in their letter No.6119-J., dated the 7th June 1906 the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam enquired "whether the Government of India would assent to the exercise of the authority of this Government in order to check the perpetration of barbarities by the inhabitants of villages which lie a short distance across the eastern frontier of the Naga Hills district." They were "confident that the Government of India will agree in the view that it is expedient to intervene for the prevention of these atrocities if intervention will not add materially to the responsibilities of British Government". The general lines of policy which Sir Bampfylde Fuller advocated were explained thus:—

"4. Should the Government of India approve an extension of the authority of the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills district, the Lieutenant-Governor would advocate no considerable change of policy. He would simply move on the lines which were recommended 16 years ago and establish an area of 'political control' along and beyond the eastern frontier of the district. He has but little faith in casual 'promenades', or in isolated punitive intervention; and he believes that nothing short of a direct declaration of continuous intervention will put an end to the raiding of one village upon another. He is

assured by his officers that such a declaration would have to be supplemented by a very small amount of punishment in order to maintain the sanctity of human life: and their opinion is entirely borne out by our experience with the areas of 'political control' which formerly existed but have now been included in the district..... In one respect the Lieutenant-Governor would depart from the policy of the past in that he would not attempt at present to define with precision the outside boundary of the belt of 'political control'. The country is not well known, and the existing maps are not reliable. Moreover it is plain that the area over which our influence should be exerted should be marked by tribal rather than by territorial limits, and should be defined by lists of villages, not by geographical features. Beginning with the southern extremity of the belt our intervention should certainly reach the three villages of Melomi, Lepvomi and Primi.....

The geographical limits which are mentioned above are, however, merely intended as a general indication of direction. It is proposed that the Deputy Commissioner should be authorised to list the villages which should be brought under our influence, subject to the limitations that they should constitute a fairly compact area, and that they should lie at no greater distance than two marches from the present frontier of the district or than 12 miles as the crow flies.

5. If, as is proposed, the assertion of our control is gradually brought home to the people, the Lieutenant-Governor is assured that the contingency need not be apprehended of any very severe or extensive measures of punishment. It is possible that some of the trans-Dikhu villages may be disposed to resent interference; but it is very improbable indeed that anything further will be needed than a show of strength. Sir Bampfylde Fuller believes indeed that the great majority of the villages will accept without unwillingness an authority to which their neighbours are subject and which brings much material advantage in its train. There is no intention of interfering in petty quarrels. It would be our policy to repress raiding within the area of control, and to protect villages within this area from being raided by those on the further side of them. The latter obligation may seem to involve rather wide possibilities. But the experience of the past has shown that the protection of the British Government, once formally asserted, is respected by the tribesmen, and with the exception of the attack on Nongsemdi (in the Ao country) which occurred in 1888, the former area of political control remained practically immune from outside aggression."

The Government of India, replying at leisure in their letter No.511-E.C.* of the 12th February 1907, were far from sympathetic. They reiterated at unusual length and with unusual emphasis their adherence "to the principle of accepting no responsibility for the protection of life and property beyond the administrative line of British territory" and the fact that they "had no desire to hasten the day when the outlying tribes would fall under their administration". They characterised the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government's proposal as being in

*Eastern Bengal and Assam, Secretariat Political, A, March 1908, Nos.1-15.

opposition to their declared policy, and, after reviewing the course of policy which had been adopted for the last twenty-five years, they pronounced themselves quite definitely as being opposed to any general change of policy. The only thing they would consider was whether there were any particular circumstances in the Naga Hills' case such as to make it desirable to make an exception. They, therefore, cautiously and without committing themselves, asked for further information on various points which they enumerated. The Local Government took a considerable time to reply to this letter and in the meanwhile made enquiries from their subordinate officers. These enquiries elicited some striking facts. The Commissioner in a letter dated the 26th September 1907 mentions a peculiarly bad instance in which, in January 1906, 250 persons had been butchered at the fords of the Dikhu by trans-frontier Nagas, the survivors of whom he himself saw when on tour. Similarly, Major H. W. G. Cole who had formerly been Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills wrote on the 20th June 1907 from the Lushai Hills where he was then stationed and pronounced himself in no uncertain terms on the subject. The only sensible thing to do was to accept as inevitable the ultimate absorption of all unadministered territory between India and Burma; if our advances in this direction were to be gradual, they should be at any rate be constant, and the sooner the thing was faced the better. Thirdly, Mr. A. W. Davis, who was then the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills, dealt at length with the subject in his letter No.584-G., dated the 6th July 1907 and concluded by saying that "We shall have no real peace until we have absorbed the whole hill area between this and the Chindwin. This can be done gradually and economically. As it is, the huge area of uncontrolled hill country between Assam and Burma is an anomaly." The East Bengal and Assam Government of which by this time Sir-Lancelot Hare was the head, replied to the Government of India in their letter No.5204-J., dated the 7th December 1907. They traced the history of our relations with our tribal areas from 1840 to 1904. They referred with regret to the effect that the orders of Government in 1900 prescribing the necessity of obtaining previous sanction had had in putting a stop to tours beyond the frontier. They strongly supported the view that there was a special case for extension of control on the Naga Hills border. "His Honour does not presume" the letter ran, "to criticize the general policy of the Government of India, and he has no desire to see the sphere of British authority unnecessarily widened, but it seems impossible to avoid the responsibilities of sovereignty, and as each successive area gradually settles down under our administration the necessity arises for pushing back the pale of barbarism from its borders. The case for the Naga Hills appears particularly strong owing to the savagery with which the feuds there are conducted and now that law and order are established within the district, Sir Lancelot Hare would say in the words used by the Secretary of State [Lord Cranbrook] of 1878, "that the continuance in immediate proximity to settled districts of a system of internecine warfare conducted principally against women and children cannot be tolerated." In conclusion reference was made to a particular aspect of the matter which required decision, *i.e.*, that difficulty had arisen owing to the fact that part at least of the coal-bearing tract

which European firms wished to exploit lay outside the area of British administration. The necessity of early orders regarding an area of control which had been put forward in their letter written so long ago as 7th June 1906, or 1½ years previously, was urged.

On the main object, in continuation of the letter of December 1907, to which no reply had apparently been received, Eastern Bengal and Assam again wrote in their letter No.2450-J., dated the 18th May 1908 and again begged for orders on the question of taking over a number of villages in order to put down outrages and raiding. The general effect of the letter was that they wanted to extend the area of control on the eastern-frontier from the Dikhu down to Melomi [Meluri] in the south-east corner, where the Kukis' oppression of Angami village on our border had been particularly troublesome.

The Government of India recommended these proposals in writing to the Secretary of State in their Foreign Department letter No.132, dated the 16th July 1908.

"3it is urged on grounds—which are in our opinion adequate—that there is no reason to apprehend that the proposed extension will involve military operations or additional expenditure. It will be observed that Sir Lancelot Hare concurs in the opinion of his predecessor as to the desirability of permitting the officers of the Naga Hills District to exercise some control over the tribes just across the frontier, and with this conclusion we are forced to agree. On a full consideration of the whole case, we think that we should be accepting a grave responsibility if, in opposition to the advice of successive Lieutenant-Governors supported by the practically unanimous opinion of local frontier officers, we declined to take steps to ensure the safety of our frontier villages and to put a stop to horrible barbarities when we have the power, more especially when this end can be achieved without adding to our expenditure or increasing our political risks.

4. It is, in our opinion, sufficiently clear from the correspondence, which we forward for your Lordship's perusal, that fitful intervention and occasional punitive expeditions have in the past proved ineffectual, whereas in areas of political control the protection of the British Government has converted scenes of chronic murder and intestine feud to peace and agriculture. The Secretary of State in his Despatch No. 107 (Political), dated the 5th December 1878, expressed the opinion that the gradual extension of British authority over these independent tribes must be regarded as inevitable. "The continuance," he said, "in immediate proximity to settled British districts of a system of internecine warfare, conducted principally against women and children, cannot be tolerated,"

We desire therefore, with your Lordship's approval, to accept the proposals of the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam for an extension of the area of our political control....."

In spite however of this strong recommendation the Secretary of State (Lord Morley) declined to accede to the proposals. He said his Despatch No. 128-(Political) dated 13th November 1908)

"I have considered in Council the letter of Your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department No.132, dated the 16th July 1908, recommending that steps should be taken to extend your political control over the tribes in a limited strip of territory adjoining the eastern border of the Naga Hills District. To give effect to this policy, it is proposed that the Deputy Commissioner with an escort and surveyors, should make a tour during the coming cold weather in the tribal area in question, it being left to his discretion, subject to general direction, to decide what places to visit. Villages at a distance of more than 12 miles from the administrative border are not, as a rule, to be included, and no attempt will be made at present to define geographically the limits of the proposed area of control. The local Government have satisfied you that the policy you recommend involves no political risk, and will cause no increase either of military police or of expenditure. The cost of the tour, I understand, would be borne by provincial revenues.

2. The force of the reasons that in 1878 led Lord Salisbury [*sic*], in the despatch to which you refer, to express the view that a general extension of British authority over the independent tribes in these regions was practically unavoidable, cannot be gainsaid. But in 1884 the Government of India found it necessary to define more closely the principle of policy to be pursued, and they laid down, for the guidance of the Local Government, that interference with tribal quarrels should, as a rule, be limited to cases involving either outrages on British subjects, or violation of the Inner Line, or danger to the interests of dwellers within the British border by reason of the proximity of disturbance outside.

3. The objections based on this fundamental and essentially sound principle of policy to the proposals first submitted, when Sir B. Fuller was Lieutenant-Governor, for bringing the area of tribal territory in question under political control, were stated most convincingly in the letter of your Government to the Local Government of the 12th February 1907. The impression produced on me by what you then wrote is that at the time you were of opinion that no necessity had been established for a departure from the policy of non-interference. You, however, thought it desirable to refer the matter back for Sir L. Hare's consideration, with special reference to the question whether, in the event of the tract which it was proposed to control being brought ultimately under direct administration, the taxes to be levied from the inhabitants would be likely to cover all expenditure, direct and indirect, that would be incurred for its administration and protection. It is true that the Local Government in their reply speak reassuringly on this point, but they do not conceal the fact that the logical outcome of the slight extension of political control now proposed is the absorption of the entire tract of country, 60 miles in width, between the Naga Hills District and the territories subject to the Government of Burma.

4. It is with reference to these wider consequences, and not merely to those immediately following on the measures now proposed, that the question must be considered and decided. I am not satisfied that the action Your Excellency would now take may not produce results wider and more serious than are at present anticipated. Nor am I satisfied on the facts as reported that it is at the present moment necessary, in the interests of the dwellers within the British border, that there should be a departure from the principle of non-interference by the extension of the area of our responsibilities on this section of the frontier.

5. I am therefore compelled to withhold my sanction from the measure which you submit for my approval."

The proposal was not to be raised again till six years later.

A separate proposal as regards coal-bearing tracts, had in October 1907 (our No.4461-J,* dated the 23rd October 1907) already been sent up to the Government of India whereby the village of Kongan [Kongnyu] east of the Dikhu river, which then formed the eastern boundary of the Mokokchung subdivision, should be included in the district. This was a large coal-bearing area and business interests desired to exploit it. The effect of the proposal was to include the whole country lying between the Dikhu and the Safrai river. This was followed by a further letter No.2384-J,† dated the 18th May 1908 in which the inclusion of an extended area covering the whole of that part of the subdivision now lying between the Dikhu and its present north-east and south boundaries and including such places as Borjan, Wakching, Wanching and Longkhai was recommended. The Government of India had apparently no great difficulty in acceding to this proposal and sanctioned it in their letter No. 2292-F. C., dated the 1st July 1908.

Further correspondence ended in Notification No. 68-P.,‡ dated the 1st February 1910, which added 14 Konyak villages between the Yangnyu and the Safrai to the district. The boundaries which it describes hold good to this day. The only difference is that there is now beyond this boundary a control area which includes the important villages of Mon and Chi and which stretches south of them for many miles down to the Sema country. It is interesting to observe in the light of subsequent events that the then Subdivisional Officer of Mokokchung, Mr. Needham, had written on the 1st November,‡ 1909 and pointed out the influence which these two villages exerted over villages within this territory and the necessity of explaining to them that they would no longer be allowed to interfere. In the District Report for 1914-15 it is recorded that the Nazira Coal Company worked the Borjan Colliery throughout the year, output being 778 tons.

Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1908, Nos. 32-34.

Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, May 1909, Nos. 21-24.

*Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, November 1907, Nos.101-114.

†Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, July 1910, Nos.7-15.

‡ Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, July 1910, Nos.28-54.

In October 1908 Mr. W. C. M. Dundas, I.P., the Subdivisional Officer, Mokokchung, reported fresh misconduct by Mozungjami. The Pelasi and Chongpo *khels* of Mozungjami had in 1903 committed certain outrages and were in consequence visited in 1905 by the then Deputy Commissioner (*see* page 141 *ante*). But full punishment was not exacted, and up to 1908 Pelasi were still in arrears with their fine and it was Chongpo who had committed the fresh outrage reported by Mr. Dundas in October. Sir Lancelot Hare decided to put an end to the unsatisfactory position and he obtained the agreement of the Central Government in their letter No.1041-E.B., dated the 23rd June 1909 to sending an expedition. The expedition was entirely successful and its doings were reported in laudatory terms to the Supreme Government in the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government's letter No.168-P., dated the 1st March 1910. Colonel Woods was in Political charge as Deputy Commissioner with Major Bliss, who was then Commandant of the Naga Hills Military Police, in charge of the escort of 100 Military Police. They left Mokokchung on the 20th December 1909, reached Mozungjami on the 24th, remained there on the 25th and left on the 26th. The behaviour of the Nagas was irreproachable, so Colonel Woods contented himself with imposing an additional fine of 5 *mithan* on the Pelasi Khel. In his report the doings of Chongpo are not mentioned. The current Mozungjami version of this expedition is perhaps worth recording. According to it the first demand of the Sirkar was for the men responsible for the outrage. To this Tuensong replied "Does a hunter give away his hounds?" The next demand was for a fine in money. To this the reply was, "We have no coins. We hear the Sirkar makes coins. If they are short, let them make some more." The final demand was for *mithan*. To this no reply was given, and the expedition had to toil many weary miles only to find them tied up ready outside the gates.

The Expedition of 1910 against the Aishan Kukis, a tribe who had been continually oppressing the local Nagas on our border in the most brutal way, originated in the murder at Melomi in 1909 of two British subjects of Temimi [Kizare] village. In Major Howell's letter No.421-G.,* dated the 8th June 1909, he explained that these troublesome people belonged to a wild tract lying between the eastern border of Manipur and the Chindwin river, which extended to the north to a point beyond the Tizu. There were two groups of Kukis, the Aishan Kukis, who occupied the area to the north; and the Chasad Kukis, who occupied an area to the south, separated from the Lanier Valley by a high range of mountains. Between the two groups lay the Somra tract inhabited by Tangkhul Nagas. In reporting the matter to the Government of India in their letter No.4079, dated the 5th August 1909, the Local Government referred to the Temimi murder and also to two raids which had been made by the same people into Manipur territory from Kangzang [Kanjang] near Lapvome [Lepthori] in unadministered territory. The expedition was agreed to. It was on a

Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, July 1910, Nos. 55-96.

*Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, August 1910, Nos.61-129.

fairly large scale, the escort consisting of 150 men of the Naga Hills Military Police, under the command of Major Bliss with two British Officers, Captain G. F. Porter of the 17th Infantry and Lieutenant Hardcastle, Assistant Commandant of the Police. Mr. Cosgrave, Vice-President of the Manipur State Durbar, joined the expedition at Melomi. It reached Kangjang on the 19th February where the Chief was arrested and kept in custody. On the 23rd February it reached Yangnoi where similar arrests were made. On the 5th March it returned to Kohima. There was no opposition throughout, but Colonel Woods reported that local conditions were such as to require drastic action. He proposed—and he started carrying out this proposal—that all Kukis should be disarmed (by the 31st May he had had surrendered to him 116 guns). Secondly, he considered that all Kukis should be ordered to return to their original homes in Manipur. Thirdly, he left a substantial guard at Melomi which was to remain there until his orders had been carried out. As regards Melomi and Primi, though the paragraph in Woods' report referring to them were left out when his report was forwarded to the Government of India, it appears that he quite definitely took over these villages and told them so at the time: Woods stated this in a note* recorded on the 6th November 1912, and this was confirmed by the then Chief Secretary. Next he decided to keep seven prominent men, as well as the Aishan "Raja", a semi-imbecile boy, as hostages until the fine was paid and the orders carried out. Lastly, he advised that Komyang and his Chasad Kukis should be warned that they must restrict themselves to the territory south of the mountain range previously referred to. This Chief and his men dominated the Somra Tract, which is geographically in Burma and shut off by high mountains from the Lanier Valley. The Government of Burma were asked to inform Komyang of these orders and they agreed to do so. The letter No.380-P., from the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government reporting the results of the expedition to the Government of India, which is dated the 30th May 1910, is somewhat inconclusive but presumably Government were waiting to see the effect of the orders which it was proposed to issue to the Kukis. One point which they did make was that Melomi and Primi had rendered Government the fullest assistance and that "it would be impossible to abandon them to the revenge of these bloodthirsty savages" (paragraph 4 of the letter).

In 1910-11, the principal event was the expedition in collaboration with Burma to Makware a village situated "high up on the great divide between Assam and Burma at an elevation of some 7,000 feet in a desolate valley surrounded with mountains covered with snow", and overlooked by the great mountain of Sarameti (12,557), in reprisal for a raid committed in January 1910 on the frontier village of Naungmo in the Upper Chindwin District of Burma. (As regards the place-names, Colonel Woods comments as follows in his report: "I have not been able to ascertain where the name Sarameti came from.

*Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, July 1913, Nos.67-73.

Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, August 1911, Nos. 13-31.

Among the Eastern Angamis the hill is called Mekriketu, the Thetchumi people call it Atso, and Melomi, Puchimi, etc., call it Mera, nowhere is the name of Sarameti known ! The name Makware is not known on this side, and the Makwares themselves call their village Dzulechili, and the neighbouring villages call it Gulechiri".) The Assam Column was under Lieutenant-Colonel Woods and consisted of Major C. Bliss, Commandant, Lieutenant Hardcastle, Assistant Commandant and 100 rank and file of the Naga Hills Military Police, Captain R. H. Lee, I.M.S., Captain V. R. Cotter, I.A., of the Survey of India, Captain Molesworth, Intelligence Officer and Mr. Pascoe of the Geological Survey of India. Colonel Woods had arranged that the Burma Column which was under Mr. W. Street, Assistant Commissioner, with Captain J. Simpson, Burma Military Police, should meet the Assam Force at or near Thetchumi on January 15th. Street, however, encountered tremendous difficulties on the route and eventually marched into Woods' camp at Puchimi on January 20th. They were therefore 10 days behind schedule when the combined force started off on the 25th January from Thetchumi on the march to Makware, which they reached on the 31st January. They had to open fire before entering the village, killing 5 Nagas, but there was no further opposition. The village was burnt and the two Columns returned on 1st February to their respective bases. Commenting on the Expedition to the Government of India in their letter No.294-P., dated the 6th May 1911, the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government wrote—

“Under the most favourable circumstance the march from Tetchanasami to Makware or Dzulechili, as it would appear to be more correctly called, would be an arduous one ; two ridges over 8,000 feet in height having to be crossed before the village is reached. But the circumstances unfortunately were far from favourable and the force was exposed to great discomfort from the exceedingly inclement weather. It speaks well for the physique of the men and coolies employed and of the excellent management of the expedition that these hardships were attended with so little actual sickness.

4. On the 31st of January 1911 the expedition reached Makware, and as the villagers declined to come in or to lay down their arms, the Political Officer had no option but to fire upon them, for, as he rightly observes, to enter the village with men armed with cross-bows concealed on every side, would have entailed serious and absolutely unjustifiable loss upon our men. The punishment inflicted upon Makware was severe ; but, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, it was in no way excessive. The murderous character of the inhabitants of these hills is unfortunately too well known and the knowledge by the tribesmen that Government is alike able and willing to punish wrongdoers with a heavy hand is the one thing which checks the perpetration of the most atrocious outrages. His Honour regrets that it was not possible to recover the captive boy, but he has little doubt that with two hostages in the hands of the Burma Government there will be no difficulty in arranging for his surrender.

5. The immediate object of the expedition was attained and the results are likely to be far-reaching. The junction of the Burma and the Naga Hills forces cannot fail to produce a great effect upon all the tribesmen living in this locality. The Political Agent of Manipur has already taken the opportunity to point out to Komyang, the Kuki Chief, who, from time to time, has given trouble in the Somra basin that this junction has taken place and that Komyang can no longer hope to be able to trek to the north and east beyond the reach of the British Government and that his only chance is therefore to live quietly and peacefully with his neighbours and not provoke the wrath of a Government from which there can be no escape. All the villages lying in the valleys near the Somra range have learnt that their remoteness and isolation are no defence if they offend against the paramount power and this knowledge cannot fail to have a restraining effect upon their murderous propensities."

In August 1910* Colonel J. Shakespear, the Political Agent in Manipur, addressed the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government and asked for permission to lead an expedition in order to punish the Kuki villages of Limkhuthang [Letkuthang] and Papang for certain outrages which they had committed against Manipur subjects. He also urged very strongly that it was time that the Somra Tract, in which these villages lay, should be brought under control. He considered, like most others, that Somra should naturally be administered by Burma. Sanction was given and Shakespear led an expedition which consisted of a company of the 17th Native Infantry under Captain B. J. Fagan and some men of the Manipur State Military Police to these villages in February 1911†. The offending villages were duly punished and one of them, Phuntret, was burnt. Colonel Shakespear reported that "the effect of the promenade has been very good". The proposal as regards taking over the Somra Tract was not then accepted by Government as a feasible proposition.

Chinglong 1910-1913.—On 23rd June 1910 Mr. J. Needham, Sub-divisional Officer, Mokokchung (a son of F. J. Needham of Sadiya fame) reported a raid by the Konyak village of Chinglong from across the Yangnu on Chingtang, a village across the Dikhu but inside our newly annexed Konyak territory (*vide* Notification No.68-P., dated the 1st February 1910). He proposed to visit the village in the cold weather. Later, on the 17th November 1910, he reported a further complication, *i.e.*, a raid by Longkai, one of our newly annexed trans-Dikhu villages, on Mongne across our border.

In a demi-official letter No.62-P., dated 28th January 1911, the Commissioner's attention was drawn to the Government of India's orders contained in their letter No.1046-E., dated the 18th May 1900, which laid down restrictions on operations on the border. The Commissioner, however, replied that there was little risk likely to arise out of a visit to Chinglong. The orders issued to Mr. Needham were that he was to visit Chinglong only if the Chinglong people refused to

*Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, January 1911, Nos. 16-38.

†Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, August 1911, Nos. 2-12.

Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., B, August 1911, Nos.39-82.

attend an enquiry which he was directed to make ; and he was given no authority to inflict any punishment. It appears that he took an escort of 80 men of the Naga Hills Military Police under Captain Hamilton and held an enquiry at Chingtang. Four of the Chinglong men came in and he took their statements. He found that the fault lay with the Chingtang people and the Longkai people and he was inclined to treat the doings of Chinglong with considerable leniency. Be that as it may, he marched on Chinglong on the 4th February 1911. The reasons he gave in his report were that the four men who came to meet him at Chingtang were not Chiefs, that the Chinglong Chiefs who had had notice to come in had refused and therefore he decided to go to them. They resisted. He retaliated by firing on them and he burnt the village. His conduct received the severe condemnation of Government, the Chief Secretary remarking that it was most improper and the Commissioner also characterised his behaviour as showing a "lamentable lack of discretion and disobedience of orders". An explanation was called for, but was not accepted as satisfactory. The Commissioner commented* that Mr. Needham's action "... ..was as unjustifiable as it was certainly against orders.....From the tone of the explanation it is clear that Mr. Needham entirely fails to realise his position and that he was determined to visit the village and inflict punishment at all hazards." Government agreed, an expression of their displeasure was conveyed to Mr. Needham and he was transferred from the subdivision.

Chinglong again became prominent in 1912. In August† of that year, when Mr. J. E. Webster was Deputy Commissioner, certain British subjects of Wanching were murdered by 6 independent Nagas of Chinglong from across the border opposite Wanching and an expedition to punish the offenders was sanctioned. Before the expedition could start further raids took place which were attributed to Chinglong and it was apparent that the 3 villages of the Totok group as well as Chinglong and Chongwe were in a truculent mood. The temper also of the villages within our border, recently annexed, was uncertain, and there was danger in the possible attitude of Mon and Chi in unadministered territory. Assam was short of military police owing to the Abor and Mishmi surveys which had absorbed 1,100 men for escorts, and had recourse to borrowing 150 men of the Dacca Military Police Battalion under Captain H. G. Bally, Commandant and Lieutenant E. D. Dallas-Smith, Assistant Commandant.

* Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., B, March 1912, Nos.185-193.

† Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, January 1913, Nos.1-39.

Mr. J. P. Mills comments as follows on this incident. "Chinglong's confession, which I believe to be true, has always been that they handed over the real culprits, but that Wanching persuaded the Subdivisional Officer to believe that they were substituted slaves. Chinglong, having done their best to carry out orders, then decided that all they could do was to fight and the opinion of their neighbours was strongly on their side. After their punishment in 1911 it was hardly likely that they would be wantonly defiant".

This force with 40 men of the Naga Hills Military Police under Captain J. Hardcastle was under the general command of Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Loch, C.I.E., Commandant of the Lushai Hills Battalion. The instructions to the expedition given in Government letter No.376-P.,* dated the 22nd January 1913 were to demand the surrender of the murderers together with such reparation and punishment as was suitable, and permission was included to make a friendly visit to Mon and Chi. The force entered and burnt Chinglong† on 5th February 1913. But as the main force were carrying out the operation, the Nagas made a determined attack on and stampeded the baggage train, killing 4 sepoy and 9 coolies, wounding 5 sepoy and 27 coolies and carrying off 3 rifles. The coolies were so demoralised that Colonel Loch decided to retire from Chinglong to Chingphoi in British territory. In so doing he was actuated by what he considered to be the inadequacy of his force ; by the difficulties on account of water ; and because he thought that the season was too advanced. He proposed to wait to resume operations until the cold weather. The Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Webster, on the other hand, wanted to undertake immediately the punishment of the offending villages and the Chief Commissioner agreed with him in holding that the season was not too advanced ; that the water problem was not insuperable ; and, lastly, that it was most important that retribution should not be postponed. The Government of India was addressed accordingly, on the 15th February 1913‡ urging the immediate necessity of action and asking for the assistance of Regular troops in the shape of 200 men of the 1/8th Gurkhas. The Central Government sent down Sir James Willcocks, the General Officer Commanding, Northern Army, to report. He recommended that the expedition should be sanctioned, that Colonel Loch should be sent back to the Lushai Hills and that Major Alban Wilson, D. S. O., of the Gurkhas should take command of the Expedition. The Government of India agreed to this and stated that the officer commanding the Police part of the force must be junior to Major Wilson. This, of course, necessitated the dropping of Colonel Loch. An interesting commentary on the whole incident is to be found in a demi-official letter dated the 26th February 1913 from Colonel Woods, who was then Inspector-General of Police, but had spent many years in the Naga Hills, to Mr. Reid who was then Chief Secretary. In that letter it was made quite clear that the balance of opinion was against Colonel Loch in his attitude and this local opinion was fully supported by the General. Viewing it all at a much later date (1921) Mr. Reid expressed the opinion§ that Chinglong turned out as it did "simply because the Commandant in charge, a senior officer with a distinguished record but who had for years had nothing to do with our little trans-frontier shows refused to go on without reinforcements though his force was more than strong enough to smash the opposition." A punitive expedition was at once organised

* Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, Jan. 1913, Nos.1-39.

† Pol., A, Mar. 1913, Nos.9-77.

‡ Pol., A, August, 1913, Nos.16-70.

§ Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, February 1923, Nos.1-53,

under Major Wilson's command, the original force being augmented by 2 companies of the 1/8th Gurkhas. The Base Camp was located at Wakching. The operations were completely successful, the rifles were recovered, and the guilty villagers were severely punished. The six villages were completely destroyed between 10th and 19th March and at least 120 Nagas killed, their losses in men, guns and livestock being described in the official report as "very heavy". As a consequence a post was established at Wakching. Captain Hardcastle, I.A., Naga Hills Military Police, and Captains Kernahan, Orchard and Giffard took part in this expedition.

Webster's comprehensive report* on this "Trans-Dikhu Tour" among what are now called the Konyaks, No.250-G., dated the 25th April 1913, is well worth reading, especially the paragraphs on their relations with the British.

IV.—*The extension of the control area after 1913.*—The Chief Commissioner (Sir Archdale Earle), in reporting the Chinglong incident of 1913 to the Government of India in his letter No.2717-P.,† dated the 5th June 1913, concluded his report with a warning regarding a very much wider question, *viz.*, that he would probably have to send up further proposals regarding an extension of our area of control. He reminded the Central Government of how the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government had sent up such proposals in 1906; how they had been first questioned and then accepted by the Government of India; and how they were finally negatived by Lord Morley, the Secretary of State. If they had been accepted, he thought, the events at Chinglong might never have happened.

In September of that year the Chief Commissioner received proposals from the Commissioner for the inclusion in a Political Control Area of villages to the south of the Tizu river, Karami [Laruri], Phozami [Yisi], Putsimi [Purr], Lapvomi [Lepthori]; as well as Melomi and Primi on the north.

Our responsibilities for Melomi and Primi dated from 1910, when at the time of the Aishan Kuki Expedition they had been assured by Colonel Woods, the Deputy Commissioner, with the approval of the Commissioner, that they had been annexed, an assurance which the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government neither approved nor disavowed. The guard at Melomi was withdrawn in March 1912, but Mr. Webster, the Deputy Commissioner, writing in August of that year was uneasy about the situation as regards Kuki activity and asked how far he might go in assuring Melomi and Primi against Kuki aggression. Sir Archdale Earle considered that we could not abandon them now, and the Government of India had been addressed in Assam letter No.2931-P., dated the 18th June 1913 with the request that they might be assured of protection, and taken within the boundary of the district.

* Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, August 1913, Nos.16-70.

† Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, July 1913, Nos.67-73.

After holding a conference * at Kohima on the 10th November 1913 Sir Archdale decided to approach the Government of India once more. The outcome was a long letter No.1544-P., dated the 3rd April 1914 in which that Government were asked if they were prepared again to address the Secretary of State. It referred to the previous correspondence contained in Eastern Bengal and Assam letter Nos.6119-J., dated the 7th June 1906, 5204-J., dated the 7th December 1907 and 2450, dated the 18th May 1908. It stated that the Chief Commissioner had reached the irresistible conclusion that we must extend our control. It recounted the "melancholy record" of outrages which had occurred since 1908, the date of the Secretary of State's last orders, outrages in which our officers had perforce no power to interfere ; gave a history of events on the Naga Hills border since the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government had last addressed the Central Government and affirmed that if the Secretary of State had accepted the previous proposals, none of the expeditions undertaken since 1909, except perhaps Makware, would have been necessary.

"9. With no desire to criticise the policy of non-interference the Chief Commissioner is forced to the conclusion that, had the proposals of the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam found acceptance with His Majesty's Secretary of State, none of these expeditions, save possibly the one against the village of Makware, would have been necessary. For reasons which have been fully explained to the Government of India the expedition against the village of Chinglong was on a larger scale than any of the others, and the assistance of regular troops ultimately proved to be necessary. The other expeditions were all conducted by the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills with the aid of the Military Police. The cost was trifling and the results were eminently satisfactory.

Experience has, however, unfortunately proved that these results are only temporary. The inhabitants of a village which has been punished are for some time only too ready to obey orders. The Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills, to take a recent instance, has reported that, when he visited the trans-Dikhu British villages in December last, he received envoys from Chinglong and the allied villages that were so severely punished in the last expedition, and that their attitude was most friendly. There is another unfortunate, but usually unavoidable, result of such expeditions. When a village has been reduced to a defenceless condition it only too frequently becomes an object of attack to its neighbours, and to the punishment meted out by the British Government are added the horrors of organised attack by savage enemies. In March 1913 Chinglong and the other villages that had been punished in the expedition suffered severely from raids, and men from our own trans-Dikhu villages were sentenced by the Deputy Commissioner to long terms of imprisonment for taking part in these. It was largely on account of these considerations that Sir Bampfylde Fuller in 1906 stated that he had but little faith in casual "promenades" or in isolated punitive expeditions, and that he believed that nothing short of direct declaration of continuous intervention would put an end to the raiding of one village upon another. With these views Sir Archdale Earle is in complete accord.

* Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, May 1914, Nos.1-16.

One effect of the abandonment of the earlier system of promenades is that the Deputy Commissioner, when he crosses the border with an escort, now does so only in order to punish some village or other. This is fully understood by our independent neighbours, and the opportunity of establishing friendly relations with the various communities along our borders no longer presents itself.

10. If, then, the Government of India are prepared to support him, the Chief Commissioner would venture to urge a new practically the same proposals that were made by the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam. He would advocate the declaration of an area of Political control beyond the existing border of the Naga Hills District, and the approximate limits of the country affected by the proposals are indicated roughly in the map attached to this letter.....

11. Subject to the considerations set forth in the preceding paragraph, I am to describe briefly the proposed outer limit of these proposals so far as we have any knowledge of this. Beginning at the eastern corner of the area added to the District in accordance with the sanction conveyed in Foreign Department letter No.1730-E.B., dated the 26th October 1909, it would run along the Yangnu river so as to include the whole of the Mozung or Chang tribe. It would continue in a southerly direction and include the whole of the Sema tribe, the greater portion of which is already under British administration, but the Chief Commissioner would prefer to await a report from the Deputy Commissioner before deciding whether the Yachumi group of villages should be included or excluded. Their exclusion was advised by the late Mr. A. W. Davis in a note which formed the annexure to Mr. Webster's letter No.2450-J., dated the 18th May 1908, but in this view Mr. Davis was not and is not supported by any of the other Assam Officers with experience of this frontier. Its southern limit would be the high range in which the Kezatulazo Peak is situated, and which bounds the Somra tract of country, a tract to which reference will presently be made, and which undoubtedly falls within the sphere of influence of the Burma Government. It would include Melomi and Primi, and such other villages in the valley of the Lanier as could conveniently be controlled. Mr. Webster's letter No.2450-J., dated the 18th May 1908, stated that Sir Lancelot Hare, as then advised, was not prepared to press for the inclusion of these villages. The Chief Commissioner has, earlier in the letter, given the reasons which have led him to urge the inclusion of Melomi and Primi, and he is inclined to think that, as the Kukis have been expelled from this area, such villages situated therein as can conveniently be controlled should also be included.

12. The control exercised in the area described would, in the first instance, be of the loosest description, interference being limited to outrages and serious disputes. In this connection the Chief Commissioner desires to associate himself completely with the views expressed in paragraph 5 of Mr. Webster's letter No.6119-J., dated the 7th June 1906. *The prohibition of raiding in the area of control would undoubtedly involve the protection of its inhabitants from outside aggression, but such a contingency would rarely arise, and if it did, could be dealt with*

easily and at small expense. To facilitate the touring of the Deputy Commissioner, and to open up and civilise the area of control, the gradual construction of bridle paths would be necessary, but the work would largely be done by the adjoining villages. Ultimately the area would become an ordinary portion of the district, and house-tax would be realised. In certain parts this step might be taken almost immediately.

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15. The Chief Commissioner makes to attempt to disguise the fact that his proposals, if accepted, are the step towards the inclusion of a further area under British administration, and that at some future date the process will have to be repeated *until the whole of the country between Assam and Burma has been taken over*. The inevitableness of his step has been recognised from the beginning by every one, but the Government of India, and his Majesty's Secretary of State have expressly declared that they have no desire to hasten the process. With this policy the Chief Commissioner venture respectfully to record his entire agreement. He feels strongly that our advance should be gradual, and he is confident that, if his proposals are accepted, the advance will be as gradual as may be desired. He thinks it unnecessary to add to all that has been urged so often on the score of humanity, and he trusts that he has succeeded in convincing the Government of India that the present sacrifice of human life can be stopped and peace be established in an extensive area without either difficulty or expense. For many years to come the Naga Hills district will not pay for the cost of its administration, if indeed it will ever do so, but the additional revenue, which will ultimately be realised from each fresh area included, will more than counterbalance the additional expenditure involved. In paragraph 17 of Mr. Milne's letter No.5204-J., dated the 7th December 1907, it was stated that Sir Lancelot Hare believed that, when at last the frontier of this province marched with that of Burma, it might be possible to secure the internal peace of the whole district with a very much smaller force than is now required. Sir Archdale Earle shares this belief, and sees no reason why ultimately the Naga Hills should require a larger garrison than that of the Garo Hills, or why its inhabitants should not become as civilised and law-abiding as those of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills. This can never come about so long as raiding and head-hunting in adjoining areas go unchecked".

For one reason and another, of which the war of 1914-18 was not the least important, no orders were passed on these proposals for more than 7 years, though it need hardly be said that the matter was not lost sight of in Assam. Thus in December* 1918, Mr. Barnes, Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, had asked for sanction to assess Melomi and Primi to house tax; and the Chief Commissioner (Sir Nicholas Beatson-Bell) then addressed the Government of India on the 4th February 1919, referred to the recent operations against the Kukis and

Assam Secretariat, Political, A, May 1914, Nos. 1-16.

*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, February 1923, Nos. 1-53.

asked that sanction should be accorded to the proposals contained in Sir Archdale Earle's letter No.1544-P., of the 3rd April 1914. Nothing happened for various reasons and again a reminder was sent on the 4th October 1920, reporting fresh outrages. The Government of India were as reluctant as ever to act but made the concession on the 29th March 1921 of leaving the matter for Sir William Marris, who was about to take office as Governor of Assam, to examine.

On the 28th April 1921, Mr. Hutton, who had had by now 8 years experience of these Hills, recorded a valuable note giving the history of relations up to then and on the basis of this the Chief Secretary addressed an important demi-official letter No. 5550-A. dated the 3rd September 1921, to the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India to inquire whether some action might not be hoped for. The letter gathers together and reviews the course of policy since 1884, and the main points are contained in the following excerpts:—

“2. Sir William Marris has now studied the correspondence on this long-standing question. The Government of India's letter No. 2789-E., dated the 20th October 1884, sanctioned if it did not actually initiate the policy of political control areas beyond the Naga Hills Frontier in preference to promenades and the execution of agreements with tribal chiefs. The restriction was imposed that interference with inter-tribal quarrels should as a rule be limited to those cases where they involved—

- (1) outrages on British subjects,
- (2) violation of the Inner Line,
- (3) danger to the interests of people dwelling inside the British borders by reason of the proximity of disturbance outside.

A subsequent letter No. 246-E., of the 3rd February 1886, sanctioned a further control area in the case of the Ao tribe and the majority of the Sema villages west of the Tizu river. This area except for paying no house-tax came to be as obedient to the orders of the Deputy Commissioner as any regularly administered portion of his charge. It was absorbed gradually by the advancement of the district boundary to the Tizu river, the process being completed in 1904. During the whole of this time the policy worked well and gradually extended the influence of Government over the tribes on the immediate frontier until the time was ripe for the extension of the administered area. Meanwhile, however, an unfortunate collision occurred between the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills and the village of Yachumi beyond the area of the political control, and was reported to the Government of India in the Assam Administration's letter No.199-For.-1366-P., dated the 14th April 1900. Stringent orders were then passed prohibiting tours beyond the area of political control except with the previous sanction of the Local Administration; and when the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government in their letters No. 6119-J., dated the 7th June 1906, and No. 5204-J., dated the 7th December 1907, proposed the formation of a new area of political control, the proposals, although approved by the Government of India

were vetoed by the Secretary of State in his Despatch No. 128 (Political), dated the 13th November 1908. It may be that the unfavourable impression created by the Yachumi incident was to some extent responsible for his decision, but that incident occurred far beyond the borders of political control, and would not have happened had not the orders of 1884 been entirely disregarded. The restrictions imposed on the exercise of influence beyond the frontier were to some extent relaxed by the order contained in the Government of India's letter No.2561-E.-B., dated the 11th August 1904, with reference to the village of Mazungzami, admitting the principle that British subjects trading beyond the frontier of the Naga Hills were entitled to protection as long as they kept within the limit of a day's march of the frontier ; and the same principle was recognised in the Government of India's telegram No. 3769-E. C., of the 8th October 1905, in connection with an outrage committed by the village of Yachumi. During the years following the decision not to establish a new area of political control sundry trans-frontier expeditions had to be undertaken and the question came up again in the early days of the reconstituted province of Assam. In the Assam Administration's letter No.2931-P., dated the 18th June 1913, proposals were submitted for special intervention, for the protection and the later absorption into British territory of the villages of Melomi and Primi ; but at the invitation conveyed in Mr. Reynold's demi-official letter of the 17th July 1913, the general question of the declaration of an area of political control beyond the existing boundary was again raised in Mr. Reid's letter No. 1544-P., dated the 3rd April 1914. Orders have not yet been received on the proposals then submitted, but in my demi official letter No.10721-P., of the 11th November 1920, Sir Nicholas Beatson Bell's alternative proposal to which your letter more immediately refers, was put forward.

3. Since the proposals of 1914 were submitted the position as regards this frontier has altered in some important respects. The labour corps which went from the Naga Hills to France during the war was largely recruited from independent trans-frontier Nagas. It followed that our relations with many independent villages became much closer than they had been.

Further the Somra Tract, which immediately adjoins on the south the area now in question, has since been brought under the administration of the Government of Burma, and the first real attempt to administer the Kukis and other hill tribes in the Manipur State has been recently made by the establishment of the subdivisions in the Manipur Hills under European Officers. Thus the proposed area of control which was flanked on the north by the administered tract to the east of the Dikhu river, added to the Naga Hills district under the orders contained in Mr. Reynold's letter No.1730-E.B., dated the 26th October 1909, is now also flanked on the south by the areas fully administered either by the Government of Burma or by the Manipur State. In this way also the relations between administered areas and the tract in question have become more intimate.

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6.The whole position on the frontier is dominated by the fact that the boundary is a purely arbitrary line. Mr. Hutton, the present Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills, who has a long and intimate acquaintance with the area, writes—"Villages on either side have land, cattle, cousins and relations-in-law on the other. Feuds, alliances, trade, cultivation—all the interests in life in fact except the payment of revenue and the freedom to hunt heads—run counter to the frontier line and not parallel to it. Under these circumstances no one could administer the district without being perpetually brought up against the question of interference beyond the frontier." In these circumstances we cannot hope to civilise our own half-savage peoples so long as they see raiding and head-hunting practised by their brothers and cousins just across the border. In order to complete our mission of civilisation within our own borders we must gradually extend the area which we control. The undertaking has been given in the past, and can be repeated by Sir William Marris, to do this, without asking for our force of Assam Rifles to be increased by a single man, or for our ultimate expenditure on the Naga Hills district to become greater than it is at present save in so far as the claims of education and medical facilities render this desirable. This, Sir William Marris thinks, does constitute a real and immediate advantage such as is referred to in paragraph 3 of Mr. Cater's letter. Another very real advantage is that as we extend our control the risk that punitive expeditions will be necessary steadily diminishes, inasmuch as complications on this frontier occur not in controlled, but in uncontrolled areas. It is only necessary in this connexion to point to the fact that throughout the Kuki operations not only the Lushais who are practically of the same race, but the Kukis themselves in the Lushai Hills and Naga Hills districts stood firm and gave no trouble, but on the contrary in some cases rendered considerable assistance.

7. After studying the past correspondence and discussing the question with those of his officers who are best acquainted with the conditions, Sir William Marris therefore desires strongly to support the proposal put forward in 1914. He has not the slightest desire to move more rapidly in the direction of the extension of control over this unadministered area than is actually necessary, but he is convinced that the administration of the Naga Hills district and the process of civilisation of its inhabitants are being materially impeded for want of the small advance which was proposed in 1914. He does not think that the alternative course put forward by Sir Nicholas Beatson-Bell, that the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills should be authorised to tour across the frontier as are the Political Officers of the two Frontier Tracts, would suffice. The existing orders on the subject of tours beyond the frontier, whether of the Naga Hills or elsewhere, are those laid down in the Government of India's letter No.1046-E.B., dated the 18th May 1900, and provide that no such tour shall be made without previous reference to the Assam Government, and that where there is risk of complications such as might render a punitive expedition necessary the tour shall not be sanctioned without the previous approval of the Government of India. A good deal could be done in the direction of making our influence felt in the area concerned without going beyond these orders, but Sir William Marris feels, as Sir

Lancelot Hare felt, that it would be better to recognise the situation frankly, and to exercise gradually the same measure of loose political control which since 1911 we have been permitted to exercise through the Political Officer at Sadiya and Balipara and which upto 1904 was exercised with good results on the Naga Hills frontier. He can definitely undertake to do nothing which will compel him to apply to the Government of India for assistance from the regular army, and he can undertake also to observe the conditions which govern the undertaking of trans-frontier tours. That is to say, without previous reference to India he will permit no tours which might render the subsequent despatch of a punitive expedition necessary.

8. Whatever orders are passed on the general question of the formation of an area of political control beyond the borders of the Naga Hills district, I am to urge that the area including the villages of Melomi and Primi, which were dealt with in our letter No. 2931-P., dated the 18th June 1913, should be definitely included in British territory without delay.....In its letter No. 2931-P., dated the 18th June 1913, the Assam Administration.....represented that at the time of the Aishan-Kuki expedition in 1910 these villages had been assured by the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills with the approval of the Commissioner of the Division, that they had been annexed. The letter continued: 'These orders were neither approved nor disapproved by the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, and the Chief Commissioner feels strongly that to follow the latter course after this lapse of time could not but effect most detrimentally the peace and tranquillity of the Naga Hills frontier.' If the disavowal of the annexation would have been detrimental in 1913, it is unthinkable after the lapse of a further period of eight years, especially in view of the course which events have meanwhile taken.....A reversion to the policy of non-interference in this particular part would entail the evacuation of an area occupied and administered since 1918, in which every existing village has applied for permanent and complete annexation and which is already regarded by independent tribes as a part of British territory, and the abandonment of villages which have been protected since the Aishan-Kuki expedition eleven years ago. It is unnecessary to enlarge on the disastrous consequences of such a step among the frontier villages on either side of the boundary. It would be a fatal error inevitably leading to serious trouble in the near future. It would also be unfair to the Burma Government to allow an administered tract to relapse into an Alsatia for Kuki head hunters desirous of escaping from their control in the Somra Tract or from the Manipur State. Incidentally, though this is of minor importance, the abandonment of this area would entail the relinquishment of 50 miles of completed bridle paths and bridges and the exchange for an irregular frontier of eighty miles of a line only 54 miles long most of which is defined by a broad and swift river entirely unfordable in the rains and only fordable in places for the remaining six months of the year.....The area which it is now proposed to include in the Naga Hills district covers more than the two villages which it was proposed to annex in 1913. This, however, is owing to the change in the situation caused by the administration of the Somra Tract and the enforced occupation of this area during the Kuki rising."

Much hesitation and reluctance had to be overcome, and it was not until the end of 1922 that the Government of India felt that they were prepared to recommend the proposals of the Assam Government. Their Despatch No. 11, dated the 2nd November 1922 was to the following effect :—

“It will be seen that the measures advocated by the Assam Government are :—

- (a) the inclusion in British territory of the villages of Melomi and Primi with the area surrounding them, and
- (b) an extension of the area in which political control is exercised by the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills District beyond the present frontier of the district.

The areas affected by these two recommendations are shown in the map which accompanies this despatch. In effect the Assam Government strongly advocate the same measures which were urged upon our attention by the Assam Administration in Mr. Reid's letter No. 1544-P., dated the 3rd April 1914, a copy of which formed the second enclosure to the despatch from Lord Chelmsford's Government, No. 16-External, dated the 16th February 1917.

3. These proposals embodying the considered views of the Local Government and the local officers, who have for many years advocated the policy which we now support, are substantially the same as those advanced by Lord Minto's Government in their despatch No. 132-External, dated the 16th July 1908. They were, however rejected by Lord Morley in his political despatch No. 128, dated the 13th November of the same year.

4. We are now satisfied that that decision might with advantage be reconsidered. The steps proposed are called for on humanitarian grounds and will be justified further by the beneficial effect which we expect them to have upon our own border villages. They involve no strategic danger, and no movement of troops, and we do not anticipate that they will lead to any charge upon central revenues or to any appreciable increase of expenditure defrayed from normal provincial revenues.

5. We, therefore, identify ourselves with the views expressed by the Assam Government and as regards the Melomi and Primi tract ask your authority to regularise the existing position by definitely including the area shown in yellow on the map within British territory. With reference to the second proposal it will be seen that the outer boundary of the area within which political control is to be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills District, has only been roughly indicated on the map. It is impossible until the country has been visited and surveyed to give more definite boundaries. We request your permission, therefore, to approve the proposed extension in principle and to authorise the Local Government to direct the Deputy Commissioner of the district to march through the area with a suitable escort and then to submit definite proposals for a boundary based on a line beyond which it will not be necessary to extend control for several years to come”.

In their letter No.1327-534-Est., dated the 23rd December 1922, the Government of India informed Assam that the Secretary of State had agreed (in his telegram No.4901, dated the 19th December 1922) to include Melomi and Primi and had accepted in principle the proposals regarding a political control area.

Melomi and Primi* were formally included in the district and assessed to revenue in the year 1922-23.

The final demarcation of the boundaries which had to be made in consonance with the decision of the Secretary of State was based on Dr. Hutton's report No. 377-G.,† dated the 9th May 1923 after a tour in the area east of Tamlu and between the Yangnyu river and Patkoi Range supplemented by a further report No.2168-G., dated 30th November 1923. During these tours powerful villages were visited which had never even heard of the plains of Assam or had seen an European. The colour of Europeans was looked at with great distaste and they were considered "unripe". Dr. Hutton tried the bold experiment of attempting to induce these entirely savage villages to carry the loads of the expedition when required. He was successful, though often only after much parley. There were some critical moments, but not a shot was fired by the escort.

Proposals for demarcation sent up in Assam letter No. 1463-5176-A.P.,‡ dated the 17th September 1924 were accepted by the Secretary of State in March 1925 and a comprehensive revised notification covering all the boundaries of the Naga Hills District was issued on the 25th November 1925, No. 3102-R.

In January 1927§ the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, forwarded a proposal from the Subdivisional Officer, Mokokchung, to include within the administered area 6 villages on the east and south-east of Mokokchung. It was to cost nothing, simplify the boundary and the villages wanted it. Government supported the proposal and the Secretary of State's sanction was communicated in Government of India's No.597-X., dated the 13th October 1927, and the changes were published in Notification No. 6492-A.P., dated the 23rd November 1927.

Mr. Mills' report on the system for the year 1924-25 was to the effect that "It has worked well and has made it easier to deal promptly and firmly with trans-frontier villages".

A description of this system as it eventually developed, though it should be premised that it has not worked, and does not work, always "according to plan", is to be found in a note|| recorded by Mr. Mills in 1937 of which the following are extracts:—

"4.Under this system a strip of territory was placed under loose control between the fully administered area and the entirely uncontrolled Tribal Area.

*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1926, Nos.22-96.

†Annual Administration Report for 1922-23.

‡Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1925, Nos. 48-126.

§Assam Secretariat, Political, A, March 1929, Nos. 219-267.

||Assam Secretariat, Tribal, B, September 1938, No. 1-9.

(1) The area selected was not too large, and was confined as far as possible to country of which we already had fairly detailed knowledge.

(2) Much of the Konyak area to the north was deliberately omitted ; the powerful hereditary chiefs there control groups of villages ; they are fully capable of managing their own affairs ; and if control is ever decided upon in the future it may well be that a scheme for establishing a number of small States may have to be considered.

(3) Tribal boundaries were as far as possible selected as our boundaries, rather than natural features, however geographically convenient, which intersected tribes.

5. No taxes are levied in the Control Area, which is not administered in any sense of the word and does not form part of the Province of Assam. Though under loose control it remains part of the Tribal Area.

On the other hand the Deputy Commissioner is always ready to arbitrate in disputes in the Control Area, first obtaining, whenever possible a previous assurance that the parties will accept his arbitration.

6.As time goes on the villages bordering the frontier of the fully administered area become so accustomed to bringing their troubles and disputes to the Deputy Commissioner that there are now considerable stretches of the Control Area where war is obsolete as a means of settling differences, 'head-hunting' has died a natural death, and the villages are as amenable to orders as any in the fully administered area.....

8. In the Assam Naga Hills Control Area there is no general order prohibiting war with its inevitable concomitant of head-taking. All know that serious and treacherous massacres meet with retribution, and particular wars are sometimes specifically prohibited. For instance a war is prohibited if there is a risk of raiders crossing our boundary into administered territory in their attempts to outflank each other, or of fugitives being followed in hot pursuit across our border. Or again a weak village which is never likely to attack anyone may be given protection by specific orders. Or yet again war may break out between two villages so near to one another that normal work in the fields is hampered and famine threatens both, and then the elders of both sides may come in and make it quite clear that their hotheads are out of control and that they would welcome orders which would put an end to the inconvenient feud without loss of honour to either side.

General orders stopping war would be impossible to enforce without constant punitive expeditions, a remedy which might well be worse for the villagers than the disease. Even a suggestion that war in general is prohibited has been found to lead to most unfortunate

results. A few villages are sure to let their defences fall into disrepair and to lose their alertness. Then a sudden raid by a watchful neighbour results in a massacre, no punishment of which can bring the dead back to life. On the other hand a properly defended, alert Naga village is practically impregnable against Naga weapons, and attacks against such villages are rarely made and are infinitely more rarely successful. This in itself makes for peace. In normal circumstances raiders' victims are almost always stragglers and the wariness of the Naga makes their number extremely small.

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10.By far the most important part of the Deputy Commissioner's staff, on whom the whole efficiency of his administration depends, is a picked body of Naga interpreters, drawn from the various tribes in such a way that a man is always dealt with by one of his own tribe. The functions of the interpreters extend far beyond anything that their name implies. They arrest offenders, advise the Deputy Commissioner on intricate questions of custom, and themselves settle a very large number of petty disputes. They wear tribal dress and remain Nagas in every way. In selecting them, though a few can read and write, education is not considered, but family character and influence are regarded as of supreme importance. Their prestige is great.

The relevance for this note of this description of the method of Government through picked interpreters lies in the fact that it extends into the Control Area. Some of the interpreters come from villages just on our side of the border and have influence across the border, while other actually have their homes in the Control Area itself. They act as liaison officials between the Deputy Commissioner and villages in the Control Area.

11. Apart from the constant stream of information reaching him through his interpreters direct knowledge of events in the Control Area is gained by the Deputy Commissioner in two ways. Firstly he makes occasional friendly tours (say once in two years) in some portion of it. Secondly, he receives frequent visits from the leading men of villages in the Control Area.....A tour, followed by return visits, smooths the way for yet another more extended tour, and a thorough prior knowledge of politics in the Control Area frustrates the common Naga trick by which a village will receive a column with the utmost friendliness and then by false tales egg on their enemies beyond to attack it, simply for the pleasure of witnessing the inevitably heavy defeat of the said enemies....."

In 1925-26* by letter No. Pol. 1902.5225-A.P., dated the 28th October 1925, the conduct of relations with the independent Nagas bordering on that District was transferred from the Deputy Commissioner of Sibsagar to the Subdivisional Officer, Mokokchung, and the latter took over relations with the area between the Taukok and Dilli rivers.

*Assam Administration Report for Naga Hills for 1925-26.

In 1926-27* the question of guns among Konyak villages came under scrutiny, owing to the great increase in the numbers of these weapons, and in consequence Totok was ordered to use only spears and *daos* in their inter-village wars. This policy has been followed since though not without difficulty. It was emphasised in 1939 when the Governor held a Durbar at Wakching on January 13th and ordered the surrender, as fines for misbehaviour in this way, of 300 guns from Aopao, Longmien, Chingha, Lungha, Chi and Totok Chingkho. They were all surrendered within a week.

In letter No. Pol. 1488-4389-A. P.,† of the 20th July 1931, Sir Laurie Hammond reiterated the policy of minimum interference in quarrels between controlled and tribal villages. The occasion for this was a reference made by the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Mills, in which he stated his own views as to the policy thus:—

“.....Lately our intervention in quarrels in the Control Area has become more and more automatic. It is easy, I admit, to say “stop” give a hint about Assam Rifles, and proceed to calculate how many mithan ought to be levied for each life lost. But I am convinced that such a remedy is only a palliative for quarrels, and a bad one in every way. People in our Control Area are lulled into a sense of false security and villages are unfortified. A surprise raid is easy. A penalty in mithan is paid, and things quiet down till there is another surprise raid.

Compensation from the fine is practically always refused by the aggrieved village. They do not consider that mithan can pay for the lives of their men and frankly settle down to wait till they can get heads in exchange.

If we let it be distinctly understood, as we did till very recently, that we reserve to ourselves the right to intervene, when we see fit, but do not guarantee to prevent all wars, trans-frontier villages would live more warily, and lives would rarely be lost, for the Naga depends entirely on surprise and never attacks an enemy who is ready for him. (I believe in a war which lasted 16 years between the big Konyak villages of Tamlu and Namsang the total casualties were 4.) Instead therefore of invariably punishing (but not hanging) the culprits I feel it is often advisable to let the disputants settle their differences for a time. I have usually found that the day soon comes when both sides have had enough, not of slaughter, for the number of lives lost is negligible, but of living in a state of nervous tension. Settlement is then easy.”

The Assam Government's reply was to the effect that--

“.....the Governor-in-Council considers that the policy suggested by the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, in his letter No. 1074-G., dated the 20th June 1931, is in consonance with that suggested by the

*Assam Administration Report for Naga Hills for 1926-1927.

Assam Administration Report for Naga Hills for 1924-1925.

†Governor's Secretariat, Political, B, March 1932, Nos. 976-984.

Chief Commissioner, Mr. Ward and approved by the Government of India, *viz.*, that Government should not interfere in disputes between tribes residing within and those residing outside the area of control, even though murder has resulted. In this connection a reference is invited to the correspondence ending with the Assam Administration's letter No. 494, dated the 9th March 1886 to the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills.

If of course the 'war' cannot be localised then it may be necessary to use the Assam Rifles or for the Deputy Commissioner; Naga Hills to tour during the cold weather and administer communal punishment, but the Governor-in-Council considers that it is best as far as possible to avoid interfering."

V. 1914-1923---*Other Events---* *The Great War of 1914-1918.*—In January 1917* the Secretary of State enquired of the Assam Administration whether they could assist in raising the 50,000 men who were wanted as labourers in France. Assam said they could produce 8,000 men and this offer was gladly accepted. The intention was to find 2,000 men each from the Lushai Hills, Manipur, the Naga Hills and the Khasi and Garo Hills combined. A spokesman on behalf of the Government of India described Assam's offer as the biggest, most definite and most practical one that had reached them. The proposal that house tax should be remitted to all who volunteered was accepted by the Government of India.

On 9th March 1917 orders were issued to raise Nos.21 (Naga Hills) and 22 (Manipur) Corps. All the Lhotas and the majority of the Semas made a good response, the latter sending 1,000 men. The Aos sent men too, if a little slowly. Angamis, Kacha Nagas and Kukis would not volunteer. A remarkable feature was the number of volunteers who came in from across the frontier. The Corps was composed of:—

Semas	1,000
Lhotas	400
Rengmas	200
Changs and other Trans-frontier tribes	200
Aos	200
						2,000

The Deputy Commissioner, Mr. H. C. Barnes went in command with a number of clerks and Dobashis.

In December 1917 protests were raised against enlistment for the duration which had been laid down but the question was finally decided by the War Office, who said that men were not wanted unless they undertook to enlist for the duration, and orders followed in January 1918 to the effect that all who would not enrol for the period of the war were to be discharged. One result of this was that a draft

*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, December 1917, Nos.39-80.

of 817 Naga Hills recruits which was waiting to go to France was diverted to the Kuki operations in January 1918. This draft consisted of—

- 60 Lhotas.
- 90 Semas.
- 120 Aos.
- 60 Kukis and Kacha Nagas.
- 480 Angamis.

There was a Naga Labour Corps numbered 35 and another numbered 38 which both arrived home in about June 1918. The money they brought home was soon spent. Semas paid their debts. Lhotas purchased land. The smiths of Wanching and Wakching and the ornament-makers of Seromi made fortunes. And prices soared. Mr. Hutton says that the men came back greatly impressed with the might of the Sarkar.

The response to the War Loan was, considering the poverty of the Hills, remarkable—Rs.26,264 was subscribed to the War Loan during 1917-18 and Rs.39,000 was subscribed to the 2nd Indian War Loan in 1918-19.

The Somra Tract and the "Cross-hatched" Area.—In a letter* dated the 11th September 1915, Burma made the proposal that the Somra Tract should be brought under administration and included in Burma. In 1908 and again 1911 and 1912 they had considered the matter but decided against such action, mainly because the Tract was giving no trouble and because the Chief Komyang kept a good control over his Kukis in that area. Komyang, however, was now dead and there was no hope of peace.

This Tract was described by the Commissioner of the Sagaing Division as covering an area of 800 square miles inhabited by Kukis and Tangkul Nagas. The latter were unarmed and were concentrated in the north-west corner of the Tract in 11 villages numbering 1,002 houses. They were anxious to be administered and to be saved from what was described as the danger of "wholesale slaughter" by the Kukis. The Kukis, who were immigrants of the Manipur State, lived in the eastern and southern part of the tract and had numerous guns in their possession.

There was agreement between Assam and Burma that the Somra Tract naturally belonged to Burma and not to Manipur. The only doubtful point was whether a small area hatched on the map, and in subsequent proceedings known as the "cross-hatched area" should go to Assam or to Manipur State. It was pointed out by Mr. Higgins, the Political Agent in Manipur, that the villages in the cross-hatched area had paid taxes to Manipur State for many years and considered themselves subjects of that State. Mr. Reid, who was now the Commissioner, Surma Valley Division, and the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. H. C. Barnes, however, declared that the cross-hatched area ought to

*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, May 1916, Nos.15-37,

go to the Naga Hills though it cannot be said that their reasons appeared to be very strong. In the result it was recommended in our letter No.3270-P.,* dated the 27th May 1916 that the Somra Tract should be placed under Burma leaving the fate of the cross-hatched area for later consideration, a proposal to which the Government of India agreed in their letter No.359-E.B., dated the 23rd November 1917.

This rather trifling matter, which only affected three small villages, cropped up now and again during the next five years, and finally in April† 1922 the then Chief Secretary, Mr. A. W. Botham, suggested that the area should be recognised as belonging to Manipur. The Government of India agreed and the area was formally made over to Manipur in 1922-23.

In 1917 a small question arose of compensation to certain independent Nagas of Zunyu [Banfera] and of the Chopnyu [Bermuthan] group of villages on the Sibsagar district frontier for land which by Government Notification No.67-P., dated 1st February 1910, had been included in Sibsagar district. The chiefs had refused the amount offered and Mr. H. C. Barnes, the Deputy Commissioner, was ordered to enquire in conjunction with Colonel Playfair, Deputy Commissioner of Sibsagar. Mr. Barnes reported the results of the expedition in his letter G(T), dated 25th January 1917, thus—

“3. From the time we left the Naga Hills district until we reached the area under the control of Yansa (Joboka) it was evident that we were unwelcome visitors: unwelcome owing to the inability of the Chiefs of Hangnyu to believe the assurance that neither punishment nor the annexation of their land was contemplated. Their fears were natural since for many years the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills has not been permitted by Government to cross the border except to punish or annex. This tour may, it is to be hoped, lead to a revival of those friendly tours in the unadministered tracts, which were in the past productive of so much good. Zunyu and Longhong endeavoured without success to accelerate our passage through their villages by making difficulties about showing the village water-supply. In Yansa and in the Chopnyu group we were well received. I attribute the absence of resistance to our movements to the careful arrangements of Major Arbuthnot, in camp and on the march, to make a surprise attack impossible or unlikely to succeed, to the size of the escort and to the fact that the force had its own coolies. Obstruction appearing unprofitable to the Nagas, the opportunity of gradually getting on better terms with them naturally resulted and was utilized. Mr. Hutton was in charge of the organization and arrangement of the Sema coolies corps and its rations, a task demanding an unusual amount of forethought and attention to detail. It would be difficult to speak too highly of the manner in which he carried out his duties.

*Political, A, May 1916, Nos.15-37.

†1. Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1922, Nos.3-6.

2. Political, A, December 1923, Nos.1-17.

4. The enquiry into the claims to rights over the land transferred to Sibsagar began at Longhong and was continued at Zusa, Chopnyu and Chepsa and concluded at Nokphang. Colonel Playfair and I were in agreement on all points. And the decisions arrived at represent our joint decisions. These were accepted by the headmen of the villages concerned. ".....the whole matter will be settled on a payment of Rs.1,500, all the land included in the Sibsagar district to be entirely given up to Government, except that Zusa will have the right to *jhum* on the Tanglam range, though not in the plains to the north of it. The claimants are to come to Sonari on January 25th. to receive payment from me. It is quite evident that the Chopnyu group has not the slightest wish to quarrel with Government. They naturally looked with apprehension and distrust on the loss of their land. Any Naga hates losing his land, even if his claim to it is somewhat shadowy."

In Assam Government letter No.1584-P.,* dated 19th February 1917, it was stated—

".....The Chief Commissioner, approves of the arrangement under which a satisfactory solution has been arrived at on payment of a compensation of Rs.1,500 to the Naga Chiefs. All the land included in the Sibsagar district will now be entirely at the disposal of the Government with the exception that the village of Zusa will have the right to *jhum* on the Tanglam range, though not in the plains to the north of it."

The Kuki Rebellion of 1917-19.—Though in the earlier days of the Kuki Rebellion of 1917-19 in Manipur there was a great deal of alarm and unrest among the Angamis and Kacha Nagas in the Naga Hills, the Kukis within the district remained loyal. Dr. Hutton, the then Deputy Commissioner, conducted two important and successful expeditions against Kukis who were troubling his border. The first was between January and March 1918 in the neighbourhood of Henima in the south-west of the Naga Hills District. The Commissioner spoke in the highest terms of the way in which these operations were carried out and stated that Dr. Hutton had thereby kept the peace in the Naga Hills and taught the Kukis a lesson. In his report the Deputy Commissioner expressed himself in uncompromising terms on the origin of the trouble, *viz.*, that the Manipur Lambus were solely responsible and that the gross corruption at Imphal largely contributed to it. This was followed by an expedition in April 1918 to the area lying between the Somra Tract on the south and the Tizu on the north, to take action against Kukis who had come in there and were oppressing the local Nagas in their customary way. They were settled near Lapvomi and were harassing it and neighbouring villages such as Phozami and Primi. His operations were entirely successful and he had only one casualty, a sepoy killed. In his report he expressed the hope that the effect would be to make this "set of robbers" clear out of the Naga Hills District and go off into the "cross-hatched area" or into Burma. He proposed that posts of one Indian Officer and 50 men each should be placed at Lapvomi and Yangnoi

*Assam Secretariat, Political, B, April 1917, Nos.13-69.

to guard against the return of the Kukis. Government agreed to his proposal, subject to any arrangements which might arise out of the large Kuki operations which were to take place in the following cold weather of 1918-19.

These operations of course affected conditions in the Naga Hills and posts had to be established on the border of, and in, Manipur to check the movements of the hostile Kukis. They were recognised as part of the Great War and the General Service Medal was given to those who took part in them. One or two points are worthy of mention. The Kukis not only possessed large numbers of muzzle loading guns, but made leather cannon which were far from ineffective at short range. Of the muzzle loading guns, which included many Tower Muskets in excellent condition, the most valued were flint-locks since the Kukis could make their own gunpowder but were cut off from all supplies of percussion caps. Our columns were continually being ambushed, but any attempt to bring the enemy to battle and inflict losses on them would have been useless. Instead economic measures were taken. The rebellion broke out after the Kukis had reaped the harvest of 1917. Columns operating over a wide area prevented them from sowing and reaping a crop in 1918, and by 1919 resistance collapsed owing to lack of food.

In 1921 orders passed by the Assam Government disposed of an interesting historical survival from Ahom times. Mr. J. P. Mills, the then Subdivisional Officer, Mokokchung, had raised the matter in 1918 and the Commissioner in a letter dated the 24th October 1921 explained that, in the days of the Ahom Kings, the Nagas who rendered services or whose allegiance it was desired to secure were given grants of land called "khats" in the plains. These were still treated as valid revenue-free grants and as the Nagas could not look after them themselves they appointed "Katakis" who realised rent on behalf of the owners and were remunerated by a share of the rent. The position was an unsatisfactory one as the Katakis, owing to the fact that they were treated as intermediaries with the Nagas by British Officials, tended to be given a position to which they were not really entitled. They undoubtedly cheated the Nagas, while their office tended to be regarded as hereditary though they were in no sense the owner of the grants, but merely agents. It was therefore proposed that certain fixed amounts should be paid to the Naga owners as "Malikana" and the khats be administered by Government. Full information was available about the khats as they had been surveyed and classified. Government agreed in its letter No. 4400-R., dated the 5th December 1921 that annual payments of certain fixed amounts should be made in perpetuity to Naga owners and that at the same time no payments should be made to the Katakis. The matter was thus disposed of except for a small point regarding a particular khat which came to notice in 1935 when Mr. N. L. Bor, I.F.S., the then Deputy Commissioner, pointed out that Government

Pol., B, January 1919 and March 1919, Part III, 1-37, Nos. 554-646.

*Pol. A, September 1936, Nos. 14-24.

†Revenue A, February 1922, Nos. 5-20.

under the terms of the orders of 1921 was making a fixed annual payment for a village called Bhitarsamsang which actually was outside the Inner Line and was in fact uncultivated and therefore producing no revenue. The remedy was to include the area within British Territory so that it might be resettled and re-cultivated. This was done.

In February 1923* four men of the Konyak village of Yungya wounded a man of Kamahu, and pursued him on to and killed him on British soil. Mr. Hutton the Deputy Commissioner† visited Yungya in March and burnt the "morungs" of the two hostile clans to whom the guilty men belonged. They did not however, give up the culprits. In the mean while information had been received that Tangsa right on our boundary and in the Control Area had bought from these same two clans a slave girl whom they beheaded. The Subdivisional Officer, Mr. Mills, then went there in August and succeeded in securing the four wanted men and also fined Tangsa for their delinquency.

VI. *Jadonang and Gaidiliu 1931-1941.*—In 1931 reports were received of a serious movement initiated by one Jadonang who set himself up in Kambiron in Manipur as a "Messiah-King" of the Kabui and Kacha Nagas. In reporting in February of that year‡ to the Government of India on the considerable unrest which existed among the Kabui Nagas in the north-west hills of the Manipur State, the Assam Administration stated :.....

"3. A Kabui Naga named Jadonang (living at a village Kambiron on the Cachar-Imphal bridle path) has proclaimed a Kabui Naga Raj. He is supposed to have powers of a sorcerer, and the Kacha Nagas, believing that he is the "Messiah" for whom they have been waiting, have sent him as tribute large numbers of *mithuns* the semi-domesticated *gayals* which are a sign of wealth among some of the Assam hill tribes and used for marriage gifts, etc.

Large assemblies of Nagas have been held at a village marked Nongkhai where Jadonang has been treated as a God. The Kukis, who during the Kuki rebellion in 1918 cut up many villages of the Kabui Nagas are afraid of reprisals and some of them have already come into Imphal for safety. According to the Kukis, Jadonang is collecting guns with the intention of attacking them. The Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, also has received information that Jadonang has given out that revenue may be paid this year but is to be paid to him in 1931-32.

4. The Political Agent in Manipur sent out a State official to arrest Jadonang, but on news being received that the latter had gone to Cachar with some followers, he wired to the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, to arrest him and news has now been received that Jadonang has been arrested in Cachar under section 108, Criminal Procedure Code. He is being taken back to Manipur under an extradition warrant".

*Political, B, March 1923, Nos. 178-180.

†Political, B, December 1923, Nos. 216-240.

‡Assam Secretariat, Political, A, September 1931, Nos. 20-94.

The Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills reported more fully on 16th March as follows :—

“Jadonang’s claim was as follows :—His day and that of the Kabuis and Kacha Nagas had come at last. In three years all would be fulfilled. He knew by his miraculous powers that during the Kuki rebellion the Kukis captured two Naga girls, and brutally murdered one and buried the other alive. Therefore the Kukis were to be exterminated within the three years. Nagas were not to strike the first blow, but were to be absolutely ready. The first act of aggression by any Kuki was to be a signal for a general attack on them, and each Naga village was to massacre all Kukis within reach. This was to be kept an absolute secret from Government and the Kukis, and any one who revealed it would die.

Jadonang’s claim appears to be connected with the old Naga tradition of a Messiah King to which Dr. Hutton refers on page 252 of his ‘Angami Nagas’. There is no evidence, however, that the Angamis are involved in the present trouble. On the contrary, Jadonang has expressed his dislike of them, clearly regarding them as oppressive overlords of the Kacha Nagas and Kabuis.

His claims as a healer were probably only a bait to attract adherents, as invalids who went with the humble offering of a rupee were told that not much could be done for them, but that their village ought to send in more substantial tribute in the form of a *mithun*. He is universally spoken of as ‘the King’ or ‘the spirit King’.

By his story of the torture of Naga girls Jadonang worked the Kacha Nagas of my district into a great state of excitement, and any incident between Kukis and Nagas, such as is always liable to occur somewhere in such a large area, would certainly have had deplorable results. The detachment reached Henima in time, however, and there was no disturbance”.

On March 1st, Mr. Higgins, Political Agent, Manipur, visited Kambiron (Jadonang had already been arrested on 19th February). He describes Jadonang’s home and temple as follows :—

“While camp was being made, we went into the village, and visited Jadonang’s house and temples. The house is of the ordinary Kabui type but is an *ahongyum* (ornamented house). The front is of wooden planks, painted white, with scrolls, patterns, and pictures of men, *mithun*, elephants, tortoises, etc., in black. In front of the house were the sacrificial posts of thirty *mithuns*—each one an upright post stuck in the ground, with two posts in front, in the form of a St. Andrew’s cross. On each side of the door were white slabs of wood, stuck in the ground, bearing a representation of a sepoy with a rifle, in red paint. In the back room of the house was a broad clay pedestal, supporting a large flat circular stone, about four feet in diameter, approached by clay steps. We were told that Jadonang used to pray on this slab. Next to the house was a temple, built on high wooden piles, and entered by steps cut in a long log. The temple was a building of bamboo matting, thatched, with a small verandah in front and behind. It consisted of one long room with bamboo branches the whole length of each side wall. From a cross beam in the middle

hung an oil lamp. At the far end was a bamboo platform, with a railing round three sides, and a flight of steps on the fourth side. Facing the platform were four wooden chairs, on each of which was a white felt hat. We were told that it was Jadonang's custom to preach from the platform, while the elders of the village set in the chairs, wearing the hats, and the lesser lights occupied the benches. Beside the platform was a perambulator, and a zinc bath-tub, for the use of Jadonang's son. Higher up the village was a second temple, recently constructed. In design it was similar to the first, except that there was a long narrow room on each side, parallel to the long central room. The central room contained benches, similar to those in the old temple. In place of the pulpit was a shrine, approached by a flight of steps, ornamented in black and white. At the top of the steps was a door, behind which was a red curtain, covering the opening of the shrine. Inside the shrine were clay figures of a Naga man and woman, dressed in festival clothes, and a clay *mithun*. In front of them were five black stones, and Re. 1-9-6 in small coins, mostly pice. On the top of the shrine was a platform, approached by a second flight of steps, on which was a chair. Just above the chair was a python, curled up on the ridge pole of the roof. In front of the shrine was a sacrificial block, made out of a log, at which goats were sacrificed. The floor round was plentifully sprinkled with blood some of which was fresh. I shot the python and told the village elders the temples must be demolished. Their demolition, as the elders themselves admitted, involves no interference with the animistic religion of these people, as it is not their custom to have temples for their gods. These temples appear to have originated in the brain of Jadonang, and to have been constructed for his personal aggrandisement, not to say profit, for he reaped a rich harvest of offerings, in animals and money, from dupes who came to worship him and his gods therein.

The two side rooms were his retiring rooms, each fitted with a bamboo bed and a hearth. The elders said that he used to sleep in them sometimes, always with his first wife (he has two).

Near Jadonang's house were two large buildings called kitchens. The elders said they were used as hostels and the smaller rooms therein were used as bath rooms by persons bringing offerings, who were not permitted to enter the upper temple until they had bathed".

On March 13th he visited Nungkao where Gaidiliu was established. He described her as a "rather surly little unmarried girl of 17".

On 16th May 1931, the Assam Government were able to report that—

"3. Normal conditions now prevail again and the idea of a Naga *raj* has been dissipated. Jadonang, the instigator of all the troubles, is now under trial in the court of the Political Agent in Manipur, with a number of men of Kambiron and neighbouring villages, for the murder of four Manipuri traders who disappeared about March 1930. It is understood that there is evidence to implicate him as one of the

principals. If he is acquitted in the murder case the question of his internment as a State prisoner under Regulation III of 1818 will be considered”.

Jadonang was tried in Manipur on a charge of murder and sentenced to death on 13th June 1931. The murder had taken place in March 1930 at Kambiron when 4 Manipuris were set upon by the mob at Jadonang's instigation and with his participation and done to death. Jadonang's disappearance from the scene had some effect, but his companion Gaidiliu who was regarded as his spiritual successor, if not incarnation, carried on his work. She was “wanted” on a charge of murder but she was not to be captured till October 1932, and as the agitation was centered in three administrations, the Naga Hills, the North Cachar Hills and Manipur, with every man and woman in the affected villages an active sympathiser, operations were made very difficult. In a note† recorded on 9th June 1932, Mr. Mills, Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, stated his views thus:—

“The real danger of the movement is the spirit of defiance now abroad. Nagas who are ordinarily truthful and friendly, have been taught that officials are to be lied to and deprived of information. These lessons will not quickly be forgotten.

The capture of Gaidiliu will not end the agitation. There is a warrant for murder out against her and she can be dealt with when caught. She will be succeeded by one or more “mediums”. To be a “medium” is not an offence under any law. Yet they will continue to keep the people in a state of constant excitement, and Nagas will continue to be set over against Government and Kukis. The result from the administrative point of view will be serious. Our first object is the capture of Gaidiliu. Once she is in our hands we must aim at gradually suppressing the movement by punishment, persuasion and personal influence. This will be a long task”.

On 20th February 1932‡ the Assam Government reported the revival of the unrest among the Kabui Nagas to the Government of India in their letter No. Pol.-471/1645-A.P.

“Jadonang, who claiming to be their Messiah King was responsible for the trouble that occurred last year, was convicted and hanged for murder, and it was thought that the unrest would then cease. Unfortunately the woman Gaidiliu, who was associated with Jadonang as a priestess, reappeared among these people, apparently with some man impersonating Jadonang, who was said to have come to life again..... The arrival of the Deputy Commissioner with a detachment of Assam Rifles at Henema led to the flight of the woman and her party, but she had already established the belief that the Messiah King was again among them, and that it was to him the Kabui Nagas owed allegiance. The fear of an attack on the Kukis has for the moment been dispelled by presence of the Assam Rifles, but it will clearly take time to undo the mischief which has been cleverly engineered by the impostors.

*Assam Secretariat, Political, B, September 1931, Nos.122-447.

†Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1933, Nos.59-315.

‡Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1933, Nos.59-315.

Every attempt is being made to capture the woman Gaidiliu who has escaped, apparently with a large escort, into the North Cachar Hills. Detachments of Assam Rifles are pursuing her and her party. One section came in contact with them on the 16th instant, but they managed to escape after opening fire on the section."

Soon after this a further report dated the 2nd March 1932 stated.--

"2. The cult which Gaidiliu has revived has clearly spread over a large area of the Naga Hills, Manipur and the North Cachar Hills, and unless Gaidiliu and her party can be captured, there is grave danger of a serious outbreak. The Governor-in-Council has therefore sanctioned organized operations to round up Gaidiliu and her party. The Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, has been placed in control with authority to draw on the 3rd and 4th Battalions of the Assam Rifles for such men as he may need. The Subdivisional Officer, North Cachar Hills, and an officer in Manipur have been directed to co-operate as his assistants."

Long and difficult operations followed in the attempt to arrest this girl. In March 1932 a detachment of Assam Rifles, when close on her heels, were attacked at Hangrum by a large body of Nagas and had to fire on them: and in the same month the Kacha Naga village of Bopungwemi in the Naga Hills District had to be burnt. At last, on the 17th October 1932 Gaidiliu was captured at Pulomi in the Naga Hills by Captain N. Macdonald, Commandant of the Assam Rifles. Mr. Mills describes her final movements thus* :—

"..... Gaidiliu was at Pulomi for about ten days before she was captured. She was clearly desperate, for she was at the end of the Kacha Naga country and had nowhere to go. She said openly that in the next two months either she or Government would win. All she could do was to stage a theatrical last stand. Apparently she hoped that an "army" would collect round her. Meanwhile she made Pulomi build an amazing palisade. It was copied from the palisade of the post at Hangrum, even down to a fault which had been criticised by the Commandant there. It ran all the way round the village except where the ground is precipitous, and to make it Pulomi worked like slaves and destroyed a great deal of their valuable firewood reserve to provide the thousands of tree trunks required. Four thousand men with rifles behind it would have been formidable, but a few hundred Nagas inside it could neither have thrown a spear over it nor wielded a *dao*. It had not been quite completed when she was captured. Her orders on what was to be done when an attacking force come were remarkable. She would strike the Sahibs dead with magic and her supporters were then to use *daos* only, for they would be enough. When Captain Macdonald made his attack at dawn on information brought to Kohima by a Pulomi gaonbura her "army" melted away and there was no magic. Pulomi shouted and brandished *daos* according to her orders, but were careful not to go beyond them. No blow was struck and the village was clearly relieved when sepoys ignominiously hauled out of a house the biting, scratching girl for whom they had uselessly worked so hard and killed so many cattle

* Political, A, June 1933, Nos. 59-315.

though any mistake on the part of the Commandant would probably have led to an attack in desperation by her supporters. With her were captured her young nephew, the Kambiron boy, a Bopungwemi boy, two Lalongmi men and a Hangrum man. The rest of her escort escaped but she gave the names of all but four later. The young nephew presents a problem, for he is obviously regarded as important and if he is released the mantle of Gaidiliu may fall on him."

Captain Macdonald's dispositions received the commendation of the Assam Government in their letter No. Pol.-283-1751-A. P., dated the 28th February 1933 thus:—

"Captain Macdonald on receipt of information regarding the whereabouts of this Naga woman led a column of the Assam Rifles on a long night march through very difficult mountain country. The Governor-in-Council appreciates very highly his quick decisions and splendid effort as well as the good work of the civil officer with the column and of the men of the Assam Rifles. If the dispositions made by these officers had not been as sound as the marching and the courage of the men were admirable, they could not have won the great success they did in such difficult and dangerous circumstances. The woman had acquired a great notoriety on account of her alleged supernatural powers and it was probable that her arrest would have led to resistance, but Captain Macdonald's excellent handling of the situation before and after the capture of the woman resulted in complete success without any resistance and consequent loss of life or injury to any one."

With him was associated Mr. Hari Blah, Extra Assistant Commissioner about whom Captain Macdonald wrote:—

"28. Mr. Blah rendered the greatest assistance throughout the operation. In the confusion after entering the village he remained cool and by forcing our guides to hurry on was largely responsible for Gaidiliu's capture."

Gaidiliu was tried and convicted at Manipur on a charge of murder and sentenced to transportation for life.

The arrest and conviction of Gaidiliu did not end the matter. According to letter *No. Pol. 1850-6261-A. P., dated the 8th August 1935, to the Government of India, in which the Assam Government asked for the detention of 7 Nagas under Regulation III of 1818 it appeared that—

"..... certain Kacha Nagas of the Naga Hills and of the neighbouring villages in the Manipur State had obtained access to her [Gaidiliu] while in the Manipur State jail on more than one occasion by bribing the jail staff, and she had urged them to keep the movement alive. By way of following out her injunction to keep the movement alive the Kuki chaukidar of the Lakema Inspection Bungalow in the Naga Hills district, who was supposed, quite incorrectly, to have been responsible for giving the information which had led to Gaidiliu's arrest, was marked down for murder. A party of Nagas

principally from the villages of Leng in Manipur and Bopungwemi in the Naga Hills, but also containing a number of individuals from other villages concerned in the movement, made a raid by night upon this rather isolated bungalow, and finding the chaukidar himself absent massacred his wife and family (four or five children) and two Kuki strangers, who were stopped there for the night. The raiding party got back to Bopungwemi either in the dark of by jungle paths away from the main road on the following day, and apparently was never seen by anyone between the time it left and returned to Bopungwemi village.

This raid took place in December 1932 and during the same month reports were received from more than one quarter of dances and semi-religious celebrations held in disaffected Kacha Naga villages and of the great nervousness on the part of the Kukis who live mostly in small hamlets scattered about among the much larger Naga villages and were, as they have been ever since, in a state of great apprehension as to what might not happen to them at any time ; for although the Kukis in the Naga Hills all remained loyal, with the exception of one individual, throughout the operations of 1917 to 1919, they share with the rebel Kukis of the Manipur State the hatred which the Kacha Naga now feels for all Kukis on account of certain sufferings at their hands experienced during the rebellion in Manipur State.

This tension on the part of the Kukis was accentuated by the discovery in March 1933 of a headless corpse at Makui which was rumoured at the time to be a Kuki though it proved in fact to have been that of a Manipuri. The head had been carried away by the Kacha Nagas who had committed the murder and offered to the pyth-on god at Leng. In the following May this same village of Leng, which was the centre of the movement on the Manipur side as Bopungwemi has been on the Naga Hills side, sent out a deputation urging villages in the Kacha Naga country not to pay any tax, a movement which was accompanied by dances of a ceremonial nature in many villages although it was not the correct season for such dances at all. In June information was obtained that this propaganda was also directed to the abandonment of cultivation partly on the ground that the god would provide food, and partly on the ground that Government was about to collapse and by the autumn villages would be at war. This rumour of the approaching collapse of Government was accompanied by one that a king called Gandhi was coming to rule instead and it was undesirable for anyone to pay any taxes to Government, as they might later be in the unfortunate position of having to pay them again to this king Gandhi, who was decried as a son of that Jadonang who had been executed in 1931. The result of this movement has been to make the collection of house tax extremely difficult in many villages, although the Kacha Naga is actually probably no worse off than the Kuki, who pays under similar conditions ; but it has also accentuated the poverty arising from economic causes that have been operating for some years, and it will not be out of place here to point out that a great deal of the success of this movement has been and still is economic in origin. Many Kacha Nagas have nothing whatever to lose and are therefore easily seduced by any prospect, however wild, of an improved economic condition.

* * * * *

..... In May, 1934, another prophet was arrested in Ncharramai by the Assam Rifles guard at Henima. He had been touring the disaffected villages in Manipur, the North Cachar Hills and the Naga Hills, claiming as usual divine or magical powers to cure illnesses, and holding ceremonies to commemorate Gaidiliu and Jadonang, and confirming his followers in their refusal to pay taxes. The Indian Officer, who happened to be a Kuki, got information of his activities and made a clever arrest. This man Haido, of Pabaram Youte in Manipur, ultimately made a confession and has turned an approver in the case against Ramjo and others of Bopungwemi for the outrage at Lakema. As a result of information received from him, and confirming previous information obtained from Leng and elsewhere, one Ramjo of Bopungwemi was arrested. This was in July 1934. It has been satisfactorily substantiated that Ramjo was the principal leader of the Bopungwemi party in the butchery at Lakema bungalow.....the Government of Assam is satisfied that it is really dangerous to release him, but so far it has been impossible to get sufficient evidence to come into Court to convict him of crimes.He is the first of the men whom this Government now proposes should be dealt with under Regulation III of 1818.

After the arrest of Ramjo there was for a time quiescence in the Kacha Naga country and the Deputy Commissioner toured the greater part of it without an escort, and was everywhere received in a friendly manner, but it was clear that in Bopungwemi and in one or two other villages the movement continued below the surface. In November of the same year another of the murderers, one Dikeo of Bopungwemi, was arrested, but managed to escape by night in his handcuffs from the fort at Henema. He has since evaded arrest but is known to moving about among the disaffected villages in the Naga Hills and Manipur, and more particularly in the less closely administered areas in the North Cachar Hills, preaching disaffection and hiding from justice."

In addition to these two men, the Assam Government wished to place under restraint 5 others, *viz.*, Gomhei of Bopungwemi and a girl, Areliu, associated with him, and 3 men Italakpa of Laloi, Italakpa of Insung and Ivongtieng of Perenmi.

The Government of India agreed in their letter No. F.425-P/35, dated the 31st January 1936. As it turned out, Gomhei and Areliu had by now been convicted, in September 1935, and sentenced to terms of imprisonment, while Italakpa of Laloi had died.

Of the remaining 4, the histories of the other Italakpa, of Ivongtieng and of Ramjo need not be pursued. Dikeo remained absconding until November 1st 1940, when he was shot by the Assam Rifles guard at Henima while attempting to escape from a house which they had surrounded.

Between 1935 when the letter* above referred to was written and 1941 the agitation never entirely died down and there were periodical rumours of fresh attempts to revive the Gaidiliu cult, but the movement

* Assam Secretariat, Confidential, Political, A, September 1936, Nos.1-63.

fortunately never reached the scale it did in Jadonang's day. It remained necessary, however, to maintain the outpost at Henima in the Kacha Naga country as a precaution and as a base for the hunt for Dikeo.

VII. *Pangsha and other Expeditions, 1936-39.*—In April 1936 Mr. Mills, Deputy Commissioner, submitted a report* on the behaviour of Pangsha, a Kalo Kenyo village in Tribal territory outside the Control Area. They had been responsible for 200 deaths in the last 6 months : they had raided Kejuk within the Control Area and taken 53 heads ; they had raided Saochu, also within the Control Area and taken 188 heads ; and they had been selling captives as slaves. Though Pangsha was outside the Control Area, their conduct had been such that Mr. Mills advised that an expedition be sent against them.

The then Governor of Assam, Sir Michael Keane, approved of the proposal, and placed it before the Government of India in Government letter No. Pol.-1948/7374-A.P., dated the 21st August 1936. In a previous letter written in May 1936 he had already mentioned Pangsha in connection with the subject of slavery and had expressed the view that the best way of dealing with the problem was to extend the Control Area so as to cover slave-keeping villages.

The Government of India's approval to a visit to Pangsha having been accorded, the operations took place between November 13th and December 13th, 1936, with Mr. Mills in political charge, Major W. R. B. Williams, 7th Gurkhas Commandant, in command of the escort of 2½ platoons of the 3rd Assam Rifles, and Mr. G. W. J. Smith, I. P., in charge of the 360 carriers, while Dr. von Fuhrer Haimendorf, an Austrian scientist also had permission to accompany the expedition (it is described in his book "The Naked Nagas"). The course of the expedition is described in the following extract from the Deputy Commissioner's Report No.3814-G., dated the 20th December 1936.—

".....on November 20th we reached our advanced base at Chingmei where the loyalty of my old friend Chingmak was of inestimable value. There we found that Pangsha had handed over to him all their slaves but one ; they still defied us to visit them, and I found they had terrorised the whole neighbourhood, threatening to destroy any village which helped us.

* * * * *

Soon after passing the Noklak-Pangsha boundary we saw a small unarmed party of Pangsha men in the distance. Four were induced to come and speak to us, and brought with them a goat and a chicken. They asked whether we would make peace. There was not the slightest doubt as to the only possible answer. To have made peace, turned back and abandoned the remaining slave at the price of a goat, a fowl and some smooth words would inevitably have been interpreted as a sign

*Assam Secretariat, Tribal, A, December 1937, Nos. 1-90.

of weakness. Friends who had helped us would have been massacred and raids would have continued. I therefore told the envoys that I did not believe their statement that they could not produce the slave girl, and that I was going to punish them for their conduct and insults to Government.

* * * *

On November 26th we burnt the main village, nearly losing four coolies who straggled against orders. In the afternoon we moved down stream to below the separate Wenshoi 'khel'. Next morning the baggage with one platoon was sent straight to Noklak, and one platoon with a few scouts and dobashis went up to burn the 'khel'. We were very heavily attacked on our way down in a last effort by Pangsha to wipe us out. It was only the skill and coolness of Major Williams and his force that enabled us to make a safe withdrawal to Noklak, without losing a man and after inflicting losses on the enemy, whom ground and cover enabled to charge to within 50 yards before they were stopped.

That evening Chingmei and Noklak made peace, Noklak being no longer in any doubt as to the safer side of the fence. I also fined Noklak for their previous hostility. Ponyo, who may have sent a contingent to help Pangsha, also came to see me. I sent word through them to Pangsha that if they would come and talk to me at Chingmei their envoys would be safe. This they did two days later, bringing with them the leading men of the Burma villages Ponyo and Shiwu. They admitted defeat and promised to stop slave-raiding and to return the remaining slave. All three villages swore an oath of friendship and were sent home with presents of salt. Pangsha kept their word and the slave girl was sent for from her purchasers in Burma and brought to our camp at Chentang on December 7th and is now safe with her parents."

The Government of Assam in forwarding Mr. Mills' report on the 30th January 1937 to the Government of India commented as follows:--

"2. The expedition completely achieved its objects in effecting the release of several slaves taken as captives and in inflicting on Pangsha a well merited punishment not only for its participation in the slave trade but for its head-hunting raids on its neighbours. The Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, has been asked to submit proposals for the constitution of a Control Area to include Pangsha and other villages."

The slavery aspect of these operations was referred to by the Government of India when issuing the report for general information in the following terms:—

"India is a party to the Slavery Convention, 1926, and has undertaken to bring about progressively and as soon as possible the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms. It was however found necessary to make a reservation in respect of certain outlying and inaccessible areas bordering on Assam and Burma where, it was thought, it would be difficult to implement our undertaking effectively. Recently the Government of India have agreed to the reservation being withdrawn in respect of certain cases including the Naga Hills area in Assam. As a first step towards the fulfilment of the requirement under the Slave

Convention to bring about the abolition of slavery in this area, the Government of India, at the request of the Government of Assam, agreed to an expedition, headed by the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, and composed of a column of Assam Rifles. The object of the expedition was to acquaint the headmen of the villages with the determination of Government to suppress the practice of slavery and, if they persisted in an attitude of defiance, to punish them. This action was rendered imperative by the conduct of one of the villages in that area, namely, Pangsha, which, with the assistance of certain other villages, had been raiding and destroying the weaker villages in their neighbourhood and holding their captives as slaves in defiance of warning from Government."

The proposals* referred to in paragraph 2 of the Assam letter dated 30th January 1937 were duly submitted, and, with the sanction of the Government of India, the Control Area was extended so as to include Pangsha, Sanglao, Nokluk and certain other Kalo-Kengyu villages with effect from January 1938. In forwarding his proposals the Deputy Commissioner said that "The proposed extension of the Control Area covers the approaches to the only known pass into Burma through which slaves are taken, and the whole of the country in which we know that slave-raiding has survived to the present."

In November 1937 Mr. Pawsey, Deputy Commissioner, accompanied by Mr. Hari Blah, Subdivisional Officer, Mokokchung, Major B. C. H. Gerty and 174 officers and men of the 3rd Assam Rifles conducted a successful expedition to Nokhu for the purpose of releasing slaves, in the following circumstances.—

"After the 1936 expedition to Pangsha, it transpired that the village of Sanglao still held one slave and in spite of constant warnings refused to release the slave. The Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, accordingly asked for permission to warn Sanglao that unless the slaves were released the village would be visited and punished. Government permission was accorded to this action. It subsequently transpired that the village of Nokhu had not released their slaves in spite of their affirmations to the Deputy Commissioner last year, and that the village of Pesu, south-west of Sanglao, the position of which was then unknown, held at least one slave. It was not known whether villages further south held slaves or not. The sanction to the expedition was duly obtained from the Government of India. Throughout the rainy season constant attempts were made to get the villages to release their slaves, but although it was reported that Sanglao had obeyed Government orders, Nokhu and Pesu remained obstinate."

The expedition left Mokokchung on the 1st November 1937 and by the end of the month all the slaves known to be in the unadministered area were set free without any casualty on our side. Nokhu was reached on November 12th, 4 slaves were released and a fine was exacted : Sanglao was reached on the 15th and was "overwhelmingly

*Governor's Secretariat, Tribal, A, September 1938, Nos.1-27.

friendly" : Pesu was reached on the 17th and burnt and slaves recovered. Soon after the expedition was over reports were received that, while Pesu was being rebuilt after it was burnt during the expedition, Panso went and took 6 heads from them.

In 1939* Pangsha and some of its neighbours had again to be visited and punished. Early in 1939 Yungkao, Tamkhung and Ukha took 12 heads off Agching, and in June of that year Pangsha, Ukha and Yungkao destroyed Agching, taking 96 heads. Guns were provided for the endangered village for their protection and the sending of a column was agreed to. Mr. Pawsey, Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, was in charge and was accompanied by Major A. R. Nye, M. C., and 3 platoons of the Assam Rifles, and Mr. F. P. Adams, I. C. S., Subdivisional Officer, Mokokchung. There was no opposition. Pangsha was burnt and property destroyed : Yungkao, which submitted unconditionally, was fined only : Tamkhung was fined a small sum : Ukha was burnt. Unfortunately Mongu and Mongsen, the Pangsha leaders, were not arrested. Pangsha and Yungkao were told not to raid the small villages in the Control Area on our side of the river. Ukha were told through an intermediary, but not directly as they did not come in, that guns must not be used in the Control Area.

VIII. *The Constitution Act of 1935.*—Throughout the discussions previous to the framing of the new Act, the authorities concerned had no difficulty in agreeing that the Naga Hills ought to be kept outside the purview of the New Constitution. They were accordingly declared to be an 'Excluded Area' under the Government of India (Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas) Order, 1936 and have since the 1st of April 1937 been administered by the Governor in his discretion.

Governor's Secretariat, December 1939, Nos.1-118.

*Governor's Secretariat, Tribal, A, June 1941, Nos.1-126.

4. SADIYA FRONTIER TRACT

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I.—Introductory.—Mackenzie deals with—

Abors,
Miris,
Mishmis,
Khamtis,
Singhpos,

under those headings at pages 33-72 of his work, and his history of those tribes is brought down to the year 1883 or thereabouts. In these notes it is proposed to group together the subsequent history of these tribes under the one head of "Sadiya Frontier Tract."

The Sadiya Frontier Tract district was formed in 1912 with headquarters at Sadiya, the old Sadiya subdivision of Lakhimpur district being its nucleus. Its first designation was that of "Central and Eastern Sections, North-East Frontier", the Western Section being what is now known as Balipara Frontier Tract.

The administrative changes thus brought about in 1912 are described succinctly by Mr. S. N. Mackenzie, I.C.S., the officiating Political Officer, in paragraph 1 of the first annual report (1912-13) for "the district of Sadiya".

"1. As this is the first Annual Report of this district, a few general introductory remarks will not be out of place. Formerly this district was known as the Dibrugarh Frontier Tract, and was administered by an Assistant Political Officer, with headquarters at Sadiya, subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur. Subsequent to the Abor Expedition of 1911-12 this system of administration was changed. The Dibrugarh Frontier Tract ceased to exist, and the district of Sadiya became a separate entity controlled by a Political Officer, working directly under the Chief Commissioner, with three Assistant Political Officers, of whom one was posted to Pasighat, and was, broadly speaking, in charge of the Abor Hills. Sanction to this system was conveyed in letter No.2447-E.B., dated the 16th October 1912, from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the address of the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam."

The title of this district was officially altered to "Sadiya Frontier Tract" in 1919, on the recommendation of the Chief Commissioner, Sir Nicholas Beatson-Bell, by Government of India Notification No. 141-E.B.,* dated the 20th March 1919.

Before 1912, the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, was charged with the duty of maintaining relations with the frontier tribes, these duties being lightened from 1882 by the appointment at Sadiya of an Assistant Political Officer for that area. The first such Assistant was Mr. Francis Jack Needham of the Bengal Police, of whom it is stated in the note to the Preface to the Sadiya Frontier Tract Gazetteer of 1928,—“By his explorations and discoveries, Mr. Needham acquired an international reputation and his work from 1882 to 1905 laid the foundations of the modern North-East Frontier of Assam.”

*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, May 1919, Nos. 8-15.

So far as this portion of the Frontier is concerned, the last important incident which Mackenzie records (page 45) is the occupation* of Bomjur and Nizamghat in 1881 by Major G. W. Beresford and a force of some 300 officers and men of the 43rd Assam Light Infantry, a stockade being constructed and a garrison installed at each place.

Beresford, besides being in military command, was also Chief Political Officer to the Expedition. His instructions were to—

- (1) prevent the Abors crossing to the east of the Dibong ;
- (2) construct stockades at Bomjur and Nizamghat ;
- (3) avoid hostilities with the Abors.

His Assistant Political Officer was Rai Bahadur Lahmon Das, Honorary Extra Assistant Commissioner, while Mr. G. H. P. Livesay, Assistant Superintendent of Police, was in charge of the Police who accompanied the party.

Nizamghat and Bomjur were evacuated towards the end of the following May, but were re-occupied after the rains, so as to show the Abors that we were determined to prevent them crossing the Dibong. Bomjur had a Military, and Nizamghat a Police, Garrison, each of 100 men.

Though these posts had been occupied without difficulty, the general attitude of the tribes, especially the Abors, gave anxiety, and Mr. Elliott, the Chief Commissioner, was not satisfied with our arrangements for maintaining relations with them. He wrote thus in his letter No. 725† dated the 18th May 1882, to the Government of India.

“9. The only plan that Mr. Elliott can suggest is that a suitable officer should be selected to conduct our relations with the Abors in particular, and also with all the tribes bordering on Sadiya. Such an officer, if intelligent in his instincts, quick in his sympathies, and a good linguist, might in the course of two or three years obtain influence on the frontier, and might from that vantage-ground use any opportunities that may occur of opening friendly communications and convincing the Abors not only of our strength to resist and our unwillingness to attack, but also of the advantages they may gain by the markets we can open to their produce. But the Chief Commissioner would add that there are not many points of contact between us and a hill tribe that lives chiefly by hunting and fishing ; and that the best consummation would perhaps be that they should let us, and we them, alone as much as possible.”

A second letter No. 728 of the same date made a formal proposal for the creation of the post of Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya, as a temporary measure, and described the position in more detail as follows—

“2. The only civil official who has any influence at Sadiya or any knowledge of the tribes beyond the border, is Rai Lahmon Bahadur, a native gentleman of a fine presence and of much natural intelligence

*Assam Secretariat, 1882. File No. 61-J.

†Assam Secretariat, For., B, December 1882, Nos. 1-13.

who and his brother, the political sheristidar, are heads of the important Mattak tribe. He has been employed for many years on the border, first as Inspector of Police, then as Honorary Extra Assistant Commissioner, a post which he now holds, and he is very widely known to the Abors, Mishmis, Singphos, and Kamptis, and has great weight among them. But he is beginning to grow old and it is dangerous that he should be the sole repository of so much experience, lest it should die with him, and he is believed to be somewhat mixed up in trading, and elephant hunting operations, in the debatable land across the Inner Line ; and he has a deep distrust and dislike of the Abors—feelings which are known to them and which they reciprocate.

3. For these reasons, some of which were known at the time while some have become more evident in the course of subsequent events Sir S. C. Bayley appointed Mr. Livesay, an Inspector and officiating Assistant Superintendent of Police to Sadiya, with the intention that he should have all the knowledge that Lahmon had acquired, and should gradually become fit to take his place as Political Officer on the Frontier. Mr. Livesay, however, has not proved equal to the situation ; perhaps, he has been a little wanting in tact, temper, and education ; perhaps the Rai Bahadur resented the attempt to supplant him and has been too clever for him. But the result is that at present Mr. Livesay does not know anything of the Mishmi or Abor language ; has no influence, and has made no progress whatever in becoming acquainted with the notable men of the frontier tribes. The Chief Commissioner is satisfied that he is deficient in the qualities required for such a post, and has decided to remove him from Sadiya."

In a third letter No.1587, dated the 28th September 1882, Mr. Elliott reported that he had found a suitable officer in the person of Mr. J. F. (*sic*) Needham of the Bengal Police, whose services the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal had agreed to surrender, and asked for approval to his appointment. In a letter No.1731, dated the 23rd October 1882, to the Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh, the Chief Commissioner stated the duties of the new post as follows.—

"2. Mr. Needham is to be chiefly employed on political work in subordination to you, but he should also take up all criminal work arising within such area about Sadiya as you may think it convenient to assign to him, and revenue work in addition if you desire it. It will probably be convenient to notify Sadiya as a subdivision, and to allot to it a certain number of mauzas. On this subject, and in regard to the magisterial powers with which he is to be invested, and the establishment he may require, you should make proposals after consulting with him upon his arrival at Dibrugarh. You should ordinarily issue through him orders upon all matters relating to affairs on the Abor, Mishmi, and Singpho-Khampti frontiers, and the arrangements regarding the location of the frontier outposts, their supplies, the patrolling between them, etc. as well as the political relations with the Abors and Mishmis will be carried on through him as soon as he has acquired sufficient local knowledge.

3. His first duty will be to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the history of our relations with these tribes and their neighbours both by mastering the correspondence in the political department of your office (more especially the recent correspondence and Major Beresford's note * of 1880), and by gaining all the information he can from Rai Lahmon Bahadur and other local authorities. His next should be to become personally acquainted with the leading members of the tribes, their chiefs, Kotokis, etc., and to establish, as far as possible, friendly and cordial relations with them. He should endeavour to learn their languages, more especially that of the Abors, with whom it is important that he should establish friendly relations and a means of communication independent of the possible errors or intentional misinterpretation of the Kotokis. And he should regard border politics as his special sphere in which he is to acquire as much knowledge as he possibly can, and to endeavour to train his judgment to right and sound opinions upon all questions relating to the subject."

The Government of India agreed, and Mr. Needham was appointed as the first Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya with effect from 8th November 1882. The way in which his position came in to be regarded, at any rate by Mr. W. E. Ward, Chief Commissioner in 1894, is explained in the following extract from a letter from the Chief Commissioner to the then Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur No.49-Foreign†-356-P., dated the 15th January 1894.

"3. Mr. Needham's position in relation to the Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur has always hitherto been that of a special adviser on all political questions arising on your frontier, and, from his intimate knowledge of the tribes on the frontier his views are necessarily entitled to considerable weight. At the same time, it is the District Officer who is immediately responsible for advising the Chief Commissioner on frontier questions, and he is not necessarily bound in every case to accept the views of the Political Officer at Sadiya."

II.—1885-1891

(a) *Needham's visit to Rima.*—Between December 1885 and January 1886, Mr. Needham journeyed up to a point very close to Rima and back, he and his companion, Captain E. H. Molesworth‡, being, as the Chief Commissioner observed, the only Europeans who had ever penetrated into Tibet by the route of the Brahmaputra [*sic*] subsequent to the French Missionaries, Messrs. Krick and Boury, who were killed by Mishmis in the Zayul Valley in 1854. His tour is described thus in the Assam Administration Report of 1885-1886.

* "Notes on the North-Eastern Frontier of Assam" by Captain G. W. Beresford, Assam Light Infantry. Assam Secretariat Press, 1881. [Reprinted 1906.]

† Assam Secretariat. For., A, July 1894, Nos.34-371.

‡ Assam Secretariat, 1886, File No.1735-J.

"4 . . . This year's record has been marked by an expedition of no less interest and boldness, carried out by Mr. Needham, Political Officer at Sadiya, up the course of the Brahmaputra into the Zayul Valley, where the river leaving Tibet emerges into the plains of Assam. Mr. Needham, who took no armed escort, started on the 12th December 1885, and was accompanied by Captain Molesworth, Commandant of the Lakhimpur Frontier Police Battalion. He marched a distance of 187 miles up the course of the river from Sadiya by a track presenting great difficulties to an unaccustomed traveller, to within a mile of the Tibetan village of Rima where he was turned back by the officials. Rima was reached on the 4th January 1886, and by the 20th he was back at Sadiya. The geographical interest of his journey rests mainly in the confirmation it affords to the narrative of the Pandit A-K, who made his way from the Tibetan side to Rima in 1882, and lived in the Zayul Valley for some weeks. After the publication of the Pandit's report, a theory was started by those who maintain that the Sanpo is identical with the Irrawaddy, and not with the Dihong as generally supposed, that the river of Zayul was an affluent of the Sanpo, and that the Sanpo finds its way into Burma somewhere between the Frontier of Assam and the furthest point reached by the Pandit in the Zayul Valley, *viz.* the village of Sámé. Mr. Needham, by following up the Brahmaputra along its whole course from Sadiya to Rima, has conclusively proved its identity with the river of Zayul. As from the Pandit's record it is proved that the Sanpo does not descend into Burma to the east of this river, there appears to remain no other hypothesis than that it finds its way into Assam, most probably as the Dihong.

[Needham's views on this point are expressed thus in paragraph 15 of his report*. ".....I am in the proud position of being able satisfactorily to settle a great geographical question. Having followed the course of the Brahmaputra from Sadiya to a spot within a mile or so of the Tibetan frontier village, or town, of Rima I can confidently assert that no river in any degree corresponding to the Sanpo in size joins it between Sadiya and Rima, and consequently the Sanpo must pass into the Brahmaputra west of Sadiya, and my opinion is that it can be no other than the Dihong."] Another important result of Mr. Needham's journey is the evidence it affords of the friendly disposition of the Mishmi tribes which separate Assam from the Zayul Valley. These people are divided into two tribes, speaking different dialects, the Digarus, who hold the country between Sonpura, our outpost on the Brahmaputra east of Sadiya and the Mdaun or Du river, within 60 miles of the Tibet border and the Mijus who occupy the tract between that point and Zayul. In 1851 M. Krick, a French Missionary, entered Tibet by this route, and returned to Assam in safety. In 1854 he, in company with another French priest, M. Boury, again penetrated to the Zayul Valley, but both were murdered there shortly after their arrival by the Mishmi chief Kai-i-sha. In February 1855 Lieutenant Eden, with a party of the 1st Assam Light Infantry, attacked Kai-i-sha's village, and

* Assam Secretariat 1886. File No.1735-J.

carried the chief off a prisoner to Dibrugarh, where he was subsequently hanged. From that date till Mr. Needham's journey, no European had succeeded in accomplishing the journey to Rima."

Mr. Needham's principal native assistant on this journey was Chowsa Khanti Gohain, of whom he spoke in the highest terms in his report and who was presented with a double barrelled gun as a reward, suitably inscribed as from the Governor-General. The Chief Commissioner's letter No. 1194, dated the 21st June 1886, with which Mr. Needham's report and diary was forwarded to the Government of India describes at great length the previous history of this country; the geographical problems which it presented; and the valuable contribution which Mr. Needham's journey had furnished to geographical science especially in regard to the identity of the Sanpo and the Dihong and our knowledge of the Mishmi inhabitants. Paragraph 28 of the letter suggested that there were great possibilities of commercial intercourse by this route between Tibet and Assam, and asked for permission to take steps towards opening it out.

The Government of India's acknowledgment of the report was described by the Chief Commissioner's Secretary, Mr. Stack, in the official noting as a "douche of cold water." While giving credit to Mr. Needham for a successful enterprise, they said they would be glad in future to have their sanction asked for for official expeditions beyond the frontier: and they declined to incur expenditure on the roads in the "Brahmaputra Valley route into Tibet" without "clear evidence of their necessity and utility." This comment did indeed cause Mr. Ward, the Chief Commissioner, to admit that it was "a dangerous business" and to observe that they did not "want to have Mr. Needham murdered and a military expedition to punish the murderer."

(b) *Needham's visit to the Hukong Valley, 1888.*—In letter No. 2323,* dated the 13th October 1887, the Chief Commissioner recommended to the Government of India that Needham should be permitted to "examine the country between Makum in the Dibrugarh district and the Hukong Valley." The Government of India agreed, and they also gave sanction to Captain St. J. F. Michell, Assistant Quarter-Master General, Oudh Division, accompanying the expedition. An escort of 50 Frontier Police was taken and a Survey Officer, Mr. M. Ogle, was included in the party.

The Chief Commissioner's instructions as regards the objective of the mission were as follows:—

"3. Mr. Needham's objective will be Main-khwon in the Hukong Valley, beyond which he will not go. It is believed that the journey from Lado [*sic*] near Makum to this place will take from 21 days to a month, and that the whole expedition may be carried through within two months. The route to be adopted in reaching Mainkhwon, and in returning thence to Assam, is left to Mr. Needham's discretion,

* Assam Secretariat, 1887, General Department. File No. 547-J.

subject to the condition that he is not to traverse country outside the sphere of Singpho influence, which, Mr. Fitzpatrick understands, includes the whole of the Naga country east of a line drawn north and south through Ledo as far as Hukong. On arrival at Mainkhwon (or before, if possible) he should endeavour to enter into communication with Captain Adamson, Deputy-Commissioner of Bhamo.....”

In a subsequent letter to the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, the Chief Commissioner stated that he had learnt from Captain Michell that “special importance is attached by the military authorities to the exploration of the route across the Patkoi by the Nongyang Lake, where the height of the range is least, and where it is believed to be practicable to carry a military road. The course to be followed by the expedition in going to Hukong has now been made for laying out depôt of supplies, and cannot be altered; but in returning the Chief Commissioner desires that Mr. Needham will unless there should be difficulties now unforeseen against it, select the route by the Nongyang Lake, and carefully examine the country he traverses in this direction.”

In point of fact, Needham did go by the Nongyang Lake in his outward route and this change of plan caused him to fail in his objects in some respects. The route which he followed and the causes which led to the failure to reach the Hukong Valley are briefly described thus in the Chief Commissioner’s report,* dated the 22nd June 1888.

“2. Mr. Needham left Margherita on the Dehing river on the 4th January 1888, and returned thither on the 28th February; he was thus absent for 55 days. He failed to reach the Hukong Valley, but has explored to a considerable extent two routes leading to it, one of which leaves the Dehing river at N’dong, crosses the Patkoi at an elevation of 4,650 feet, and goes by the Nongyang lake and the Loglai river to a Singpho village called Numyung, distance eight marches from Dafa Nong’s village in the Hukong Valley, and the other of which, going through the hills south of Margherita, *via* Yogli and the Namchik river, crosses the Patkoi at an elevation of 7,300 feet, and proceeds *via* Phoong, Morang, Shangge, Hashan and Khulluk, to Sumbaya Nong’s village in Hukong, distant two days’ journey from Khulluk, the furthest point reached by Mr. Needham.

3. The expedition failed, primarily, owing to the want of sufficient carriage, and dependence upon local porters and supplies; secondly, owing to the sudden and abrupt change of plans, the Yogli route having been first adopted and provisions sent out by it in advance which it became necessary to transfer to Numyung: this caused much loss of time and disappearance of about a quarter of the stores so sent out, while great difficulty was experienced, partly owing to the want of water in the Dehing river, in provisioning the route selected *via* the

*1888—Assam Secretariat, General Department. File No. 613-J.

Nongyang lake, and delay consequently occurred in making a start in that direction ; thirdly, owing to the late period at which the expedition was sanctioned by the Government of India, its start being thus deferred till well into January, by which time the Nagas had scattered on rubber-cutting business, and the weather (though the Chief Commissioner believes that the past was an exceptionally dry cold season elsewhere in A sam) had broken, and the hardships of the journey were thus much increased."

The expedition had been, however, not without results. It established "the possibility of reaching Hukong by either of the two routes explored that by the Nongyang Lake, Numyung, and Dafa Nong's village, which is two days' journey from Mainkhwon, and that by Yogli, Phoong, Morang, Shangge, etc., to Sumbaya Nong's village, which is five stages from Mainkhwon": and the Survey Officer who accompanied the party had succeeded in mapping about 1,500 square miles of new country south-east of the Patkoi, up to which the hills had been fully mapped by the survey party of 1873-74 and had linked the work of this expedition with that accomplished by Colonel Woodthorpe in 1884-85.

The party suffered great hardships throughout owing to bad weather and failure of supplies. The ascent of the Patkoi was begun on the 19th January, a steep and slippery route, and camp was made at an elevation of 3,500 feet. Crossing the top at 4,655 feet on the 20th, they descended to the Nongyong Lake at 3,429 feet. They reached Phoong on the 6th February, a Moshang village at 4,300 feet and remained there 6 days. Needham found this village in a bad way, reduced to only 8 houses, though it was the oldest of the Moshang villages, and in fact the parent village of the rest.

On the 16th February they reached camp at Hashan and from there on the 17th they visited their furthest point, the village of Khulluk. They returned *via* Phoong, Namchik and Yogli

Accounts of conditions in this country which were recorded many years later by Mr. Williamson in 1909 and Mr. O'Callaghan in 1924-25 and 1925-26 may conveniently find a place here. Mr. Williamson stated as follows in paragraph* 11 of his report on his visit to that country in 1908.

"11. The loss of life by raids in these hills is slight, but the people make up any deficiency in this respect by the sacrifice of human beings. Ordinarily every male is responsible for the death of two slaves. Raids among the Naga tribes to the south west of the Rangpang country result in the death of women and children, but these raids would appear to be less savage than the slaughter of a helpless slave in cold blood".

Further comments on this subject are to be found in his diary of 7th and 9th December.

*Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, May 1910, Nos 13-40

“Human sacrifice appears to be very common. Every householder has to offer up at least one victim during his life time to propitiate the deity located in his house. The Gam’s father had offered up a victim when the Gam had attained manhood. He had himself made a sacrifice on his father’s death when he became the head of the household, and again when his son had arrived at man’s estate. Victims consist of women and children as well as males. A soothsayer, who lives at Chumka in the Numyung valley, decides which sex is necessary for proper propitiation. These victims are obtained from the south from the naked Naga tribes. A victim costs in kind Rs.300—a very high estimate. I saw one of these people at Rangku. Marriage is exogamous and a wife is said to cost three slaves. This, at the Rs.300 rate, come to Rs.900, which is of course a very exaggerated estimate.....” And again on the 9th December he records—“Sacrifices are made for the purpose of propitiating the household deity. If this is not done, the man falls sick, his crops fail, and his wife will either die in childbirth, or her children will be still-born. When a household wish to sacrifice a human being, a slave is purchased and kept in the village for about a month, with his ankles in heavy wooden stocks to prevent his running away. Otherwise, he has the use of his limbs. Women and even children are sacrificed—any human being in fact who is brought for sale, old or young. The slave is well fed, and on the day of sacrifice has his head struck off as he is descending the notched log which leads from all these houses to the ground. The owner of the victim does not strike the blow. Some man of the village is selected for the duty and is paid Rs.10, a pig, a woman’s brass bracelet and a fowl. The pig is given in order that after the ceremony the executioner may use the fat of the animal to cleanse his hands from blood, etc. The head is stripped of all flesh by the executioner, and the dry skull is hung up in the verandah of the house. The same man has to drag the headless corpse to some ravine, where he buries it. The hair and flesh off the head is not kept but thrown away. The blood which falls on the steps of the house is carefully covered over with *dhan* chaff. As the victim is beheaded, the owner of the house calls on the deity to accept a human being as a sacrifice, and in return to deal kindly with him and his household. These people may not go in much for raiding compared to the Naga tribes to the south-west, but they certainly take a pretty steady toll of human lives. Every male of this tribe accounts for two victims—one on the occasion of becoming possessed of a home of his own, and one on the birth of his first son.”

Mr. O’Callaghan wrote as follows—

(a) in 1924-25*, “The Nagas of the Sadiya Frontier Tract have hitherto been known as Rangpang—a name unknown among themselves. They live on the southern slopes and in the broken country of the foot hills of the Patkoi Range in basins of the Namphuk, Namchik and (mainly) the Dirap Rivers (South and South-east of Margherita and Ledo). Some of them still have clansmen South and South-west of the Patkoi in the unadministered area between the Hukong Valley and the Naga Hills district from whence they have immigrated due North and North-East to the Sadiya Frontier Tract. The clans

*Appointment and Political, B, June 1925, Nos.1311-1319.

are Moklum (6 villages) Yogli (13 small villages), Rongrang (5 villages), Moshang (3 villages), Tikak (6 villages), Longri (3 villages) and odd hamlets of Mungrang, Sakeng, Tonglim and Yungkup. South of the Patkoi are Morang, Moshang, Longri, Dongai, Shongrang, Rinku, etc. Nagas when asked who they are will always name their clan and not their village. It may be mentioned that between the Tirap River and the plains of Lakhimpur the foothills are occupied by other clans of Nagas—Lungchang, Tikak, Seban and those known to the plainsmen as Namsangias, Jaipurias, etc. These people live in 'chang' houses and do 'jhum' cultivation. Those in the Sadiya area live in small and scattered hamlets built on spurs, each clan in its own area, usually divided into hamlets, owing to their system of cultivation. The absence of weapons other than the *dao* is noticeable. They are physically medium in build, well proportioned, active and hardy. They have the one language varying more or less with each clan, some of which state they find it difficult to understand some of the other clans. They claim to be endogamous. They are spirit-worshippers, a peaceful people who still keep to themselves, with primitive culture and probably representing the front of a wave of one of the first foreign invasions (Mon) from the South East towards India, pushed forward by economic pressure from the South. One noteworthy practice has attracted particular attention to them—that of human sacrifices. Within the past decade occasional sacrifices have undoubtedly been held in the area now administered from Sadiya and are probably still carried out south of the Patkoi. It must not be inferred that they were or are common, the bar of expense alone being an exaggerated estimate. The details they give lead one to think that a human sacrifice was a real event in the history of the village it was offered to the spirit of the house, an evil Spirit (Mathai or Thangba) in the case of serious and general sickness. Victims were procured by capture or purchase costing to the value of Rs.400, Rs.500 and might be of either sex, any age and, in addition to captives, were probably slaves, idiots, orphans or useless members of clans. They were slain soon after purchase in front of the house offering the sacrifice in presence of the village. Previous to the actual killing which was done by a relative of the giver, residing in a different house, the victim was offered to the Spirit with a prayer to accept and remove the sickness. The victim was then slain by the blow of a *dao* on the neck and the body buried at once, un mutilated, in an unmarked grave some distance away in the jungle. The authority for these details are the Nagas themselves and are probably correct in the main."

(b) In 1925-26*, "This custom [human sacrifice] has been and is a normal practice among all Rangpang its clans which they explain as a reaction to felt necessity to appease the spirits. It is primarily a personal or communal votive and intercessionary gift and will be vowed in times of difficulty, *i.e.*, promised for the future if a victim be not immediately available and it is such promises already made to the spirits, which many clans in the unadministered area have advanced as one of their main reasons for not immediately abandoning the practice *i.e.*, the

* Appointment and Political, B, September 1926, Nos.155-162.

fear of retribution due to the non-fulfilment of such vows. More than one household may subscribe to purchase a victim ; in time of urgency a slave victim may be borrowed to be replaced later or may be bought on credit and even buffaloes, etc., stolen to provide part of the price. Victims who are generally slaves, captives in war, may be of either sex and any age and cost from Rs.300 to Rs.500. Doubtless, useless members of the community are seized and sold and also weak, helpless debtors in a powerful turbulent village. Rangpangs do not supply any victims themselves and all admit that the source of supply is away to the South and South-west, *i.e.*, the Dilli (Namphuk) River Basin and Westwards *i.e.*, west of the Sandri Bum and Magri Bum Ridges where the Rangpang area may run with the big raiding head hunting Naga villages in the unexplored area east of the Assam-Burma boundary on the extreme east of the unadministered area of the Naga Hills district of Assam. The Rangpang not only sacrifice but traffic in victims, the Dilli Basin people not only buying from the west and sacrificing but buying and reselling ; in fact, it is probably the custom for a victim to pass through more than one hand before meeting his or her end. The slaves are always described as of being of an unknown clan, tattooed on the cheeks and forehead and speaking an unknown tongue. The Rangpang of the administered area give the Laju clan as one of the sources of supply in the past. The Laju dwell just inside the Sadiya Frontier Tract unadministered area — is the most Northerly of the big head hunting villages and though they deny keeping slaves or trafficking in them, it is extremely probable that some of them did in the past. They number some 7,500 people. When purchased for sacrifice, the victim is kept in the house of the owner, well cared for and fed but kept in stocks if there is any suspicion that escape may be attempted. The sacrifice is within a month of purchase unless bought for resale. On the appointed day, selected as is the executioner, by divination by the 'wise' man, the victim is drugged with opium or drink or, failing these, even beaten into insensibility, led to the front of the front verandah of the house and decapitated by a blow or blows on the neck from behind at the top of the notched tree which serves as a ladder entrance to the verandah. The skull when clean is divided in two perpendicularly and the front hung suspended in the verandah room. As for the body, one account is that the body is divided up and bones, flesh and entrails are sold as charms or divided among clansmen !. Another account is that the body is buried in the jungle and when the bones are cleaned they are distributed or sold. Others have stated that the body is buried un mutilated. The executioner, it may be noted, is never of the household of the donor of the victim.

It has often been alleged that runaway coolies from Assam tea gardens, and coal mines, earthworks, etc., have been enticed away by the Rangpang and others, seized and sold as victims but enquiries have hitherto failed to elicit any evidence whatsoever to support these allegations."

(c) *Needham's second visit to Burma*:— In December 1891 Mr. Needham, at the instance of the Chief Commissioner of Burma, was sent on an expedition to join hands from the Assam side with a Burma column which was being sent to Mungkhom (spelt on early maps as Mainkhwom) in the Hukong Valley to subdue the tribes lying north of Mogaung between the Irrawadi and the Hukong Valley. Starting from Margherita on December 14th, 1891, with a force of 100 Lakhimpur Military Police, under Captain R. M. Maxwell, their Commandant, he reached the Tirap on the 17th and the Namchik on the 19th. The party crossed the Patkoi at an elevation of 7,000 feet and went on down to the Namphuk on the 20th reaching Phung on the 21st. Here they had to leave half their force behind owing to shortage of transport. On the 4th January they reached Dabop, thereby passing the farthest point (Khalak) that Needham had reached in 1888. On 14th January they arrived at their destination, Mungkhom, where they met Mr. A. Symington, Extra Assistant Commissioner, the Civil Officer with the Burma Force and Major the Hon. A. E. Dalzell of the 52nd Light Infantry, commanding the Force, which consisted of 50 men of the 2nd Devonshire Regiment, 100 Sikhs of the (3rd Burma Battalion) 33rd Madras Infantry, 2 Mountain guns and 12 or more British Officers. Shortage of rations compelled an early return and on the 19th they commenced their return march. Much valuable assistance was rendered to the expedition by the Singpho Chief, Bisa Jauhing, his brother Bisa La and Ningrang Nong, and Needham took with him as well Chausa, the Tengapani Khamti Chief who had gone with him to Rima in 1885. The route entailed great difficulties and hardships for the coolies, and Needham advocated that for future expeditions the "old Burmese Route" should be explored. This route (para. 24 of his report) was described as being from Ningben *via* Numyung and the Nongyong Lake, and Chausa Khamti actually traversed it on this occasion, reporting subsequently to Needham that it was an easy one. It was by this way that the Burmese armies invaded Assam. Needham, while stating that most of the great numbers of slaves in the Hukong Valley were Singphos carried off from Assam, reported that not one of them asked him to secure their release and return to their homes, they being very well treated where they were.

Needham in his report, long and detailed as usual, makes some disparaging remarks about the Burma Column and their arrangements. In particular he was much perturbed at the Commanding Officer's proposal to hold a ceremonial parade at which he was going to "celebrate [to quote Major Dalzell's Garrison Order] the establishment of British authority and the supremacy of Her Majesty the Queen Empress of India over this portion of Upper Burma". Needham pointed out that, apart from the fact that the Burma Column had orders merely to tour through the Valley and accept the submission of such Chiefs as chose to come in, such action would endanger his own small force on their return journey, as the Singpho Chiefs had been told that their independence would not be interfered with and would now hold that he (Needham) had deceived them and would take revenge upon him. Fortunately he managed to persuade the Burma Officers to cancel their plans.

III. *The Abor Expedition of 1893-94.*—Encouraged by the failure of previous expeditions, the lenient treatment hitherto meted out to them, and the continued annual grant of *posa* in spite of their misdeeds, the Bor Abors or Padams (according to Mr. Bentinck, writing on 23rd April 1912, after the close of the Abor Expedition of 1911-1912, the term 'Bor Abor' should never be used, "Padam" being the correct term) had become more and more independent and defiant. The climax was reached when 3 of our sepoy's were ambushed and murdered near the Bomjur out-post on the left bank of the Dibong river on the 27th November 1893, probably by men of Bomjur assisted by Dambuk and Silluk. Writing in his letter No.21-T*, dated the 10th December 1893, the Chief Commissioner, Mr. W. E. Ward, said he was only waiting for a further report from the Deputy Commissioner before deciding "that there shall be an expedition" (he seems to have held he had a freer hand than was later admitted and his language is interesting in view of the way in which his actions were queried later on) and said that he thought 500 men, half Military and half Military Police, would suffice. Before a reply had been received, a further outrage occurred on the 23rd December 1893 when a sepoy was killed and a rifle carried off. Mr. Needham strongly recommended action against the offenders; and on a reference from the Chief Commissioner an expedition was sanctioned by the Government of India. The Chief Commissioner's instructions are set forth in paragraph 20 of Mr. Needham's report of the 19th March 1894† and were as follows—

"20. The Chief Commissioner, after informing me that he had appointed me Political Officer with the expedition, and left all details as to direction and management of the same in my hands, gave me the following instructions regarding the object and scope of the expedition :

Confine yourself to punishing villages you have good reason to believe concerned in outrage, insisting on delivery of murderers and sepoy's rifles. Don't go further inland than is absolutely necessary for purpose, and give all villages clearly to understand that we have no desire to annex their territory, but only to punish offending villages. Old complaints about Miri slaves and claims to territory which we have always disputed are on no account to be listened to".

In a telegram (No.60-T), of the same date to the Deputy Commissioner, however, the Chief Commissioner indicated that any villages which might offer resistance to the force were also to be punished.

Though a small detachment of regular infantry formed part of the force, this was not a military expedition, and the Commander-in-Chief assumed no responsibility for the plan or the conduct of the operations, a point which the Chief Commissioner Mr. Ward was careful to make when subsequently reporting to the Government of India in June. The force consisted of 100 men of the 44th Gurkha Rifles under Lieutenants J. A. Wilson and G. L. S. Ward (son of the Chief Commissioner) of that regiment: 300 men of the Lakhimpur Military

*Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, July 1894, Nos. 34-371.

†Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, July 1895, Nos. 36-95.

Police under Captain G. Row, 44th Gurkha Rifles, Lieutenant J. M. Camilleri, 13th Bengal Infantry and Mr. E. Muspratt, Superintendent of Police: 100 men of the Naga Hills Military Police under Captain W. R. Little of the 21st Punjabis, their Commandant: and two 7-pounder guns under Lieutenant L. W. P. East, R.A., and a British non-Commissioned Officer, Sergeant Loweth, and manned by men of the 44th Gurkhas. At that time the Military Police Battalions in Assam had only one British Officer attached to each of them, and so, for purposes of an expedition such as this, it was necessary to borrow extra officers from Army. Captain R. M. Maxwell, Commandant of the Lakhimpur Military Police was in command, and Mr. Needham was appointed as Political Officer. The Medical Officer was Surgeon-Lieutenant Birdwood. Major E. H. Molesworth of the 44th and Captain W. Prior of the 13th Bengal Infantry, took over Military Police outposts so as to release the police for the expedition, and were in charge of the line of communications but did not take part in the actual operations.

By the 14th January 1894 the expedition was ready to move against Bomjur, which they entered on the 15th January and found deserted. They then advanced to Dambuk on the 20th January where they encountered considerable resistance at a tremendously strongly built stockade, 2,000 yards long, 10 feet high, and strongly panjied, in some places having a double palisade with 2 or 3 feet thickness of stone between, which was quite impervious to shellfire. It was rushed successfully however, with a loss of 3 killed and 22 wounded, Lieutenant East, who showed great gallantry, being the first to climb in. Returning to Bomjur, they went westwards on the 28th across the Sesserri to Mimasipu and Silluk, which they burned. After the fight at Silluk, opposition ceased, and the force halted at Silluk from the 29th January to 8th February, during which time Needham was engaged in negotiations and inquiries.

Needham became convinced that Damroh, a village to the North, described by the Chief Commissioner as "the headquarters and stronghold of the Padam Abor occupying the country between the Dihong and the Dibong and the paramount power which controls and guides the actions of all the villages on that side," was deeply involved in the opposition to our advance and that unless it was punished the expedition would fail in its object. He therefore asked the Chief Commissioner's permission to go there, and was informed in a telegram, dated the 9th February, that "If Needham and Maxwell think it quite safe, I sanction advance on Damroh but no farther". This was followed by another wire on the 11th February to the Deputy Commissioner desiring him to inform Needham that after Damroh had been adequately punished the Chief Commissioner wished operations against the Abors to cease and the force to return to Sadiya, arriving not later than 10th March. Damroh was a long way north up the Yamne river in unknown country, Mr. Needham never having gone beyond Silli, while its strength was also unknown, and the Chief Commissioner evidently hesitated before he granted the permission asked for. He must have been greatly influenced by the reliance which he placed on Needham's experience and judgment, and by the fact that Needham

was convinced on what he believed to be reliable information that the Abors had given up all intention of resistance. Needham affirmed in a letter which he wrote to the Chief Commissioner on the 17th February from Membu that if he succeeded at Damroh, "as I have no doubt we shall", the Abors would never give any trouble again and that he did not expect any fighting there.

Needham decided to march *via* Bordak on the left bank of the Dihong, above Pasighat. Damroh was estimated to be 4 marches from Bordak, and owing to shortage of transport it was decided to leave at Bordak the rations which were not required as well as the heavy baggage and all unneeded sepoy and followers, amounting to 60 in all, under the charge of Subadar Enayet Ali Khan of the Naga Hills Police. A start was made on the 22nd February and Silli was reached on that day and Dukku on the 23rd, at both of which places they were hospitably received. There was still anxiety about rations and transport, but Dukku was left on the 25th and camp was made, after an arduous march, on the left bank of the Yamne river. Lieutenant East was wounded in the hand by a poisoned arrow in the course of a brush with the Abors that evening. On the next day, the 26th, the march was an equally difficult one, and very little progress was made. Lieutenant Camilleri and his company were engaged for some hours with the Abors and had some difficulty in withdrawing in the face of gun and arrow fire and showers of boulders. Rations were low, they had only 3 days' food with them, Lieutenant East was now very ill with dysentery and heavy rain made the position still more disheartening. The decision was made to leave Muspratt at the camp with 100 men, while Maxwell and Needham went on with the rest and one gun to try and reach Damroh and burn it. On the 27th February the attempt was made. But by 2 00 P.M. after a terrible march in confused jungle and heavy rain, with Damroh evidently still a long way off, it was decided to return.

They halted on the 28th as word had come that the Damroh *gams* were anxious to come in and make terms, but neither they nor any rations turned up, and a miserable day was spent in camp, Needham himself being in bed and Mr. East's condition worse. It became clear that there was no alternative but to return to Bordak. On the 1st March therefore they began the return journey. Dukku was reached that night, Lieutenant East being carried in a *dooly*. Heavy rain continued. On the way to Silli the following day, Needham got word that the camp at Bordak had been attacked, every one in it massacred and all rations destroyed. (At the same time Major Molesworth reported* to the Chief Commissioner from Sadiya that Ulung Pasi, Gam of Gina, who was left in charge of the Bordak stores, had just come in with the same news.) Silli was reached at 11 P.M. and there they halted on the 3rd and resumed their march on the 4th. When they were some 3 miles short of Bordak at 6 P.M. Maxwell, Needham and the advance guard under Row pushed on to the old camp. They found it deserted and spent

*Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, July 1894. Nos. 31-371.

a miserable night in the wet. Next morning 2 survivors of the massacre turned up, a Khasi cooly who had escaped owing to his being out of the camp when it occurred, and a *dhobi* of the 44th who had managed to escape across the river though severely wounded in the arm with a dao cut. No less than 27 dead bodies lay in the camp, 12 sepoys and 15 followers and coolies, while everywhere stores and clothing were strewn in confusion. 8 more persons were later found to have been killed. The Abors got away with 14 rifles* and many hundred's of rounds of ammunition. On the 6th they resumed their march towards Padu: on the 9th they attacked and took Membu. Needham had decided to visit and punish these 2 villages for their complicity in the massacre at Bordak. Though he had intended to return *via* Silluk and Bomjur, the continuous rain had caused the rivers to rise and he had to turn back and make for the Dihong and so to Sadiya. On the evening of the 10th they met Major Molesworth and his party at Membu Ghat. By 14th March the force was back in Sadiya. Bomjur was evacuated and burnt on the 20th March.

Needham claimed that the chief object of the expedition, *i.e.*, to punish Bomjur, Dambuk and Silluk, had been accomplished. He explained, however, how it had become necessary to take steps also against other villages, *i.e.*, Membu and Damroh who had joined in the defence of the 3 villages previously mentioned. He strongly recommended that another expedition should be organised in the ensuing cold weather to punish Damroh: and that Bomjur be forbidden to rebuild on their old site.

As regards the massacre at Bordak, Needham's opinion was that the Padu and Membu Abors were the culprits, instigated by Damroh, that the sepoys were completely off their guard, having on suspicion of foul play: that if the smallest precautions had been taken no massacre would have occurred: that it was carefully premeditated, the Abors having seen that no watch was kept in camp.

Maxwell in his report explains how it was believed by Needham and everyone else that there was no sort of danger and that he (Maxwell) left the sickly men behind only because they were sickly and not as a guard because no guard was considered necessary. If a guard had been asked for he would have left 50 men and put them in a stockade. Needham told him he did not require a guard as the place was perfectly safe. The Chief Commissioner in his letter to the Government of India, No.520, dated the 1st June 1894, reviewed the results of the expedition and the question of future policy in the following words—

“59. It is too soon to judge what the results of the expedition will be in the direction of keeping the Abors quiet in the future. It is of course quite possible that Damroh, having been left unpunished, will try and stir up the villages in the plains and on the lower slopes of the hills to fight us again, but the Chief Commissioner doubts whether it will succeed in doing so, at any rate, for some years to come. The punishment inflicted on these villages has been

*Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, July 1895, Nos. 36-95.

as severe as it is possible for any expeditionary force to inflict on the hill tribes on this frontier, and it will take them some time to recover from it. We have now proved to the Abors for the first time that we can march through their country from one end to the other with the greatest ease, and destroy every village they have, their cattle, their household goods, and their crops. They are not likely to forget this, however much they may boast that they succeeded by treachery in preventing the force from reaching Damroh. One important result of the expedition is that we now know the way to Damroh, and the nature of the opposition we may expect if any future expedition is undertaken against that village.

60. It has, however, to be considered whether, without further provocation, there should be an expedition next year to punish Damroh. The murderers of our sepoy on patrol have not been given up. The Chief Commissioner does not attach much importance to this point. We do not know who the actual murderers were, and are, therefore, not in a position to say whether, supposing anyone was given up, he was or was not really concerned in the murders, and experience has shown that, whenever we have insisted upon hill tribes who have raided on British territory and killed British subjects delivering up the murderers, they have almost invariably delivered up some unfortunate man or men who took no share whatever in the crime committed. Moreover, in such cases, the Chief Commissioner does not think that we should try to distinguish the particular men who commit a murder from the rest of the inhabitants of the village to which they belong, or from other villages which have instigated the crime. The punishment, therefore, to be inflicted should be on villages and heads of villages, not on any particular member of the village community. If this view be accepted, then one of the primary objects of the expedition has been accomplished, as every village in the Padam Abor country, except Damroh, has received as severe a punishment as it is possible for any expeditionary forces however strong, or however composed, to inflict. If there had been more time, and the season had not been so far advanced, the Chief Commissioner would have been glad if Mr. Needham could have remained longer at Padu and Membu than he did when on his way back from Damroh. If the force had quartered itself for a week on each of these important villages it would have made them realise more keenly than perhaps they have done what the penalty is of treachery against the British Government. Mr. Needham, however, had received the Chief Commissioner's orders to return to Sadiya before the 10th March, and he had to comply with them, so far as he was able to do so. It will be seen, from paragraph 144 of his report, that he proposes to inflict further punishment on these two villages for their treachery if another expedition is sanctioned. He would also inflict further punishment on Silluk and Dambuk. There is, however, nothing at present to show that these villages had any share in the Bordak massacre, and unless it is proved that they had, it seems scarcely necessary to add to the punishment they have already received.

61. But, although the offending villages have been more or less adequately punished, and thus the chief object of the expedition has been secured, the rifles stolen from the murdered patrols and at Bordak have not yet been given up. It was not to be expected that they would be given up at once. In paragraph 140 of his report Mr. Needham gives the number of rifles and the amount of ammunition stolen and recovered to date, and he believes that he will recover the remainder. If his expectations are realised, we may be assured that the Padam Abors, including the village of Damroh, have submitted and do not wish to fight us again; but, if they are not recovered, the Chief Commissioner has no hesitation in recommending that another expedition be sanctioned next cold weather, which will include in its programme the punishment of Damroh, and a march through all the villages which have been visited by the present expedition, these same villages to be again punished if they resist the progress of the force in any way, but not otherwise.

62. There is still the further question to be considered, whether, supposing all the stolen rifles and ammunition are recovered, there shall be another expedition for the express purpose of punishing Damroh. The Chief Commissioner has no desire to recommend the Government of India to take any step which, in the present state of the finances, would involve a large expenditure of money, unless he felt that such a step was absolutely necessary. Mr. Ward has already, in paragraph 28 above, indicated his opinion that, so long as Damroh remains unpunished for the share it has taken in fighting against us during this expedition, and for ordering and inciting the villages of Membu and Padu to commit the gross act of treachery they did at Bordak, we shall never succeed in bringing the Abors who live in the territory immediately contiguous to our own to a state of submission. They may, after the lesson they have now learnt, keep quiet for five years or so,—possibly for ten years; but, after that, the Chief Commissioner has little doubt that the lesson of the past will have been forgotten, impudent demands and insolent behaviour will be repeated and will go on increasing year after year, until another overt act of hostility is committed, followed by another expedition, and possibly annexation, resulting in permanent additional expenditure for the purpose of administering a country which will bring us in no revenue in return. Anyone who is acquainted with the history of our past relations with the hill tribes on this frontier knows that this is no fanciful prophesy. If we are going to strike at all, therefore, and to show Damroh that we will not tolerate the support which it is now proved that village gives to the villages in the plains to murder British subjects in British territory, the Chief Commissioner thinks it is better that we should strike at once. By doing so the Government of India, may, by the immediate expenditure of a lakh and a half of rupees save many lakhs of annually recurring expenditure hereafter."

His conclusions as regards the responsibility for the massacre at Bordak are stated in paragraph 68 of his report as follows.

"68. On the whole, the conclusion which the Chief Commissioner has come to on this unfortunate affair is that Mr. Needham committed a grave error of judgment in acting as he did in allowing himself to put implicit belief in the statements and promises of the Abors of

Membu and Padu, and that he would have acted more wisely if he had borne in mind the habitual treachery of the hill tribes on this frontier, and had asked Captain Maxwell for the guard which that officer says he would have had no difficulty in supplying, if it had been asked for. Mr. Ward also thinks that the consequences of this mistake were aggravated by carelessness on the part of the guard in not standing by their arms when the coolies appeared, if not by actual provocation given to the coolies. In regard to Captain Maxwell, the Chief Commissioner thinks that he should have insisted on a guard being placed at Bordak without waiting to be asked for one by the Political Officer. He says he trusted entirely to Mr. Needham's opinion in the matter, and there is no doubt, Mr. Ward thinks, that the chief responsibility for the massacre must lie with the Political Officer. At the same time the Chief Commissioner believes he is correct in stating that the Officer Commanding an expedition is not always bound to follow the Political Officer's opinion in a matter of this kind, and that it was quite open to Captain Maxwell to refuse to leave the men at Bordak in the middle of an enemy's country without a proper guard, and in an exposed position, on the general ground that it is opposed to all military rules to leave the base of an advancing force unprotected, or insufficiently protected. The fact that, at that time the Abors had tendered their submission, and that their submission was generally believed to be complete and sincere, was not, Mr. Ward thinks, a sufficient reason for departing from the ordinary rule in this respect."

He concluded his report with the following remarks on the same point—

"Mr. Ward, however, trusts that whatever degree of blame or responsibility it may be decided attaches to Mr. Needham and Captain Maxwell for the massacre at Bordak, His Excellency the Governor General in Council will agree with him in thinking that the services rendered by these officers in connection with the expedition and in accomplishing what they have done, are such as deserve high praise and the acknowledgments of the Government of India."

By way of immediate action against the tribes the Chief Commissioner proposed to blockade all tribes North of Sadiya and on the left bank of the Dihong ; to stop all further payment of *posa* to Abor villages on the left bank of the Dihong ; to impose a fine of Rs.5,000 on Damroh, the Padam Abors to be blockaded in case of non-payment ; Membu and Padu to be fined Rs.2,000 each ; Bomjur not to be rebuilt on the old site ; and that the *gams* of Dambuk and Silluk whom Needham had arrested on the 8th February and sent to Sadiya should be kept in custody at Tezpur or Calcutta as hostages until the stolen rifles were given up and the fines of Damroh, Membu and Padu paid.

In their letter No. 1509-E., dated the 31st August 1894, the Government of India who had already expressed their dissatisfaction with the conduct of affairs in telegrams sent while the expedition was still in the field, conveyed a severe reprimand to the Chief Commissioner, for permitting the advance to Damroh and on Mr. Needham and Captain Maxwell for their share of responsibility for the Bordak massacre as follows.

“3. The advance on Damroh was, however, as Mr. Ward himself says, ‘another matter’. It was not only altogether beyond what the Chief Commissioner admits he had originally contemplated ; but it was entirely unprovided for by the orders of the Government of India, and it seriously enlarged the field of operations of a force organised for action within much more restricted limits. The movement should certainly not have been undertaken without the previous sanction of the Government of India ; Mr. Ward, in authorising it, incurred a grave responsibility ; and it has been observed with surprise that he did not even consult the General Officer Commanding in Assam before issuing orders on Mr. Needham’s proposals. It is to be regretted that an officer of Mr. Needham’s experience should have been misled, as he apparently was, by entirely untrustworthy information, but in the opinion of the Governor General in Council, no force should have been sent so far into the Abor country unless strong enough to overcome all opposition, and with its communications thoroughly assured and at the proper season of the year. The available strength with which Captain Maxwell made the final attempt to reach Damroh from his camp on the Yamne was only 250 men and one gun, though his original force was 500 men and two guns. In fact by that time the expedition had failed ; to have proceeded further would have been to run serious risk—the necessity of retiring without effecting anything, when our troops had advanced to within sight of Damroh, in all probability encouraged the opposition afterwards encountered, and must in any event have left a bad impression behind, but it was the almost inevitable result of the rashness with which the operations were undertaken. After a careful consideration of all the circumstances, the Governor General in Council is constrained to record the opinion that Mr. Ward, in sanctioning the advance on Damroh without the knowledge or approval of the Government of India, altogether exceeded his authority, and committed a grave error of judgment.

4. The Government of India consider that the main responsibility for the Bordak massacre attaches to Mr. Needham, who appears, in this instance, to have shown want of judgment and political foresight. At the same time it is impossible to excuse Captain Maxwell for neglecting necessary military precautions. It was Captain Maxwell’s duty to secure his base and the followers and supplies left there ; the small detachment of weakly men, unprotected by any entrenchment or stockade, and apparently without any orders as to precautions against surprise, was obviously insufficient for these purposes, and the subsequent massacre can only be attributed to over-confidence and to failure to appreciate the military situation. The responsible officers, however, anticipated no risk ; Captain Maxwell reports, ‘when Mr. Needham told me the place was perfectly safe and a guard was not necessary, I implicitly believed him, and I believed, equally of course, that the unfortunate men left behind were perfectly safe.’ Under these circumstances the Government of India do not accept the suggestion that the men who lost their lives can be in any way considered to have brought their fate upon themselves, and they regret that it should have been made.”

They declined to sanction any further action against Damroh, including the imposition of a fine, which, as they pointed out, "would render the despatch of an expedition almost obligatory if the fines were not paid".

They agreed, however, to the blockade, to the withdrawal of *posa*, and to the prohibition of the rebuilding of Bomjur. They would not agree to the deportation of the Dambuk and Silluk *gams*.

Mr. Ward's rejoinder to the expressions of the Government of India's displeasure are contained in his letter No.6851-P., dated the 25th October 1894. He explained that he had no idea that he was exceeding his powers when he sanctioned the advance on Damroh: that in any case a decision had to be given at once and the lateness of the season made a reference to the Government of India out of the question: and that he gave the matter "very full and earnest consideration." On the general question, he stated as follows."

"Putting the matter shortly, Mr. Ward has always understood and assumed that, after a Military Police expedition across the Frontier has been sanctioned by the Government of India, the main responsibility for its organisation and proper direction rests entirely with the Chief Commissioner, subject, of course, to the general control of the Government of India, who, in order to enable them to exercise such control effectively, should be kept regularly informed by the Chief Commissioner from time to time of all action taken, and also of the progress and main incidents connected with the advance of the expeditionary force. In the terms "organisation" and "direction" Mr. Ward includes such matters as the power to determine what shall be the strength and composition of the expeditionary force, and also of its transport, as well as the power to direct generally the plan of campaign, and to limit and extend or reduce from time to time, as occasion may require, the field of operations. The Chief Commissioner is also further solely responsible for seeing that the force is provided with the necessary transport and supplies so far as it lies in his power to procure, what, after consultation with the Political Officer, he considers to be necessary. In all the matters above indicated it has been always assumed that the Military authorities have no concern and incur no responsibilities whatever, the expedition being entirely under the direction of the Civil authorities acting under the control of the Foreign Department of the Government of India. In all cases where the Chief Commissioner is in doubt upon any question of a military nature, he is expected to consult the General Officer Commanding, who will give him such advice as he is able, upon the information supplied to him by the Chief Commissioner as to the character of the country in which the operations are to be conducted, the probable strength of the enemy, their weapons, the field of operations contemplated by the Chief Commissioner and other similar matters. In advising the Chief Commissioner, the General Officer Commanding takes upon himself no responsibility for the direction and control of the operations of the expeditionary force after it has once started. The Chief Commissioner is also not bound always to accept the advice tendered to him. In all cases, and more especially in cases of urgency, he is at liberty, and is

expected, to take action on his own view of the situation, provided always that the Government of India are kept informed of the action taken and of the Chief Commissioner's reasons for not adopting the views of the General Officer Commanding.

4. It was in accordance with what has been briefly described above as the past practice and procedure of this administration in directing Military Police expeditions across the frontier that Mr. Ward acted throughout his proceedings in the recent expedition against the Abors, with the exception that he omitted to keep the Government of India regularly informed of the progress of events and of the action taken by him from time to time. Mr. Ward has already expressed his regret for this oversight, and in paragraph 55 of my letter of the 1st June has explained how it happened."

The paragraph referred to shows that the Chief Commissioner sent no intimation of the progress of the operations to the Government of India between 31st December 1893 and 4th March 1894 when he wired reporting the Bordak massacre and stating that he had "some cause for anxiety about the safety of the Abor Expedition". (In the meantime the Government* of India themselves had had intimation from some other source of the massacre and wired on 3rd March asking for particulars). The reason given was that the Chief Commissioner was on tour, away from his Secretary, and had himself to carry on the whole correspondence regarding the expedition with the General Officer Commanding, the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Needham and Captains Maxwell and Molesworth.

He then enquired what was to be the procedure for the future, urging however that previous practice should be adhered to, *i.e.*, that once the Government of India had sanctioned an expedition and agreed it should be carried out by the Military Police, all further details should be left to the Chief Commissioner. "Mr. Ward feels", the letter said (paragraph 7), "that he has some justification for pressing upon the attention of the Government of India his view that nothing has occurred in the recent expedition against the Abors to render it either expedient or desirable to depart from the existing practice of allowing the Chief Commissioner full power to organise and direct such expeditions, without requiring him to obtain the previous sanction of the Government of India to all his proceedings, and without requiring him to consult the General Officer Commanding the Assam District unless there appear to him to be very special grounds for doing so."

The Government of India replied on the 25th January 1895 (letter No.214-E.) to the following effect—

"3.....the expedition for which you asked sanction, was distinctly limited to the punishment of certain named villages. The Governor-General in Council accorded sanction to the undertaking of an expedition for that purpose ; and though he recognises, as you have already been informed, that reasonable latitude must be permitted in conducting such an expedition, he cannot admit that sanction to undertake a special trans-frontier expedition implies indefinite sanction to extend its field of operations. You have yourself recorded that,

* Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, July 1894, Nos.34-371.

although the first visit to Membu and Padu was within the scope of Mr. Needham's orders, the proposal to attack Damroh went altogether beyond what you had originally contemplated. The original object was the punishment of three or four frontier villages. The change of scheme involved an advance, through unknown country and late in the season, far across the frontier against the headquarters of the tribe which, according to the information* before yourself and the Government of India, consists of a cluster of ten villages said to be able to turn out 6,000 fighting men.

4. The Government of India must adhere to the view which they took of this case, that the approval given to the Abor expedition did not extend to the advance on Damroh ; and for the future the same principle will obtain. When the Government of India sanction an expedition for a definite and limited object, it is not open to the Chief Commissioner to extend the operations without authority from the Government. The Government of India however readily accept the assurance that, except in your omission to keep them informed of the progress of events, for which you frankly express your regret, you believed yourself to be following previous practice and had no intention or desire to go beyond the orders of the Government of India, as you understood them ; while your willingness to accept their orders now shows that it can be safely anticipated that no similar difficulty will arise in future.

* * * * *

7. Punitive expeditions fall into two main classes according as they are conducted in what may be styled interior and exterior tracts. In the case of interior tracts, it should generally be possible to foresee with tolerable certainty what the limits of possible disturbance may be. When an expedition in an exterior tract is under consideration, the Local Government or Administration should report, in applying for sanction to the expedition, not only the approximate limits proposed for active operations but also the extent of the area within which those operations are likely to have an immediately disturbing effect. If, after sanction has been accorded, it is anticipated that the operations cannot be confined to the area indicated : or, if there is reason to believe that the disturbing effect was originally under-rated, immediate report should be made and unless local circumstances rendered delay impossible, the orders of the Government of India must be awaited."

The sequel, however, was more satisfactory to the Assam Administration, for in letter No.37-E.,* dated the 6th January 1896 the Government of India forwarded despatches "showing that in the opinion of Her Majesty's present Secretary of State and of his predecessor, the censure passed upon Mr. Ward by the Government of India went beyond what the occasion called for". In the first of these despatches the Secretary of State, Mr. Fowler, took the view that, while Mr. Ward was justly censurable for not keeping the Government of India informed of events, he was not justly censurable for sanctioning the advance to Damroh. Damroh was implicated and if the advance

* Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, August 1896, Nos.1-5.

had been successful, probably the question of responsibility would never have been raised. The Secretary of State also feared that if the censure were maintained, it would tend to make officers shirk responsibility in the future. He also disagreed as to the responsibility for the Bordak massacres, holding that Captain Maxwell, not Mr. Needham, should be blamed. To a further letter from the Government of India Mr. Fowler's successor, Lord George Hamilton, said he adhered to his predecessor's view. He did, however, express his agreement with the principles laid down in the last paragraph of the Government of India's letter of the 25th January 1895 to the Chief Commissioner for the future regulation of frontier expeditions (see page 207 *ante*).

IV. The Bebejiya Mishmi Expedition of 1899-1900.—On the 6th May 1899, Mr. Needham sent in his first report of an outrage committed by Mishmis on the inhabitants of a Khamti hamlet containing only 1 inhabited house known as Mitaigaon some 16 miles north-east from Sadiya, in which 3 Khamtis were killed and 3 carried off. He described the Mishmis, including the Chulikattas (who, he at first thought, had committed the crime) as "bloodthirsty wretches of the first water who take a life for the mere devilry of it." On 9th June he reported that he had no doubt the crime was committed by Bebejiyas, and recommended that the tribe, not the individual, should be punished and mentioned that these Bebejiyas had never been punished for the murder of our sepoy on the Bomjur road in 1893. In letter No.357-For.,* dated the 11th July 1899 the Chief Commissioner recommended a punitive expedition. In recounting the past misdeeds of this tribe, he explained how the murder, in November 1893, of three Military Police sepoy near Bomjur outpost, then attributed to Abors, was really committed by the Bebejiyas and it was from a Bebejiya village that the sepoy's rifles were recovered. For this reason it was that Mr. Needham asked permission in February 1895 to visit and punish the Bebejiyas. This was not sanctioned, but a blockade of the whole of the Chulikatta Mishmis was ordered, to be withdrawn in 1897-98, on Mr. Needham's representation that the Chulikattas were not badly behaved and that a blockade of the Bebejiyas was not effective. For this reason the Chief Commissioner advised an expedition rather than a blockade. The object of the expedition should be to "arrest and punish the perpetrators of the Mithaigaon massacre, and recover the guns and children: arrest the *gams* of Aiyu Mimi's village who were guilty of the 1893 outrage: and acquire information about this unknown country." Explaining that "the Mishmis.....are not warriors and they are extremely few in number", he advised that the military authorities should take charge of the expedition: that the difficulties would be those of transport and of moving bodies of men in jungly and hilly country: that open fighting was not probable: and that the force should be reduced to the lowest possible limits. Lieutenant Eden in 1855 had stormed Kaisha's village with 20 Assam Light Infantry and 40 Khamtis and brought back Kaisha to Dibrugarh to be hanged. Mr. Needham

*Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, July 1899, Nos.32-49.

4 years before had proposed to visit these hills with only 60 Military Police, but Mr. Cotton thought that on this occasion, to be on the safe side, there should be provided a force of 100 men and half a company of Madras Sappers. (This was what Curzon called "Force A"). The Government of India intimated their sanction to the expedition, following it with the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation that the force should consist of some 900* Infantry, Police and Sappers: that guns were undesirable but bluejackets with rockets would be useful. (This was what Curzon calls Force B). The Chief Commissioner concurred in these numbers, but demurred to the bluejackets. He nominated Lieutenant-Colonel E. H. Molesworth 43rd Gurkha Rifles, to command. Mr. Needham was attached to the expedition as Political Officer. Two guns were added later on and the strength of the Sappers brought up to 90 and the Police increased by 95. (This is called Force C by the Viceroy).

Needham joined the force on the 20th December 1899† at a point 2½ miles south-west of the high pass which led into the Bebejiya country, known as the Maiyu Pass. (Names are confusing, but this seems to be the point marked on the 2 inch map as Mayodia at 10,008 feet). On the 28th December Needham with a party of 290 men under Colonel Molesworth crossed the pass. Needham gives the height as 8,900 feet. On 1st January they arrived at Hunli, at 3,880 feet. From there bad weather with much snow set in; and Molesworth decided to send back the greater part of his force and the guns, proceeding with only a small party. To this Needham readily agreed, for as he says in his report, he was "convinced from the very first that our force was more than double as large as was required for the work we had to perform." During the halt both the captive children and 1 of the guns were recovered: and Pika and 2 other villages were burnt. Leaving Hunli on the 22nd January, they marched first north-west on the left bank of the Ithun *via* Abrangon, Elanpu (Elapoin?) Ethoma and other villages and then south down the left bank of the Dibong, reaching Nizamghat on 5th February. They destroyed Aiyu Mimi's village on 1st February. It was the son of Aiyu who with others killed our 3 sepoys near Bomjur in 1893.

Needham summed up the results of the expedition as follows:—

"40. I think it may fairly be said that the expedition has successfully accomplished the major portion of the task which was set it, and we have demonstrated, in a forcible manner, to both tribes that, difficult as their country is, we can penetrate it with ease whenever it suits us to do so, either by using the Maiyu pass, or by entering the hills *via* Nizamghat. We failed to arrest any of the murderers, and this is not to be wondered at, considering the facility with which any one knowing the country can move about from one jungly and inaccessible fastness to another if any attempt is made to search for him, and the fact that no Mishimi will act as a spy, even against a member of a hostile clan, lest he should incur the displeasure of that clan,

* Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, June 1900, Nos.1-26.

† Assam Secretariat. Foreign, A, August 1900, Nos.46-60.

for once a blood-feud has been started, it is carried on from generation to generation with relentless severity; but we nevertheless punished them and their clansmen severely by destroying their houses and property, and loitering about in their country at a time when fresh lands have to be cleared, and prepared for next season's crops, etc., and there can be no doubt that these men will, now that we have left the country, still further suffer, and that some of them may even lose their lives at the hands of certain members of their own clan, for Arati Mison, one of the headmen of Hunili, told me distinctly that he did not blame us for having shot one and wounded another of his clansmen, or for damaging his village, and, by occupying it, compelling him and his fellow clansmen, with their wives and children, to reside for weeks in the jungles at the most inclement time of the year, but that he and his people would call Ahonlon (the leader of the Mitaigaon outrage) and his crew to account for these misfortunes; while Sondon Mega (the Bebejiya we arrested on suspicion in May 1899, and kept in the quarter-guard at Sadiya for weeks) told me he and his clan had determined to avenge themselves on Ahonlon and his crew for all the humiliation and trouble he (Sondon) had suffered on their account. In addition, too, to punishing the guilty and impressing both tribes with our power, we have mapped in a large tract of hitherto unknown country, and, had the weather been more propitious, we should have mapped in a good deal more, and the Political Officer has learnt a good deal about both tribes which he did not know before, and the information which he has gathered will not only be most useful to himself now, but likewise to his successor"

Needham also freely admitted that the Bebejiyas were far from deserving the description of a blood-thirsty and dangerous race which he had previously given them. Nor were they anything like as numerous as he thought. He put them now at 3,000 to 4,000 souls, of whom 1,500 would be fighting men.

Mr. Cotton's comments, in his letter No. 231-For., dated the 17th April 1900, were as follows:—

"3. It was decided that the Military authorities should be entirely responsible for the conduct of the operations, and it does not fall within the Chief Commissioner's province to say anything regarding the expedition from a military point of view. There was no fighting, and practically no opposition; but the natural difficulties of the country were immense, and steep passes rising to 8,000 feet in elevation, dense forests, cold, snow, sleet and rain were obstacles which prevent the advance of the troops and circumscribed the extent of the operations. Mr. Cotton may, however, be permitted to say that he had hoped that the force would have been able to stay for a somewhat longer period in the heart of the Bebejiya country, and that ampler opportunities would have presented themselves of improving our geographical and topographical knowledge. So far as he is aware, it has not been found possible to add very largely to our scientific knowledge of the North-Eastern Frontier. Despite the energy of the officers and admirable spirit of the men, too much time was taken up in getting to the enemy's country. The expedition was hampered by

its transport, and very little attempt was made to pierce the hills by flying columns, which are practically independent of transport. The Chief Commissioner deeply regrets the heavy losses attributed to cold and exposure among the members of the Khasia coolie corps.

4. At the same time Mr. Cotton entertains no doubt that the objects with which the expedition was undertaken have been substantially accomplished. It was not possible to capture the murderers, who fled into the forest-clad hills on the approach of our troops. But the captives and guns have been recovered, and the principal offenders have been severely punished by the occupation and destruction of their villages. Our previous ignorance of the Bebejiya country and of the people who inhabit it was profound. This ignorance has now been dispelled, and Mr Needham, with a candour which does him credit, is not ashamed to confess that his information was at fault, and that his views have undergone considerable modification. The darkness which lay over the Mishmi country has been dissipated. The home of the Bebejiyas is no longer a *terra incognita*, which had never been visited by a European. The Bebejiyas, who had hitherto been described as a fierce race of cannibals, a very savage, blood-thirsty, and dangerous race, are now known to be no better nor worse than their neighbours. They are undoubtedly responsible for the outrages with which they have been charged, but these outrages do not appear to have been perpetrated from mere wantonness or devilry as was supposed, but to be due to the ordinary blood feuds which always prevail among these frontier tribes. They have now learnt the strength of the British power; they know that if they commit murder and plunder within the area of British political control, they will be punished, and the Chief Commissioner does not hesitate to express his belief that there will now be peace on a frontier where there has hitherto been continual raiding. It may be confidently expected that for a generation at least quiet will be restored”

This Expedition came in for severe criticism by the Viceroy Lord Curzon, and he recorded a minute on the 14th May 1900, in which he expressed his views in uncompromising terms. “So far”, he said, “from regarding this expedition as having been satisfactory, either in its inception or in its results, I hold it to have been marked by serious miscalculation from the start, by a sacrifice of life which ought, with reasonable precautions, to have been avoided, by an expenditure of money for which there has been no proportionate return and by political and scientific results that are all but worthless.” He then proceeded to show how the size of the force which was, according to the original proposal made by Assam, to be only of 400 fighting men, was gradually developed by the Army Department into a force which reached a total of more than 1,200. As Lord Curzon put it, “27 British Officers, 7 British non-commissioned officers, 31 Native Officers and 1,126 rank and file were considered necessary to discharge a task, for which the Chief Commissioner had only originally asked for 400 men, and which the Political Officer had avowed his willingness to undertake with 60 Police.” He then proceeded to examine what became of “this miniature army”, and discovered that, “..... the small army that had assembled at Sadiya for the reduction of the

rebellious Mishmis a few weeks before was finally reduced to 120 sepoys and such coolies as were required..... To such paltry dimensions, just double the force which Mr. Needham had originally considered as sufficient to march through the country, but only one-tenth of the total force equipped, had fallen, in less than 3 weeks, the army of 1,200 men who had been assembled on the frontier for the subjugation of the Bebejiya Mishmis. It was this insignificant body of 120 men who carried through the whole of the expedition. The various numerical phases through which this ill-fated expedition has passed, and which I have designated from A to F were in fact as follows: 60, 450, 1,210, 600, 300 and 127." As to the results of the expedition, he said "When the expedition was originally proposed, it had a number of objects. These are classified by Mr. Cotton in his final letter of April 17th, 1900, as primary and secondary. The primary objects were the arrest and punishment of the perpetrators of the Mitaigaon massacre of May 1899 (*i.e.* the murder of three unoffending Khamtis); the recovery of the three children and three guns then carried off; the punishment of the guilty Bebejiya *gams* (headmen) who had murdered three Military Police in 1893; and retribution for other raids and murders. The secondary object was the acquisition, by exploration, of an accurate and scientific knowledge of a hitherto almost unknown country and people.

Let us see to what extent these results were attained. Not one of the Mitaigaon murderers was captured. The three children were recovered. Mr. Cotton says that the guns were recovered also. But this is not the case; since it is clear from Mr. Needham's paragraph 17 that only one gun was recovered. So far as is known not one of the guilty *gams* of 1893 was punished. The expedition finally came away with two solitary captives who were seized (Needham's paragraph 30) under circumstances into which it is not desirable to enquire too closely, since it appears that they had received us in their village without resistance, and were seized after a sort of palaver—and both of whom Mr. Cotton has since thought it prudent unconditionally to release. Finally a large number of villages were burnt or destroyed.

As regards the scientific results of the expedition, I take Mr. Cotton's opinion. He points out that the force stayed too short a time in the Bebejiya country to enable us greatly to improve our geographical and topographical knowledge, that too much time was taken in getting to the enemy's country, that the expedition was hampered by its transport, that very little attempt was made to pierce the hills by flying columns, and that "it has not been found possible to add very largely to our scientific knowledge of the North-Eastern Frontier".

Finally, to cap the whole story, the Bebejiyas, who were the objects of the whole expedition, who "had hitherto been described as a fierce race of cannibals, a very savage, blood-thirsty and dangerous race", and whose homes and villages, acting upon this hypothesis, the expedition unsparingly destroyed and burned, were discovered by the Political Officer to be a petty community of only 3,000 to 4,000 souls (including not more than 1,500 adult men), who are described by him as "on the whole a well behaved and inoffensive tribe, very desirous of being on friendly terms with us".

His final conclusion is as follows. "These being the facts of the case, when I read the conclusion of the Political Officer (paragraph 40) that "it may fairly be said that the expedition successfully accomplished the major portion of the task which was set it"; of the Chief Commissioner that "the objects with which the expedition was undertaken have been substantially accomplished;" and of the Military Officer Commanding that "the spirit of the scheme was thoroughly carried out", I am inclined to wonder whether euphemism can further go. The actual results of the expedition were the recovery of 3 children, the capture of 1 gun, the seizure of 2 Mishmis (who have since been released), the slaughter of a few tribesmen, and the destruction of a number of villages. For these returns we have sacrificed the lives of 34 unhappy coolies; have expended a total sum of about £16,000; and have gained the cheap honour of having marched with a force of 130 men, out of an army of 1,200, through a difficult and almost impassable country. The conclusions which I draw from the whole affair are these. I hold—

- (1) that a serious miscalculation of the strength required for the expedition in the first place was made by the military advisers of the Government of India;
- (2) that, when the expedition had been sanctioned, the force was increased, more especially in respect of officers and staff, to wholly unreasonable and unnecessary dimensions;
- (3) that the successive stages of subsequent contraction, and the relative failure of the entire expedition, have been imperfectly brought out in the reports, and notably in the military report, which represent the whole affair as having been, in the words of Commander-in-Chief and the Military Member, of a satisfactory nature;
- (4) that much greater care will require to be exercised in the future, both in the authorisation and in the composition and equipment of these petty frontier expeditions, which are much too readily converted from police excursions into military campaigns."

It is satisfactory, however to observe that he concluded his minute by adding, "In these criticisms I have not one word to say against the conduct either of the Political Officer or of the Military Officers and troops who actually took part in the expedition. Mr. Needham seems to have played his part with ability and discretion—it is a pity that his views as to the strength of the force required were not followed earlier in the day—and to have frankly admitted the misconception under which he had previously laboured as to the character of the Bebejiya Mishmis. The small minority of the assembled force, who penetrated into the country, appear to have faced considerable difficulties and hardships courageously and well, and to have performed such limited work, as was open to them, with credit."

In a letter* to the Secretary of State, dated the 22nd February 1900, he referred to the Expedition as "an absolutely bootless though costly excursion, with no result whatsoever but the capture of two inoffensive and worthless prisoners"

In a further letter† to the Secretary of State dated the 11th March 1900 after he had himself travelled in Assam as far as Dibrugarh, he described the incident as follows.

"Lockhart turned it into a military expedition. I managed to prevent him sending a naval detachment with rockets. But the soldiers, once they got hold of the matter, turned it into a military expedition on a large scale—over 600 men, 27 officers, 6 doctors, 86 sappers and miners with dynamite, gun cotton and wire rope, and 2,000 coolies. When they got into the pass entering the Mishmi country, it was found to be quite impossible to get this great force over, and all but 120 soldiers, 8 officers and 300 coolies were sent back, to remain hanging about on the border in receipt of campaign pay, until the expedition was over.....You may be sure that there will be some very plain speaking on my part when the final reports are submitted and when the bill—estimated at several lakhs of rupees—comes in"

V. 1900-1911.—The next few years were uneventful, until in July 1905‡ a murderous outrage was committed in British territory on two Chulikattas. Certain Bebejiya Mishmis, Pongon and Taji, were held to be responsible and it seems that the murder was done in revenge for their punishment during the Bebejiya expedition of 1899-1900, but as no arrest was effected, a blockade both of the Chulikattas and the Bebejiyas was proclaimed in 1905. Mr. Needham advised that the Chulikattas be exempted, but that was not agreed to.

Mr. Needham left Sadiya for good in December 1905, after 23 years service there, and was succeeded by Mr. Noel Williamson, who, until his death in 1911, was to do much to establish good relations with the frontier tribes and to explore hitherto unknown regions.

In December 1907—January 1908, Mr. Williamson, made a valuable tour up the Lohit towards Rima, his object being to make himself "acquainted with the people and their country and to collect information regarding the practicability of a trade route towards south-eastern Tibet". (His letter No. 233-G., dated the 27th February 1908). He had no escort, his party consisting, besides himself, only of Chowna Khamti Gohain, two other Khamtis and one servant. Travelling by the right bank of the Lohit, he reached Sati, 35 miles south of Rima, his furthest point; on 27th December. He had orders not to enter Tibet and therefore did not go beyond that village. He mentions that the next village, Walung, paid tribute to the Governor of Rima. His account of the country and the people was most favourable.

*Ronaldshay's Life of Curzon, Vol. II, Page 113.

†Ronaldshay's Life of Curzon, Vol. II, Page 114.

‡Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, January 1907, Nos. 13-70.
Eastern-Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, B, October 1908, No. 87-110.

“5. I found the inhabitants respectful and obliging. In fact, I might have been travelling in an administered tract. There is nothing to stand in the way of a trade route. The people through whose country it would pass are peaceable and quiet. British prestige is high in the land, the result possibly of Kaisha's capture by Eden in 1855, and subsequent punishment. The country itself presents no difficulties ; it is in fact a strikingly easy one for a mountainous tract. The highest altitude is met with when crossing the first range, where the axis of the mountain system is transverse to the course of the river. Even here we only have to face a rise of 4,600 feet, after which no high altitudes obstruct the way. The banks of the river would appear to be formed especially for a road. Large flat tiers running parallel to the Lohit, with easily-surmounted spurs extending to the river itself, the whole rising gradually from 1,200 feet at the Tidding to 3,100 feet at Sati, an ascent of 1,900 feet in 70 miles. It is a natural highway into Tibet, and only requires the hand of man to render it easy and expeditious. From the Tidding to Rima, with the path properly cleared and aligned, the journey for mule or coolie transport would not occupy more than seven days ; and from Sadiya the whole distance could be accomplished in 11 or 12 days.

6. Before embarking on any project connected with a trade route, the first point for consideration is whether the result would justify the expenditure. At present trade is infinitesimal, I admit. The imports which pass up from Assam to Tibet amount to little and of Tibetan exports there are none. But would these conditions continue if an easy and expeditious route existed? I very much doubt it. At present south-east Tibet has no industries, because she has no incentive for the development of her resources. To the north she has no market ; to the south the country is mountainous and inhabited by savages ; to the east her nearest market is Batang, where however the demand for her industries has not been sufficiently great to create a supply : and to the west at present she has to encounter a wild and tedious route inhabited by a people of whom the Tibetans stand in some dread. South-eastern Tibet is absolutely isolated, and she has no industries and consequently no exports, because she has no outlet for them. The attainment of affluence is one of the principal objects of man, be he yellow or black or white, Pagan, Christian, or Buddhist. Given facilities for export, industries must arise. Improve communications along the natural outlet and the line of least resistance, *viz.* the Lohit Valley, and facilities for export are placed within the reach of all. Once the Tibetan learns that every hide and every pound of wool has a marketable value in Assam, which can be reached quickly, comfortably, and safely, and where in return he can purchase tea, clothing, etc., commercial interchanges are assured and the expenditure on the route justified. Trade intercourse just now is impossible, as Tibet is a forbidden land to the trader. But there can be no objection to attracting the Tibetan to trade with us by constructing a good bridle-path from the border of Tibet to Sadiya, a place which in a short time will be in close proximity to the terminus of the Dibru-Sadiya Railway.

7. At present this is all that can be done. This will, however, only create a trade with south-east Tibet, for a bridle path from the Tibetan boundary is not likely to draw traders from beyond Tibet, from Western China. A railway can alone produce this result; a railway running towards Sechuan. Until, however, commercial necessities become sufficiently pressing to overcome political objections, no connection by rail can be hoped for. But as far as Rima a railroad is practicable. From there the country is difficult. Between Rima and Batang, which would probably be 300 miles by rail, the Tila La has to be crossed at an altitude of 16,000 feet. This altitude, however, is not that above the surrounding country, for Rima we know to be about 5,000 feet above sea level, which substantially reduces the height to be encountered. Batang is on the main route from China to Lhasa, and from Batang to Litang and on to Ta Chien Lu a regular post road exists. Two high passes would have to be surmounted and the Salween and the Mekong crossed. To judge by the Lohit, however, the bridging of these rivers at the points where they will be met should not prove difficult. They are not the enormous rivers we know them to be further south, but are confined within narrow limits with a rock formation suitable for bridge foundations. But, however costly, were there facilities for quick communication between India and Western China the possibilities would appear to be boundless. Given a railway, every ton of our exports for Sechuan would be captured for this route instead of being carried a long sea voyage from Calcutta, only then to commence the difficult journey up the Yangtse. With such improved communications, the resources of Sechuan, one of the wealthiest provinces of China, would develop enormously; with an easy and expeditious route there is no reason why the Chinese coolie should not seek for employment on the tea-gardens of Assam, and so possibly solve some of the present labour difficulties. I trust I may be pardoned for writing at such length on a route which at present is politically impossible, and the cost of which may be considered prohibitive. My excuse is that I have been singularly impressed by the comparative ease with which it would be possible to forge the next link in a chain connecting India with China. From Chitagong to Rima is about 620 miles, and on to Batang would probably total 900 miles by rail: of this we already have 400 miles of railroad, a 400 miles which have proved very costly, and which lead nowhere."

In December 1906 the management of the Sissi Saw Mills and the Meckla Nuddee Saw Mills Company, who were working timber at the western end of the tract, had complained to the Chief Commissioner of exactions by the Pasi Minyong Abors on threat of stopping timber supplies by contractors working between the Inner Line and the foot of the hills. This question of blackmail was an old one, having been first brought to notice by Mr. Needham in 1902. In connection with this, among other matters, the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam made certain proposals embodying a policy of a 'forward' nature to the Government of India in their letter No.3923-J.,* dated the 9th

September 1907. These, and the Government of India's decision thereon are summarised in the latter's reply No.177-EC,* dated the 16th January 1908 as follows—

“2. The Lieutenant-Governor considers, after consulting with several officers of frontier experience,—

- (a) that Government should no longer tolerate the extortion by the Abors of blackmail from timber-cutters and traders in British territory ;
- (b) that a policy of aloofness is foredoomed to failure, and that, apart from the urgent need of preventing interference with the development of trade, the fact that over half a century of proximity to civilization has failed in any way to redeem the tribes from their native savagery is in itself a condemnation of the policy of non-interference.

3. With these views in mind, His Honour recommends a modification of policy in dealing with the Abors and other tribes inhabiting the hills to the north of the Dibrugarh Frontier Tract, and in regard to the territory between the Dihong and Dibong he proposes—

- (a) to prohibit and prevent by force, if necessary, the recovery of dues by the Abors from traders, etc., within the “outer” boundary ;
- (b) to impose a poll-tax or house-tax on all settlers in British territory ;
- (c) to impose a tax on cultivation within the “inner” line ;
- (d) to substitute a system of presents for the fixed “*posa*” ;
- (e) to encourage the tribesmen to visit Sadiya and settle in British territory ;
- (f) to require them to receive in their villages the Political or other officers of Government who may have dealings with them ;
- (g) to take some measures through the Political Officer for the purpose of preserving the valuable stock of *simul* timber in the forests north of the Brahmaputra, from being ruined by ignorant and improvident felling, simple rules being drawn up for this purpose.

The Lieutenant-Governor does not propose to put back the “Inner” Line or to relax the restrictions on crossing it, nor does His Honour agree with Mr. Williamson's recommendation that the line of police posts should be advanced to the foot of the hills, *i.e.*, to the “outer” border.

4. To attain his objects, the Lieutenant-Governor considers that it will be sufficient if the Assistant Political Officer visits “the principal villages” with a strong escort and informs them of the orders and intentions of Government. His Honour also thinks that during the tour the Political Officer should settle details of the assessment of villages within the border, and warn the villagers that failure to pay will entail the destruction of both crops and villages.

*Eastern Bengal and Assam, Political, A, April 1908, Nos.7-19.

5. The Government of India regret that they are unable to sanction His Honour's proposals in their entirety. They have not at present before them sufficient information regarding the temper of the people, to justify the assumption that the poll-tax, house tax and tax on cultivation proposed could be collected without resorting to punitive measures, which are undesirable ; and, while agreeing that something should be done towards the conservation of the forests, they consider it doubtful whether the steps proposed by the Lieutenant-Governor would be effective, without further knowledge regarding the forests. It is also desirable that the country should be surveyed as far as possible before a definite scheme for its future administration is adopted. In these circumstances, the utmost to which the Government of India can agree is that Mr. Williamson should undertake a tour in the tract between the "inner" and "outer" lines in order to ascertain the actual position of affairs now existing there, if this can be accomplished without any risk of a serious collision with the tribes. Mr. Williamson should be accompanied by a forest officer and a surveyor, and his instructions should be as follows—

- (a) to inform the villagers that the collection of blackmail within our border must cease ;
- (b) to collect information as to the forests ;
- (c) to survey the country as far as possible ;
- (d) to test the feelings of the people in regard to the proposed taxation on settlers within the outer line and generally.

Nothing should at present be said to the villagers about the imposition of any new taxes, and I am to request that His Honour will take no action in this direction until the Government of India have been furnished with the further information above indicated, which will be obtained by Mr. Williamson. As "*posa*" has not been paid since 1894, it should not be revived, but in lieu thereof presents may be given as recommended in paragraph 12 of the letter under reply.

6. There remains the question of possible visits to the parent Abor villages of Kebang, Padu [Dukku] Membo [Mebo], Silluk and Dambuk which are mentioned in Paragraph 11 of your letter, and which appear from the accompanying map to be (with the exception of Padu) beyond the "outer" line. The Government of India recognise that it is desirable to get into closer touch and to establish better relations with the Abors, and that it will be difficult to protect the tract between the inner and outer lines effectively unless this is done, but they are not prepared to contemplate the possibility of an expedition. If, therefore, the Lieutenant-Governor is satisfied that Mr. Williamson can safely extend his tour to these villages without the use of force or the danger of subsequent complications, they agree to this being done. Otherwise, the visits to these villages must stand over for the present.

7. In conclusion, I am to request that no action be taken in regard to that portion of the border, inhabited by Mishmis, east of the Dibong river without further orders from the Government of India "

In March 1908*, Williamson made a tour from Pasighat through the foot hills south-west to Ledum and then on through the Pasi Minyong and Galong country to the Sinyeng River at Dijmur. He returned along the Inner Line, which then ran a little distance away from the right bank of the Brahmaputra by way of Laimakuri Saw Mills, to Sadiya. He had no escort. Most of these places had never seen a European before, and he was able to establish friendly relations with them. One point to which the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam referred in forwarding Mr. Williamson's diary to the Government of India with their letter No. 3873-J of the 25th August 1908 was as regards the levying of blackmail, discussed before in 1907 on the import of timber to the saw mills. Though Mr Williamson made it clear to the people of Depi, one of the principal offending villages, that they were within British territory and that this practice must stop, a further incident had occurred in May 1908. The Assistant Political Officer recommended the imposition of a Poll-tax on such villages as a means of making them realise they were within British territory :

In November-December 1908, Mr. Williamson visited the Rangpung Naga country, in order to find out and punish those responsible for a raid on Wakpang in British territory in October 1907, when 7 British subjects were killed. He had an escort of 154 officers and men of the Lakhimpur Military Police Battalion under 2 British Officers, Captain Bliss, 8th Gurkha Rifles, their Commandant, and Subadar-Major Dorward. Mr. Driver of the Assam Oil Company went with him as Geologist. Leaving Mushong on the 17th November 1908 they crossed the Patkoi at 5,900 feet and camped at Manpang. From there they went south west to the Dilli and on the 29th November reached Rashi, their destination. There was no opposition, and being satisfied that its men were guilty of the raid, Williamson had the village burnt. On 1st December they started on the return journey. When they reached Phung on the 10th December they turned left and returned by the old and normal route instead of making the detour (of double the distance) of their outward journey. Williamsons report† states.

"8. The tour has been a satisfactor one. The last visit paid to this part of the country was in 1891, [by Needham] and since then many changes have taken place. It has been a great disappointment to me that I was unable to return by another route, which would have extended our knowledge of the country still further. But circumstances, I considered, did not permit of my doing so. Our being able to take a column, consisting at its lowest of 334 persons so far from our base without any previous preparations in the shape of advanced store godowns, and the rapidity with which we showed we could move on o casion, has considerably opened the eyes of these savages. The tour has further proved of great benefit to the men of the escort in the shape of a very practical camp of exercise.

* Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, March 1909, Nos.27-39.

† Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, May 1910, Nos. 13-10.

9. As regards the guilt of Rashi, one of the objects of my tour, there is no doubt that this village was concerned in the raid on Wakpang in October 1907."

He added, as regards the Singphos and the Rangpangs that—

"10. The story that the Singpho Chiefs of the Hukawng Valley exercise great influence over the Rangpangs is a myth. I made enquiries during my return journey, and was informed that, beyond an occasional visit from Singpho traders, the two tribes have no intercourse. The idea probably originated in the fact that, when hill people go down in the Hukawng Valley to cut rubber or to search for amber at the mines, they have to pay a tax to the local Singpho headman for permission to do so."

The expedition entailed considerable hardships and all the British Officers were incapacitated at one time or other from fever or colds, while their men and followers suffered pretty severely. Both Captain Bliss and Mr. Williamson commented unfavourably on the want of efficiency and discipline of the escort.

In February 1909, Mr. Williamson penetrated to Kebang. In 1901* two Gurkha surveyors of the Survey of India had got as far this village in an endeavour to reach Gyala Sindong, only to be turned back by the Pasi Minyongs who would let them go no further, but no Europeans had visited it before, the expedition of 1858 having returned before reaching it. Mr. Williamson went across the hills, leaving the river well to his right, *via* Balek. He was accompanied by Messrs. Jackman (an American missionary) and Lumsden.

In commenting on the results of this trip, the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Lancelot Hare, observed as follows in his letter No.3390-G† dated the 22nd June 1909, to the Commissioner, Assam Valley Division.

"2. The conclusions at which H. H. has arrived, after a perusal of the papers, are as follows:—

- (i) that there is no Tibetan influence in the tract ;
- (ii) that Kebang controls several of the villages with which we shall have to deal during the impending Abor settlement and is therefore an important place for negotiation ;
- (iii) that the attitude of hillmen is generally friendly ;
- (iv) that they recognise that all the country up to the foot of the hills is British territory,— an important factor in coming to a settlement with them ;
- (v) that they are very amenable to the influence of money and that they are likely therefore to fall in with a settlement which will probably carry with it pecuniary benefits.

3. H. H. congratulates Mr. Williamson on the pronounced success of his tour and regrets that the hardships which he underwent during the journey should have resulted in a severe illness."

* Assam Annual Administration Report, 1900-1901.

† Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, B, July 1910, Nos 39-58.

In 1909-10 Mr. Williamson repeated his Lohit tour of 1907-8, and this time went beyond Sati, his previous furthest point, almost as far as Rima. His purpose was partly to construct the Digaru-Miju bridle path, and partly to make further contacts in that area. As regards the former, a track was cleared from the Tiju River to Sati, 92 miles. Leaving Sadiya on the 11th December 1909 with Mr. Ward, Superintendent of the Margherita Company's collieries, he was back in Sadiya on the 26th February 1910. He reached Walung 2 days march-beyond Sati on the 31st January, which he found to consist of "one hovel with five inhabitants". Finding no trace of Tibetan influence there, he pushed on, until on February 2nd, finding the first signs of Tibetan authority, he halted at the stream called Tatap Ti and went no further. The Governor of Rima visited him at his camp on February 4th, and presents were exchanged in a cordial atmosphere. Williamson formed* the opinion that the authority either of Tibet and China was very slight in Rima and could find no trace of collisions between Chinese and Tibetans.

But signs of Chinese penetration became manifest later in the year, when the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam reported to the Government of India in their letter No. 231-P, † dated 26th May 1910 to the effect that a large body of Chinese had occupied Rima, had demanded taxes and had issued orders for the cutting of a road to Assam by the Mishmis. The Mishmi chief, Tungno, who brought the news, claimed to be a British subject and the Lieutenant-Governor asked for instructions as to how the situation should be dealt with "in the event of further information being received confirming the report that Rima has been effectively occupied by the Chinese". A later letter dated 4th July 1910, reported that the Chinese were in firm control of Rima, and had planted flags at the river Yepuk, two miles west of Walung or 30 miles west of Rima.

Mr. Williamson again penetrated‡ into the Mishmi Hills in January and February 1911 and went as far as Walong. He observed then that the Chinese had set up flags outside Tibetan territory. While agreeing that Walong might be considered to be in South-East Tibet, he said they had no claim to going as far south as Menekrai or Menilkrai where the flags were planted. The Chinese were then in full possession of Rima, a fact which Mr. Williamson thought did not arouse any resentment on the part of the Tibetans. In forwarding his diary to the Government of India, the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government expressed their concern at the way the Chinese were penetrating to the south in this area, and said that His Honour considered it essential that they should not be permitted to extend their influence up to the Outer Line; as he feared they would overawe the hill tribes of our border and "dominate all the tea gardens north of the Brahmaputra". They recommended that the Mishmis should be brought definitely under our control.

*Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, September 1910, Nos. 7-10.

†Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, August 1910, Nos. 1-6.

‡Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1911, Nos. 85-88.

A few months later Captain F. M. Bailey* of the Political Department arrived at Sadiya, having travelled from China *via* Batang and Rima. He mentioned large forces of Chinese troops in that direction and evidence of their increasing influence. He found in the Taroan country evident signs of friendliness especially among the Miju.

VI. The murder of Mr. Williamson and Dr. Gregorson in 1911.—On 30th March 1911 Dr. J. D. Gregorson, a tea garden doctor from Tinsukia who was accompanying Mr. Williamson on a tour in the Abor country was murdered at Pangì, and on the 31st March 1911 Mr. Williamson was murdered at Komsing. 44 followers belonging to their party were massacred at the same time.

The details of this outrage are best described in the words of Mr. Bentinck who visited the spot when with the Abor Expedition of 1912, in his letter dated the 23rd April 1912† “.....The party consisted of Mr. Noel Williamson, Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya, Dr. J. D. Gregorson, a doctor with a large practice on the tea gardens round Tinsukia in Lakhimpur district and a man much interested in the frontier tribes, their three servants, two orderlies, ten Miris, and 34 Gurkhali coolies from Shillong ; assembling at Passighat they started thence on March 8th and reached Rotung on the 20th. The object of the journey was to ascertain, if possible, the extent of Tibetan influence in the Abor country and was expected to extend over about six weeks. At Rotung some rations and a case of liquor were found to have been stolen by the Abor carriers who supplemented the Gurkhalis, and Mr. Williamson told the villagers that he would require satisfaction on his return journey ; this seems to have caused some anxiety in Rotung, and the advisability of murdering Mr. Williamson, was discussed at a council that night ; the matter was reported to Mr. Williamson, but he, knowing the Abor to be stronger in council than in action, considered that nothing serious was intended and on the next day continued his journey. Carefully avoiding the territory and village of Kebang which was not only of doubtful friendliness, but infected with small-pox, the party crossed the river and marched up the left bank to a place below Pangì village where a camp was made and the return of the coolies sent back to bring up the remaining stores awaited. On the 28th one of the Miris, by name Manpur, was sent back with three sick coolies and some letters. In Rotung Manpur boasted that the letters contained orders to send up sepoy and guns to punish Rotung and Kebang ; this of course was untrue, but coming on the top of the previous alarm, which had otherwise died down, so excited the Rotung men that on the following day they followed the four men, and when they halted for their mid-day meal fell upon them and killed them all. The murderers at once returned strengthened in numbers, hurried on to Kebang, picking up on the way men from the small village of Babuk, and in number about 100 crossed the Dihong, and finding in the Pangì camp only Dr. Gregorson, the Miri Kotoki (or interpreter) Moria, and three or four sick

* Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, March 1912, Nos. 3-46.

† Assam Secretariat, Political, A, September 1912, Nos. 1-22

coolies, killed them all on the spot. Dr. Gregorson was resting in his tent and was instantly cut down: this was at about 1 P.M., on March 30th. That same morning Mr. Williamson had marched on with the rest of the party and had camped on the large stream the Ribung, which runs at the foot of the hill on which Komsing stands. There were still a few Abor coolies in his camp and news reached these from below of what had happened that afternoon; the facts, however, were deliberately kept from Mr. Williamson. The following morning the party moved up to Komsing and encamped in the village. At about 10 A.M., while the coolies were cooking their food Mr. Williamson started to go to the house of the Gam, Lomben, who had come with him the previous day. Three men—Lunung Gam of Pangi, Manmur of Yagrung, and Tamu of Bosing—went with him on the pretence of showing him the house; taking him down a side path out of sight of the rest of his party, they suddenly set on him and cut him down. The rest of the Abors who had crossed from Rotung and Kebang attacked the coolies at the same time; only five or six were killed in the village, the remainder mostly reaching the river bank in small parties; there after exhausting the little ammunition that the few men with guns had with them, they were all killed except five coolies, who managed after great hardships to make their way back to the plains; a servant of Mr. Williamson, who reached the Pangi village of Pongging and was there kindly received; and the principal Miri kotoki Mullina, who swam the river, was taken by Babuk men up to their village and killed there. Three of the survivors reached an Abor village near the mouth of the Dihong, and from there news of the disaster was sent in to Sadiya and thence to Dibrugarh, where it arrived at about 9 A.M., on April 5th. Being then Deputy Commissioner and Political Officer, I at once communicated with the Military Police and arranged to have their station duties taken over by the 114th Maharattas, and the same afternoon left by train with a detachment of Military Police under Captain Dunbar, fully equipped and rationed for three weeks. Captain Hutchins, Assistant Commandant, Lakhimpur Military Police, met us at Saikhowa with all the boats and boatmen that could be secured, and within 100 hours of the receipt of the news in Dibrugarh a defensive post was being constructed at Passighat. The journey up the river, as most of the boats were far too large, was most arduous, and the advance party under Captain Hutchins, which had the largest boats, rested hardly day or night; it bore, however, excellent testimony to the organisation and training introduced by Captain Dunbar that the movement was performed in as many days as not many years ago it would have required weeks. On the way up Mr. A. J. Harrison of the Laimekuri Saw-mills overtook us in his steam launch on which he had picked up the three survivors already mentioned; he also did us great service in securing extra boatmen. At Passighat Captain Hutchins received from the Passi Gams the remaining two survivors whom they had found, fed and cared for; one of these two, Dal Bahadur Rai, remained with Captain Hutchins until the expedition started and was of the greatest service during the three months that followed on account of his accurate knowledge of the country he had been through; the other was later on enlisted in the Military Police."

It was sufficiently established that Kebang and Rotung committed the murders and that Babuk, Sissin and Pangi had accounted for some of the fugitives.

Government apparently had no idea that the Assistant Political Officer had any intention of going so far, or at all, beyond the Outer Line. He had previously been as far as Kebang before without a guard, had been received in a friendly manner and had been given a cordial invitation to visit Komsing and Riu. As the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam's report No.197-C.G.,* dated the 22nd April 1911 observes, there is no doubt that Mr. Williamson acted contrary to standing orders in crossing the Outer Line: he was no doubt actuated by zeal to obtain information. The Government of India accepted this conclusion in their letter No. 850-E.B.† dated the 8th May 1911 in the following terms.

“2. The Governor General in Council desires in the first place, to record his deep regret at the untimely end of this zealous and gallant officer, whose almost unique experience of the tribes on the North-Eastern Frontier rendered his services at the present moment of the greatest value to the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam and to the Government of India. The Governor General in Council feels, however, that it is impossible to ignore the fact that this sad incident could not have occurred but for Mr. Williamson's breach of wellknown standing orders, prohibiting the crossing of the Outer Line without permission. The Governor General in Council accepts Sir Lancelot Hare's view that, in thus acting, Mr. Williamson's fault was that of a zealous officer anxious to obtain information which he believed would be valuable, and willing to run a certain amount of risk in getting it. In the circumstance, it is undesirable to record a formal expression of disapproval of the late Officer's proceedings, but the Governor General in Council directs that such steps should at once be taken as shall ensure the enforcement of the standing order regarding the crossing of the frontier and relations with the frontier tribes.”

Owing to the advanced season, effective punitive operations were out of the question, and the Lieutenant-Governor decided to wait till the cold weather. In the meanwhile a stockade was erected at Balek, close to the present subdivisional headquarters of Passighat, and the principal village of the Passi Group, to ensure their safety against reprisals and to check possible raids by the hostile elements, and when the rest of the force withdrew in May, a garrison of 150 rifles remained there under Captain Hutchins.

VII. The Abor Expedition of 1911-1912. (a). Preliminaries.—The political background in the light of which the Abor Expedition and its ancillary expeditions on the North-East Frontier were undertaken requires to be described.

*Eastern Bengal & Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1911, Nos. 1-84.

†Eastern Bengal & Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1911, Nos. 89-141.

The general question of Chinese encroachments had been the subject of discussion between the Lieutenant-Governor, the Government of India and the Secretary of State since 1910. As early as July of that year the Lieutenant-Governor had inquired of the Government of India as to "the degree of recognition to be extended to the Mishmi Tribe and the attitude to be adopted by this Government with reference to the Chinese occupation of Rima", and eventually, in a telegram dated the 23rd October 1910* the Viceroy (Lord Minto) reported to the Secretary of State (Morley) that "In consequence of proceedings of Chinese in Rima and vicinity of tribal tracts on the North-East Frontier, the question of our future relations with these tribes is causing anxiety." Pending the obtaining of further information and a decision on the general question, he wished to have authority to inform the Mishmis that they were under our protection and would be supported if they refused to have relations with any other foreign power. The Secretary of State definitely refused to agree to the giving of these assurances, and said that the main question of policy must be left to Lord Hardinge, who was to join very shortly as Viceroy. The matter was further reviewed in Despatch No. 182, dated the 22nd December 1910, written after Hardinge had assumed office and also had had a discussion with Sir Lancelot Hare in Calcutta on the 22nd November 1910. The despatch quotes a demi-official letter† which Sir Lancelot addressed to the Viceroy on the 24th November 1910, which summed up the position as well as his own views—

"I think I hardly brought out with sufficient distinctness one important consideration which should induce us to press forward beyond the limits by which under a self-denying ordinance our frontier is at present limited. We only now claim suzerainty up to the *foot* of the hills. We have an inner line and an outer line. Up to the inner line we administer in the ordinary way. Between the inner and the outer lines we only administer politically. That is, our Political Officer exercises a very loose jurisdiction, and to prevent troubles with frontier tribes passes are required for our subjects who want to cross the inner line. The country between the two lines is very sparsely inhabited and is mostly dense jungle.

Now should the Chinese establish themselves in strength or obtain complete control up to our outer line, they could attack us whenever they pleased, and the defence would be extremely difficult. We have a chain of frontier outposts directed to controlling the main routes used by the neighbouring hill tribes when they come down to trade in the cold weather. These are not on the outer lines, because such positions at the foot of the hills would be too unhealthy to occupy, as they would be in the worst part of what is called the Terai. It is accepted that, if the outposts were pushed forward so far as the outer line, than in each case it would be necessary to place them on the spurs of the hills and above malaria height. This we could only do if we establish our suzerainty or could claim the consent of the hill people who are in occupation, as being under our protection. It seems

* Eastern Bengal & Assam, Political, A, December 1910, Nos. 1-11.

† Eastern Bengal & Assam Secretariat, Political, A, March 1911, Nos. 45-46.

to me, in view of the possibility of the Chinese pushing forward, that it would be a mistake not to put ourselves in a position to take up suitable strategic points of defence. It is true in any trial of strength between England and China the contest would not probably be decided on this frontier, but we should be bound to defend our valuable tea gardens, and unless we had suitable positions, this would be exceedingly difficult, and we could very easily be greatly harassed and put to great expense and have to maintain an unduly large force on this frontier.

I am therefore of opinion that we should take a more active line and should (a) tour in the hills bordering our frontier, (b) improve the trade routes to the principal villages so far as they lie within our recognised borders and further, if not opposed, and (c) give presents to our neighbours for friendly services and information.

Where we have already established ourselves by friendly relations, as in the country on extreme east up to Sati on the road from Sadiya to Rima, we should maintain our present standing and should forbid China stepping in. After all, if China presses forward, we must forbid further progress some day, and at this point of our frontier I do not think we can safely allow the Chinese to advance beyond Sati. I think it would be a pity to give away any advantage we now possess here, and as far as I can see, this is the only point where any immediate measure is likely to be required. We should be well advised to take our stand here ; to allow the Chinese to intrude here would make the defence of the Lakhimpur district difficult, and would not be in agreement with the accepted Burma frontier line. I have already advocated this view in my official representation, and I wish to make it clear that I do not recede from that position."

The Government of India, however, were not convinced and their views are summarised in paragraph 9 of the despatch as follows.

".....we do not see our way at present to recommend the more active policy which the Lieutenant-Governor advocates. We recognise that the action of the Chinese may ultimately compel us to fix a line beyond which no further advance can be permitted : but we see no necessity at present for incurring the risks and responsibilities entailed by a forward movement into the tribal territory now beyond our control : and we propose, with Your Lordship's approval, to request the Lieutenant-Governor to instruct his frontier officers that they should confine themselves, as hitherto, to cultivating friendly relations with the tribes beyond the "outer line" and punishing them for acts of hostility within our limits. Should it be possible to obtain further information about the country beyond the "outer line" without risk of complications, we should be prepared to authorise explorations for the purpose, but we would not permit any general increase of activity in this direction, nor can we recommend that any sort of promise should be given to the tribes that they may rely on our support or protection in the event of Tibetan or Chinese aggression."

Discussions had reached this stage when the events of March 1911 occurred, and the opportunity was taken, while seeing to the punishment of the guilty Pasi Minyongs to clear up also the frontier situation

in respect of the Chinese both on the Abor and the Mishmi border. The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam recommended the despatch of an expedition to exact punishment for the murders in their letter No. 294-C. G., dated 16th May 1911 in the following terms :—

“.....3. Since 1858, no expedition has gone into the Meyong [Minyong] Hills, and the first British Officer to penetrate into them was Mr. Williamson when he visited Kebang in February 1909.

Mr. Needham, Assistant Political Officer of Sadiya, visited in 1884, some of the outlying villages, including Balek, where the Military Police have erected a stockade since Mr. Williamson's murder ; he received a hospitable though somewhat rude and boisterous reception, but it is recorded that the demands of the Abors were for the most part unreasonable. Mr. Williamson, himself, made a tour in 1908 from Pasighat through Ledum and Dijmur to Laimekuri, but did not cross the Outer Line on that occasion.

4. The Pasi Meyong have repeatedly given trouble ; in 1888, the villages of Yemsing and Ledum combined and murdered 4 Miris whom they had induced to go beyond the Inner Line. They levied blackmail on contractors cutting timber for the saw-mill and in 1904-1905 a new Military Police post had to be placed at Laimekuri to protect the Meckla Nudi Saw Mills. Subsequent years show little improvement in their conduct. In 1906-1907, they interfered with the Sissi Saw Mills, robbed an employee of all his property and constantly oppressed the Miris who were usually too frightened to complain. In 1907-1908, they again attempted to blackmail the Manager of the Meckla Nudi Saw Mills.

5. The attack on Mr. Williamson's party, for so it must be considered since the Pasi Meyongs sought for the quarrel by asking him into their country with the deliberate intention of killing him, was probably due to sheer bravado and devilment due to want of appreciation of our power arising from the fact that the only force which had penetrated into their hills was driven back and compelled to retreat, fighting hard for existence. The challenge cannot be refused and due reparation must be exacted. Otherwise our position on the frontier is impossible and our villages and tea gardens will not be safe. It is as much a deliberate attack upon us as if the Abors had come into our country, for Mr. Williamson's was a wholly unarmed and peaceful entry solicited by them. Certain villages are principally concerned and Madu, the Gam of Riu, seems to have taken a leading part, but the blow was, as all the evidence goes to show, a deliberate blow given by the whole community in council and every village of the Pasi Meyongs is concerned and must share in the reparation. This, subject to further information from enquiries in the country, must, if they submit, principally take the form of fines in cash and supplies and in labour in carrying, and on roads so far as these may be required. It will also be for the Government of India to consider whether the opportunity should be taken to enter into any treaty with these people on the lines on which it is understood that treaties have been framed with Sikkim and Bhutan. In

this connection I am to refer to Government of India's telegram No. 560-P., dated the 30th September 1910, on the subject of the policy to be adopted on this frontier and to this Government letter No. 468-C., dated the 26th October 1910, in reply. Every village of the clan will have to be visited, as only by this means can it be ascertained what punishment would be suitable, as the number of houses and the wealth of each village must be considered in apportioning the fines. At the same time the opportunity must be taken of obtaining all possible information of the country and to survey and map it as far as possible. Much information of great value and interest will, it is expected, be secured, and on this aspect of the question I am to invite attention to my letter No. 204-C. G., dated the 25th April 1911, with which was forwarded Mr. Williamson's diary of his tour to Walong. It is as important to prevent the Chinese from establishing their influence over the Abors as over the Mishmis, and this expedition should furnish an excellent opportunity of ascertaining their movements in the neighbourhood of Gayala-Sindong."

The Government of India agreed, and recommended to the Secretary of State that an expedition should be despatched. It was to be "a Military one conducted by the Government of India and under the immediate command of the General Officer Commanding Assam Brigade, who will also be in supreme political control, and will have attached to him Political Officers to be nominated by His Honour. A "friendly political mission was to be despatched simultaneously to the Mishmi country under the orders of the Lieutenant-Governor" (letter No. 1382-E. B. * dated the 28th July 1911.)

Telegram P. dated the 29th June 1911 which the Government of India addressed to the Secretary of State shows that they intended to take advantage of this punitive expedition to clear up the obscure boundary situation as against China both on the Abor and the Mishmi border, which had been discussed in 1910. They said :—

"The primary objects of the expedition are the exaction of reparation for the murder of Mr. Noel Williamson and his party, and the establishment of our military superiority in the estimation of the Abor tribe. The principal villages in the country will be visited, and it is hoped that the Pasi Meyong Abors will be compelled to surrender the chief instigators and perpetrators of the massacre ; thereafter such terms for past offences, and such security for future good conduct of the tribe will be exacted as may seem advisable.

It is of prime importance that we should take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the expedition to carry out such surveys and exploration as may be possible, in order that we may obtain the knowledge requisite for the determination of a suitable boundary between India and China in this locality, as to which at present we know practically nothing. Recent events on the frontier of Burma have shown the urgent necessity of coming to an understanding with China about our mutual frontier, of preventing Chinese intrigue within our limits, and of keeping her as far as possible removed from our present administered area. We accordingly propose to depute a staff of Survey officers with the punitive force.

* Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, March 1912, Nos. 47-148.

Simultaneously with the despatch of the punitive expedition, we propose to send a friendly mission under escort from Bomjur, through the Mishmi country, with the double object of checking any tendency on the part of the Mishmis to help the Abors, and of obtaining information for boundary purposes. This step is rendered especially desirable by the advance of China to Rima. There is no reason to anticipate opposition on the part of the Mishmis, whose headmen, indeed, on the occasion of Mr. Williamson's recent journey to Walong, asked that they should be recognised as British subjects. Our object would be a friendly one, and no trouble should arise, provided that previous notice of our intentions is given, and the people are tactfully treated. The escort for this Mishmi Mission would be furnished from the Assam Military Police. We do not propose that the Mishmis should be given a guarantee of protection, but we would leave them, as well as the Abors, in no manner of doubt as to their being under us, or as to their having to look to us for future reward or punishment according to their conduct. We should see no objection to the erection by this party of cairns and boundary stones on what may be considered a suitable frontier line, since this would greatly strengthen our position in the event of future negotiations with China for frontier demarcation. It is not proposed to advance our administrative frontier; our future policy would be to cultivate friendly relations with the Mishmis, and, in the event of our demarcating our external limit, we should explain that we regard it as the line within which Chinese officials should come [*sic.* should be "should not come"?] and that we should periodically send a small police column to visit their country".

The Secretary of State (Lord Crewe) agreed in his telegram* P. dated 24th July 1911 to punitive measures against the Abors as well as surveys and explorations in their country: to the despatch of a friendly mission to the Mishmis: and to the proposal not to advance the administration frontier in that direction and at the same time not to give the Mishmis a formal guarantee of protection.

The objects of the Abor portion of the operations were laid down by the Government of India in the instructions to General Bower, contained in letter No. 1773-E.B.† dated the 25th September 1911.

"2. The Governor General in Council is pleased to vest you with full political control during the progress of military operations and Messrs. Bentinck and Dundas have been appointed as Assistant Political Officers to accompany the expedition, and as such will give you every possible assistance in political matters. Your authority and responsibility will, however, be complete.

3. The objects of the expedition are—

(1) to exact severe punishment and reparation for the murder of Mr. Williamson, Dr. Gregorson, and their party in March last; and, by establishing our military superiority in the estimation of the tribe, to endeavour to compel the Minyongs to surrender the chief instigators and perpetrators of the massacre;

*Eastern Bengal & Assam Secretariat, Political, A, March 1912, Nos. 47-148.

†Eastern Bengal & Assam Secretariat, Political, A, March 1912, Nos. 149-197.

(2) to visit as many of the Minyong villages as possible, and to make the tribe clearly understand that, in future, they will be under our control, which, subject to good behaviour on their part, will for the present be of a loose political nature :

(3) to visit the Bor Abor or Padam village of Damroh, which the expedition of 1873-94 failed to reach. Provided that the Padam Abors behave themselves, the visit to their country will not be of a punitive nature.....

(4) if during the course of the expedition Chinese officials or troops are met, endeavour should be made to maintain amicable relations. If, however, such officials or troops be met within the territory of tribes on this side of recognised Tibetan-Chinese limits, they should be invited to withdraw into recognised Tibetan-Chinese limits, and, if necessary, should be compelled to do so ;

(5) to explore and survey as much of the country as possible, visiting, if practicable, the Pemakoi falls and incidentally settling the question of the identity of the Tsangpo and Brahmaputra rivers ; and

(6) to submit proposals for a suitable frontier line between India and Tibet in general conformity with the line indicated in paragraph 6 [quoted below] of the despatch enclosed. No boundary must, however, be settled on the ground without the orders of Government except in cases where the recognised limits of Tibetan-Chinese territory are found to conform approximately to the line indicated above, and to follow such prominent physical features as are essential for a satisfactory strategic and well-defined boundary line.....

4. I am to add that instructions will be issued to the Officer in charge of the Mishmi Mission, which will explore and survey the country to the east of the scene of your operations, to endeavour to get into touch with the expedition, and to connect his results with yours ; and, in the event of the sanction of His Majesty's Government to the despatch of a mission to the Miri and Dafla country being received, similar instructions will be issued to the Officer in charge of that Mission."

About this time also the Government of India had addressed the Secretary of State in their despatch No. 105*, dated the 21st September 1911 on the "policy to be followed in future on the north-east frontier" of which paragraphs 6, and 10—12 ran as follows.

"6. Lord Minto's Government were of the opinion, subject to further information being obtained in regard to the nature and extent of the territory of the tribes and their position *vis a vis* China and Tibet, etc., that the external boundary should run, approximately, from the east of the wedged shaped portion of Tibetan territory known as the Tawang district, which runs down to the British frontier north of Odalguri in a north-easterly direction to latitude 29°, longitude 94°, thence along latitude 29° to longitude 96° ; thence in a south-easterly direction to the Zayul Chu as far east and as near as possible to Rima ; thence across the Zayul Chu valley to the Zayul Chu-Irrawaddy watershed ; and then along that watershed until it joins the Irrawaddy-Salween watershed. At the same time, in view of the near approach

*Eastern Bengal & Assam Secretariat, Political, A, March 1912, Nos. 149-197.

to, and aggression of, the Chinese on the Mishmi border, they recommended, at the urgent request of the Local Government, that the Mishmis should definitely be informed that they were under British protection, and that we would support them in refusing to have any intercourse or relations with any Foreign Power. His Majesty's Government were however, opposed to any such communication being made to the Mishmis and desired that this, as well as the general question of policy, should be held over for Lord Hardinge's consideration.

* * * * *

10. During the past few months, there have been further developments in the Chinese policy of expansion which it is impossible to ignore. For example, Mr. Hertz's expedition on the Burma-China frontier had no sooner been withdrawn than the Chinese attempted to assert their influence in the country we claim by the despatch of a party with the usual appointment orders and tokens for issue to village headmen ; in April last a party of Chinese appeared in the Aka country close to the administrative frontier of Assam ; the Chinese officials at Rima have sent a summons to the Mishmi tribal headmen to appear before them with a view to the annexation of the Mishmi country ; and Sir John Jordan has recently reported that, in connection with the disturbances in the Poyul and Pomed country in south-eastern Tibet, the Chinese Government have approved of the despatch of a force down the Dihong river towards the Abor country, a measure which, if carried out, may possibly lead to claims to tribal territory which do not at present exist, if not to more serious complications. Circumstances have thus forced us to revert practically to the original proposal of Lord Minto's Government that endeavour should be made to secure, as soon as possible, a sound strategical boundary between China *cum* Tibet and the tribal territory from Bhutan up to and including the Mishmi country, and this should, we consider, now be the main object of our policy. As long as such tribal territory lay between us and our peacefully dormant neighbour Tibet, an undefined mutual frontier presented neither inconvenience nor danger. With the recent change in conditions, the question of a boundary well defined and at a safer distance from our administrative border has become one of imperative importance and admits of no delay, for we have on the administrative border of Assam some of the wealthiest districts of British India, districts where large sums of private European capital have been invested and where the European population outnumber that of almost any other district in India. The internal conditions moreover of our Eastern Bengal and Assam Province are not such as to permit us to contemplate without grave anxiety the close advent of a new aggressive and intriguing neighbour.

11. As to the actual frontier line to be aimed at, we know little more of the area than we did last year, and can, at the moment, only indicate approximately the course of a line which promises to suit our purposes. Such a line is the one defined in Lord Minto's telegram of the 23rd October 1910, which represents roughly the limits of tribal territory on the Assam frontier, which we desire to keep out of Chinese control ; and, subject to such modifications as may be found

necessary as a result of the explorations which will be made during the ensuing cold weather, we consider that that line should be our approximate objective up to which the existing Assam "Outer Line" should be advanced. We do not propose to have a third or intermediate line between the existing "Inner Line" and the new external boundary; neither do you think it necessary for the latter to be regularly demarcated at present, but it will probably be necessary, during the course of the contemplated operations in tribal territory, to erect cairns at suitable points, such as trade routes leading into Tibet, to indicate the limits of our control, and to explain to the tribesmen the object of such marks. One such cairn will be required in the neighbourhood of Menilkrai on the Lohit river, opposite the flags erected by the Chinese from Rina to mark the limits of their territory, but the sites of other cairns can only be determined after enquiry on the spot; and, provided that the sites selected conform approximately to the position of the line defined in the above cited telegram, and correctly represent the limits of locally recognised Tibetan territory, we see no objection to the erection of such marks by officers during the course of their enquiries.

12. The question of future arrangements for controlling and safeguarding the area between the administrative boundary and the new external frontier remains to be considered. We consider that our future policy should be one of loose political control, having as its object the minimum of interference compatible with the necessity of protecting the tribesmen from unprovoked aggression, the responsibility for which we cannot avoid, and of preventing them from violating either our own or Chinese territory; and, while endeavouring to leave the tribes as much as possible to themselves, to abstain from any line of action, or inaction as the case may be, which may tend to inculcate in their minds any undue sense of independence likely to produce results of the nature obtaining under somewhat analogous conditions on the North-West Frontier of India. We admit that, as a natural and inevitable consequence of the settlement of the external boundary, whether the settlement be by mutual agreement or, as in this case, for the time being at any rate, of an *ex parte* nature, it will be necessary to take effective steps to prevent the violation of the new external boundary by the Chinese after the expedition and missions have been withdrawn. The nature of the measures to be adopted, however, cannot be determined until we know more of the country. In one part they may take the form of outposts, while in another only tribal agreements and arrangements may be necessary; but in addition to such local measures as may eventually be decided upon, it is essential in our opinion that, as soon as the boundary has been roughly decided, a formal intimation should be made to China of the limits of the country under our control."

The next reference to policy is contained in telegram No.458-S., dated the 8th August 1911, from the Government of India to the Local Government in which they stated their policy as follows:—

"Reference my No.1382-E.B. of 28th ultimo. Policy on North-Eastern Frontier. Government of India, in consequence of changed

conditions during last eight months, propose to recommend to His Majesty's Government the following general line of policy :—

1. That, subject to such correction as may be found necessary as result of Abor expedition, and connected exploring parties, the boundary to be secured should be that indicated in my wire of 29th September, 560-S., up to which existing outer line should be advanced.

2. That administrative frontier should not be advanced and no intermediate line will be necessary.

3. That our future policy with regard to tribes between lines will be one of loose political control, having, as its object, minimum interference compatible with necessity of protecting them from unprovoked acts of oppression, responsibility for which must be admitted, and of preventing them from violating either Chinese territory or our own, and while endeavouring to leave tribes as much as possible to themselves, to abstain from any line of action, as case may be, which may tend to inculcate in their mind any overdue sense of independence.

4. That we admit necessity to take effective steps to prevent Chinese violating new boundary, after expedition and missions retire, but nature of measures cannot be decided until we know more of country. They may take the form of outposts in one place, and only tribal agreements and arrangements in another.

5. That it is not proposed to regularly demarcate new boundary at present, but it may be desirable to erect "cairns" at suitable places such as routes leading into Tibet to indicate limits of our control and to explain to tribes object of such marks. Sanction of His Majesty's Government would, however be required before any cairns are erected."

The Lieutenant-Governor accepted this policy.

(b) *The Expedition*.—The Expedition was composed of both military and police units. The latter consisted of 725 officers and men drawn from the Naga Hills, Lushai Hills, Lakhimpur and Dacca Military Police Battalions, under the command of Major C. Bliss, Commandant of the Naga Hills Battalion. The former included the 1/8th Gurkhas, the 32nd Sikh Pioneers, a company of the 1st King George's Own Bengal Sappers and Miners, and a detachment of 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles. They were accompanied also by two 7-pounder guns which "proved to be a useless encumbrance".

Messrs. A. H. W. Bentinck, I.C.S., who had been Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, and W. C. M. Dundas of the Police, were appointed Assistant Political Officers. Major-General H. Bower was in command and was also Chief Political Officer, and he assumed his duties at the Base Camp of Kobo, 6 miles above the junction of the Poba river with the Brahmaputra on the 6th October 1911.

The days spent in October at Kobo before the Expedition actually started, were utilised in making contact with the Padam Abor *gams* not excluding those of Damro, the Chief Padam village which had caused so much trouble in 1894. The local *gams* of the Passis and Minyongs proved of value, particularly Mulliem of Balek, a Passi,

who died at an advanced age only in 1939. The main column commenced their advance on 28th October, no very serious opposition was encountered anywhere, and with the fall of Kebang* on 9th December 1911, the active opposition of the tribes came to an end. The general effect of the military operations is those described at pages 49† and 69 of the "Official Account".

"With the fall of Kebang the active opposition of the tribes came to an end. The operations had been uniformly successful and had avoided the regrettable incidents of former campaigns, and, although the actual loss inflicted on the tribesmen was small, the moral effect of the campaign must have been very great. The Abors had been driven out of their selected and carefully prepared positions without difficulty; they had been shown that an armed force could visit with ease any part of their country; their crops and villages had been destroyed wherever resistance had been offered; and a road had been made through the heart of their country. The force employed by us must have seemed very large to them, for the Naga carriers, of whom there were several thousand, from their numbers, their bearing and their fierce aspect, no doubt appeared very formidable. Again, the rapid fire to which they were subjected for a brief period at Kekar Monying, although its actual effect was small, must have been very terrifying to savages unaccustomed to the report of firearms. Had it been possible to intercept their retreat and harass their scattered parties in the depths of the jungle the effect of the campaign must have been greatly increased.

Previous to the expedition, the power of the Abors was greatly overrated owing to the reverses suffered by former expeditions. It was not realised that the tribe were quite incapable of combination, and that the failure of these enterprises was due, not so much to the strength of the enemy, as to lack of organisation on our part. For this reason, the strength of our force on this occasion was unnecessarily great, and whenever the enemy made a stand, they found themselves so greatly outnumbered that they realised that resistance would be useless and they fled before heavy loss could be inflicted on them.

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"The expedition resulted in the punishment of all the hostile villages and the exaction of punishment for Mr. Williams's murder. All the men who had taken a leading part in this were tried and punished and practically all the looted property was restored. The Minyon tribe was crushed and its villages brought to submission, while the power of Kebang, which for years had terrorised its neighbours, was finally broken. This village lost a large number of its fighting men, and its reputation was so shattered that it will probably take years to recover.

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*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1912, Nos. 140-200.

†Official Account of the Abor Expedition, 1911-1912. General Staff, India, 1913.

“The disgrace and memory of our former defeat was wiped out and the tribes were shown that, while resistance to the British was useless, we could with ease visit any part of their country. The tribes who had not prove themselves openly hostile, were visited by friendly missions, which behaved with great judgment and tact, proving to the people that, while the hand of the British was heavy in dealing with aggression or avenging insult, nothing was to be feared by the well-behaved.

“Many of the weaker tribes had been quite debarred from visiting the plains in order to trade, and had, in general, been tyrannised over by their moral powerful neighbours. The advent of the British and the messages they conveyed made clear to all that weak and strong alike would be allowed to visit the plains and that no tribe was in future to be prevented from doing so by another, while our ability to enforce this could no longer be questioned.

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“The geographical results of the expedition, although not as full as had been expected, owing to the climate and physical difficulties of the country, were still of great value. Practically the whole of the country was surveyed accurately as far as latitude $28^{\circ} 40' N$. The whole of the valley of the Yamne was surveyed up to the snow ranges, the Shimang river was mapped throughout its entire length; the course of the Siyom was roughly traced; and the valley of the Dihang was followed as far north as Singging, Latitude $28^{\circ} 52'$ (approximate), a point within 25 or 30 miles of the most northern Abor village. The identity of the Dihang with the Tsangpo, though not absolutely proved, was at any rate practically established, and there is little doubt that part of the district traversed by Kinthup in his famous exploration from the north, was visited.

“Although it was not possible to determine accurately the natural frontier between the Abor country and Tibet, a rough idea of its nature and position was obtained. Points on the great snow range to the north were definitely fixed and a way was paved for an accurate determination of the boundary in the future while the chances of Chinese aggression in this region were greatly reduced.

“Although there was little actual fighting, the successful conclusion of the military operations was no small achievement. The popular imagination likes to be fed with accounts of battles and daring, but it is not in these that the whole test of an army lies. The continual struggle with natural difficulties and with hardship and privation without the loss of a cheerful discipline, and the self-control required when dealing with ignorant and arrogant savages, represent a very high standard of military efficiency.”

The total casualties were 1 officer wounded, 2 other ranks killed and 2 wounded, and 3 followers killed and 3 wounded. Severe orders were issued to all the offending villages. Kembang had among other things, to restore all stolen property, to pay a fine of *mithan* and war equipment, and “In future to obey all orders of Government and not

prevent people from trading in the plains". This last point refers to a perennial source of grievance which previous political officers had commented on unfavourably often before and which persists to the present day in the shape of "trade blocks" further North. Similar orders of varying degrees of severity were issued to Rotung, Babuk, Pangi, Sissin, Yemsing and Rengging.

As regards those guilty of the actual crime, two of the 3 murderers of Mr. Williamson were captured and tried as well as 3 other persons who killed members of his party. The two men, Manmur of Yagrung and Tamu (or Namu) of Bosing who were accused of Mr. Williamson's murder, were tried on 2nd April 1912, by a "Military Court", presided over by Mr. Bentinck, with Captains J.F.D. Coleridge and L. S. Smithers as Assessors. Both were found guilty. Manmur was sentenced to transportation for life, since, though he was held to have acted with premeditation, it was also held that he was originally unwilling to consent to the murder but did so under compulsion. (Judging from the contents of the Court's Order, he was exceedingly lucky to escape the death penalty). The other man was given 10 years, on the ground that he was younger, of a weaker character and acted under Manmur's influence. Three other men, Buissong of Bosing, and Lutiang and Popiom, both of Yagrung, who were found guilty of killing Williamson's coolies were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. It was not until the expedition was over that the 2 men of Kebang, Lamlaw and Bapuk, who murdered Gregorson were surrendered to Mr. Dundas. They were found guilty of murder on 18th May 1912, by the Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur, Colonel Herbert, and sentenced to death, sentences which, in view of the sentences referred to above, gave the Chief Commissioner considerable embarrassment when they came before him for confirmation. "After prolonged and anxious consideration" he decided to commute them to transportation for life. It is sufficiently clear from paragraph 5 of the Chief Commissioner's letter No.69-P.T., of the 7th July 1912, that all these culprits were decidedly fortunate.

An echo of these proceedings was heard in 1922 when by chance it came to the District Officers' notice that one Tarung Tamuk, a *gam* of Pangi village, was identical with the man Lunning who was mentioned in Bentinck's judgment as one of the actual murderers but who was not placed on his trial then. This fact was confirmed by Namu (or Tamu) who had recently returned from the Andamans after serving his sentence, as well as by Manmur who made a statement while still serving his sentence there. When the Political Officer, Mr. O'Callaghan, report this, it was pointed out to him by Government that this Lunning, though one of Williamson's foremost assailants, was, according to Bentinck's own reports used as an intermediary to bring other tribesmen in and had received promises of protection by implication. This is a point that Bentinck himself made in reporting the result of the trial in his letter from Kobo, dated the 5th April 1912. No further action could therefore be taken against the man, guilty though he was.

At the end of December, Mr. Bentinck, with 5 British Officers and a party nearly 300 strong set out to visit as many Minyong villages as could be reached in 26 days. No part of the country they were to visit, except Pangi and Komsing, had ever before been penetrated. The Column was received in friendly fashion. Only a few small Minyong villages were not visited. In Komsing they found some of Mr. Williamson's remains which the people of Komsing had buried. These were re-interred on 13th April 1912 at Dibrugarh*. In Komsing and below Pangi were later erected cairns in memory of Williamson and Gregorson. Thereafter they visited the important villages of Riu, Geku (the chief village of the Pangis—a small tribe wedged in between more powerful tribes, which inhabits the Riu bank of the Yamne and extends into the Dihong Valley at Geku), Riga (the metropolis of the Minyong and the biggest village of all that the column met with, containing from 250 to 300 houses), and Simong, opposite Kar ko, of about 220 houses, a village whose people are akin to the Panggis whom they protect. From Simong they continued Northwards, towards Tibet. Their furthest point was Singging, which they reached on 31st January. From there they turned back and reached Simong once more, where they stayed till the 23rd February, enjoying excellent relations with the local people all the time. Bentinck took the opportunity to hold a representative gathering of *gams* at Komkar which was attended by men from Simong, Damro, Riu (Madu and Konying), Panggi and Komkar. At this he explained to them the necessity of behaving properly as subjects of the Queen, and that all were entitled to trade where they liked.

Meanwhile, a party under Colonel D. C. F. McIntyre had been up the Yamne between December and February and had visited many Padam villages including the redoubtable Damro, being received in friendly fashion throughout: another headed by Captain Molesworth, 1/8th Gurkha Rifles, and Mr. Needham visited the Minyong villages on the right bank as far as Parong: a Survey Party under the same two officers went up the Shimang Valley visiting Dosing, Pareng, Yingku (or Yuying), their object being to work from a 10,900 feet hill at the head of the valley: and Captain Dunbar toured to Kom-bong, the principal Gallong village and one held in respect as far north as Riga.

Mr. Bentinck's "Political Report" on the expedition dated the 23rd April 1912, recounts not only the details of Messrs. Williamson's and Gregorson's murder, and the course of the Expedition from the political point of view, but also furnishes proposals as to the future of these tracts.

He sums up the "results and conclusions" of his 3 months tour in this hitherto unknown country as follows. ".....our [previous] knowledge of them was confined to those nearer villages which, so far from forming the door opening on those beyond, have acted as the curtain shutting off us from them and them from us, so that trade was forced into circuitous routes, or in most cases in the opposite and

* Assam Secretariat, Pol., B, June 1912, Nos. 46-60.

unnatural direction, and the thoughts of men turned rather to the country across the great snowy range than to the plains towards which they faced. The worst side of the Abor character was also emphasized by our previous failures in the Minyong country and by the two unfortunate incidents—the massacre at Bodak (Bordak) and the stopping short of Damro, which have tended to overshadow the otherwise marked success of the 1894 expedition. What Mr. Williamson might have done single-handed in opening this country had his life been spared, can be estimated from the brilliant success of his five years at Sadiya, which opened a new era in our relations with the hills, work to which I cannot help thinking that sufficient justice has not yet been done. He had at least shown that the Abor is not the truculent, intractable savage, which previous accounts generally made him, but there had not been time for this view to gain general acceptance. Quite recently the Abor has been characterized by those who know him least as dirty, sullen, lazy and treacherous. It may be taken that those who visit a new tribe expecting to find an unpleasant savage will not be disappointed wherever they may go, but it does not follow that they are correct. In the case of the Abors, I concede the dirt, as far as the men are concerned; our friend the Riga Gam spoken to on the matter replied to the effect that dirt was the poor man's blanket; I grant also a certain surliness, but only when their fears or suspicions are aroused; it must be remembered that to the vast bulk of the people whom we visited we were utter and mysterious strangers, and that our appearance, our habits, our methods, and our designs were alike new and unintelligible to them. The strong force which accompanied all parties might have produced a more or less reluctant acquiescence, but not the genial welcome, the ready and often generous hospitality, the tolerance of our strange ways, and the interest in our doings and belongings which we found at almost every village we entered; of the fearless confidence with which they approached us, I have already spoken. To their indolence their vast and laboriously prepared *jhums* are an emphatic contradiction; in this work men, women, and children all share, and in a country where vegetation runs riot few sights are more remarkable than many hundred acres of steep hillside cleared not only of jungle, but at sowing time of every weed and blade of grass, and this by means of a *dao* and a pointed bamboo. Treachery has for so long been branded on the Abor that to refute the charge fully would need an examination of every occasion on which the charge has been made; I do not propose to reproduce my conclusions after such examination beyond pointing out that what has been attributed to Abor treachery has always been the outcome of an assumption on our part of a friendliness or a fear or an unwillingness to take action on theirs which the circumstances did not justify. I do not mean to hold up the Abors as Bayards, but they have a code and recognise the obligations which it imposes.

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“The Abors have reached a period of their history at which they must either adopt new methods, such as we are able to teach them, or must risk their whole existence. Their methods of warfare and

defence have been proved to be puerile except against one another, and their methods of agriculture have brought them to such a pass that unless they are superseded by better every child that grows up brings them nearer starvation ; already hill-sides so steep that it is surprising that even a plant can maintain its hold have been brought under cultivation, and there are many clearings on whose fresh lap the swart star can look very sparsely indeed. Fields are cropped for three years in succession, and the jungle is then allowed to grow up again for as long as possible, varying from about six years where the pressure on the soil is greatest, as at Riga, to as much as 10-12 years in a few more fortunate villages. For many miles together there is no virgin soil left, and my impression from seeing many score of *jhums* in all stages was that the soil, partly from too rapid rotation and partly from the tendency of grass jungle (*khagri* and *ikra*) to replace and check the saplings, is steadily deteriorating, while some of the oldest lands, on account of repeated *jhuming*, steep hill-sides, and heavy rains, are suffering from denudation. The position, though serious, is one that can be met by improved methods, as, for instance, terracing like that practised in the Naga Hills, and improved implements, which will enable more to be done than a mere scratching of the surface."

As regards slavery he states as follows: "The Abors generally obtain their slaves from one another by purchase, but prisoners of war also become slaves ; they feed with the family and are not in ordinary life distinguishable by any mark from free men. A master has full powers over his slaves, but attempts to escape are rare because if a slave has been sold, he will not better himself by returning home, where he is likely to starve, and if he has been captured, his own village is not likely to welcome him back, because he provides one of those causes of friction which as I have said above, the Abor is anxious to avoid. The only place of refuge is the plains, and under the existing rule the slave has to work out his ransom ; this in the case of men (for women readily find a protector who is willing to pay the amount fixed) generally means that either a Government officer has to find him work until his wages amount to the required sum, or else he borrows the amount and becomes a bondman of his creditor. The owner in any case has to wait some time for his money and in the interval to replace the labour which he cannot do without. It is probable that in the future such runaways will be more frequent, and the only alternatives at present open are either to refuse to recognise slavery at all or to make prompt restitution of the value to the owner. I have explained why the former course will cause grave injustice and hardship to the owners ; the latter can only be effected if officers who have to deal with such matters have at their disposal a fund from which they can pay the claimants and treat the amount as a loan to the runaway, for the recovery of which certain powers will be required. The case for abolition here is not on a footing with abolition elsewhere, and it should therefore be our endeavour to introduce a currency as soon as possible and to foster the growth of a labouring class. Slaves, it may be added, are generally kindly treated."

His remarks regarding the Menbas, who have come to figure prominently in the political history of recent years are as follows.

“47. The three last villages on the right bank—Kopu, Jeling, and Shirang—are occupied mainly by the Menba, though Abors also inhabit them. The Menba appear to be emigrants from the country on the other side of the snows and therefore originally Tibetans in the geographical sense. They are, however, in no way under Tibetan authority, nor is the tract that they inhabit regarded as in any way different from the rest of the area occupied by Abor tribes. A Tibetan sardar of coolies that we had with us denied that either they or the tribes beyond the range are Tibetans, and this is borne out by the fact that the Abors speak of the people in the area under Tibetan control by another name. I have described how we met two Shirang men at Gette; though different in feature from the Abors’ they were not much like the usual Tibetan and wore neither boots nor hats.”

For the future administration of the country his views were these—

“ Even before the expedition the area under the control of the officer at Sadiya had become too large for one man, and for the western part of it Sadiya was distant, inaccessible, and probably the Assistant Political Officer was away. The importance of the Mishmi area has now greatly increased, and cannot be separated from the Khamti country. These tribes and the Singphos will afford ample work for the Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya, and he should, in my opinion, become an officer corresponding directly with the Local Administration, and not through the Deputy Commissioner at Dibrugarh. The last named should in my opinion be relieved of his responsibility for matters beyond the line of administered country; his ordinary district work is heavy and increasing as the district is markedly progressive, and he had either to neglect frontier matters or to sacrifice his other work to them. Frontier work has now become so extensive and important that a whole time officer, who should, in my opinion, have the status of a District Officer, appears to me an imperative necessity. While therefore the Sarkari Nagas, who are in easy reach of Dibrugarh by rail and visit the district in large number for work, must remain under the Deputy Commissioner he will not have other political duties. This will leave the whole of the Abor country, both the eastern and western sections, the Daflas (including the “ Hill Miris ”) and the various tribes westwards to the Bhutan border, together with the plains area from the Dijmur-Sengajan path to the Dibong, to form the new charge of which I have spoken, and this will be too large for the efficient control of one officer, even with assistants. The plains area I had proposed should fall under Lakhimpur district, but it is likely to be so intimately connected with the hills on account of migration to it from above that to put it under a different authority would tend to cause delay, friction, and divergencies of procedure. It should form a subordinate charge and may include the villages in the hills contained roughly in a line following the Simen, Sipu, and Siyom and thence with the Dihong as its northern boundary; the headquarters, I would suggest, should be at Pasighat, where the site is much better than had been at first supposed. The inner country cannot be controlled from a point nearer the plains than Geku, and it should not be necessary to

go further. Geku possesses an admirable site for a post, which being under grass will not diminish the area of cultivation and it is remarkably central, being 2 days' journey from Damro, 1 day from Riu, Riga, or Komkar, 2 days from Simong, and if the Dihong can be crossed below Rengging only 5 days at most from Passighat: there is no other place within easy reach of, and so accessible to, so many different tribes. Another subordinate charge will be required for the area between the Siyom and the main stream of the Subansiri and at least one more for the country west of the Subansiri."

General Bower, who commanded the Abor Expeditionary Force held much the same views, and recommended in his letter No.147-A,* dated the 16th January 1912 that the Frontier should be divided into 3 sections (1) Central, for the Abors, under 2 Political Officers, one of whom would be in charge of all 3 sections, with headquarters at Rotung;

(2) Eastern for Mishmis and Khamtis, with an Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya; (3) Western with an Assistant Political Officer for the whole country from the Subansiri to Bhutan.

He proposed Military Police Garrisons at Rotung, Pasighat and Kobo.

Both he and Mr. Bentinck were agreed that the time had come to separate these areas from the control of the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur.

(c) *The Mishmi Mission* - As is stated on a previous page, the Secretary of State agreed to a Mission visiting the Mishmi country at the same time as the Abor Expedition. The proposals of the Lieutenant-Governor of East Bengal and Assam are contained in his letter No.72-C.P.T.,† dated the 21st August 1911. The Mission was on a large scale as regards officers—Mr. Dundas was in chief Political control: Major C. Bliss commanded the Escort of 150 Military Police, assisted by Captain J. Hardcastle: Captain W. H. Jeffrey 73rd Carnatics was Intelligence Officer: Captain F. M. Bailey was Assistant Political Officer: Captain E. P. Le Breton, R.E., commanded No. 5 Company, Sappers and Miners, assisted by Lieutenant J. F. Gray, R.E.,: Captain E. J. C. McDonald, I.M.S., was Medical Officer: Captains H. G. Bally, Commandant and L. A. Bethell, 10th Gurkha Rifles were with the Dacca Military Police: Captain C. P. Gunter, R.E., and Lieutenant Morshead, R. E., were with the Survey Party: Captain R. A. H. Robertson, 30th Punjabis, Commanded the Lines of Communication. It was intended that Mr. Dundas should go towards Rima as far as the place where the Chinese planted flags between Menikrai and Walong. In letter No.488 C.G. ‡ dated the 5th October 1911, Mr. Dundas was instructed that

" 8. If during the course of the mission Chinese officials or troops are met endeavour should be made to maintain amicable relations. If, however, such officials or troops be met within the territory of tribes

*Assam Secretariat Pol. A, June 1912, Nos. 140-200.

†Eastern Bengal & Assam, Pol., A, March 1912, Nos. 17-148.

‡Eastern Bengal & Assam, Pol. A, March 1912, Nos. 149-197.

on this side of recognised Tibetan-Chinese limits, they should be invited to withdraw into recognised Tibetan-Chinese limits and, if necessary, compelled to do so."

A little earlier* the Secretary of State had inquired whether it was "possible or advisable to take any steps to at once make clear to the Mishmis" the fact that they were under us and must look to us for future rewards or punishment, the proposal which Lord Morley so firmly turned down in October 1910 when made to him by the previous Viceroy, Lord Minto. The Lieutenant-Governor thought it was very desirable and in a telegram* dated the 4th September 1911 he was desired by the Government of India to make the communication.

The Mission eventually was directed along two lines (i) the Sisseri and Dibang Valleys, (ii) the Lohit Valley.

(i) *The Dibang or Nizamghat Column*.—This was under command of Captain Bally and had attached to it as Political Officer Captain F. M. Bailey. Captain Bethell of the Lakhimpur Military Police and Lieutenant A. de R. Martin, R.E., accompanied it, with 150 officers and men of the Dacca Military Police, and 10 men of the 1st (K.G.O) Bengal Sappers and Miners. The objects of the column were—

- “ (a) to enter into friendly relations with the Mishmis ;
- (b) to inform the Mishmis that for the future they will be under British control exclusively and must accept no orders except for the present from the Political Officer, Mishmi Mission, and thereafter from the Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya ;
- (c) to further inform them that, in return for the protection afforded, they must unhesitatingly obey orders and provide coolies for work on the track, which is about to be improved, between Nizamghat and Amili and to carry such loads for the column as they may be ordered ;
- (d) to inform the people that all the land up to the foot of the hills is British, and that all cultivation on it makes the village to which such belongs liable for poll tax and that this tax must in future be paid ;
- (e) to order the people that all raiding in the plain must cease, as must all inter-tribal feuds and raiding, which should be always referred to the Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya for settlement and orders ;
- (f) to inform the people that all prohibition against visiting Sadiya and trading will be withdrawn as long as orders are obeyed ;
- (g) to select a line for a future “bridle track” from Nizamghat onwards to the north, and if time permits, to cut a trace as far as Amili, and in any case, to improve the existing paths.”

*Eastern Bengal & Assam, Pol., A, March 1912, Nos. 47-148.

They toured up the Sisseri between 4th and 19th December 1911, and found the Mishmis of the Sisseri Valley, who constitute the Mi Hi section of the Chulikatas, very friendly: they were evidently in great fear of the Padam Abors of Damroh and Dambuk. A friendly message was even received from Dambuk, to the effect that they were British subjects as much as the Mishmis.

At the end of January a move was made northwards to the Ithun river, and they got as far as Ichigu on the right bank of river of that name which runs in to the Dibang. In all 30 Mishmi villages were visited.

(ii) *The Lohit Valley Column.* — This, under Mr. Dundas himself, went as far as the Yepak river, $\frac{3}{4}$ mile north of the flags set up by the Chinese at Menilkrai. Survey Parties went up as far as Sama on the right bank and to the source of the Sa'al Ti on the left bank, and they collected sufficient material on which to base a good strategical frontier line on either side of the Lohit. The people in the Lohit Valley were every where friendly. Mr. Dundas considered that their general tendency was to favour British protection, though the Chinese had been making great efforts to win their friendship. Out of the whole number engaged 5 British Officers, 86 officers and men of the Sappers and Miners and 31 officers and men of Military Police arrived at the furthest point, Menilkrai (on 4th January 1912)

The physical difficulties they encountered were very great, as the following extract from Major Bliss' report* indicates.

“The communications in the Mishmi Country are by far the worst that in a considerable experience I have ever met with. Before the cart road was cut by the Sappers and Miners, the path from Sanpura to Temeimukh was narrow track, over which jungle hung so low that it was seldom that one could move in an upright attitude. It crosses a large number of rivers of varying sizes and was in parts infested with leeches as late as the middle of November. The road opened by the force has greatly simplified movements over this portion of the country, but even the Mishmi country is entirely cut off from the plains throughout the rains, owing to the rivers rising and the country around Sadiya becoming a huge swamp. Until a road parallel to the rivers has been constructed from Sadiya to the hills, communication must remain only possible by boat. Some line should be found from Sadiya which will lead to the hills without crossing any large river. I do not think this should be difficult when the results of the Survey operations are available.

After leaving Temeimukh, the path enters the hills and the difficulties are at once enormously enhanced. The slopes are so great that large portions of the hills are on the move. At one point the path will be following a knife-edge with 1,500 feet drops on either side. At another there is a precipice on one side and a cliff on the other with the path between little broader than one's boot to walk on. Again,

Assam Secretariat, Political, A, September 1912, Nos. 1-22.

* Brief Narrative of the Mishmi Mission, submitted by Major C. Bliss, I. A. 1911-12.

the path will lead over rocks tumbled aimlessly one on the other with hollows under and between them. Ladders were built in many cases to enable the force to climb steep faces of rock. Sometimes the soil is a slippery clay and at others a crumbling sand with boulders, and these latter are the cause of constant land-slides. Rivers and streams occur at frequent intervals. All these are torrents and must be bridged, as the few that are fordable would nevertheless be dangerous owing to the current. The Mishmis have cane suspension bridges over the larger rivers."

The Sappers and Miners assisted by the Military police cut 37 miles of cart road and built 1843 feet of bridges in 37 days.

VIII. Administrative changes subsequent to the Abor Expedition.—

The proposals of the Lieutenant-Governor (Sir C. S. Bayley) for the future administration of the North-Eastern Frontier, after the troops of the Abor Expedition had been withdrawn, based on the recommendations contained in General Bower's letter No.147-A,* dated 16th January 1912, are summarised as follows in paragraph 9 of his letter No. 53-C. G.,* dated the 22nd February 1912.

"9. *Summary.*—In conclusion, I am to sum up the Lieutenant-Governor's proposals with regard to the North-East Frontier.

- (1) The tribal country should be divided into three sections:—
 - (a) The Central, or Abor, Section, with headquarters at Rotung ;
 - (b) The Eastern Section consisting of the Mishmi Hills and the Bor Hkamti country with headquarters at Sadiya, the Dibrugarh Frontier Tract continuing to be administered from Sadiya as at present ;
 - (c) The Western Section comprising the country between Tawang and the Subansiri river and including the eastern watershed of that river.

For (a) there will be two officers at Rotung, with garrisons at that place, Pasighat, and Kobo, and for (b) two officers at Sadiya working under the supervision of the Political Officer at Rotung. A post will be established near Menilkrai on the site chosen by Mr. Dundas and Major Bliss with subsidiary posts connecting it with Sadiya

To maintain communications a company of Sappers and Miners should be employed further to improve the Rima road and to build bridges over the Delei and the Du rivers, materials for which should be collected at Sadiya during the rains. Any further survey required in the Mishmi or the Hkampti country should also be undertaken next cold weather. For (c) three small missions should be employed to survey and explore the Aka, the Daffa, and the Miri Hills, connecting their work with that done by the Miri Mission under Mr. Kerwood.

(2) In order to provide for the permanent posts in the Abor and the Mishmi country together with their reliefs, a second Lakhimpur battalion with a strength of about 750 men should be formed.

(3) The Dacca Battalion should be transferred to Assam, the portion not required for Tura or Silchar forming the nucleus of the new Lakhimpur Battalion.

* Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1912, Nos. 140-200.

(4) As the Assam Military Police, even when re-inforced by the Dacca Battalion, will not be able to provide sufficient men for all the work which will have to be done on the frontier next cold season, at least the escorts for the missions in the Western Section should be drawn from a Gurkha regiment.

(5) Mr. Dundas should be selected for the post of Political Officer at Rotung, exercising at the same time general supervision over the Eastern Section also. The Political Officers on the North East Frontier should be under direct control of the Chief Commissioner of Assam."

As regards the Central or Abor section he wrote as follows :—

"3. *Central, or Abor Section.*—The Abors have always been the most troublesome tribe on this frontier, and past experience has proved the impossibility of exercising effective control over them from a post in the plains. This experience is not unique, for the Nagas and the Lushais were only brought under control when their country was permanently occupied. The policy hitherto adopted of sending expeditions into the Abor country, inflicting punishment, and withdrawing the force has invariably been misunderstood by the tribes concerned. The temporary occupation has been soon forgotten and fresh trouble has ensued. It should now be definitely abandoned both on the ground of its want of success and because the presence of an aggressive and intriguing neighbour, whom it is absolutely necessary to debar from obtaining influence over the hill tribes on our border, necessitates a reconsideration of the whole position not in regard to the Abor tract alone, but in respect of the whole frontier, from Bhutan to the Hkampti country and the unadministered regions north of Burma. In the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, it is essential to establish a post within the Abor country, preferably among the Minyongs, the section of the tribe against whom the present expedition has been specially directed. Rotung is described by Mr. Bentinck in his letter dated the 22nd December 1912 as an admirable site for the purpose. It promises to be healthy throughout the rains, which seem to be less heavy there than on the southern face of the hills and good building sites are available in the vicinity. Rotung is only two days' journey from Pasighat, where a connecting post would be stationed, and it is near enough to Kebang to prevent that village from giving further trouble. It commands many of the more important paths and would ensure an outlet to the Pangi clan, who are now cut off from the plains by the Minyongs. It is in all respects well adapted to play the useful part played by Samaguting in the early days of British connection with the Naga Hills. His Honour desires, therefore, to support the recommendation of the General Officer Commanding the Expedition that a post garrisoned by 200 rifles should be established at Rotung with a connecting post held by 100 rifles at Pasighat and a small guard of, say, 50 men at Kobo. The road between Kobo and Pasighat is being improved by the Public Works Department, and it is hoped that it will be passable throughout the rains except in the case of a very severe flood."

These proposals were recommended by the Government of India to the Secretary of State in their Telegram No. P., dated the 7th March 1912, but the reply they got in his telegram dated the 14th March 1912* was that he was "most unwilling on grounds of general policy to sanction the establishment of the permanent police posts in the Abor country as this would arouse strong Parliamentary opposition in view of what has been stated by us as to the objects of the expedition." The Secretary of State added that he would "prefer even not to keep a permanent post beyond the Inner Line". The Government of India protested against this in their reply of the 21st March as follows. "It is impossible, we consider, to bring into accord with existing conditions our relations with the tribes as contemplated in our secret despatch dated the 21st September 1911 without the establishment of the proposed posts. It is not proposed to advance administrative boundary, but results of present expedition will speedily vanish and fresh trouble may arise necessitating further operations unless posts are established in tribal territory beyond. Further, complete withdrawal is to be deprecated, in justice to the friendly tribes—see paragraphs 7 and 8 of Bentinck's letter of the 22nd December, a copy of which was forwarded with the Foreign Secretary's weekly letter No.3-M., dated the 18th January 1912. Again, the eventual demarcation of the boundary with China without the proposed posts would necessitate a considerable military force. The posts proposed in the Abor country are, we consider, quite as necessary as the post suggested near Menilkrai by His Majesty's Government, where at least the intermediate boundary appears to be respected and known."

Apparently these protests were heeded and the Chief Commissioner of Assam who had in the meanwhile replaced the now defunct Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam was able to send up his proposals for the administration of this frontier. in his letter No. 69-P.T.,* dated the 7th July 1912.

In this letter Sir Archdale Earle reviewed in a comprehensive fashion the results of the Abor Expedition and the Miri and Mishmi Missions and made his recommendations as follows. As regards Chinese influence, he observed that neither the Abor Expedition nor the Miri Mission found any trace of the Chinese in the country which they explored. Only in the extreme north of the Abor country was there some signs of Tibetan influence. The position in the Mishmi country was different and was such as, in the opinion of the Chief Commissioner, urgently to call for further survey and exploration. The Chief Commissioner quoted with approval a note recorded by the general staff, which recommended as follows.

"(1) A matter of the first importance is the construction of a road up the Lohit Valley as far as Walong. This should be a cart road in the plains section (constructed by the Public Works Department) and in the hill section a good bridle path, with permanent bridges above flood level over the Tidding, Delei and Dou rivers.

* Assam Secretariat, Political, A, September 1912, Nos. 1-22.

For this work the employment of two Companies, Sappers and Miners, and two double Companies, Pioneers, is recommended, the whole under an Engineer Major of experience in such work. The question of the economical strength of the party resolves itself into one of supply and transport. The above party is the minimum that could hope to complete the work in one season, and the maximum for which supplies, together with the bridging material, etc., could be forwarded. Half the strength of the above party with a road survey party, should advance from Sadiya on the 15th September to commence preliminary work from the terminus of the Public Works Department cart tract, in order to facilitate supply matters. The remainder of the party should leave Sadiya on 1st November, and at once commence work on the bridges.

* * * * *

(2) The construction of Military Police posts at Walong, Minzang and near the mouth of the Delei river."

As regards the necessity of posts in the Mishmi country, their arguments were these—

"It is necessary to establish posts in the Mishmi country for the following reasons:—

(1) The Mishmi mountains impose a screen behind which the progress of the policy and movement of the Chinese near our vulnerable north-east salient cannot be observed from within our administrative border, and it is imperative that we should be in a position to watch this progress. Native information, necessarily unreliable, would often arrive too late to be of value.

(2) A wrong construction will be placed, both by the Mishmis and the Chinese, upon our failure to establish posts after the withdrawal of the Mission. The fact that the Mission started on its return journey just at a time when a considerable concentration of Chinese troops was taking place at Rima, will be given undue significance, and the Chinese are skilful in turning such matters to account.

(3) The Taroans of the Delei Valley, who were induced to surrender their Chinese passports to us, will find themselves in a false position if the Chinese demand an explanation, were we not in a position to support them.

(4) The difficulty of future negotiations with China will be much enhanced by an apparent renunciation of territory by us, and our failure to set up boundary marks or occupy any position will be construed to mean that we are not justified in regarding the country as under our control, and acquiesce in the Chinese demarcation.

(5) Mishmis of all clans are anxious to obtain firearms. They have been informed that they cannot expect them from India. The establishment of posts in their country will minimise the danger of their obtaining them from the Chinese.

(6) Advantage should be taken of the present friendly attitude and primitive armament of the Mishmis to consolidate our position."

The Chief Commissioner agreed that Walong was the best site.

As regards general control of the tribal country, the Chief Commissioner proposed a staff on a pretty generous scale. He said—

“The Chief Commissioner would now propose that, so far as political control is to be exercised, the entire tribal area east of the Subansiri-Siyom divide should be in political charge of Mr. Dundas, who should have the status of a Deputy Commissioner and work immediately under the Chief Commissioner. He would require four assistants. One of these would devote his attention particularly to the Lohit Valley ; the second would look after the Bebejiya and Chulikata Mishmis ; the third would deal especially with the Abor Hills ; while the fourth would, in the first instance, assist the Political Officer at headquarters in the administration of the plains area, and would ultimately be concerned with Hkamti Long. It is essential that the Political Officer should be left free to tour as circumstances necessitated in any portion of his extensive charge, and it is almost certain that before long he will require yet further assistance. For the present, however, the Chief Commissioner desires to keep his proposals within as moderate limits as possible. Sir Archdale Earle fully endorses the view expressed in paragraph 7 of Mr. Gruning’s letter No. 53-G. G., dated the 22nd February 1912, that recruits for appointments on this frontier should be drawn mainly from the officers of the Civil and Military Police.....”

As Mr. Dundas’ assistants, Sir Archdale Earle proposed Mr. T. E. Furze of the Indian Police for the Abors ; Mr. T. P. M. O’ Callaghan, also an Assistant Superintendent of Police, for the Lohit Valley ; and, for Assistant at headquarters and the Hkamti Long, Mr. W. J. H. Ballantine, an Extra Assistant Commissioner.

Rotung, which had been recommended in February by Sir Charles Bayley as the headquarters of the Abor section of the frontier, had by now been abandoned under orders of the Secretary of State, and garrisons in the Abor section were maintained at Kobo (25 Military Police) Pasighat (75 Military Police) and Balek (100). It was yet to be decided which of the last two was to be retained as a permanent post.

The important point of trading facilities so often referred to in the past and which is of particular interest in view of later developments in connection with the situation around Karko and other places of recent years, is dealt with in paragraph 16 of the letter, which runs as follows.

“16. This question of trading the Chief Commissioner regards as of paramount importance. Many of our past difficulties and misunderstandings with the various Abor tribes have arisen from the fact that the privilege of trading with the plains was monopolised by a few sections of the community, to whose interest it was to misinterpret our motives and actions. In the course of the Abor Expedition both General Bower and Mr. Bentinck impressed upon all the tribes

visited that trade with the plains would in future be open and unrestricted, and the powerful villages which had hitherto prevented their weaker neighbours from approaching us were solemnly warned that such conduct must cease. The chief sufferers from the high-handed attitude of Kebang and other powerful villages were the Panggis and the tribes lying to the north of them. These people importuned both General Bower and Mr. Bentinck for access to the plains, and have since approached Mr. Dundas with similar requests. If effect is to be given to this policy, and if our relations with the Abor tribes are to improve, the Chief Commissioner considers it essential that a trading post should be established within the Abor country. Kebang have promised obedience to the orders issued by General Bower, and have accepted, as one of the conditions on which peace was made, the stipulation that they will not prevent people from trading in the plains. The promise was made when Kebang were overawed by superior force and suffered from the presence of a body of troops. A breach of the promise could not be overlooked, and, with a view both to obviate the necessity of future hostile operations against Kebang, and in the interests of the other tribes concerned, the Chief Commissioner must urge most strongly that, for at least several months in the year, a trading post, temporarily occupied by a guard of 100 rifles, should be established. As to the precise location of this trading post, Sir Archdale Earle would prefer to reserve his final decision. A post has actually been built at Rotung, but against this it must be remembered that a bridle track has been constructed for ten miles beyond as far as Yambung, and that the villages concerned have been ordered to keep this track in repair. Yambung is situated immediately below the village of Kebang, in the middle of the villages which formerly interfered with trade and have now undertaken to refrain from so doing, and the occasional presence of a garrison there would tend more than anything else to ensure that the promises given were kept. There is another consideration. As already stated, a bridle track has been constructed as far as Yambung, and orders have issued for its maintenance. Both General Bower and Mr. Bentinck have laid the greatest stress on the educative and civilising effect of roads in this country, and from this point of view as well as in the interests of trade, it is essential that this road should be kept open, and, as opportunity affords continued further. In paragraph 11 of this letter the Chief Commissioner has held that if survey and exploration by small parties is to be rendered possible, it will be necessary for the Political Officer to become acquainted with all the important villages in his charge and to establish friendly relations with them and Sir Archdale Earle holds that the best, and indeed the only means, of doing this will be, in the first instance, through the medium of trade and by the establishment of a trading centre in the Abor country. He considers in fact that the entire success of the policy outlined for the control of this area depends on the suggestion now made. Mr. Bentinck has described the scarcity of culturable land when cultivation is carried on by the wasteful method of *Jhuming*, and Mr. Dundas has actually carried out on a small scale a demonstration of the advantages of permanent terrace cultivation such as is effected with the utmost success by the Angami tribe in the Naga Hills. It is by the Abors

thus coming in contact with civilisation and seeing for themselves its benefits that Sir Archdale Earle counts on converting these hitherto troublesome tribes into peaceful neighbours. On this subject Major-General Bower, extracts from whose note are appended to this letters, is in complete sympathy."

The following are extracts from the note referred to (it forms Annexure H to the Government letter):—

"The chief points to notice in our relations with the various Abor tribes is the manner in which certain sections have denied access to the plains to all those living behind them. These sections are the people who have been responsible for many raids and for the massacre of Mr. Williamson's party. Their power has been broken, condign punishment inflicted, and the *purdah* lifted. The villages in the hinterland have expressed a wish to be allowed to trade, and we have explained to the border villages that no hindrance will be tolerated. Common humanity indicates that the Panggi tribe should be allowed access to a trading station. Their condition owing to their inability to obtain salt is pitiable. They will do almost anything to obtain it. They are also anxious to obtain cloth, cooking pots, etc.

The villages to the north, such as Simong, trade with Tibet, but this trade is carried on under considerable difficulties, and the people state that they would much prefer to trade with India if allowed to do so.

* * * * *

To keep touch with the people and at the same time pursue a policy that will tend to their material prosperity should, I consider, be the lines on which our future dealings should be directed.

The first step required towards both objects is the establishment of a trade mart, and Rotung is the nearest suitable point. It has the great advantage of being easily accessible to both the Minyongs and the Panggis, and can be reached by both the Padams and the Gallongs. It has the further advantage of being placed just inside the line across which hitherto the trade barrier existed. It is suitably placed for the maintenance of the mule road recently constructed".

Finally, in paragraph 21, the Chief Commissioner proposed the formation of a permanent Coolie Corps at Sadiya, of a strength of not less than 600, as a permanent nucleus of transport.

The Government of India's orders, approved by the Secretary of State, on these proposals were contained in their letter No.2447-E.B.,* dated the 16th October 1912, and were to the following effect as regards the policy to be followed on the North-East Frontier.

"Central section—

- (1) The retention of the posts established at Balek (100 rifles), Pasighat (75 rifles) and Koiso (25 rifles).

*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, December 1912, Nos.172-173.

- (2) Establishment of a trading post near Ke'bang to be held for several months in the year by a guard of 100 rifles. This post is sanctioned on the clear understanding that the guard only remains there as long as the trading post is open and that its scope is confined to keeping the road open and undisturbed. The Chief Commissioner's proposals for the precise location of the post should be submitted as soon as possible.
- (3) Despatch of exploring and survey parties, with sufficient escorts to overcome any possible opposition, to the Doshung pass and the head-waters of the Siyom and Sigon rivers.

Eastern section—

- (1) Construction of a properly bridged cart and bridle road from Sadiya to the frontier near Menilkrai.....
- (2) Establishment of a Military Police post in the vicinity of Menilkrai. The actual strength and site of the post must be decided later and will require careful consideration. An intermediate post of 100 rifles at Buruphu with a track up the De'ei river to the G'lei Dakhru pass ; and a third post of 25 rifles on the Digaru river with a track up to the Painlon pass. The sites of these intermediate posts not to be finally settled until the road is constructed.
- (3) Employment of two companies of Sappers and Miners and two double-companies of Pioneers, with complete transport under a Major of Royal Engineers, for the construction of the above posts and roads.
- (4) Construction of a light telegraph line from Sadiya to the advanced post with offices at the intermediate posts.
- (5) Construction of a bridle track up the left bank of the Dibong river up to the Dri-Dibong confluence, and the employment of an additional company of Sappers and Miners and an additional double-company of Pioneers, with full transport, for the construction of this track.
- (6) Surveys to be made of the Dibong valley in continuation of the work done last season ; of the Dri river to its source ; of all the inhabited valleys leading into either the Dri or Dibong rivers ; and of the Sisscri valley to connect with the Mishmi and Abor surveys of last season. Escorts and coolie transport to be provided by the Local Government.

Western section—

The next season in this section no survey or exploration on any extensive scale be undertaken, but west of the Subansiri-Siyom divide the Political Officer in charge should increase our knowledge of the tribes and establish relations with them by means of promenades as a preliminary to subsequent survey and exploration.

General—

- (1) *Appointment of officers and pay.*—The entire tribal area, east of the Subansiri-Siyom divide, to be in political charge of Mr. Dundas, with headquarters at Sadiya. Mr. Dundas to have the status of a Deputy Commissioner and work directly under the Chief Commissioner.

Mr. Dundas, who should be left free to tour, to have for the present four assistants. One—Mr. T. P. M. O'Callaghan, Assistant Superintendent of Police, 1st grade—for the Lohit valley; another, to be nominated by the Chief Commissioner, to look after the Bebejiya and Chulikata Mishmis; the third—Mr. T. E. Furze, Assistant Superintendent of Police, 1st grade—to deal especially with the Abor hills; while the fourth—Mr. W. J. H. Ballantine, Extra Assistant Commissioner, 6th grade—in the first instance to assist Mr Dundas at headquarters in the administration of the plains portion of the charge. The portion of the frontier, west of the Subansiri-Siyom divide, to be in political charge of Captain G. A. Nevill, Superintendent of Police. Captain Nevill to have no fixed headquarters, but, after a period of training under Mr. Dundas, to tour about with the object of formulating definite proposals for the control of his charge. Captain Nevill to also work directly under the Chief Commissioner.

- * * * * *
- “(2) *Police.*—(i) Removal of the present Lakhimpur battalion of Military Police from Dibrugarh to Sadiya, where it will be accommodated in temporary quarters until its final location is decided.
- (ii) The immediate recruitment at Dibrugarh of a second battalion of Lakhimpur Military Police, 750 strong, to occupy the quarters vacated by the first battalion.....
- (iv) The maintenance of a permanent coolie corps of 600 men, with sardars, etc., at Sadiya”.

In letter No.1394-P.,* dated the 24th March 1914, Assam addressed the Government of India on the question of defining the inner boundary of the North-East Frontier Tract, the object being “to enable the Political Officers to exercise in a regular manner the measure of political control which has been sanctioned”. The Chief Commissioner proposed “to constitute a new North-East Frontier Tract, which will comprise two political charges and at the same time to define a new Frontier Tract in which the Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur will exercise jurisdiction”. The three new charges would be known as the “Central and Eastern Sections, North-East Frontier Tract, the Lakhimpur Frontier Tract, and the Western Section, North-East Frontier Tract”

*Assam Secretariat, Political, A. April 1914, Nos.1-2.

The proposals were agreed to and by Notifications* Nos.977-E.B., 978-E.B., and 979-E. B., all of the 25th September 1914, the new charges were constituted and their boundaries defined. By Notification No 6709-P, † dated the 16th November 1914, the Chief Commissioner prescribed "rules for the administration of justice in the Central and Eastern Sections North-East Frontier", adding that "these rules will only be enforced in the area under loose political control to the extent which may from time to time appear expedient"

IX. *Minor events, 1912—1923*—(a) *The Dibong Survey and Exploration Expedition of 1912-1913.* ‡—This was organised with the sanction of the Government of India, in pursuance of the policy outlined in their letter No 2447-E.B., † dated the 16th October 1912, and its purpose was to (a) discover the course of the Dibong river and (b) fix the main range of the Himalayas north of the Dibong river basin. Its objects were survey and exploration, safety was to be kept in view but the officer in charge was to "visit as many as possible of the villages in the areas over which loose political control will now be exercised."

It was a big force, including 315 Military Police, 52 Survey personnel, over 1,000 coolies and 10 British Officers. Captain G. A. Nevill, S. P. was appointed to be in charge of the party: Major C. Bliss commanded the Military Police escort: Captain F. M. Bailey was Intelligence Officer: Captain C. P. Gunter, R. E., was in charge of the Survey Party.

The expedition were in the field from 30th November 1912 to 5th June 1913, and Captain Nevill claimed that they had accomplished the whole of the task set before them. The entire country had been surveyed, and excellent relations were established with the inhabitants. The Sisseri Valley, the Matun Valley, the Emra Valley, the Upper Dri Valley, the Upper Tanong Valley and the Ahui Valley were surveyed. When in the Matun region, interesting information was obtained about the incursion of Tibetans which had occurred some ten years previously with disastrous results to the invaders. A few were still left, however, a colony of about 900 souls, in the Matun Valley. Nevill observed that there were constant complaints, as in the Abor country, of "trade-blocks", which he gave orders must be removed. He found no trace of Chinese penetration. In May towards the end of the expedition, Nevill made an attempt to arrest Pongon of Elapoin who had been concerned in a murder and evaded capture ever since. He failed to arrest him, but burnt his village.

(b) *The Rima Road.*—The progress made in carrying out the six schemes enumerated under "Eastern section" in the cold weather of 1912-3 was disappointing. In his letter No.2958-P., dated the 19th June 1913, with which he sent up his proposals for the ensuing season's

*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, December 1914, Nos.19-54.

†Assam Secretariat, Political, A, December 1914, Nos.11-18.

‡Assam Secretariat, Political, B, February 1914, Nos. 153-162. (Capt. Nevill's Report).

work, the Chief Commissioner explained how the Public Works Department constructed a cart road 22 miles long from Sanpura to Paya, and a mule road of 52 miles from Paya to Pareliang. Beyond the Tidding Sappers and Miners and Pioneers, under the command of Colonel C. W. Somerset, 48th Pioneers, were employed. It soon became clear that no more than the Lohit Valley road could be attempted, and item (3) of the programme was postponed, while the men were also withdrawn from the work on item (5). Great physical difficulties were encountered, and finally work had to be abandoned owing to heavy and continuous rain from April to May. A mule track had been constructed to a point 8 miles from Minzang, at which instead of going on to Walong, they had to decide to stop, the withdrawal from Minzang entailing severe hardships and difficulties.

(c) *The "Walong Promenade" of January-March 1914.*—The Secretary of State's sanction was conveyed in the Government of India's telegram No.2657-E.B.* dated the 19th November 1913. The expedition† was in the charge of Mr. T. P. M. O'Callaghan, Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya, accompanied by Major C. Stansfeld and Lieutenant H. R. Harington of the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles and an escort provided by that regiment. Captain McDonald, I.M.S., was Medical Officer. Rima was visited at the invitation of the Tibetan authorities, and cordial relations established. Sir Archdale Earle's views as to what should be done as regards the frontier were given in letter No.2025-P., dated the 6th May 1914 as follows.

"3. Mr. O'Callaghan's report confirms the information in the possession of the Chief Commissioner that there are at present no Chinese troops anywhere in the neighbourhood of Rima. It urges nevertheless the importance of carrying the Lohit Valley road to our frontier, and of establishing a post as near the frontier as is practicable at the earliest possible date. This view is shared by the Chief Commissioner, but he realises that, for reasons which will presently be stated, it will probably be found advisable to move slowly in the coming cold weather. He thinks, however, and he trusts that the Government of India will agree in this view, that the impossibility of recognising a Chinese boundary in the neighbourhood of Menilkrai has been finally established, and he regards Mr O'Callaghan's action in removing the boundary posts as thoroughly justified. He has all along held that our boundary should begin at the junction of the Tho Chu stream with the Lohit, and that the road should be continued up to this point. In your telegram No.127-C., dated the 2nd March 1913, the Government of India found themselves unable to accept this proposal, holding that the Tho Chu stream was clearly within Tibetan limits. The Chief Commissioner was compelled to ask for a reconsideration of this decision, and did so in Major Kennedy's letter No.358-C., dated the 17th September 1913, to which no reply has yet been received.

Assam Secretariat, Political, A, May 1914, Nos. 17-64.

*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, September 1914, Nos. 1-86.

†Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1914, Nos. 5-13.

4. Another matter, as regards which Sir Archdale Earle considers that there can no longer be two opinions, is the location of the ultimate post on the road. Mr. O'Callaghan supports all the officers who have visited the locality in selecting Walong, and the Chief Commissioner has little to add to what was stated in my letter No.22-T.C. dated the 23rd January 1913. The position is materially altered by the undoubted possibility that, in a few years, the garrison of the post could be rationed locally, while the experience of the promenade shows that Mishmi transport will be available in increasing volume for the carriage of the stores and rations, which must be sent up from Sadiya, and for reliefs. Sir Archdale Earle is not at present prepared to put forward definite proposals for the establishment of a post at Walong in the coming cold weather, but, if the Government of India are prepared to accept the necessity of this post, the case will be further examined, and the knowledge gained in the trifling operations which it is proposed to undertake, and which will be presently described, will be utilised. The possibility that the Tibetan authorities will improve communications between Walong and Rima, and that thereby a valuable trade route will be opened, is an attractive one, and it must be remembered that this road, if constructed, could readily be rendered impassable by the Walong garrison should signs of Chinese aggression render this course advisable at any time. It is also possible that, with the completion of the road and with local supplies and transport available to a large extent, it may not be necessary to have a chain of connecting posts between Sadiya and Walong as was at first proposed.

The party started on January 1st, 1914 from Sadiya: they reached Minzang on the 29th: and Tilam on the 8th February, passing on the way at Menilkrai the Chinese boundary post: and on February 11th rode into Rima, the party consisting of O'Callaghan, Stansfeld, Macdonald, Harington, Sergeant Howard, Supply and Transport Corps, and 3 Gurkha Officers and 36 Rifles of the 1/8th. They exchanged visits with the Tibetan officials the attitude of whom was most cordial. On the 13th February they left Rima. While at Menilkrai on this occasion, O'Callaghan took the opportunity to remove both the boundary pillars which the Chinese had put up 3 miles south of Walong and which Dundas found there in 1911, as well as a fresh one which had been put up on June 9th, 1912.

O'Callaghan's views as to the establishment of a post at Walong were expressed as follows.

".....I am more than ever convinced of the necessity of the finishing of the road to our frontier and the opening of a post as near our frontier *as soon as possible*. From Walong to Rima, there is no difficulty in road making and the Lohit Valley road—already constructed and open up to Mankum—only required continuation to Manglor flat, a distance of less than 30 miles, to make the opening and rationing of the post a practicable scheme. I trust it will be clearly realised that a small force, operating from Walong, could occupy Rima and hold the Rong Tho and Zayul Valleys in 24-30 hours and, *vice versa*, a force moving from Rima can unopposed be in position on Menilkrai flat within 36 hours and effectually prevent any advance up the Lohit Valley. Should delay be made, it is not impossible that

in the years to come it may take much more than the resources which the Local Administration will have at its immediate command, to assert our legitimate rights and claims, which the ready completion of the already sanctioned but uncompleted scheme for the Lohit Valley will confirm.

Another important point in connection with the establishment of a post at Walong is that of the immense cost rationing the post from Sadiya would entail. I made enquiries locally and am satisfied that within a few years the majority of the rice and other items required for the supplies can be procured locally, either grown or purchased. Large quantities of grain are raised locally and at or near Rima and up the Rong Tho Chu and much of the grain trade could, I think, be diverted southwards.

With the construction of the properly graded mule road to the frontier, it is to be hoped that a trade route, capable of progressive development, will be created and a high road secured to Tibet and perhaps beyond, in no way inferior to the present route from Bengal through Gyantse in point of distance and in a few years of economic and strategic importance. The eastern and south-eastern Tibetans will quickly realise the advantages of their proximity to the markets of India."

The cautious policy adopted in the new Frontier Tract for the first few years after its formation is described in Mr. Dundas, report for the year 1917-18 as follows.

"During the year the remaining few Abor and Singpho villages and all Khamtis were brought under administration and assessed to poll-tax. The district is now completely formed as far as the Simen river. West of that stream and as far as the Subansiri the country is comparatively unknown and the first point to be decided on is a definite boundary with the Lakhimpur district, which cannot be done until the area is properly surveyed. Parties were at work on it during the year, but the result of their survey has not yet been communicated.

The plains as far as the foot of the hills have always been claimed as British territory. It was not however expedient to enforce this claim until recent years, and several Abor villages, all the Khamtis and half the Singphos enjoyed immunity from taxation. I began with the most powerful villages in which strong opposition to any impost was to be expected, and in 1915-16 brought the large Padam Abor villages Bomjur, Dambuk, Silluk, Mimasipo, Mebo and Aiyeng under administration not without critical moments when trouble was barely averted. The example influenced the smaller Mishmi villages between the Dibang and Dihong who offered no opposition and began to pay poll-tax the same year. Next year the process was extended to the Pasi-Minyong and Minyong villages near Pasighat and to those Singphos and Nagas living to the south and west of the Noa Dihing. During the year under report the remaining Abors as far as the Simen river, the rest of the Singphos and all the Khamtis have been assessed to poll tax and are now British subjects. Once the difficulties with the Padam Abors were surmounted, the rest was simple. The test applied in bringing a village under administration was the fact of having any portion of its cultivation in the plains. None of the Padam villages

now British are exactly in the plains but the greater part of the cultivation of each is. The same test was not found practicable in the case of the Pasi-Minyongs, Minyongs, and the Galongs in the Pasighat subdivision. There between the Dihong and Simen I made the Bapur Torne ridge the boundary and taxed every village on its slopes and spurs running down to the plains. They are easy of access to Pasighat. The people have since the Abor Expedition and the establishment of a post at Pasighat been very friendly, bringing all their disputes to us for decision. The transition in their case was not abrupt, and they had the example of villages infinitely more powerful submitting to taxation. They are contented now under close administration, hardly realising that conditions were ever different. Pasighat has been happy in the quality of the officers posted there."

On the 24th November* 1918, a sepoy was murdered at Nizamghat by three men of Elapoin (Mideren Mishmis) 6 days march from Nizamghat. In sending up proposals for an expedition to punish the perpetrators of this outrage, the Chief Commissioner, Sir Nicholas D. Beatson-Bell gave a history of the case as follows.

"2. The murder of the rifleman appears to have been but another step in a long series of blood feuds. In the month of July 1905, as reported in paragraph 13 of the Report on the Frontier Tribes of Eastern Bengal and Assam for the year 1905-1906, three British subjects were murdered by Bebejiyas near the Dikrang block-house. This outrage seems to have been committed in retaliation for the detention in jail of a man named Pongon, during the Mishmi Expedition of 1900. The chief culprits in the murder of 1905 were found to be the same Pongon and one Taji Mideren of Elapoin village in the Ithun Valley. In consequence of the murder a blockade was declared against both the Bebejiya Mishmis and the Chulikatas through whose territories the murderers had passed. This blockade was maintained down to the time of the Mishmi exploration of 1912, subject only to some relaxation in the case of friendly villages. In 1913 Captain Nevill, while engaged in the Mishmi exploration, visited Elapoin and tried to arrest Pongon and his confederates, but found the village deserted. Pongon refused to come in, so Captain Nevill burnt the houses of Pongon and of his relations and also those of Taji and Tali who were concerned in the 1905 murder. Nothing more happened until December 1917, when Taji Mideren came down to Sadiya, apparently thinking that the outrage of 1905 has been forgotten. He was arrested, tried, and sentenced to death, and his appeal for mercy having been rejected by the Governor General in Council he was hanged at Tezpur Jail on the 29th January 1918. In his Report on the Frontier Tribes for the year 1917-18 Mr. Dundas, Political Officer of the Sadiya Frontier Tract, wrote as follows:—

"The villagers of Elapoin have now sworn to revenge his death. This is not idle talk. Some innocent person will certainly be ambuscaded and done to death. It may not be this year, but it will happen." The murder of the rifleman in November 1918, a few

*Political, B, December 1919, Nos.1-28.

months after Mr. Dundas wrote that report, is striking evidence of the accuracy of Mr. Dundas' knowledge. In his letter of the 30th November 1918, of which a copy was submitted to the Government of India with my letter No.9652-P., dated the 6th December 1918, Mr. Dundas reported that he had received information that the persons responsible for the murder of the rifleman at Nizamghat were Ekhrome Mideren, Bapo Mideren and Kosa Mideren of Elapoin, and it seems certain that the murder of the rifleman at Nizamghat was the work of Pongon and his confederates in retaliation for the hanging of Taji Mideren."

The Government of India were, however, averse to any sort of "military commitments" and they asked that the operations should be deferred.

In December 1919*, the Chief Commissioner reopened the matter, pointed out how we were supposed to be exercising "loose political control" in these areas as approved in Despatch No.105, dated the 21st September 1911 and Secretary of State's orders dated the 8th November 1911), and undertook that the operations would entail no risk of any situation arising which could not be controlled by local forces.

The Government of India agreed on the 31st December 1919, but owing to the lateness of the season the expedition had to be postponed. It took place under Mr. O'Callaghan who had succeeded Mr. Dundas, in December 1920. They reached Elapoin on the 9th December. An ambush was laid for our troops and one Mishmi was shot who very fortunately turned out to be Pongon Mideren himself, the leader and instigator of the whole previous trouble and a constant nuisance for some 25 years. There was no further difficulty and the troops returned to Sadiya by 27th January 1921. Punishment was inflicted where required and many outstanding disputes settled. The Chief Commissioner was satisfied that the result of the expedition had "gone far to re-establish the authority of Government after the enforced non-intervention of the last few years." (Government letter No.1094-P., † dated the 11th February 1921).

In his Administration Report for 1921-1922 Mr. O'Callaghan, Political Officer, stated as follows—

"..... The Minyong of the Dihong Valley rendered what assistance was required of them without open murmur in helping the Survey Party who were working in the foot hills and on the second range, also in the construction of the new memorials to the late Messrs. Williamson and Gregorson on the scenes of their murders in 1911 at Komsing and near Panggi villages. Sir Archdale Earle when Chief Commissioner on his tour in the Abor country in 1913 ordered the construction of memorials suitable to the memory of the murdered officers. These memorials—massive cairns—15 feet high on a 15-foot base were constructed this year, the villages giving, without question or delay, every help demanded of them, and the memorials were placed in charge of the villages concerned with solemn ceremony—some of those present at the ceremonies being undoubtedly the actual

* Political, B, January, Nos.775-781.

† Political, B, April 1921, Nos.243-268.

murderers. It would not be correct to say that the Minyong has forgotten the Abor Expedition of 1911-12 that was despatched to exact punishment and retribution for the treacherous murder of Messrs. Williamson and Gregorson and party but the earnestness of our occupation of the Dihong Valley must never be allowed to openly diminish. More than with most primitive peoples, the Abor responds to signs of thoroughness and strict fairness in our administration."

Railway route
between Assam and
Burma.

The Hukong Valley route for a railway connection between Assam and Burma from Ledo to Sahmaw was surveyed by Mr. F. W. Allum, C.B.E., Engineer-in Chief in 1920 and 1921. His report is dated the 30th April 1922, and the following extracts give the main facts.

"3. Early in the nineties of the last century the desire for a railway connection between India and Burma was so strong that the Government of India appointed Mr. R. A. Way, a very experienced and capable Engineer, to investigate the problem, and he examined three routes in this order:—

- (1) From Chittagong on the Assam-Bengal Railway along the Arakan coast and over the An Pass to the Chindwin river in Burma ; the coast route.
- (2) From the neighbourhood of Lunding on the Assam-Bengal Railway, by way of Manipur, into the Kubaw valley at Tammu, and thence, crossing the Chindwin river near Yuwa, to a junction with the Mu Valley Railway in Burma near Wuntho ; the Manipur route
- (3) From Ledo on the Dibrugarh-Sadiya Railway in the north-east corner of Assam, *via* the Hukong Valley, to a junction with the Mu Valley Railway in the neighbourhood of Mogaung ; the Hukong Valley route

* * * * *

6. In the cold weather of 1895-96 he reconnoitred the third route and estimated its length at 284 miles and the cost at 383 lakhs of rupees."

* * * * *

9 In the winter of 1917-18 Mr. Stevenson, Executive Engineer of the Assam-Bengal Railway, explored the Patkai ridge for a distance of 20 miles west of Way's pass and 25 miles east thereof and discovered the lowest point on the ridge within this distance, the Sympana Saddle. He established the impracticability of any route west of Way's pass and east of the Sympana Saddle.

10. Early in 1919 the Government of India decided to make a preliminary survey of the Hukong Valley Route.....

* * * * *

24. *The Hill Section* dividing the Assam plains from the Hukong Valley, of which the principal feature is the Patkai range, the watershed between Assam and Burma. In the vicinity of the route the range varies in altitude from 6,800 at the Maium Bum to 3,080 at the Sympana Saddle, where the railway will cross it. Extensive spurs

nearly as high as the main range are thrown off in directions indicated by the main rivers, roughly, after a quick turn, parallel to the main range and these spurs throw off subsidiary spurs to right and left, forming a tangled mass of hills through which the main rivers, the Namchik and the Namphuk on the Assam side of the watershed and the Loglai and Turong on the Burma side, present the only practicable route for a railway: the hill sides, especially in the upper portions of the main ridge, are very steep and crimped to an extraordinary extent, like the teeth of a bevil wheel and the soil consists of sandstone or shale covered with a shallow layer of earth in which clay predominates supporting an exuberant growth of tree and bamboo jungle

25. A part of the hill section, from the crossing of the Namphuk to the summit of the Patkai range, lies in the Sadiya Frontier Tract, and the remainder is not under British rule.

* * * * *

43. The length of line, as surveyed, from Ledo in Assam to Sahmaw in Burma is 278.71 miles, of which 17 miles are in the Lakhimpur Frontier Tract, 46 miles in the Sadiya Frontier Tract, both under the Assam Government, 151 miles in unadministered territory (from the Patkai range to the eastern boundary of the Hukong Valley), and 64.71 miles in the Myitkyina district of Burma. The route I recommend, see paragraph 173, will be about 268.36 miles in length."

* * * * *

"70. The proposed route *via* the Namphuk Valley. The extreme costliness of a railway over the Patkais compelled us to look for the shortest practicable route over these mountains and from the Assam plains to Digum Jup this appear to be the line I have shown in dotted red on the map, i.e., Ningrangnong to Nambong Jup on a ruling grade of 0.7 per cent. and Nambong Jup to Digum Jup *via* the Sympana tunnel....."

The cost was estimated (paragraph 173 of Allum's report) at Rs.6,98,66,000.

The potentialities of the Nongyong Lake as a source of power in connection with what was known as the "Hukong Valley Project" were investigated in the course of the Hydro-Electric Survey of India. The report of Mr. B. A. Blenkinsop, officer in charge of the Hydro-Electric Surveys, Assam, dated 1923,* states that "the Hukong Valley power station..... should form an excellent commercial undertaking". Mr. Blenkinsop's succeeding remarks are interesting in view of the long-drawn controversy, as yet unsettled, regarding the Assam-Burma boundary in this area. He observes ".....though situated in the Naga country 40 miles from Namchik, the finished products turned out by the Electro-Chemical factories in connection with this power station would practically be at the present rail head of the Assam-Bengal Railway, for the rough estimate of cost provides for constructing a line from Ledo to the Power House site of the scheme at the foot of the Patkai Range. I understand that the boundary between Assam and Burmah has not yet been finally decided on. If the present

*Report on Hydro-Electric Surveys, Assam, 1923.

territorial boundary as at present shown on the older maps, some 20 miles to the south-east of the Patkai Range, be adopted, then the whole of this project lies in Assam, but if for geographical reasons the Patkai Range is taken as the dividing line, then the Power House and pressure pipe line would be in Assam, while the reservoir would be in Burma. This project, it will be realized, is of intense importance to Assam, for if taken up commercially, it would certainly be a big, if not the decisive factor in the construction of the Indo-Burma connection railway along this route and consequently all that this railway would mean to the further prosperity of Assam."

X. 1928-1941—In December 1928*, Mr. Furze the Political Officer, reported the arrival at Sadiya of Tebu Dendun, the Raja of Po, who had fled before invading Tibetans to sanctuary in British territory. The unrest in Po had started, according to the Political Officer in Sikkim, in the previous year, when the inhabitants refused to pay taxes to the Tibetan Government. Troops were sent by the latter to enforce their orders, and their action resulted in the flight of the Raja to British territory. At the suggestion of the Political Officer, Sikkim, permission was accorded by the Government of India in March 1929 to the Raja to reside in Darjeeling or Kalimpong, it being held undesirable that he should remain so close to Po as Sadiya. In February 1930, however, the Political Officer advised that the Raja should be allowed to remain in Sadiya, advice with which the Governor of Assam concurred, and which the Government of India accepted. A year† later, however, the Raja expressed a wish to return to his own country. While the matter was under reference to the Government of India, he absconded from Sadiya on the 25th April 1931. He was arrested and kept in confinement, but again fled on the 20th July. Information was subsequently obtained to the effect that he had fallen ill and died at the village of Aokan some time in September 1931.

The flight from Sadiya and subsequent death of the Po Raja gave rise to conditions in the northern vil ages of the Abor country, which caused concern to the authorities, as the following extract from the Political Officer's Report for the year 1931-32 indicates.

"The flight of the Po Raja from Sadiya, which had been organized by one of his following Kemi Tsiring, and his subsequent death from exposure brought about consequent reactions in the Abor Hills. Alleging that the Padam tribe had been responsible for his leader's death and for the imprisonment at Sadiya of two Membas who had assisted in the escape, Kemi Tsiring succeeded in persuading the Shimong group of villages to attach Komkar, which is allied to the Padam tribe, and in this unprovoked attack Kemi Tsiring and a small party of Membas also joined. It would appear however, that these warlike operations were organised without the knowledge of the

*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, September 1930, Nos.1-58.

†Assam Secretariat, Political, A, December 1931, Nos.1-49.

Tibetan force which still occupies the Memba country or alternatively had been sanctioned by them only on account of Kemi Tsiring's misrepresentations. The Tibetans, obviously, would not view with displeasure the death of the Po princeling, whose refusal to remit tribute to Tibet and whose action in slaughtering the first Tibetan force which came to extract the outstandings was the direct cause of all the trouble. Possibly with the idea of righting the wrong done by the unprovoked attack on Komkar village, two parties of Membas, led by Tibetans, subsequently visited Shimong and Karko villages, the first mentioned force sending a Memba delegation to Damro. It is reported, but this report is not yet confirmed, that the Tibetans have taken over Shimong and are realizing taxes from that village. Whatever the intentions of these Tibetan-led parties of Membas may have been, such activity in areas under our loose political control, particularly in view of the fact that no official communications on the subject have been received from Tibet, cannot but cause concern.

About the beginning of March, in retaliation for the attack on Komkar earlier in the year, a combined attack on Geku village was made by the villages of Komkar, Riga, Pangkang and Karko. The attacking force found the village undefended and are reported to have killed a number of women and children, but on their return journey they were trapped by the Geku fighting force and in the fighting which ensued they suffered considerably, 11 men being killed and a large number wounded, Komkar being the chief sufferers. The Geku casualties are not known but are also supposed to have been considerable."

Annual Report for 1933-34 relates that in this year "The British Museum Expedition (Captain Kingdon Ward, the explorer botanist, Mr. Kaulback and Mr. Brooks Carrington) passed up the Lohit Valley but separated not far beyond Rima. Captain Kingdon Ward took a route which was approximately the line of the Rongthong Chu North by west, till he could look into the basin of the Dibang, and thence back down the Delei south by west to the Lohit and Sadiya. He was away 9½ months. The other two turned east and then south coming out to Fort Hertz in Burma.

Nothing much was achieved in the way of exploration but the scanty news that got through and subsequent confirmation by letters, revealed conditions which show that the influence of Government is felt far up amongst the Lohit Mishmi tribes who are definitely friendly. The Tibetan Official at Rima was extremely kind and helpful and seems most anxious to establish close relations and trade with Sadiya.

The Cinematograph, which Mr. Brooks Carrington operated, seemed to have aroused neither superstitious fears nor unfavourable comment—which is rather unusual.

The tribesmen were very willing to earn the several thousands of rupees which the expedition brought in to the country. Since all relationships were friendly—the expedition may be considered to have been beneficial.

* * * *

“That the British Museum Expedition could wander about so vaguely and yet return in complete safety without difficulties augurs well for the progress of pacific conditions since the march of Colonel F. M. Bailey some 20 odd years ago, when he ‘found the Mishmis there a disagreeable and hostile lot.’”

The Political Officer referred again to the aggression of Membas on behalf of Shimong and their interference in Abor quarrels.

In November 1933 an outrage was committed by unadministered Chulikatta Mishmis on a village in British Territory within one march of Nizamghat, four children being killed and others injured. The Political Officer (Mr. Grace) was authorised to make a “promenade” in the Sisseri Valley. Mr. Grace carried* this out between 14th February and 5th March 1934 accompanied by Captain Glenn and one platoon of the Assam Rifles. The expedition was successful, many cases were settled by the Political Officer and friendly relations were maintained throughout.

This was followed in October 1934 by a similar promenade up the Dibang by Mr. Grace who was accompanied by Captain Sherman and 6 sections of the Assam Rifles. The object was to exact retribution for certain murders and to settle cases between taxpaying and non-taxpaying villages. The expedition was successful and penetrated above the Ithun by way of Aprunye as far as Ibyni and Aurnli (or Erunli) on the Emra. Immense physical difficulties were encountered and successfully overcome.

In his report for 1936-37, Mr. W. H. Calvert, I.P., the Political Officer, wrote—“With an escort of one British Officer and 25 rifles, the Political Officer carried out a three weeks’ tour in Unadministered territory of the Abor Hills. The column crossed the Dihang River at Yembung, inspected the Memorial to Dr. Gregorson at Pangin and that to Mr. Williamson at Komsing, and proceeded north to Riu and Beging, crossing the river again to Dosing and returning down the right bank of the Dihang River through Yeksing, Pangin, Yembung and Rotung to Pasighat. This is the first occasion villages north of Komsing and Pangin have been visited since the Abor Survey in 1913. The Column was well received everywhere and friendly contact was renewed with the Minyong Abors of the Dihang, Shimang and Siyom valleys. Large representative gatherings of Minyongs took the opportunity of discussing disputes, mostly concerning land, mythun and other property (and actually setting some!) which have been hanging fire for years. I was repeatedly urged to extend my tour further north and was assured of a warm welcome if I would do so.”

* * * *

*Assam Secretariat, Political, B, June 1934, Nos.1300-1329.
Governor's Secretariat, B, Progs. December 1937, No.222.

During March an armed party of Membas came down the Dihang Valley as far as Karko. They brought presents of salt and endeavoured to collect tribute. At Riga, the Minyong parent village, they met with a blank refusal. This village also refused to accept the salt and would not allow the party to pass through or camp in the village, declining to supply coolies.

The annual report for 1937-38 states that—

“Mr. Calvert carried out a tour in the Mishmi Hills so far as the Dou Valley (Unadministered). The object was to renew contact with the Taroan and Miju Mishmis who had not been visited for fifteen years, to inspect the suspension bridges over the Delci and Dou Rivers and to investigate the possibility of re-opening the Lohit Valley Road beyond Theroliang.

* * * * *

Another tour was undertaken in the Unadministered area of the Abor Hills as far as the Shimang River. Mr. Calvert was escorted by an Indian Officer and 25 rifles of the 2nd Battalion, Assam Rifles. Friendly contact was renewed with the Minyong Abors of the upper reaches of the Siang and of the Shimang and Siyom Valleys. The tour was a success and he was well received everywhere, large numbers of tribesmen coming in to renew acquaintance and to have their disputes settled by an unbiassed arbitrator. Dosing, who resented his visit last year and non-co-operated as much as they dared, received him most cordially, an indication that we are gaining their confidence. It is hoped in a few years those living in and close to the Control Area will be as amenable to orders as those in the fully administered area. Mr. Calvert is confident that this tour did a great deal in that direction.”

In this year the formation of a “Control Area” to the north of Pasighat was sanctioned in the Government of India’s letter No.F.-45-X/37, dated the 13th January 1938. This was the outcome of a conference held in 1936, the immediate purpose of which was to take measures for the abolition of slavery in unadministered areas, and final proposals were submitted to the Government of India in the Assam Governor’s letter No.2762-G.S.,* dated the 11th November 1937. It was this Control Area which was subsequently extended in 1941 by virtue of the Government of India’s letter No.121-X/41, dated the 20th May 1941. (See page below).

In 1938 the Political Officer, Mr. Godfrey, reported to Government on the subject of the annual incursion by Tibetan officials into the villages along the Tsangpo as far as Karko which had been going on for the last 20 years, and which was stated to be getting yearly more of a burden. These officials levied taxes and took forced labour from both Momba and Abor villages south of the McMahan line, treated the villagers with great cruelty, and told them they were Tibetan subjects. Subsequent information showed that Karko had

* Governor’s Secretariat, Tribal, A, March 1941, Nos.42-98.

instituted a trade block preventing trade up or down to go past them. It was then recommended to the Government of India in Assam letter No.5474-G.S , dated the 31st December 1938 that the Political Officer should himself pay a visit to this area, and this was agreed to. Mr Godfrey left Sadiya with Mr. J. H. F, Williams, Assistant Political Officer, Pasighat, and an escort of 45 Assam Rifles on the 26th February 1939, and was back there on the 31st March 1939. The objects which he set before him were--

I. To ascertain the position as regards Tibetan infiltration and oppression south of the McMahon Line.

II. To attempt to remove "trade blocks" imposed by certain of the Abor clans on the main trade routes to Tibet and the plains on either side of the Siang Valley.

III. To settle inter-tribal disputes between the main Abor clans the Padam, Pangi, Minyong and Karko, which of recent years have become aggravated and which in the absence of an early peaceful settlement it was feared would again lead to bloodshed.

In addition the opportunity was to be taken to carry out a rough survey of this area, which had not been visited since 1913, with a view to ascertain the prevalence or otherwise of tuberculosis and other diseases."

His 32 days' tour covered a total distance of over 230 miles, took him through the heart of the Minyong country up the Siang or Tsangpo Valley from Pasighat and brought him into contact with villages north of Dosing which had not been visited since the Abor Survey Expedition of 1913. He found trade blocks at (1) Riga on the right bank, who prevented trade from going past them either north or south: (2) at Karko, also on the right bank who prevented any trade going from south to north: (3) at Komkar and Damroh. (Padam) on the left bank who prevented trade coming down to the south: and (4) at Shimong on the left bank who prevented travel from south to north. He ordered these blocks to be removed. His reception in general was friendly, except from Shimong, who were inclined to be hostile, but he was convinced that any escort of less than a platoon would be unwise beyond Dosing, Komsing, or Damroh

It was apparent from this expedition that Tibetan influence extended some 70 miles south of the McMahon line and that the big villages of Shimong and Karko had recently been paying tribute to Tibetan officials. It was recommended that the whole position needed review; while as regards trade blocks it was pointed out that to enforce their removal, a cold weather outpost would be required.

In letter No.3720-G.S.,* dated the 24th October 1939, the Government of Assam proposed on the basis of the Political Officer's report that outposts should be established at Karko and Riga in the Upper Siang Valley at the beginning of the cold weather of 1940, being withdrawn the following April, a proposal with which the Political Officer in Sikkim, agreed. The Government of India

Governor's Secretariat. Tribal, A, June 1940, Nos.199-330.

* Governor's Secretariat, File No.G.S.-768 of 1940.

agreed in their letter of the 30th August 1940.* The outposts were put out under the direction of Mr. J. H. F. Williams I.P. the Assistant Political Officer, Pasighat in March 1941.

In April 1940† Mr. Godfrey made an extensive tour up the Siyom Valley on the south, or right, bank of the Siyom through the north-east unadministered Gallong country which had not been visited since the Survey operation of 1912-13. The main purpose of the tour was to settle a serious land dispute between the Minyong and Gallong Abors who were on the verge of hostilities. A boundary was fixed and peace assured.

In reviewing the effects of the action taken in the season 1940-41 in the upper reaches of the Siang, the Governor of Assam expressed the opinion (letter No.1439-G.S.,* dated the 22nd March 1941) after discussion with the Political Officers, both of Sikim and of Sadiya, that progress had been made towards the pacification of this area, that feuds had been checked, trade routes opened, and our abhorrence of slavery impressed on the inhabitants. Success in preventing the illegal exactions by the Tempo officials had not been so great, inasmuch as the Memba tax-collecting parties came down as before immediately after Mr. Williams' departure and exacted tribute from Gette and Simong. His recommendations as to the next step were as follows.

"5. In His Excellency's opinion matters cannot be allowed to rest in this condition, and he considers that the time has come to follow up the partial success of this year by extending our protection up both banks of the river. From Karko northwards to Tuting inclusive on the West Bank and similarly from Simong northwards to Jido inclusive on the East Bank the villages are Abor and owe allegiance to the powerful parent villages of Karko and Simong. North of Tuting and Jido there are a few small villages of Bhutanese origin akin to the villages in the valley on the Tibet side of the frontier. Two alternatives appear to be possible. We can either consider the Abor villages only and leave the Bhutanese villages further North to their fate, or we can consolidate our position right up to the Tibetan frontier on the McMahon Line. His Excellency favours the latter alternative, seeing that to stop short of the Bhutanese villages might appear to imply relinquishment of our claim to the territory they occupy. This alternative, as the Political Officer in Sikkim has pointed out in discussion, has the following definite advantages; the Tibetan Government would soon thus realise that we intend to exercise control up to the McMahon Line and no further; the presence of people of the same race on either side of the frontier is likely to prove as advantageous as at other places on the North-East and North-West Frontier; and the relationship of Bhutanese on our side of the frontier to Bhutanese on Tibet side would tend to facilitate intelligence work. His Excellency further considers that the best method of establishing our counter-influence over these

* Governor's Secretariat File No.G.S-1159 of 1940

† General Administration Report of the Sadiya Frontier Tract for the year 1940-41.

villages would by extending to include them the control area approved in your letter No. F.45-X/37, dated the 13th January 1938. The Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract, is satisfied that if this be done he will be able gradually to stiffen their resistance to illegal exactions.

6. I am to request the approval of the Government of India to the proposals to re-establish the outposts in the Upper Siang valley next cold weather and to extend the control area as indicated above, the Political Officer being permitted to tour with an escort up to the Tibetan frontier for the purpose of ensuring that his orders of this cold weather to the Abors have been duly carried out of investigating suitable boundaries for the extension of the control area and of informing the villagers that they are under no obligation to comply with the demands of tax-gatherers coming down from the North."

The Government of India sanctioned the "proposed extension of the Control Area of the Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract, up to the McMahon Line in the Siang Valley" as suggested in the above extract, on the understanding that no additional expenditure was incurred, in their letter No F.121-X/41,* dated the 20th May 1941.

Further correspondence ensued in order to elucidate certain points, and the Government of India were again addressed in Assam letter No.5360-G.S.,* dated the 9th September 1941 as follows.

".....the Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract, will, in the Upper Siang Valley, come in contact with the following :—

(a) A large number of Abor villages, who are not Buddhist and to whom the revenues of the Sera Monastery are of no concern.

(b) A small group of Bhutia villages inhabited by Buddhists at the farther end of the new Control Area. These Bhutias trade in Tibet and have probably always contributed to monastic revenues.

(c) The Tempo officials on their tax-collecting tour.

The attitude which His Excellency considers the Political Officer should adopt towards the persons in each of these categories is slightly different.

(a) To the Abor villagers he considers that the Political Officer should say that they are under no obligation to pay anything to the Tempo officials, and that they may tell the Tempo officials so ; if the Tempo officials after this warning persist in their demands the Abor villages should send word down to the Political Officer.

(b) To the Bhutias His Excellency considers that the Political Officer should be authorised to give the same assurance, adding that we have no intention of interfering if they wish to subscribe to purely monastic funds in Tibet.

(c) If the Political Officer meets the Tempo officials His Excellency considers that he should inform them that they are within a British control area, where no exactions of taxes other than such as may be imposed by the British Government are permissible ; but if they claim any rights to exact monastic dues he will report that claim to his Government for orders, pending which none should be collected.

*Governor's Secretariat File No. G.S.-1159 of 1940.

These proposals have the concurrence of the Political Officer in Sikkim. The orders of the Government of India on them are solicited.

2. His Excellency considers that the Political Officer should be careful to say nothing to the villages in the Control Area which might be taken to imply that immediate and effective protection will be forthcoming. Protection, His Excellency considers, must certainly come about at some time or other, either by the exercise of their authority by the Tibetan Government or by the establishment of posts, but, taking into consideration the delays in correspondence and the distance involved, that protection cannot immediately be effective.

3 If these incursions from north of the McMahon Line do not cease it may be necessary at some future date to establish one or more additional outposts further up the Valley, but the expenditure involved is not likely to be large "

The Government of India concurred in these views in their letter No. F.121-X/41, dated the the 2nd October 1941.

The post at Riga and Karko were put out afresh by Mr. Williams, accompanied by Captain G. A. E. Keene and an escort of Assam Rifles. They had difficulty with Riga at first, that village having apparently thought that our people had come to take sides with them in their old quarrel with Karko and being correspondingly dissatisfied when they found they were mistaken. A firm attitude and the exercise of some judicious pressure, however, made them change their attitude.

The Governor of Assam paid a visit to this region in December 1941. His tour had unfortunately to be cut short as the outbreak of war with Japan necessitated his return to headquarters, but he went up as far as Pangin, 4 marches up the Siang Valley from Pasighat. He met 370 representing 75 villages, both Padam, Gallong, Minyong and Pang-i, and including such important ones as Karko, - Riga, Pangin, Dosing, Rotung, Kembang, Komsing and Damro. Their attitude was throughout friendly, and His Excellency impressed upon them the necessity of refraining from the practice of slavery, from *mithan*-raiding, and from maintaining tradeblocks: as also the fact that they were under no necessity to accede to the demands of the Mombas.

XI. *The Rima Road again.*—The nature and quality of our system of intelligence on the North-East Frontier was reopened in 1936, at the instance of the then Governor-General and, as regards this side of the Frontier, the Governor of Assam in his letter No 1704-G.S., dated the 1st September 1937 to the Government of India recommended that the Lohit Valley Road up to the International Boundary near Rima should be reopened as the best means of improving our system of intelligence. He thought that.....

"3. The advantages likely to accrue from the reopening of the road are great. His Excellency is advised that were a road passable for ponies to be maintained as far as the International Boundary the Tibetan Government would undoubtedly keep the road between Rima and the Boundary open. By this means the great wool-producing areas of Eastern Tibet would be tapped and the trade from them

brought down to Sadiya and thence to the Assam-Bengal Railway or the Brahmaputra steamer service. With the Assam end of the road emerging in the tea-growing districts there will be every inducement for planters to produce leaf and brick tea suitable to Tibetan taste, and a valuable return trade could be expected to develop. It would not indeed be unduly optimistic to anticipate that the road might well become one of the greatest trade routes across the Indian Frontier, and with the trade a constant stream of information can be expected to reach us.

4. A subsidiary, but not unimportant, result of the reopening of the road would be a tightening of our hold on the tribes through which it passes ; with increased opportunities for the gradual suppression of slavery to which the Government of India is committed."

The project was, however, for the time being dropped, the Government of India stating that they had come to the conclusion that there was "little probability that any material advantages were to be expected either from the the commercial or strategical point of view in case the road were reopened up to Rima."

The matter however was not lost sight of, and our information of conditions in these regions was greatly increased by the visit which Mr. Godfrey, the Political Officer, made there in 1940. As he wrote in his annual report for 1939-40.

"For the first time in twenty-six years a visit was paid by the Political Officer to Rima. I spent a week at Rima in January and established friendly relations with local officials and residents. I was received with great hospitality. Both the people at Rima and also traders from Kham and the country bordering on China are all very anxious that we complete the mule track as far as Rima. They point out that a great deal of the trade now diverted to Sikkim would come straight down the Lohit to Sadiya, a journey eight times shorter and far more safe."

XII. ASSISTANT POLITICAL OFFICERS, SADIYA

1882 to 1905	F. J. Needham, Bengal Police.
1906 to 1911	Noel Williamson, I. P.
1911-1912	W. C. M. Dundas, I. P.

POLITICAL OFFICERS, CENTRAL AND EASTERN SECTION, NORTH-EAST FRONTIER

1912-1919	W. C. M. Dundas, I. P.
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Governor's Secretariat, Assam, Tribal, A, December 1937, Nos. 1-19.

Governor's Secretariat, Assam, B, Progs., September 1940, Nos. 267-268.

POLITICAL OFFICERS, SADIYA FRONTIER TRACT

1919-1920	W. C. M. Dundas, I. P.
1920-1927	T. P. M. O'Callaghan, I. P.
1927-28 (8 months)	R. C. R. Cumming, I. P.
1928-1932	T. E. Furze, I. P.
1932-1935	J. H. Crace, I. P.
1935-1938	W. H. Calvert, I. P.
1938-1942	R. W. Godfrey, I. P.

ASSISTANT POLITICAL OFFICERS, PASIGHAT

1912-1917	T. E. Furze, I. P.	
1917-1922	R. C. R. Cumming, I. P.	
1922-1925	W. H. Calvert, I. P.	
1926-1927 periods.	for	short	} G. S. Lightfoot, I. P. B. H. Routledge, I. P. R. W. Godfrey, I. P.	
1927-1930		R. W. Godfrey, I. P.
1930-1932		R. Carse, I. P.
1st May 1932 to January 1933.	to	11th	E. T. D. Lambert, I. P.	
1933-1937	R. E. R. Parsons, I. P.	
1937-1938	} G. E. D. Walker, I. P. and J. H. F. Williams, I. P.	
1938-1942		J. H. F. Williams, I. P.

5. BALIPARA FRONTIER TRACT

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BALIPARA FRONTIER TRACT

I. *Introductory*.—Mackenzie deals with the Dufflas and Akas under those headings at pages 21-32 of his work. The last incident which he mentions as regards the former is the sending of a military force into the Hills in 1874-75, after which, up to the date at which his narrative leaves off, they had given no trouble.

As regards the Akas, the last entry in Mackenzie is a reference to the Duffla "the first Aka raid since our early connection with the tribe and our first expedition into their hills" This was in 1883-4.

2. The district known since 1919 as the Balipara Frontier Tract was formed in 1913, under the title of 'Western Section of the North-East Frontier', with Captain G. A. Nevill, of the Indian Police, who was to remain there for some 17 years, as its first Political Officer. Previous to that the Deputy Commissioner of Darrang had been charged with the duty of maintaining relations with the hill tribes on this border. The change came about at the same time as the "Central and Eastern Sections of the North-East Frontier", the present Sadiya Frontier Tract, were placed under a separate officer as a consequence of the events of 1911-1912 and the review of our arrangements on the North-East Frontier to which they led.

II. *The Aka Expedition of 1883-1884*.—On 10th November 1883 occurred the raid on Balipara referred to in the concluding sentence at page 26 of Mackenzie, when a party of about 100 Akas headed by Chandi, brother of Medhi Raja, carried off as captives the clerk of the forest office, the forest ranger, and 2 guns.

This incident was connected with events which occurred in the previous October and the causes which led the Akas to act as they did are set forth in paragraphs 7-9 of Captain H. St. P. Maxwell's *report on the Expedition. There was an old grievance as regards the boundary between us and them, going back to 1873. As Maxwell says—

"The demarcation of the boundary, and the gazetting of the forests as forest reserves, at once precluded them from following their usual pursuits as regards this tract of country; and for the purposes of hunting the most valuable preserves lie at the foot of the hills. Whatever the grievance may be worth, it is certain, I think, that in the savage mind a grievance did exist, and an experience of hill tribes teaches me that a "land" grievance is the most deeply rooted of all grievances and is next to impossible to smooth.

8. The tract of country included in the boundary lies in the Balipara mauza, of which the mauzadar or head revenue official was Babu Lakhidhar Kolita. This officer had held charge for nearly fourteen years, and when the boundary was surveyed, and later on when the demarcation followed, he accompanied the Government officers. True to his salt he naturally would include in his fiscal charge as much land as possible and thus throw back the boundary as near the hills as feasible.

*Assam Secretariat, Judicial Department, File No.116-J. of 1884, Nos.1-26. Military Report on Assam—1908.

The Akas would of course conclude the fountain-head of their grievance to be Lakhidhar, and it is well known at Balipara that the tribe has for many years showed much ill-feeling towards him and has frequently threatened him with reprisals.

This ill-feeling has also extended to the Forest Department, on which has fallen the duty to strictly enforce the forest rules in the reserves.

When the District Officer of Darrang was asked to collect some exhibits for the Calcutta Exhibition, Lakhidhar consented to visit the Aka *changs* for the purpose. By persons most intimate with his relations with the tribe he was strongly advised not to undertake the duty.

This counsel he overruled, and as mentioned in paragraph 12 of this report, he in due course started for the hills.

On his arrival at the Kapaschor villages, the meetings of the Akas and their after-conduct clearly shows that the opportunity to punish Lakhidhar was at once seized.

* * * *

“The true reason for seizing Lakhidhar must be that the Akas were of opinion that he materially assisted in ousting them from the land to which they considered themselves entitled”

Thus it was that when in October Lakhidhar reached Medhi's village, he and his party were detained. Eventually all except Lakhidhar himself and his servant were sent back with a message from Medhi to say he would see the sahibs after a certain interval. This party arrived back on the 15th November, 5 days after the outrage at Balipara.

Mr. Elliott, the Chief Commissioner, recommended to the Government of India in his letter No.38-T.,* dated the 26th November 1883, that a small military expedition should be sent to punish the offenders, unless the captives were restored, His letter recounts the previous history of our dealings with these people since 1829, and explains how Medhi was a powerful chief of the Kapaschors and had been in constant and generally friendly touch with the Deputy Commissioner for many years, though there had been a long standing dispute about boundaries. Since 1848 the Kapaschors had been in receipt of an annual *posa* of Rs.520. They were a small clan, numbering according to Maxwell, only about 510 souls, of whom only 100 would be fighting men.

Early in December information was received that Lakhidhar had died in captivity. This information came in a letter written by one of the Bengali captives accompanied by a number of preposterous demands for restoration of territory. It was proved subsequently that no violence was used on him, though no doubt his end was hastened by the circumstances of his captivity.

*Assam Secretariat, Judicial Department File No.154-J of 1883, Nos. 1-18.

On 27th November the Viceroy approved of the proposed expedition. Brigadier-General Sale Hill, C. B., was in charge of the operations from his base at Dijumukh. Captain H. St. P. Maxwell, Deputy Commissioner of the Garo Hills (who was later to be conspicuous in Manipur) was Political Officer with the force. His instructions were to rescue the captives: punish the leaders of the raid: and generally to reduce the Akas to submission. The force included both military and police. The later consisted of 290 Frontier Police drawn from Dibrugarh, the Garo Hills, Sibsagar and Darrang, under the command of Mr. W. B. Savi, and Lieutenant E. H. Molesworth. The former included 571 officers and men of the 43rd N. I. from Shillong, 210 of the 12th Khelat-i-Ghilzais from Cachar, 2 mountain guns and a party of Sappers.

On 17th December a flying column of 150 rifles of the 43rd Assam Light Infantry and 50 of the Dibrugarh Corps of the Assam Frontier Police under Major Beresford of the 43rd started for Medhi's village.

Negotiations were attempted from the 19th December when the force reached the Maj Bhareli, but without success, and on the 23rd night the Akas who were assisted by many Mijis, who live to the North of the Kapaschors, carried out a surprise attack on the British camp which was driven off with a loss of 32 men to them, and 2 dead and 6 wounded and 2 rifles lost on our side. On the 27th they met with resistance in attempting to cross the Tenga which lay between them and Medhi's village and had to fall back on their previous camp. One sepoy* was shot and one died from a wound from a poisoned arrow. Reinforcements now began to arrive and the General himself and his staff reached the camp on 5th January. On the 8th January 1884 the advance began; the Akas were easily dispersed; Medhi's village was occupied: and the enemy disappeared from view. The Chiefs, however, did not come in. General Hill was anxious to evacuate the country, and this took place on 21st to 23rd January without contact having been made with the Chiefs. Maxwell, judging from paragraph 22 of his report, seems to have been satisfied with this decision. He says.

"The country had been well surveyed by the survey officers, and a further inducement to leave the hills soon was contained in the fact that sickness among the troops had broken out at an alarming rate.

* * * *

"23. As regards the objects of the expedition, the results were—

The surrender of the captives ;

The restoration of all firearms taken by the Akas ;

A fine of 10 mithan valued between Rs. 700 and Rs. 1,000 ;

A great loss to the enemy in live-stock, consisting of pigs, goats and fowls ;

Destruction of much grain.

*Assam Secretariat, Judicial Department, File No 116-J. of 1884, Nos. 1-26.

And to show the displeasure of the Government towards the ring-leaders of the Balipara raid, the houses of Chandi, Naloo and Kota were burnt to the ground. These houses were substantially constructed of planked sides and flooring about 120 feet long and valued at Rs. 400 each."

Reviewing these results, however, the Chief Commissioner was not so well satisfied and wrote as follows in his letter No. 167-T.,* dated the 7th February 1884.

"3. The Chief Commissioner considers that the expedition has, on the whole, been decidedly successful from a military point of view, the repulse of the midnight attack on the Maj Bhoroli camp on the 23rd December (where, as Captain Maxwell was afterwards informed by the Hazarikhoas, the assailants lost 32 men) and the crossing of the Tengapani on the 8th January were creditable, and even brilliant feats of arms, and showed a spirit, dash, and discipline among the troops, which are highly praiseworthy. From the political point of view, the punishment of the Akas has been severe. They have lost largely in grain and small live-stock, and ten of their mithan, valued at Rs. 1,000, have been killed. They have shown how thoroughly they feel their defeat by giving up the captives, the guns, rifles, and bayonets, without any conditions whatever, and by not venturing to attack the force during its return.

4. At the same time, the Chief Commissioner is bound to say that the political success would have been more complete if the force had remained longer in the hills and if more time had been allowed for the chiefs to come in. In the instructions given to the Political Officer, the terms of which were discussed by the Chief Commissioner with General Hill and agreed to by him, great stress was laid on the importance of inducing them to do so. It was part of the programme settled on between the Chief Commissioner and the General Officer in command that the troops should not retire hastily.....the surrender and appearance of the chiefs was an object of the highest importance, and, inasmuch as the Political Officer considered that in all probability they would come in as soon as they had mastered their fear, in the space of a week or ten days, the Chief Commissioner would have wished that the force, or a part of it, should have remained longer on the spot. As long as they were there, and could hold out the threat of destroying their houses if submission was withheld, the chiefs had an incentive for coming in, which is now removed

5. Mr. Elliott has the more regret in recording his disappointment regarding this one point, because in every other respect he considers General Hill's management of the expedition to have been highly praiseworthy and successful; and he ventures to think that the Government of India may be congratulated on the proof which the Aka Hills Expedition has given of the efficiency with which the military force on the North Eastern Frontier is able to overcome the hostility of a savage tribe and the difficulties of a mountainous country"

*Assam Secretariat, Judicial Department, File No. 116-J. of 1884, Nos.1-26.

He proposed the following steps for the further reduction of the Akas.

"I. Unless Medhi and the other Aka Chiefs come down and make submission, no Kapaschor Akas will be admitted into British territory, and, if found anywhere, they will be arrested.

* * * *

III. They will be required—

- (a) to bring in the prismatic compass stolen from the Forest Office, which they are known still to possess ;
- (b) to restore the money taken from Lakhidar, from the forester, and the opium shop at Balipara.
- (c) to make a written submission, acknowledging their error in raiding on Balipara and in detaining Lakhidar, and withdrawing all claim to any land south of the boundary pillars set up in 1873-75.

IV. On their doing this, their submission will be accepted, and the order forbidding any Akas to enter or trade in British territory will be withdrawn.

* * * *

VI. The *posa* will not be given them till the year after next, *i.e.*, January 1886, and only then if the conduct of the tribe has been perfectly peaceful. When it is restored it will be distributed by name to the respective chiefs, and will in future only be given into the hands of those chiefs, his own share to each, on their appearing and presenting an article of tribute.....

VII. It will be a further condition that the road which has this year been cut from Balukpung *via* Dijumukh shall be kept open by the Forest Department to the Balipara stockade, and that the Kapaschor Akas shall use that road alone when they come down for *posa* or any other purpose, and shall present themselves at the stockade, give up their weapons and receive a pass which they shall give in again when they return to the hills. A date will be fixed, corresponding to the 1st December, as the earliest date on which they are allowed to come down, and a Kotoki will ordinarily be sent to accompany them down".

To these proposals the Government of India agreed. The principal action taken to bring about the submission of these Akas was a blockade which was instituted immediately after the Expedition retired. This was not lifted until January 1888, when Medhi and Chandi appeared before Colonel Campbell, the Deputy Commissioner of Darrang, and made their submission. As the Annual Administration Report for 1887-88 states. "The compass taken has been restored, the value of the property looted paid, and written agreements in the terms prescribed by Sir Charles Elliott executed, by which the chiefs have sworn to abide. The blockade against the tribes has been raised, but they will not get *posa* for two years, and only then if they have conducted themselves well".

It is noticeable that the author of this Report refers in paragraph 2 of the General Summary to "the abortive expedition of 1883".

III. *The Apa Tanang Expedition of 1897.*—On the 8th November 1896, a Tarbotia Miri, Podu by name, and his step son, Tapak, were murdered near Mr. H. M. Crowe's tea garden at Kodom, within the Inner Line, and four of his household taken captive. The Deputy Commissioner (Mr. F. C. Henniker, I.C.S.,) was satisfied on circumstantial grounds that the offenders were Apa Tanangs, or "Anka Miris" as, according to the report, some people termed them, and he recommended the immediate obtaining of sanction to a punitive expedition. The Chief Commissioner supported this proposal in writing to the Government of India in his letter No.32-T, dated the 6th January 1897 and said that a force of 200 Military Police would suffice, the Apa Tanangs being "a small and not very warlike tribe". (This was raised to 300 subsequently on the advice of General R. M. Jennings, General Officer Commanding, Assam). It was proposed to send Mr. R. B. McCabe, I.C.S., by now Inspector-General of Police, as the Political Officer to the Expedition in view of his great experience in such campaigns. The Government of India agreed.

The force consisted of 300 men of the Lakhimpur Military Police Battalion, under Captain G. R. Row, their Commandant, and Lieutenant H. F. Norie, of the 42nd Gurkha Rifles while Surgeon-Lieutenant A. Leventon, I.M.S., was the Medical Officer, and Mr. E. Muspratt, Superintendent of Police, was Transport Officer. Actually only 120 men completed the march to Hong. Transport problems compelled the reduction of the force to a minimum, nor were more indeed necessary. A start was made on the 3rd February 1897, when the force moved to Camp No. 1 on the Ranga River. On the 11th February they crossed a high range called Lui at 8,000 feet and descended to camp at 4,000 feet near Silli, a Duffla village. On the 14th they crossed the Pobo range at 6,800 feet and that afternoon reached the southern extremity of the Apa Tanang country. Mr. McCabe wrote, "The sight is one I shall never forget, as we suddenly emerged on a magnificent plateau some ten miles in length, laid out in highly cultivated and artificially irrigated terraces well watered by the Kali river, a sluggish stream some 45 to 60 feet in breadth, with low alluvial banks. The valley was dotted with isolated hillocks, and low pine-clad spurs ran here and there into the valley from the Eastern ranges. No crops were on the ground, but the stalks gave ample evidence of the beautiful character of the recent paddy harvest. Our hearts warmed at the sight of primroses, violets, wild currants, strawberries and raspberries, and I felt disposed to almost believe some of the wonderful stories we had heard of the fabulous wealth of this country."

They marched into Hong that day, being threatened with opposition all the time, in which however there was not much real sting. McCabe explained it thus—"Unless the Hong men had shown by every possible means that our presence was unwelcome, their neighbours would have turned on them afterwards and accused them of having invited us into the country." Next day after much discussion the Apa Tanangs were induced to hand over the three captives as well as Mr. Crowe's gun which had been taken in the raid from Podu's house

McCabe was satisfied that the Apa Tanangs had had a well-founded grievance against Podu on many scores. The punishment he decided on was a somewhat oblique one. He considered that the only form of fine, one of *nithan*, was unsuitable on a number of grounds, and therefore he took the following course. The Apa Tanangs had in the previous October raided a Duffla village, Tara's and carried off six captives and a gun, all of which were in Hong. He ordered these to be restored, thereby, as he succinctly put it, discovering "a means at hand by which I could do him [Tara] a good turn, assist the cause of humanity, and at the same time inflict a punishment on the Apa Tanangs which would touch both their pockets and their *amour propre*." On the 17th February the force started on its homeward journey, and McCabe was back at North Lakhimpur on the 21st, the whole expedition having occupied only 18 days.

Mr. McCabe's observations on the Apa Tanang country deserve reproduction.

"19.....I take the opportunity of recording my impressions of the Apa Tanangs and comparing them with the information previously recorded. The first mention I find made of the Apa Tanangs is in Major Graham's report on the Dafla Expedition of 1874-75. In describing the survey operations undertaken by Lieutenant Harman, he writes:—

'To the north, far up the Ranga, could be seen the plains of the Apa Tanang Abor country, a race held in much dread by the Daflas of the Ranga valley. These Abors seldom or never visit the plains, and from the fact of their trading in rock salt and swords, such as are made by the Tibctans, are evidently in communication with Tibet. The people of the Ranga valley state that the Apa Tanang Abors have bullocks and ploughs, that they have made roads about 4 feet wide, and that they had at least one stone building in which they place the skulls of their enemies. They do not intermarry with the Abor Daflas of the Ranga Valley, and are evidently quite independent of the plains either as regards food, clothing, iron or salt.....I think it will be found sooner or later that the Apa Tanang Abors, if not actually subordinate to Tibet at least are in a measure under its influence. As regards their strength, all that can be said is that the Ranga valley people fear them and describe them as a very powerful people..... I have often been asked—what is an Abor, and what is a Dafla? The Abor Daflas express themselves as quite unable to understand the language of the Apa Tanang Abors.....The Abors proper I take to be Apa Tanang Abors, while Abor Dafla would appear to be the fitting nomenclature for the tribes residing North of the Dikrang and in the Ranga valley.

In the report on the North-East Frontier of India, 1883, I find the following remarks:—

'It appears probable that a force marching straight for the villages of the North-West corner of the Ranga valley would find abundant supplies in the Apa Tanang villages; for we are told, on reliable evidence, that they possess large stone-built granaries, and we know from actual observation that their country is highly cultivated.'

Again, in the revised Dafla report it is noted :—

‘A group of villages in the North-West corner of the Ranga valley, called Apa Tanang, consists of Takay’s village called Cheng Hong, 60 houses ; Rikom’s 60, Apa Tanang 150, and two or three other very small villages. Their total population is about 3,000 souls.

‘Comparing them with Daflas the Apa Tanang are smaller and rather darker men. Some of them are tattooed like Daflas, and they wear cane helmets of the same shape.

The revised Miri report gives a condensed account of Mr. Crowe’s and Captain Dunne’s description of this tribe. I fully agree with much that they have said, but have to dissent on one or two important points, *viz.*, the names and location of the villages and the tribe to which the Apa Tanangs bear the closest affinity.

20. My impressions have been derived from personal observation and from information received from the Apa Tanangs themselves and from Daflas who had resided for a long time in the Apa Tanang country. The first point to which I would call attention is that the name “Apa Tanang” is a complete misnomer. Throughout the Expedition I never once heard this name used by a single Miri or Dafla ; the tribe was referred to only by the names of Ankas, Apas and Akas, the first name being that in most common use. Captain Dunne agrees with me that these people are best described under the name of “Ankas”, but goes on to state that they are more allied to the Miris than to the Daflas. I totally disagree with this last dictum. I had the opportunity of seeing plains Daflas, Abor Daflas and Miris, side by side with the Apa Tanangs, and while the latter differed most markedly from the Miris they bore a most striking resemblance to the Daflas. The principal points of difference are :—

- 1st—They wear no cane helmets.
- 2nd—They carry no bows and quiver.
- 3rd—They wear a tail.
- 4th—Their cloths are of distinct patterns.
- 5th—They tattoo their faces differently.

The Miris did not seem to be able to make themselves understood by the Apa Tanangs, while I noticed that my Dafla coolies chatted away with them without hesitating for a word, and as far as I could judge they appeared to be speaking one and the same language. I have no hesitation in concluding that the Apa Tanangs are merely a tribe of Abor Daflas who have developed a few distinguishing characteristics from their isolation and from the special physical features of the country they inhabit. They are somewhat smaller and of less robust build than the Daflas, but this is easily accounted for by the fact that while the latter have to cultivate steep, sterile mountain sides, the former are favoured with a fertile, level, well-watered plateau yielding a maximum outturn for a minimum of labour. The male Apa Tanang only tattoos below the mouth ; a horizontal line is drawn across the under lip, and straight lines are drawn downwards from it to the point of the chin. The women are tattooed with broad blue lines

from the top of the forehead to the tip of the nose, and from the lower lip to the base of the chin. To add to their original ugliness they wear wooden plugs inserted in the sides of the nostrils, expanding the nose right across the face. Both the Daflas and the Apa Tanangs wear strips of cane around the waist, but the latter specially distinguish themselves by the addition of a tail. This tail is made of loosely plaited strips of cane dyed red, and gives the wearer a most ludicrous appearance. In reply to my enquiries as to the meaning of this appendage I received nothing but the stereotyped answer—"Our fathers wore it, and so do we". It must be left to some scientist to determine whether it is used as a portable cane chair, or for the sake of decency, or again perhaps with the idea of inspiring awe in their enemies. I would describe the Apa Tanangs generally as a "timid, good-natured, industrious and loquacious people far inferior in pluck and physique to the Hill Miris". It would be interesting to ascertain the sources of information from which previous reports on this tribe, were derived. There are no four feet wide roads, no stone granaries, and no bullocks and ploughs. The Apa Tanangs only possess a few hoes which they obtained through the Daflas, most of the work of tilling the land being done with sharpened bamboos. Each village has its granaries built outside the circuit of houses. These granaries consist of small bamboo sheds with roofs, either of thatch or of pine shingles, and are usually half hidden in clumps of bamboos.

21.

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Hong contains 800 houses.

Krachi and Kotipu are small overflow hamlets from Hong.

Hari, 2 miles north of Hong, has 400 houses.

Hut, 2 miles north of Hari, has over 1,000 houses.

Nichebamin, 1½ miles north-west of Hong, has 150 houses

Modutaji, 200 houses.

Hija, about 900 to 1,000 houses.

The houses are very large and commodious I would roughly estimate the total population of this tribe at 15,000. As all the villages are within half a day's journey of one another, the Apa Tanangs can in a few hours concentrate a large force to repel nay invasion, and it is due entirely to this fact that they have been carefully let alone by the neighbouring Miris and Daflas. On the other hand, their inferiority in arms and physique reduce them to a comparatively low level as an aggressive power. It is quite possible, any even probable, that this tribe was at one time in regular communication with Tibet, and even at the present moment articles of Tibetan manufacture find their way into the country; but from the evidence I have collected I feel justified in stating that the intercourse is very limited, and that Tibet exercises absolutely no authority in Apa Tanang land. The present tendency is to seek trade relations with the plains of Assam, and instead of bartering Tibetan rock-salt and swords, the Apa Tanangs shows a strong leaning towards salt, hoes and *daos* imported from our district of Lakhimpur."

The Chief Commissioner's opinion was that the Expedition might be described as "a complete success."

IV. *The Miri Mission.*—As part of the general plan of the Government of India in connection with the North-East Frontier, they asked in their telegram No.458-S. of the 8th August 1911 for the views of the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government on a proposal that a mission similar to the proposed Mishmi Mission should explore the tribal country between Bhutan and the Dihong river, or the "Hill Miri country", as it is referred to in the correspondence. To this the Lieutenant-Governor agreed and his proposals were as follows (his letter No.72-C.P.T.†, dated the 21st August 1911, paragraph 4).

"4. I am now to discuss what can be done to explore the country between the Dihong river and Bhutan, which will not be touched by the Abor expedition. The area to be covered is very large and cannot be traversed in one cold season. His Honour considers that the best that can be done is to despatch a small party with a Surveyor, who should be deputed by the Surveyor General, up the Subansiri river. He proposes to place this mission in charge of Mr. Kerwood, Sub-divisional Officer of North Lakhimpur, who has some acquaintance with the Hill Miris. Mr. Kerwood will be given an escort of 75 men under an experienced Assistant Commandant. Twenty-five rifles will remain at Dulongmukh, where a depot will be established, while Mr. Kerwood with 50 rifles will advance up the Subansiri to the Kamala and then turn westward, choosing whatever route seems to be most practicable and penetrating as far as possible. The Hill Miris are friendly..... This Mission will probably take two months, and it is hoped that the friendly relations with the Hill Miris will be strengthened by it, and that Mr. Kerwood will be able to get into touch with the tribes further to the west."

The Secretary of State agreed to this on condition that the Mission could be sent without risk. In their letter No.490-C.G. to the Commissioner dated the 5th October 1911* the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government explained the object of the Mission as follows.

"2. It is believed that the Hill Miris, whose country immediately borders Indian territory, are friendly, and that there will be no difficulty with these people. No information is, however, available to show what the attitude of the more remote villagers will be; and in view of the Secretary of State's orders, the Lieutenant-Governor desires to impress on Mr. Kerwood the necessity of advancing with caution. He should not hesitate to retire if he finds the country into which he is penetrating to be hostile.

3. The main object of the mission will be to establish friendly relations with the tribes and to survey and explore the country in order to obtain information which will enable a satisfactory frontier to be demarcated between India and Tibetan-Chinese territory. Mr. Kerwood's route will be up the Subansiri river to the Kamla river

* Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A., March 1912, Nos.149-197.

† Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A., March 1912, Nos.47-148.

and then northwards or westwards as he may deem most desirable. It is, however, very important that he should endeavour to get into touch with the General Officer Commanding the Abor Expedition which will explore and survey the country to the east of that in which he will work, so that the results obtained by the two parties may be connected.

4. A copy of a map on which is marked the approximate line of frontier proposed by the Government of India will be forwarded in a few days' time. It is extremely improbable that Mr. Kerwood will succeed in penetrating as far as this line unless he joins hands with the General Officer Commanding the Abor Expedition and he should run no risks in trying to go so far, but, should he succeed, he should submit proposals for a suitable frontier line between India and Tibet. No boundary must, however, be settled on the ground except in cases where the recognised limits of the Tibetan-Chinese territory are found to conform approximately to the line indicated in the map and to follow such prominent physical features as are essential for the strategic and well-defined frontier line. A Memorandum by the General Staff on the subject is annexed and I am to invite special attention to the importance of ascertaining, as far as possible, the course of the Kamla river."

Besides Mr. Kerwood, the other members of the Mission were—

Captain A. M. Graham, 5th Gurkha Rifles, Assistant Commandant Military Police, in charge of the Escort ;

Captain G. A. Nevill, I.P., Transport Officer ;

Lieutenant C. G. Lewis, R.E., in charge of the Survey Party ;

Lieutenant R. S. Wahab, I.A., Surveys ;

Captain B. O. Duff, Intelligence Officer ;

Captain A. S. Kirkwood, Supply and Transport.

The escort numbered some 150 officers and men. The Base Camp was formed at Dulangmukh and from there the party made a start on November 11th, 1911. Mr. Kerwood's account is difficult to follow, but it seems that unforeseen difficulties forced them to retrace their steps. A fresh start was made early in December and on the 6th they reached camp at the junction of the Persen and the Kamla at Gocham. Here they encamped for the rest of December and a great deal of useful surveying was carried out in hitherto unknown country. A party under Captain Duff and Lieutenant Wahab was out from 27th December to 9th January and did some useful survey work in the Subansiri valley and neighbourhood, their furthest point being Muki. At this place they had considerable difficulty in avoiding a clash with the ignorant and suspicious villagers, but fortunately no incident occurred.

There was a high proportion of sickness, 66 men being at one time in hospital at Dulangmukh, mostly cases of dysentery, while the *damdins* gave much trouble.

On 13th January 1912 the party reached Chemir advanced camp with a view to exploration in the Kamla valley, and here for the first time all the British Officers of the Mission met. From here Captain Duff and Mr. Wahab explored the Khru valley, the furthest point being Takum. The main party went on and reached Sartam on 28th January where they halted till 8th February. They then made a move northwards. On the 9th they reached the neighbourhood of Rugi where they halted for some days. On the 14th February their camp at Tali was attacked. 3 Miris were shot by Captain Graham and the rest soon melted away, between 10 and 20 of the attackers being killed. Rugi and Tali were judged guilty of this attack and both villages were burnt.

The return journey commenced early in March, all trans-Kamla posts being evacuated on 20th March. The route lay through the Apa Tanang and Duffla country. The former was reached first and Kerwood was evidently as impressed with the beauty of the country and the friendliness of its inhabitants as was McCabe, whose report of 1897 he quotes and comments on. Kerwood did not agree with McCabe as regards the name of the tribe. He says he found the name Apa Tanang frequently used, and held that it or Tanae, a variant used by Miris and Dufflas, was correct, with Anka as a sort of nickname. The language he held was distinct from Miri and Duffla, and he thought this people were distinct in origin from their neighbours.

On the 16th March 1912, the party reached Diju Tea Estate and by the 16th the whole force had been evacuated. Nearly 1,400 square miles of unknown country had been mapped, though it proved impossible to obtain any definite material for the delimitation of a frontier: the courses of the Khru and the Subansiri had been determined: the sites of more than 100 villages had been located and over 70 visited: the population of the area mapped was estimated at between 15,000 and 30,000; but fighting strength was held to be very low there was no tribal consciousness, each community or clan living in isolation. As regards nomenclature, Mr. Kerwood points out that Miri is an Assamese term, and he found it impossible to discover any general Tribal name. They themselves referred to themselves as "Nyisi" and to the Dufflas as "Bodo", while the latter called themselves "Nyisi" and the Miris "Chimir." Again 3 clans of these Miris who had long been in the habit of visiting the plains called themselves Chikam, Peren and Pai, while the Assamese referred to them as Tarbotia (users of the land paths), Panibotia (users of the river routes) and Sarak.

As regards Tibetan influence, Tibetan swords, bells and beads were to be found in every village. There was no trace of Chinese influence.

A note by the Chief of the General Staff which was compiled about this time is worth quoting on the subject of Tawang and our boundary there in view of subsequent developments. It says:—

"The direction of the frontier line about Tawang requires careful consideration. The present boundary (demarcated) is south of Tawang, running westwards along the foothills from near Udalguri

to the southern Bhutan border, and thus a dangerous wedge of territory is thrust in between the Miri country and Bhutan. A comparatively easy and much used trade route traverses this wedge from north to south, by which the Chinese would be able to exert influence or pressure on Bhutan, while we have no approach to this salient from a flank, as we have in the case of the Chumbi salient. rectification of the boundary here is therefore imperative, and an ideal line would appear to be one from the knot of mountains near Longitude 93°, Latitude/28°20', to the Bhutan border north of Chona Dzong in a direct east and west line with the northern frontier of Bhutan. There appears to be a convenient watershed for it to follow."

V. *Formation of the "Western Section of the North East Frontier" as an independent charge.*—This process was, owing to our scanty knowledge of the country, begun on very tentative lines. In Eastern Bengal and Assam letter No.69-P.T. of the 7th July 1912, the Chief Commissioner reviewed the results of the Miri Mission and made proposals for future dealings with this tract. As regards the Mission, he observed as follows.

"6. The Miri Mission, which was sent forth with the establishment of friendly relations as one of its objects, was in this respect successful, with one notable exception. The Government of India have already had full particulars of the attack on the camp at Tali, but the effect of this, so far as can be judged, has been to show that armed opposition to our forces only leads to severe punishment, while those who received us in friendly fashion have nothing to fear. One unfortunate result of the incident at Tali was, as Mr. Kerwood points out, to debar the party from obtaining any definite data on the question of the frontier. A considerable amount of survey work was done, but this will be discussed in more detail later on. The Chief Commissioner, while fully appreciating the tact and forbearance displayed by all members of the Mission, as shown by the manner in which so large an area was visited with only one instance of active opposition, cannot but feel that the force employed was too small, particularly in view of the fact that such long lines of communication had to be established, and so comparatively large a number of connecting posts maintained. Sir Archdale Earle considers that any further exploration in what is still a largely unknown country should be done in greater force, so that not only may any opposition encountered be met, but the odds against the possibility of offering a successful resistance may be apparent to the tribesmen concerned."

As regards the future of the Western Section of the Frontier, he wrote as follows—

"12. The note of the General Staff recommends, as regards the Miri section, that an exploring and Survey party with an escort should proceed to Mara in the Subansiri Valley and explore the pass and the upper waters of the valley, and that a similar party should proceed through the Daffa country to the upper waters of the Khru river.

The advisability of an adjustment of the Frontier Line in the neighbourhood of Tawang is also mentioned, but on this subject the Chief Commissioner, while fully realising its importance, is in possession of less information than are the Government of India. The programme already outlined for survey and exploration work in the coming cold weather is so extensive that the Chief Commissioner hesitates to add to it. The Chief Commissioner would suggest that, instead of undertaking extensive survey operations, an attempt should be made to increase and consolidate our knowledge of the frontier west of the Subansiri, and proposals to give effect to this are stated later in this letter.

* * * *

“14. In a previous paragraph the Chief Commissioner undertook to make suggestions not so much for the control of the western section of the tribal area as for some means by which our knowledge of the tribes west of the Subansiri-Siyoms divide could be increased and consolidated, and relations established with them as a preliminary to subsequent survey and exploration operations on an extensive scale, and the ultimate settlement of a suitable boundary. For this work the Chief Commissioner considers that the most suitable officer would be Captain G. A. Nevill, a Superintendent of Police on the Assam List. If the suggestion is approved, Sir Archdale Earle, without for the present locating him at any permanent headquarters, would leave him to make promenades, extending in no case to any great distance from the Inner Line. He would travel with a suitable escort and have, throughout the cold weather at all events, a regularly organised coolie corps. He would begin by spending some time at Sadiya to receive instructions from Mr. Dundas, and would work directly under the Chief Commissioner. After an experimental season of this nature, it should be possible to formulate definite proposals for the control of this troublesome area.”

These proposals were approved by the Government of India in their letter No. 2447-E.B., dated the 16th October 1912.

Captain Nevill took charge in July 1913 and in Assam letter No. 5197-P,* dated the 23rd September 1913, the Chief Commissioner reported that he had received Nevill's recommendations and was able to formulate his own proposals. These were as follows—

- (a) the boundary between the Western Section and the Central Section should be the main channel of the Subansiri ;
- (b) Captain Nevill's charge should be demarcated off from the regularly administered charges of Darrang District and North Lakhimpur Subdivision ;
- (c) his headquarters should be at a site chosen by him about 5 miles from the terminus of the Tezpur-Balipara railway and buildings should be erected there ;
- (d) he should be provided with an escort of 200 military Police for his tours ;

*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, September 1913, Nos. 300-321.

(e) a permanent coolie corps should be constituted, 400 strong.

For the ensuing cold whether extensive touring was recommended to the Aka country, up the Subansiri to the Daffa country, and to Tawang. As regards Tawang, it is noticeable that the Chief Commissioner refer to this as being a "wedge of Tibet which abuts on the Assam Valley", while his Chief Secretary in noting on the subject observed "Tawang is of course in Tibet". This was to be a friendly visit and made without any escort.

VI. *The Aka Promenade and the visit to Tawang, 1914.**—Captain Nevill was authorised to visit the Aka country in the cold weather of 1913-14, the object being to establish friendly relations with the inhabitants: to visit also the Mijis and the people living north of the Akas, if time allowed; and to survey as much of the country as possible. The expedition, known as the "Aka Promenade" was on a considerable scale, comprising a total of 1,032 of all ranks. There were 6 British Officers besides Captain Nevill, viz., Captain A. L. M. Molesworth, 8th Gurkha Rifles, Assistant Political Officer: Captains A. M. Graham and G. D. Mathew, Commandant and Assistant Commandant respectively, of the Naga Hills Military Police; Captain W. B. Dunlop, Supply and Transport Corps: Captain R. S. Kennedy, I.M.S., and Lieutenant P. G. Huddleston, R.E., Surveys. One hundred and eighty-eight officers and men of the Naga Hills Military Police formed the escort.

They started from their base camp at Peinjulie on the Borelli river on 31st December 1913, and reached the neighbourhood of Jamiri on the 5th January 1914, where they had good reception. On the 12th January they visited Rupa. On the 27th January, Nevill, Graham, Kennedy and Huddleston left for the Bichom Valley, mainly inhabited by Miji Akas. They had a friendly reception at Kelong and other Miji villages and stayed until February 17th. On 4th February they visited the Monba villages of But and Konia, the people of which Nevill describes as "a miserable lot ... entirely under the thumb of the Mijis who make them cultivate for them very poor and the dirtiest and most craven people I have ever seen."

They then returned and rejoined the rest of the party in the Miri Aka country. The one untoward incident of the expedition occurred on 8th March in the Duffa country at the village of Riang. It is best described in Nevill's own words.

"The following day we left camp at 7 a.m. As our advance guard reached Riang, a large number of Daffas were seen streaming up the *khud* on both sides of the village. The village itself was full of armed men, who as we came were endeavouring to erect a barricade. At this moment Captain Graham, who was with the rear guard, opened fire at the men advancing up the *khud* side. He did so just at the right time as immediately afterwards a thick fog descended and nothing could be seen more than 20 yards off. It was an unpleasant position, as the *khud* side was lined with Daffas, whom we could hear but could

*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, December 1914, Nos. 1-37.

not see. The coolies behaved excellently. Our advance, flank, and rear guard opened a slow fire, and we managed to get our whole party clear of the village. Fortunately the fog lifted shortly after the main column had cleared the village, and a steady advance was continued to the Pachuk, the rear guard was considerably harassed, but their steadiness and successfully improvised ambuscades soon made the Daflas keep at a respectful distance. On arrival at the river we found the bridge had been cut down on the far bank, presumably by the Yefan people. The whole scheme had been well thought out, they evidently thought they had us in a trap and could dispose of us without much difficulty. We had to return up the path again and cut a track down to the river, about 400 yards up stream, where there was some open cultivation, and it seemed a likely place for building a bridge. Here the coolies were put on to make a bridge, covered by sepoys. The rear guard picquet under Captain Mathew remained above guarding the main path. Our coolies worked exceedingly well and in about two hours got a good bridge over. Whilst building the bridge we saw a party of Daflas trying to outflank us, we opened fire and dispersed them, at the same time a very large number tried to encircle our rear guard. Captain Mathew opened fire on them and drove them off. As soon as the bridge was completed, the advance guard was thrown over and we got all the coolies across, Captain Graham and Captain Mathew guarding our rear. I was very relieved to get our whole force over without any casualties. It is not pleasant going through very enclosed country where hundreds of bowmen can hide without being seen. It was made worse by a thick fog encircling us most of the time. After crossing the bridge we destroyed it ; as it was late, we had to camp close to the river.

The Dafla casualties were to-day, I fancy, about 16 or 17. Their attack was most treacherous, as they had professed friendliness, taken our presents, and had been very well treated by us.

We had no casualties.

Early next morning we left camp at 7.30. We went along very carefully, but saw no signs of Daflas. We continued our march till we got to the village of Yefan. There we saw a few men who waved green branches to signify peace. I met them and spoke to them. They acknowledged that some of their men had been at Rieng. I told them I should fine them 20 pigs and 10 swords, and that they must produce the *gaonbura* ; they then said they would go and collect the fine, but instead of doing so, they left the village. I waited a while for them. As we left the village, the men shouted at us from the hill side, but they did not come on. I burnt all their grain houses, which is a very severe punishment.....

On March 15th Captain Nevill arrived back at Jamiri and the Aka portion of the "promenade" was over. Salient portions of Nevill's report are as follows.

"The Daflas as a tribe have not yet recognised British authority as was shown by their treacherous attack on us this year and also by numerous petty acts of aggression on our Assam frontier. For the sake of peace on our frontier it will be necessary for us to impress on

them a sense of our power. We shall probably in the near future be compelled to exercise some kind of control over the Dasla and Abors living near the head waters of the Borelli, Subansiri and Khru rivers.

* * * * *

“The Akas are divided into two tribes the Kavatsun and the Kutsun ; each of these tribes is under its Chief or Raja, who is the nominal head ; it greatly depends on the personality of the Raja as to the amount of power he enjoys. The post is an elected one and is not hereditary.

Each village has its own council for its own local affairs and an elected headman, every man has the right of free speech and a vote. The Raja has his central council and they control the foreign policy of the tribe and affairs of inter-village interest. Disputes are settled and offenders punished by the village elders, dissatisfied persons can always appeal to the Raja and his council.

Both the present Rajas have a good deal of control over their people. Tagi is gifted with a good deal of intelligence, perhaps slimness would be a better term, he has been much spoiled when visiting Assam and is now somewhat puffed up with the sense of his own importance. Kalor, Raja of the Kavatsun, is a pleasanter man, though not nearly so shrewd, he is too much given to religious meditation and pondering of affairs other than of this world. I think all the Akas thoroughly realise our power and recognise the advantages to be gained by standing well with us. There should be no difficulty in controlling them in the future, it is our best policy to strengthen the power of the two Chiefs, who will then obtain a firmer grip over their people.

The Mijis are very like the Akas in most things, but have no Chiefs ; each village is the unit having each its own council and headman, who settle all the external and internal affairs of the village. There is, however, a good deal of tribal spirit amongst the Mijis ; there are practically no inter village quarrellings, and in affairs concerning the whole community, the different village representatives meet together and talk the matter over. Against a common enemy, I think there would be a solid combination.

* * * * *

“I would strongly advocate the establishment of a trading post and dispensary at Kolabruh in the Kavatsun Aka country with a guard of 50 rifles. Now is the favourable time. The Akas know us and are friendly, and there would be little difficulties in establishing this post, and by doing so we should get the loose political control which it is our policy to exercise over the frontier tribes, also the development likely to occur in the Tawang area of the Bhutia country would render the immediate establishment of the post desirable. If we leave the establishment of a post till later on, the effects of our visit will be lessened and difficulties will very likely arise. The post would have a great effect in controlling the Mijis, and the policy of checking these people from raiding the Tawang area, which will be necessary, will probably for a time make them very restive. Of course before a post can be established, communications must be improved. I think

there will not be much difficulty in making a mule road.

In the past the Akas have been, like most of the other tribes, somewhat a thorn in the flesh of the Assam Administration due to our lack of control over them. With a little supervision and the introduction of improved methods of cultivation and the proper treatment of the sicknesses prevalent amongst them, their material prosperity would very rapidly improve, and a great step towards the control of the frontier would be achieved.

* * * * *

“Over 4,000 square miles of country was surveyed.

The most excellent relations were established with the Akas. I believe this friendliness will be permanent. The hitherto unknown countries of the Mijis and Miri Akas were surveyed, and we received from both people a very good reception.

The Daffas living on the Upper Borelli were visited ; unfortunately we were not well received, we made every endeavour to make friends, but without success, and in the end they treacherously attacked us. We were able to teach them a needed lesson that they are not so powerful as they think, and also that they cannot interfere with us with impunity.”

On March 18th, Captain Nevill and Captain Kennedy, I.M.S., left Jamiri on the first stage of their journey to Tawang. The object of this journey as stated in Captain Nevill's memorandum dated 23rd May 1914, was “(1) to actually see the trade route in order to know what was required to improve the communications and to find out the best means of fostering and increasing the present trade ; (2) to gather information about the inhabitants of this part of the frontier and to make myself thoroughly acquainted with the local conditions ; (3) to enquire to what extent the Lobas harass the villagers ; (4) to ascertain exactly how far Tibetan rule and influence affected the country.”

They reached Dirang Dzong on the 23rd, the principal Monba village south of the Sela Range : and on the 30th March they crossed the Sela pass at 14,450 feet over deep snow frozen hard. On the 1st April they reached Tawang where they received what Nevill describes as “a most overwhelming welcome.” Nevill describes the country thus—

“.....At Tawang there is a large monastery containing 500 monks : it is built in a fine position on a gently sloping ridge. The Monastery buildings are enclosed by a fortified wall. Below the monastery is the village of Tawang consisting of a collection of wooden huts. The inhabitants are largely composed of Tsona people, who come here to escape the severe cold of Tsona during the winter months. North of the Sela range is the magnificent open valley of the Tawang-chu. The gentle slopes on either bank of the river are almost entirely under cultivation. The soil is rich and it is exceptionally well tilled. The principal crop is barley, but large quantities of wheat, rice, beans, peas, maize, onions, chillies, dal and garlic are grown. Also I believe below Tawang cotton is planted, although I did not see any. The

country between Tawang and Jang is thickly populated, numerous villages are dotted over the valley and the inhabitants appeared prosperous. South of the Sela is the valley of the Dirangchu, a fine open valley and well populated. There is a very large area of land under cultivation and the fields are well kept, also up some of the small tributary streams, such as the Dugamchu and the Sangtichu, there is a good deal of cultivation, also a great deal of land that could be brought under the plough and hoe. I noticed in the Dirangchu valley a very considerable area of land under irrigation. This area might easily be increased. Although this valley is naturally a very rich one and although a very large area is brought under cultivation, the inhabitants did not strike me as being nearly so prosperous as their neighbours north of the Sela. This is due to the fact that the country south of the Sela as far as the Assam border is controlled entirely by the monks of Tawang, with the exception of the village of Sengedzong, which is under the jurisdiction of the Tsona Jongpens. The people are ground down by excessive taxation they are only left barely enough to live upon, also they are greatly harassed by the Lobas, who levy blackmail in the most oppressive manner."

Leaving again on April 9th, they were back at Udalguri on the 23rd.

The reception they got throughout is described thus—

"We were made very welcome on the trade route, and all our wants as to provisions and coolies were at once supplied. After crossing the Sela we found that the Tawang officials had sent instructions to all headmen that they were to do their utmost to make us comfortable, and from this point on our advance was a triumph. At each village the people had made houses ready, both for us and our coolies. We were invariably met outside the villages, the headmen carrying huge quantities of beer, blocking our way and insisting on us partaking before they allowed us to advance. We were officially met and entertained at about five miles from Tawang by the two Tsona Jongpens, who annually winter at Tawang and who administer the Tawang country north of the Sela, and also by two representatives of the Tawang monastery. On our arrival at Tawang good quarters were found for us and for our party..... During our stay the officials and the people did their utmost to entertain us and to make us welcome."

Captain Nevill wrote thus as regards Tibetan influence—

"The chief Tibetan influence is the monastery in which 500 monks live, this monastery is an off-shoot of the Drepung monastery in Lhasa. Its abbot and the principal officials are also appointed from Lhasa.

* * * *

"The country south of the Sela is, with the exception of the village of Sengedzong, administered only by the monks of Tawang. There are two Jongpens at Dirangdzong and two Jongpens at Kalaktang."

His recommendations for the future, which bear a close resemblance to those of Captain Lightfoot 24 years later, were as follows—

“In order to bring about a state of prosperity in this region and to promote the growth of trade, it will be necessary to establish a simple form of Government The present state of the Tawang Monbas, more especially of those south of the Sela, is one of extreme poverty. They are greatly harassed by the Lobas, who run over the country, demanding whatever is their fancy, robbing and stealing if their demands are not complied with. They are also ground down by excessive and unjust taxation of the monastery, being left barely sufficient for a livelihood. These taxes are collected entirely in kind. Thus a people who are naturally industrious and who are good farmers have no incentive to better themselves and are gradually being starved. The people are crying for a just administration and would greatly welcome our rule under which they would be infinitely better off. They are simple, hardworking, timid folks and very easy to deal with. The two difficulties we should have to deal with are—(1) the Tawang monks, who for a century have had a complete control over the Tawang area. South of the Sela is monastic property and is the endowment on which the monastery has to depend for its sustenance. The monks, without a doubt, would take up a policy of obstruction which, if backed by the great local influence of Guru Rimpoche, as is probable, would be most difficult to overcome. Also this obstructive policy might perhaps be backed by the weight of the Drepung monastery, the largest of the three great religious houses in Lhasa, and from which the Tawang monastery has sprung. I can see very great difficulties in administering the Tawang country north of the Sela. South of the range the difficulties would exist, but not in nearly so large a degree.

I would suggest that the best method of overcoming these difficulties would be to carefully assess the value of the supplies drawn by the monastery from the district and then to subsidise the monastery on the basis of this assessment. It would then be necessary to fix a standard rate, only to be altered by the Political Officer, at which all supplies should be bought. If this was not done, the monks would cheat the people and get their supplies for little or nothing. Also I would suggest that arrangements be made so that the five thousand rupees we annually pay should be used for the monastery and not sent to Lhasa. The second difficulty is the Lobas. I have shown how they harass the people. Their blackmailing raids have been going on for many years. They look on the Monbas as their lawful prey and talk of their visits as collecting taxes. These things must be stopped at once, and there should be no great difficulty about it. The Lobas must be clearly told that this state of things cannot continue. Police posts must be established at Dirang and Rupa, and possibly in the Aka country to enforce our orders. There would be friction at first, but it would not continue long. This need not involve a great expense, as military police at present stationed in the plains would be used.

There is no doubt that given protection from raiding tribes and relief from monastic oppression by establishing a fair system of

taxation, this valley would soon become most prosperous and, I think, far more than self-supporting. An increased prosperity would extend to the Lobas, who, both by circumstances and example, would be forced to work and might in time become useful members of society instead of a set of idle blustering freebooters.

A very great want in all parts of the Tawang country and even throughout the whole of the North-East Frontier is treatment for the sick. Everywhere I went a great cry was for the doctor and medicine. Whilst among Mönbas, Captain Kennedy was constantly surrounded by people suffering from real and often imaginary diseases and clamouring for medicines. I am very sure the establishment of dispensaries will form a very large factor in gaining the confidence of the people and a peaceful settlement of the country.

I think that, in view of the coming changes in the conditions, loose administration of the country and settlement of the affairs with the monastery and the Tibetans should be taken in hand at once. Now is the psychological moment. We are popular with the Monbas, we are fresh in the mind of the Akas and the Mijis, and we could more easily introduce changes now, with less friction, than later on. A delay, I am thoroughly convinced, will be to increase our difficulties. A European Officer should be stationed, at least for a time, at Tawang. He will have no easy task and will have to take up a very firm attitude. He must be able to speak Tibetan well. If he can combine this work with doctoring, I am sure he would get a great hold on all the people and this would make his work the easier."

Affairs on the North-East Frontier were overshadowed by the Great War of 1914-18, and the Chief Commissioner in forwarding the report in letter No. 6466-P., dated the 7th November 1914, to the Government of India observed as follows.

"3. Captain Nevill has submitted various interesting suggestions for the extension of our control over the country visited by him, but the Chief Commissioner does not propose to submit his recommendations on these proposals now, as he understands that the Government of India are averse from anything in the shape of a forward move upon the frontier at the present moment. Sir Archdale Earle observes with much gratification that the majority of the people are well-disposed towards the British Government, and that the country possesses considerable natural resources, which only await a more advanced form of Government for their proper development."

VII. 1918-1937.—In May 1918 the Miripathar Daffas raided the plains Daffa villages of Gaigaon and Boranipathar and carried off 59 captives. 14 escaped, 20 were released by the Political Officer who started immediately for the offending village, Pigerong, and all the rest were subsequently sent back. Owing to the lateness of the season Captain Nevill was not able to exact full satisfaction. He completed the business, however, in January 1921, when he visited Pigerong and imposed a suitable fine.

In Government letter No. 100-T.,* dated the 4th February 1919, it was ordered that no settlement should be permitted within a strip of country north of the Inner Line 5 miles wide. This revived an order of 1888.

By Notification No. 1534-P., dated the 13th February 1919 the Political Officer Western Section was appointed a Special Magistrate in Darrang and the North Lakhimpur Subdivisions for the trial of cases in which Daflas only were concerned. This was at the request of the Political Officer who had pointed out how difficult it was for Courts with no experience of their ways to adjudicate in Daflas' cases.

The title of the Western Section of the North-East Frontier was changed to that of "Balipara Frontier Tract" in 1919, on the recommendation of the then Chief Commissioner, Sir Nicholas Beatson-Bell, by Government of India Notification No. 142-E.B., dated the 20th March 1919.

In letter No. 395-T.,† dated the 7th August 1919 the Chief Commissioner of Assam reported that anxiety was being felt as to the inadequacy of the garrisons maintained in Darrang and North Lakhimpur and that since 1914 neither the Political Officer, Sadiya, nor the Political Officer, Balipara, had been able to make proper tours. He accordingly recommended to the Government of India the raising of a 5th Battalion of the Assam Rifles 'for the protection of the Western Section of the North East Frontier, now known as "Balipara Frontier Tract". The Government of India supported the proposal and the Secretary of State sanctioned it in his telegram of the 14th April 1920. One consequence of the raising of this new battalion was that the Civil station was shifted from Lokra, where the new battalion was quartered, to its present site at Charduar (sanctioned in G. O. No.3702-P.,‡ dated the 12th May 1921.) The battalion was, as a measure of economy, amalgamated in 1931-32, with the 2nd Battalion, to be revived again as a separate unit in 1941-42.

Captain Nevill visited the Akas in 1925 and in his Administration Report for the year 1924-25 he records some interesting remarks about these people. He says—

"I visited the Aka country in February at their request. I was made very welcome. Since Kalao and Tagi the two old chiefs died there has been no one to take their place, all the older men of standing have died and only young men with no experience remain. The most important people in the country are Kelime, widow of Tagi, and Dibru, the present head of the Kovatsun. These two and all the principal people early in the season put in a petition to Government that we should station a guard in their country and establish a dispensary.

* Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, June 1919, Nos. 21-30.

† Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, December 1920, Nos. 42-66.
Assam Secretariat, Pol. A, May 1919, Nos. 8-15.

‡ Assam Secretariat, Pol., B, February 1923, Nos. 298-386.

The reason for this is that for the past three years they have been much worried by the Mijis, a neighbouring tribe closely related to them who finding they are weak and leaderless have taken to bullying them.

They also have become painfully aware that for sometime their death rate is larger than their birth rate, and that their numbers are seriously decreasing. This is why they are so anxious for a dispensary, this is not a new idea, but they have continually spoken about it for the past ten years.

I strongly recommend that a garrison should be stationed in the Aka Hills and that a dispensary with a good competent Sub-Assistant Surgeon be established.

These Akas are an excellent and most interesting people, they are much more civilised than the Dufflas and they are capable of great improvement. I do not think it would cost a great deal. The main expense would be the construction of a road, which would present no very formidable difficulties.

It would mean the salvation of these people, who, if we do not comply with their request, will gradually die out. Another advantage is the excellent strategic position of the Aka Hills. A garrison stationed there would protect the Monbas of Rupa and Shergaon. It would guard the Udalguri-Lhasa trade route and would dominate the Mijis, Miri Akas, and Dufflas on the North and the Bharelli and Miripathar Dufflas on the East."

In 1926-27 the Runganuddi* Expedition (East Dufflas), was undertaken in consequence of a raid by Dufflas of the village of Jorum in February 1926 in which 5 Dufflas settled in the plains were killed and 3 carried off. Captain Nevill with 68 men of the Assam Rifles and Captain Abbott left his headquarters on 23rd December 1926, reached Jorum in January and inflicted suitable punishment. He visited the Apa Tanang country in the course of this expedition and was much struck by its fertility. On his return journey the party encountered snow and suffered considerable hardship, there being 9 cases of frostbite.

Captain Nevill's Annual Administration report for 1927-28 contains valuable suggestions on the question of placing posts in the Hills with which he had relations. He wrote—

"As years have passed by, the Akas, Dufflas and the other tribes have gained confidence and learnt to appreciate the benefits of the new order. The people are increasingly bringing their disputes for settlement and they fully appreciate the fact that their grievances are sympathetically listened to and dealt with when possible.

This growing friendliness has brought about the desire for a still closer relationship. Nowadays the constant request from all sections of the hills is to establish a garrison in their country. Wherever I go, I am asked to plant a boundary post so that others may know this portion is under my immediate control. This request is not made

*Appointment and Political. B, June 1926, Nos.587-603 and June 1927, Nos 582-586.

by the small villager frightened of his stronger neighbours but invariably by the wealthiest and most important men in the villages. The reason being that in Duffla land a most terrible state of unrest prevails ; amongst the tribes there is no cohesion or combination. Every village is an independent unit, and even in the village there may be several factions. Every man's hand is against his neighbour. Raids, arson and murder are the order of the day. If a man goes on a journey alone, he is likely to be seized, and carried off into slavery. Even women working in the fields are sometimes seized and carried off. There is no certainty of life and no peace. All Dufflas realise the benefit of peace, but owing to their entire lack of combination they are unable to make a united effort to stop this anarchy. I have constantly been asked to help one faction against another. Of course such action is out of the question. I have many times called a meeting of headmen and explained the benefits of a miniature League of Nations. Such meetings always end with the request that I should come and administer affairs for them. I have constantly arbitrated between two villages and have been able to patch up quarrels and effect peace which in some cases has been lasting.

However with the headquarters sited in the plains cut off from the hills from June to October the Political Officer cannot in any way administer the Hill Tracts nor can he exercise very much control in inter-village or inter-tribal affairs. I am quite convinced that the only way to effectively deal with the tribes of this Frontier is to make roads and establish outposts at different points in the Hills.

A small garrison with a British Officer, a dispensary and a Sub-Assistant Surgeon should be attached to every post, as a hospital for treatment of sickness is appreciated by the savage more than anything else. The British Officer would be the eyes and ears of the Political Officer who should spend at least three quarters of the year at the different posts. In time as the posts thoroughly settled down, the strength of the posts could be reduced.

Jamiri, Miripathar, the Dikrang valley, and the Apa Tanang country should be the sites for posts. Jamiri in the Aka country should be the first post established. The Akas have petitioned for a post to be established and the petition was sent to the Government with my letter No. 53,* dated the 5th January 1925, to the Chief Secretary.

Jamiri is so situated that it controls a very large area of country. It dominates the Duffla villages on the North and East of the Akas. It would control the Mijis. It is near to the Mombas of Rupa and Shergaon, who consider themselves under the British protection, indeed they live for five months of the year on British soil at Doimara.

Good roads exist from Jamiri to Rupa and Shergaon, easy for ponies.

It is also close to the Tawang area and near the Tibetan Trade route from Udalguri to Lhasa. There is no doubt that as soon as China settles down this Tibetan Frontier will become of great importance. China has still its eyes on Tibet and on Lhasa, the pro-Chinese

*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, December 1927, Nos. 21-57.

party is growing in influence and should China gain control of Tibet the Tawang country is particularly adapted for a secret and easy entrance into India. Russia is also trying to establish her influence in Tibet, and, if successful, could safely and secretly send her emissaries into India by this route.

The road to Jamiri is now under construction.

I would advocate that after Jamiri, the Apa Tanang country be opened up. The road would not present any extraordinary difficulties. A post situated there would control the large and turbulent population of the Runganuddi Valley. It would not be an expensive post to maintain as I believe a very large proportion of the sepoys' rations could be bought locally as the whole Apa Tanang country is under irrigated rice and is very fertile.

Miri Pathar controls the Dafflas East of the Bhorelli and west of the Poma Pani. It is a very large open valley containing thousands of acres admirably suited for wet rice cultivation.

The Dikrang is a very large flat-bottomed valley capable of supporting a very large population. It is very sparsely populated at present owing to the state of anarchy that has existed there for many years past.

Discussing this Frontier I have often heard it expressed that the country is worth nothing and is not worth the expenses of Administration. This is not altogether true for there are very large areas of extremely rich country, the only thing wanting to develop it is settled conditions and a just administration.

There are two other strong arguments for the establishment of posts in the hills. These are that it would put an end to the most undesirable settlement of Duffla villages in the plains. Also if slavery is ever to be abolished, it can only be done by Officers living in the hills.....

.....The question of slaves has got to be taken in hand before long, indeed Burma has already given us a lead.....

.....Amongst the Dufflas the system is one of serfdom rather than slavery in the sense usually accepted in Europe. The slave is a son of the soil and in no case an alien different in tongue and habit. The slave lives on his master's land, or in his house, his marriage is arranged and paid for by his master. He is provided with clothing and feeds with the family and he is even permitted to acquire property. In many cases he is the confidential adviser of his master. Every well-to-do householder has his slave or slaves, he could not do without them. A man is accounted rich by the size of his cultivation and the number of his cattle, and it is necessary for him to have labour to help in his work. Hired labour is impossible as there is no currency and each free man has his own cultivation to look after.

Sudden emancipation of slaves would cause a complete dislocation of the existing social conditions. It would bring ruin to the owners and in many cases would prove disastrous to the interest of the so-called slaves themselves.

Nevertheless the question has to be faced in the near future and I am confident it can only be tackled by an officer living amongst the people.

Finally I do not advocate the establishment of the posts simultaneously, but the policy must be roads and posts. As soon as one has been established a start should be made on the next post in order of importance. When this is done, the safety of the Frontier is assured, and the benefits of civilization will be introduced among a people who at present are amongst the most miserable of any race on earth."

Eventually, in 1928-29, a new post was opened for 2 months at Jamiri. It was generally regarded as a good move but the troops stationed there suffered severely from the *damdims*. It was given up temporarily in 1930-31.

In 1931-32 Mr. N. L. Bor, the Political Officer, made 3 small punitive expeditions into the Duffla country, to punish Chemgung for complicity in ill-treating and imprisoning a British subject: to burn Sengmara for being set up within the Inner Line against Government orders: and to punish Midpu for raiding Laluk, a plains village.

VIII. *The Constitution Act of 1935*.—Neither the Local Government nor any other authority which had to deal with the matter had any difficulty in deciding that Balipara Frontier Tract should be an "Excluded Area" It accordingly was entered as such in the Government of India (Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas) Order, 1936, and came under the direct administration of the Governor from the 1st April 1937.

IX. *Tawang, 1936-1941*.—Questions connected with Chinese and Tibetan influence and regarding our system of intelligence—or lack of it—on the North-East Frontier became prominent again in 1936. The position as it then appeared to be is described in a letter dated the 17th September 1936, from the Assam Chief Secretary to the Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract.

" 2. The Tibet Conference of 1914 resulted in the delimitation of the Indo-Tibetan frontier from the eastern frontier of Bhutan to the Isu Razi pass on the Irrawaddy-Salween water parting. The line, which was accepted by the Government of Tibet, was demarcated on maps then specially prepared, and is known as the Macmahon Line. Sir Henry Macmahon recommended in his memorandum that while great care should be taken to avoid friction with the Tibetan Government and the vested interests of the Tawang monastery, an experienced British officer should proceed to the western part of the area south of the Line to settle its future administration.

The 1914 Convention was never published, mainly because the Chinese Government failed to ratify it, and nothing was done to give effect to Sir H. Macmahon's recommendation for extension of administration in the Tawang area. Another consequence is that many published maps still show the frontier of India along the administered border of Assam.

*Governor's Secretariat, Lital, A, December 1937, Nos 1-19.

The information you collected has been reported to the Secretary of State. An important point to notice is that the latest Chinese atlases show almost the whole of the tribal area south of the Macmahon Line up to the administered border of Assam as included in China. It amounts to this, that while the Chinese already claim a large stretch of Indian territory East of Tawang as part of the Sikang province of China, the Tibetan Government, over whom the Chinese claim suzerainty, are collecting revenue and exercising jurisdiction in the Tawang area many miles south of the international frontier. The Government of India consider that some effective steps should be taken to challenge activities which may be extended to a claim on behalf of China to Tawang itself, or even Bhutan and Sikkim. They therefore propose to demand from the Tibetan Government, which has recently re-affirmed the Macmahon Line, that collection of revenue for the latter Government in the Tawang area should be discontinued, and the question whether it will be necessary to introduce Indian administration to replace Tibetan officials in that area has been left for further consideration in the light of Mr. Gould's report on conclusion of his mission to Lhasa. The suggestion which has now been made to this Government is that it is highly desirable to emphasise the interest of British India in the Tawang area either by *actual tours* or by *collecting the revenue ourselves*, since the mere reproduction of the Macmahon Line on Survey of India Maps would be insufficient to correct false impressions which have gained ground in the years since 1914. The continued exercise of jurisdiction by Tibet in Tawang and the area south of Tawang might enable China, or still worse, might enable any other power which may in future be in the position to assert authority over Tibet, to claim prescriptive rights over a part of the territory recognised as within India by the 1914 Convention. In taking any steps of the nature contemplated it would be necessary to make it very clear that there is no intention to interfere with the purely monastic collection of the Tawang monastery."

The views of the Governor were forwarded to the Government of India in Assam letter No. 284-G.S., dated the 27th May 1937, in which it was stated that Tawang was undoubtedly Tibetan up to 1914, when it was ceded to India, but that, "though undoubtedly British it has been controlled by Tibet, and none of the inhabitants have any idea that they are not Tibetan subjects". The letter then went on to say:

"After giving the matter his most careful attention, he is forced to the conclusion that more impressive and permanent action is required if Tawang is to be effectively occupied and possible intrusion by China into that area forestalled. Great importance was attached to Tawang in 1914 by Sir Henry McMahon and Sir Charles (then Mr. C. A.) Bell, and it was then urged that a tactful and discreet officer should be posted to Tawang for the summer months, with instructions to collect a light tax but at the same time to leave the people to manage their own affairs. His Excellency considers that the time has now come when the policy advocated in 1914 but so long

held in abeyance should be carried out. His Excellency would therefore propose that a European officer of the Indian Police with experience of frontier diplomacy should be posted as Assistant to the Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract, and should proceed to Tawang in the spring of 1938 and remain there for the summer, the visit being repeated year by year for the present. He should be furnished with an escort of a size consistent with the importance of his mission and sufficient for his protection. This would be not less than one platoon of the Assam Rifles. He should have a carefully selected Sub-Assistant Surgeon who, in addition to his ordinary duties, would give free to the local inhabitants the medical treatment of which they are believed to be in great need. The Governor would propose to impress upon the officer deputed to Tawang the great importance of tactful behaviour towards the inhabitants. In particular it is desirable that he should, as suggested by Sir Charles Bell, give to the owners of privatee states an assurance that their proprietary rights would be respected, and to the monks of Tawang monastery an undertaking that the Tibetan Government would be consulted whenever a new head Lama was appointed."

After further consideration it was proposed that, as a preliminary, a small expedition should go up to Tawang, "examine the country, get into touch with the inhabitants, and form some estimate of its revenue possibilities" before a final decision was come to. This was agreed to by the Government of India.

Captain Lightfoot was in charge of the expedition and the instructions issued to him were as follows—

"..... your task will be to explore facts rather than to issue orders and make decisions.

4. Our position *vis a vis* the Tawang monastery is a particularly delicate one in view of Tibet's *de facto* position there. In the autumn of 1936 Gould had an interview with the Kashag in Lhasa at which Tawang was discussed. Their attitude was that (1) up to 1914 Tawang had undoubtedly been Tibetan, (2) they regarded the adjustment of the Tibet-Indian boundary as part and parcel of the general adjustment and determination of boundaries contemplated in the 1914 Convention. If they could, with our help, secure a definite Sino-Tibetan boundary they would of course be glad to observe the Indo-Tibetan border as defined in 1914, (3) they had been encouraged in thinking that His Majesty's Government and the Government of India sympathised with this way of regarding the matter owing to the fact that at no time since the Convention and Declaration of 1914 had the Indian Government taken steps to question Tibetan, or to assert British, authority in the Tawang area. There is, of course, no possible doubt that the Indo-Tibetan boundary was definitely determined; and I am to ask you to be scrupulously careful to give no impression that the matter can be reopened. Your presence with an escort in Tawang will in itself be an assertion of British authority, but your conduct in all things should be such as may be calculated to cause least shock to Tibetan susceptibilities."

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7. It is probable that the preliminary to detailed action in future will be the notification of a Control Area to include the Tawang area and the country to the south as far as the administered border, I am to ask you therefore to submit on your return proposals for a suitable boundary for such an area

8. Detailed questions, such as that of tribute, now exacted in the area, should be left till a Control Area has been established, but the more information you can obtain on all such matters the better.

9. Any officials of the Tibetan Government whom you may encounter will realise at once that we are at last asserting our rights. You should endeavour to find out exactly what they are doing on our side of the boundary and note for the information of Government their attitude and any claims they may make. It would be improper for you to give them any orders ; that will have to be done through the Government of India.

10. I am to say that your whole handling of this delicate situation must be cautious. It is better to go too slow than too fast "

The expedition reached Tawang on the 30th of April 1938.

Their arrival soon came to the ears of the Tibetan Government, who protested to Mr. B. J. Gould the Political Officer in Sikkim and asked that the expedition should be withdrawn. Meanwhile, Captain Lightfoot had reported on the 26th April that Tibetan officials had been collecting taxes in presence of the expedition and asked that they be made to withdraw. The Governor therefore asked that the Tibetan Government be requested to withdraw their officials to their side of the International boundary. The Government of India, however, were averse to "any action which would commit them to permanent occupation and further expenditure." They intimated that "Lightfoot should inform all concerned that Tawang is by treaty Indian and not Tibetan territory and should impress this on Tibetan officials if he meets them. He should not however demand their withdrawal and should give no assurances to local inhabitants but should simply inform them that he has been sent to make enquiries into local conditions and that Government will decide after he returns whether to take any further interest in them or not. This attitude may create difficulties for Lightfoot but is only possible line until future policy has been decided."

Captain Lightfoot furnished a full and accurate report of conditions as he found them in Tawang and in addition made certain concrete suggestions for the future control of this area, of which the following are extracts.

"(1) The Tibetan Government should be asked to withdraw their officials, viz., the Tsona Dzongpons and their assistants. With them will automatically disappear their exactions of tribute and forced labour. Till this is done our prestige must inevitably be non-existent.

(2) It would be of the utmost advantage if the withdrawal of the Tibetan officials from the monastery could be arranged, making it, what in fact it is, a Monba monastery. So inextricably are State and Religion intermingled in Tibet that till the Tibetan monastic officials are withdrawn, Tibetan influence and intrigue must persist in the surrounding country.

(3) The monopolies of salt and rice should be abolished.

(4) Payment of tribute in kind, whether to us or the monasteries, should be abolished and payment in cash substituted. Payment in kind means carriage of the bulky tribute by forced labour, the form of oppression most bitterly resented now.

4. The following are the innovations the introduction of which I beg to propose :—

(1) In place of the present haphazard and inequitable tribute in kind I beg to propose that tribute in cash at the rate of Rs.5 a house be paid to the Government of India throughout the Control Area the establishment of which is proposed below. This rate of tax may seem high as an initial rate, but I am of the opinion that it is not excessive. I think, indeed, that in a few years this rate might even be increased. Such a fixed and properly distributed tax would be a boon to the villagers in that it would do away with the greater part of the forced labour now being inflicted on them. I have calculated that at the beginning about Rs.11,000 in tribute would be collected from such a tax. The following figures will explain how this total is arrived at:—

In the Tawang area there are approximately 80 villages with an average of 15 houses in each. In the Dirang area there are about 15 villages with about 40 houses in each. In the Kalaktang area there are some 15 Monba villages of 12 houses each and in addition there are two Sherdukpen villages of 160 houses. This makes a rough total of 2140 houses, which gives a revenue of approximately Rs.11,000. I confidently anticipated that the amount of this tribute will gradually increase. Not only will freedom from oppression lead to greater prosperity, but the emigration of families seeking asylum in Bhutan will cease, and many will return.

(2) After the removal of the Tsona Dzongpons, I would suggest the appointment of two Agents, one of whom, the senior, would be stationed in Tawang, and the other in Dirangdzong.

These Agents would be assisted by panchayats. The panchayat at Tawang would be composed of 2 Representatives of the monastery council, elected for a period of one year, and 4 village headmen, who would be elected by a meeting of all village headmen once a year. In the Dirangdzong area two panchayats would be necessary, one in Dirang and the other in Kalaktang, the additional panchayat being necessary owing to the great distance between the two places. The Dirang panchayat would consist of the two Dirang Dzongpons, who are monastery officials, and, as in Tawang, 4 village headmen, who would be similarly elected. The Kalaktang panchayat would be composed

in the same way as the Dirang panchayat, except that the Talung Dzungpons would take the place of the Dirang Dzungpons. These panchayats should be empowered to deal with all cases under the supervision of the Agents and, of course, subject to the right of appeal to the Political Officer of Balipara Frontier Tract. The two Agents, who should be Tibetan-speaking persons of good social position, should be given considerable powers to deal with cases independently of the panchayats when necessary. A brief summary of the two Agent's duties is given herewith.

- (i) The collection of the Rs.5 house tax.
- (ii) With the aid of the panchayat the hearing of cases.
- (iii) Checking and counting houses in the villages.
- (iv) Keeping the Political Officer informed of all matters concerning their areas.
- (v) Putting up of appeals.

The Senior Agent would carry out the above duties in the Tawang Area, and would, in addition make occasional visits to Dirang for the purpose of inspecting the work of the Junior Agents, who would be under his supervision.

* * * *

"5. To mark the limits of our loose administration and of the area from which revenue is received a Control Area should be established.

6. I would recommend the institution of village panchayats as is done in most hill districts. Such panchayats would hear all petty village cases, the parties, of course, having the right to appeal to the main panchayat of their area.

7. Influence should tactfully be brought to bear to try and persuade the monastery officials to elect Monbas to their high religious posts and not to allow Tibetans to be brought from Drepung in Lhasa. I am making this proposal tentatively as, being a matter of religion, it would have to be very carefully handled. As the Monbas dislike the Tibetans I do not think that such action would be difficult of accomplishment."

In forwarding these proposals to the Government of India in his letter No. 3851-G.S., dated the 7th September 1938, the acting Governor (Sir Gilbert Hogg) expressed himself strongly to the effect that the existing situation was intolerable and should be terminated as soon as possible. He accepted in general Captain Lightfoot's proposals and recommended as follows :

(1) A control area should be declared, with boundaries as proposed by the Political Officer (*vide* Report, Part II, paragraph 2 and Appendix 2). This will in itself entail no expenditure, but will mark the limits of the area from which the tribute proposed in sub-paragraph(5) below will be paid and into which raids by Akas from the east will not be allowed.

(2) The Tibetan Government should be requested to withdraw their officials from this area. The absolute necessity of this needs, His Excellency feels, no further emphasis (*Vide* Report, Part II paragraph 3).

(3) Negotiations should be begun with the object of causing the substitution of Monba for Tibetan religious officials in Towang monastery and of placing the contributions to the monastery on a known and equitable basis, with the abolition of all forced labour.

(4) Monopolies in salt and rice should be abolished.

(5) A tribute of Rs. 5 per house should be imposed throughout the area. His Excellency has discussed this with the Political Officer and is satisfied that it is not excessive [*vide* Report, Part II paragraph 4(1)].

His Excellency recommends that this should be a tribute rather than a tax, for he considers that the area now under consideration must remain tribal territory and cannot form part of the Province of Assam even with the status only of an excluded area, in any future that can be foreseen. The inhabitants are for the most part Buddhists, with no affinities with the plainsmen of Assam. Indeed members of some of the tribes are, His Excellency understands, forbidden by their religion even to visit the plains. His Excellency therefore considers that the receipts in the form of tribute from the Towang area should be credited to Central Revenue, from which expenditure on the area, will be drawn.

(6) His Excellency agrees with the Political Officer (*vide* Report Part II, para 4(2) (3) and (4) that the administrative staff should consist of an Agent at Towang and Assistant Agent at Dirangdzong, and considers that the type of officer and pay proposed are suitable."

Estimates amounting to Rs.41,617 non-recurring and Rs.37,896 recurring to cover the cost of carrying out this policy were subsequently submitted.

In December 1938 the Government of India were again addressed to the effect that, if permanent occupation were not immediately practicable, a second expedition in the ensuing April would be desirable, as there were sign that the Tibetan officials were reverting to their previous practices since our people had left.

The Central Government however, reluctantly decided (their letter No. F-8-X/ 38, dated the 20th April 1939) that the proposed second tour could not be allowed as it "might result in the Government of India having to undertake permanent occupation in order to fulfil their obligations towards the Monbas". It was decided subsequently, in July 1939, that the question of future policy should be decided after the expiry of one year. While agreeing that the situation should be watched, the Government of India trusted that nothing would be done to incur commitments in that area.

X. *Minor incidents—1938-40.*—The main event of the year 1938-39 was the visit to Tawang, but besides that there were the following minor incidents.

An Expedition* visited in December 1938 the Miji Aka village of Nakhu in order to warn them that raiding and taking tribute from the Monbas of the Dirangdzong area must stop.

In the Eastern Duffla country, Kabeng was guilty of a raid on Pinji, a village in the tribal area but very close to our frontier, in which 8 persons were carried off. Orders were issued to release the prisoners, but as they were disobeyed a punitive expedition was despatched, the captives were released and a fine of 10 mithan imposed. The Political Officer reported that this action had a good effect on other Dufflas.

In 1939-40† the Miji Akas were again troublesome, attempting to exact tribute from the Monbas of the Dirangdzong and Sherdukpen areas, Nakhu again being conspicuous.

XI. *Posa*.—References to the payment of *posa* occur frequently throughout the history of this tract.

Captain Nevill's annual report for 1914-15 gives the details of the *posa* payments as follows.

“*Posa*.—The following amounts are paid :—

			Rs.	a.	p.	
Tawang Monbas	5,000	0	0	
Rupa and Shergaon	2,526	7	0	Called by the Assamese Charduar Bhutias or Sat Rajas.
Tembang	145	13	6	Called by Assamese Thebengia Bhutias.
Akas, Kovat sun	536	0	0	Called Kopa-chors.
Akas, Kutsun	164	0	0	Called Hazari-khowas.
Daflas	3,631	2	3	
Miri-Abors	1,124	11	0	

As regards the *posa* paid to the Tawang Monbas, the amount was agreed upon in 1853 and was given in order to put a stop to the Bhutia raids, and to their quite groundless claim to land in the Mangaldai subdivision. The Rs.5,000 paid at Udalguri, as I have previously stated, is sent direct to Lhasa with the exception of Rs. 500 which is retained by the Monks of the Tawang Monastery.

*Administration Report for 1938-1939.

†Administration Report for 1939-1940.

The Rupa and Shergaon Monbas receive Rs. 2,526-7-0. This was originally paid to them in lieu of goods obtained by black-mailing the plains people. It is hard to conceive why these two very insignificant villages should receive so large a sum, especially as they are a very timid people and quite incapable of ever causing much trouble on the Frontier.

The Tembang Monbas receive Rs. 145-13-6. How these people established a claim to *posa* is extraordinary. Their village is a small one about 5 days' march from the plains and due north of Rupa. They are the most craven and degraded people I have seen in the hills.

The two Aka tribes receive *posa* of Rs. 536 and Rs. 164, respectively. These amounts are paid to the two chiefs and they are held responsible for the good behaviour of their people.

The *posa* paid to the Daflas and Miri-Abors is in varying sums from Rs. 350 to four annas and in some villages as many as twenty persons receive it. Amongst the Daflas the great majority of *posa* receivers are men of no standing or influence at all, in some cases even slaves receive payment. *Posa* is paid on the production of a piece of paper called a *Hat Chit*. Previously little or no effort has been made to verify the claim of the producer to this *Hat chit*. These *chits* have been made an object of barter and consequently in some cases quite unimportant people will produce 7 or 8 *chits*. Runaway slaves have stolen the *chits* from their masters and have settled in the plains and received payment on production of the *chits*. Every endeavour has been made this year to straighten matters out. The producer has been asked to establish his claim and state how he became possessed of his *chit* and his fingerprints have been taken, in order that in future, there may be some check. Since *posa* is given it is a great pity that it is not paid to responsible headmen who could be made responsible for the good behaviour of their villages.

With the Miri-Abors the state of things is better and the larger receivers of *posa* are in most cases influential men.

In addition to money-payment of *posa* it has become an established custom to present the hillmen with 203 bottles of liquor, 18 maunds 32 seers of salt, Rs. 164-2 6 to meet their expenses in the plains, also 108 yards of red broad cloth."

In his report for 1921-22, Nevill again mentioned the payment to the Tawang Jongpens of *posa* of Rs. 5,000, which went to Dre-pung monastery, except for Rs. 500 to Tawang, and said that it ought to be discontinued. The point was examined* and it was found that it originated in 1844 when it was sanctioned by the Government of India in commutation of the claims of the Bhutias of Kuriapara Duar: and it was guaranteed in the treaty shown at page 156 of Aitchison's Treaties, Volume I. Though Captain Nevill affirmed that the Tawang people had got the *posa* on false pretenses, and that the monastery received the *posa* and not the Tibetan

*Assam Secretariat, Appointment and Political, July 1922, Nos. 64-67.

Government, it was decided that the payment could not now be stopped. So the rather curious position, by which, as Mr. A. W. Botham, the then Chief Secretary, put it, "Tawang being a dependency of Lhassa and Tibet being a dependency of China, we are in a way paying tribute to China for part of the Darrang District", continued.

By 1923-24 the amounts paid to the Dufflas had been reduced to Rs. 2,440 and that to the Miris to Rs. 935. Nevill again referred to it as "a very bad system, but it is very hard to abolish".

XII

POLITICAL OFFICER, WESTERN SECTION, NORTH-EAST FRONTIER

1913—1919 Captain G. A. Nevill, I. P.

POLITICAL OFFICERS, BALIPARA FRONTIER TRACT

1919—1928 Captain G. A. Nevill, I.P. (Retired 21st May 1928).

1928—1930 Mr. R. C. R Cumming, I. P.

1930—1931 Mr. H. F. B. Burbidge, I. P.

1932—1934 Mr. N. L. Bor, I. F. s.

1934—1942 Captain G. S. Lightfoot, I. P.